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Abstract 
 
There is global recognition of the need for more women in decision-
making positions within bureaucracies to ensure gender-equitable 
policies and outcomes. Article 7 of the Convention of the 
Elimination of the Discrimination against Women commits states to 
ensure equality between women and men in political and public life, 
including participation in formulating government policy. In 
Indonesian government agencies, women now are employed in 
almost equal numbers to men. This thesis considers whether these 
changes represent genuine empowerment for these women, 
focussing on the gendered processes within the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF).  
There is a small but growing literature on female managers in 
developing country government agencies. However, no studies 
systematically combine an analysis of gendered processes within 
these organisations with an exploration of women’s work/family 
balance. This thesis develops such a combined approach. It draws 
on a range of data sources including interviews with 121 MOF 
employees, personal observation and documents. The analysis 
compares gendered practice within three different ministerial 
departments.  
Drawing on Goetz’s concept of the “gendered archaeology of 
organisation”, this thesis reveals a high degree of gender inequality 
in the daily practices. This includes overt discrimination in 
recruitment, as well as more indirect forms of discrimination in 
promotion and training. The thesis considers how employment in 
the MOF shapes the identities of female managers, and how these 
women balance their domestic lives with their careers. Among other 
things, this considers the effects of corruption, Islamic conservatism, 
Javanese culture, a bureaucratic reform programme and a gender 
mainstreaming initiative. The thesis observes how these women 
exercise agency within and outside the MOF, and the extent to 
which their education and professional status empower them in 
their working lives. The thesis also examines how gendered 
processes within the MOF affect its external policies. 
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1 Introduction 
In the Indonesian civil service, as is the case in many developing 
countries, women are underrepresented particularly at more senior 
levels. This is especially apparent in the country’s Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). Yet in recent years there has been a rise in the 
proportion of civil servants who are women, including those in 
managerial posts. Taking the MOF as a case study, this thesis 
explores what this change means for these women, as well as for 
the Ministry itself and for Indonesian society (both via MOF policies 
and inasmuch as the MOF reflects wider changes in the status of 
women). It recognises that female empowerment is not just about 
numerical representation. Instead, it argues that empowerment is 
affected by gendered processes operating at different levels both 
within organisations and across wider society.  
This chapter begins with a brief review of the main tools that have 
been used to assess the status of women by global development 
agencies, and identifies a number of limitations of existing 
approaches. It then provides some contextual information to locate 
and justify the selection of the case study. The final part of the 
chapter sets out the study’s aims and objectives and the 
organisation of the remaining chapters. 
1.1 Assessing women’s empowerment in 
developing countries 
At the international level, there have been efforts to integrate 
women’s interests in development processes for nearly 40 years, 
beginning with the International Decade for Women in 1975-1985. 
Many strategies have been adopted to ensure that women’s receive 
an equal share of the fruits of development. These include Women 
in Development (WID), Women and Development (WAD), Gender and 
Development (GAD) and the latest approach, used for the past 15 
years, Gender Mainstreaming (GM) in development processes. 
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Ministries of Women’s Empowerment have been set up around the 
world and GM has become a common concept in the development 
arenas. To date, however, progress has been very slow and at best 
has only marginally improved women’s conditions in areas such as 
basic services (Clisby, 2005, Goetz, 1992, Standing, 2004). These 
strategies still fail to advance women’s participation in decision 
making, whether in the family, the community, bureaucratic 
institutions or the state (Goetz, 1992, Mukhopadhyay et al., 2006). 
Around the world, the number of women in decision-making 
positions is still much lower than that of men, as is evident in the 
proportion of Indonesian civil servants who are women.  
Since the 1990s international agencies, notably UNDP, have taken a 
growing interest in this aspect of women’s empowerment. One of the 
main tools that UNDP has developed to compare levels of women’s 
empowerment across countries is the Gender Empowerment 
Measure (GEM), which from 1995 to 2010 featured prominently in 
UNDP Human Development Reports along with the related Gender 
Development Index (GDI), which is the Human Development Index 
(HDI) adjusted for gender disparities in its basic components. The 
GEM seeks to capture the level of women’s empowerment by 
measuring three indicators: the proportion of seats held by women 
in national parliaments, the percentage of women in economic 
decision-making positions (including administrative, managerial, 
professional and technical occupations) and the female share of 
earned income compared to that of males. However, its conceptual 
and methodological limitations have been criticised (Bardhan and 
Klasen, 1999, Charmes and Wieringa, 2003, Dijkstra, 2006). The 
main criticism is that level of income tends to dominate the indices 
and so low-income countries (even with high levels of gender 
equality in the distribution of earnings and other components of the 
indices) are unable to achieve a high score. Another criticism is that 
it represents an elite bias, as the chosen indicators are better suited 
to measuring inequality among the most educated and economically 
advantaged women, and in the higher echelons of society (Cueva 
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Beteta, 2006, Klasen, 2006). GEM’s domination by income and its 
elite bias make it more relevant for developed countries and urban 
areas of developing countries than for rural areas of developing 
countries (UNDP, 2011).  
If female representation in parliament and managerial positions can 
be seen as a means of enhancing decision making that benefits 
other women, the GEM may be relevant to the wider empowerment 
of women. This, however, is premised on the assumption that 
women in a position to make influential decisions will make 
decisions that benefit other women. Yet this simple relationship 
between female representation in high-level positions and gender-
sensitive decision making cannot be taken for granted, and 
empirical evidence for this effect is still debated (Alolo, 2005, Swamy 
et al., 2001, Dollar et al., 2001, Roberts, 2006, Mukherjee and 
Gokcekus, 2004, Goetz, 2007). 
Even when the focus is on elite women, official statistics can still 
give a misleading impression of their experience. The extent of 
gender equality/empowerment cannot be assessed simply by 
referring to the number of women holding managerial jobs and 
comparing it to the number of men in similar positions. This 
approach does not take into account the barriers that women may 
encounter in pursuing their careers, and does not compare their 
present position with what they might have achieved in the absence 
of discrimination. Also, women who theoretically have the same 
level of seniority as men may in fact have fewer opportunities to 
exercise power due to informal gender bias mechanisms.  
In 2010 GEM was replaced by the Gender Inequality Index (GII), 
which measures inequality in men and women’s achievements in 
three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and the 
labour market. Empowerment is measured using two indicators: the 
share of parliamentary seats held by each sex and secondary and 
higher education attainment. GII excludes participation in local 
government, but, unlike GEM, it also excludes senior positions in 
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the civil service and private sector. The rationale for excluding 
representation in management was the data limitations in some 
developing countries rather than the view that this aspect of 
empowerment is unimportant. Partly in recognition of this 
important gap in the GII, this thesis focuses exclusively on women 
in civil service management positions. 
1.2 Locating the Indonesian civil service in a 
wider context 
As in other developing countries, gender issues in Indonesia are 
often conflated with other development issues ranging from poverty 
to corruption. This section describes the MOF as part of the 
Indonesian civil service and in its national context.  
Figure ‎1-1 Map of Indonesia 
 
Source: WorldAtlas 
1.2.1. The Javanese as the culturally and politically 
dominant ethnic group 
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world, with a 
total population of more than 238 million. It consists of 300 distinct 
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ethnic groups speaking over 700 different languages and dialects. 
The largest and culturally and politically dominant ethnic group is 
the Javanese, which comprises around 42% of the population 
(Kingsbury and Aveling, 2002). This high proportion of Javanese 
people is reflected in my interviewees’ backgrounds, and therefore 
the literature on Javanese households is used as reference for this 
thesis.  
As well as cultural and political diversity there is considerable socio-
economic diversity across Indonesia, especially between Java and 
some of the remoter parts of the country. In 2008 the Human 
Development Index (HDI) for Indonesia as a whole was 0.712, but it 
reached 0.77 in Jakarta and was as low as 0.64 in Papua (HDI, 
2008).  
Many anthropologists have commented on the gender equality of 
Javanese households. Observations that Javanese women can move 
about in public without restrictions and can own land (Hull, 1982), 
that they tend to play a dominant role in running the household 
including managing the household finances (Geertz, 1961b, Jay, 
1969, Koentjaraningrat, 1985, Magnis-Suseno, 1991, Papanek and 
Schwede, 1988), and that they make actual and potential economic 
contributions to the household (Geertz, 1961b) are used by these 
authors to indicate that Javanese women enjoy an equal 
relationship with their husbands. Hull (1982) even argues that the 
status of women in Java appears to be ahead of that of women in 
neighbouring countries. Feminist scholars, however, do not agree; 
the fact that women manage the household has been linked to the 
Javanese view that household matters are mundane and earthly 
(Nieuwenhuis-Djajadiningrat, 1987), and that Javanese men know 
that their wives will run the household according to their husbands’ 
interests (Sullivan, 1994, White and Hastuti, 1980) even if they have 
to sacrifice their personal benefit (Berninghausen et al., 1992). 
Sullivan (1994) concludes that the relationship between husband 
and wife in domestic budgeting is like one of master and manager. 
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The importance of respect and harmony and of avoiding personal 
and social conflict at all costs is a dominant characteristic of 
Javanese culture (Geertz, 1961b). Extending Geertz’s argument into 
public life, Koentjaraningrat (1985) argues that it is possible that 
this prioritisation of harmony may have proven costly to Indonesian 
bureaucracy, encouraging civil servants to over-rely on seniors and 
superiors and leaving subordinates unwilling to take risks due to 
their fear of acting without the support of someone who will share 
responsibility. This is similar to (Madhu Ranjan, 2007) research 
findings for the Indian bureaucracy, although higher-level managers 
there tend to be less dependent than lower managers on their 
superiors. 
Javanese culture also has a very strong notion of refinement (alus) 
and coarseness (kasar) and a concern about whether certain 
behaviour is considered proper according to these notions 
(Anderson, 1990). As such, the Javanese tend to put appearance 
above anything else and ‘reality’ is of secondary importance 
(Kingsbury, 2005). Knowing this is helpful in Chapter 8, where I 
discuss how women are treated at MOF: although everything may 
seem fine on the surface and people are polite to each other, it may 
not reflect what they actually think and believe.  
1.2.2. Islam as the predominant religion  
Islam is the dominant religion of the country, with 86.1% of 
Indonesians Muslims. There is no option for people in Indonesia to 
call themselves agnostic or atheist, at least formally, especially in 
the civil service. Everybody has to have a religious affiliation or they 
are suspected of being connected with the communist coup of 1965, 
whether or not they were born by then. Five religions are 
acknowledged in Indonesia: Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, 
Buddhism, and, since 1999, Confucianism. Although Islam is the 
predominant religion and acknowledges Judaism, the State of 
Indonesia does not. 
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There is a widespread perception that in countries with strong 
Islamic traditions, women’s participation in the labour market tends 
to be lower than in other countries due to their restricted movement 
(Miles 2002). Baramitash (2002) argues that this does not apply to 
Indonesia despite the strong revival of Islamic traditions in the last 
two decades. My research observes the extent to which Islam as a 
religion affects how people think and behave in the MOF as an 
organisation. 
According to the MOF human resource (HR) database, more than 85 
percent of staff is Muslim, in keeping with the proportion of 
Muslims in Indonesia. Most people at MOF practise their religion 
devoutly. This involves participating in prayers five times a day for 
Muslims, and joining a monthly congregation for other religions 
depending on numbers of believers in the same office. 
Throughout this thesis I refer to Islamic religious devotion and piety 
when analysing MOF women’s agency. Mahmood (2005) argues that 
female subjectivity obtained through religious practice is a form of 
agency that is not well captured by what she sees as the western 
feminist binary of submission versus resistance, and this research 
also observes the extent to which religious devotion frames MOF 
women’s choices in their employment with MOF. As White (2010 
p.342) suggests: ‘…women's subjectivity may be found in and not 
just against religion — and ... such subjectivity is many layered and 
at times contradictory.’ 
1.2.3. The lingering effects of civil service politicisation 
during the Suharto regime (1966-1998) 
The MOF is part of the Indonesian civil service bureaucracy founded 
immediately after Independence in 1945 (GOI, 1997b). Despite the 
long history of the civil service, this research focuses on the Suharto 
regime, known as the ‘New Order’ period (1966-1998), and the 
subsequent Reformasi (post-Suharto to present). All civil service 
regulations that remain in place to date originated in the Suharto 
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era. Most, if not all, of the high-ranking officials in the Indonesian 
civil service today were recruited during the Suharto regime and, 
given the top-down power dynamics in the bureaucracy, play an 
important role in shaping the organisation (Dwiyanto et al., 2006). 
Working in the Indonesian civil service is a strictly full-time 
commitment, and everybody starts as a junior clerk regardless of 
educational background (Rohdewohld, 1995). There is no part-time 
option for working in the civil service (GOI, 1974a, GOI, 2000). 
Unlike some developing countries, where civil servants come and go 
with changes of political regime, in Indonesia a job in the civil 
service is a life-time tenure that does not usually end until 
retirement at the relatively low age of 56. Nor do civil servants move 
between public and private employment. The Civil Service Law 
clearly states that people who leave the service cannot be recruited 
again by the government (GOI, 1974a), and civil servants only move 
from one ministry to another under very special circumstances.  
Suharto manipulated the civil service as the tool of his regime 
(Rohdewohld, 2004), with civil servants expected to set an example 
to the wider public of how to behave, not only in carrying out their 
duties in the office but also in their daily lives (GOI, 1983). The New 
Order Regime introduced a comprehensive regulation of the 
Indonesian civil service (GOI, 1974a). 
MOF has a complex geographical hierarchy, with branches at the 
kabupaten/regency level (of which there are currently nearly 500), 
and some sections, such as the Tax Office, extending to branches at 
the kecamatan/district level (of which there are over 6,500) 
dispersed across the archipelago. 
1.2.4. Corruption and public perception 
For a long time, Indonesian civil servants have been associated with 
a culture of corruption, delay, laziness and inefficiency (Ginting, 
2003, Kristiansen and Ramli, 2006, Rock and Bonnett, 2004, Server, 
1996, Sherlock, 2002, Wang and Rosenau, 2001, World Bank, 
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2003b). They are rarely fired, despite the long lists of threats in the 
regulations drafted to manage their lives. The machinery of the state 
suffers from a bureaucratic inertia that makes many plans and 
programmes disappear into thin air (Dwiyanto et al., 2006), which is 
one of the reasons for the ongoing civil service reform 
(Tjiptoherijanto, 2006). 
The Corruption Perception Index produced by Transparency 
International ranks Indonesia 118 out of 174 countries in the world 
(Transparency International, 2012)1 . The World Bank notes that 
corruption is a serious problem in the civil service as acknowledged 
by the civil servants themselves (World Bank, 2003b). As a key part 
of public service accountability, civil servants are responsible for 
both creating regulations and delivering services to the public and 
yet corruption is rampant in both areas (World Bank, 2005). 
MOF has been under public scrutiny for corruption (Blane D. Lewis, 
2003, Ikhsan et al., 2005, Kuncoro, 2004), especially in two 
Directorate Generals: the Directorate General of Tax (DGTX) and the 
Directorate General of Customs and Excise (DGCE) (Wijaya, 2012). I 
explore how corruption interacts with gender issues at MOF in 
Chapter 9. 
1.2.5. Female civil servants in the context of the 
Indonesian labour market  
According to the GII, Indonesia’s labour force participation rate (the 
ratio of female to male workers) was 0.605 in 2011, meaning that 
37.5% of paid workers were female. This is higher than in other 
countries in the region such as Thailand (0.811) and Malaysia 
(0.561), and is broadly comparable with the Philippines (0.627). 
                                           
1 The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based 
on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country or 
territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on 
a scale of 0 - 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly 
corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean. A country's rank 
indicates its position relative to the other countries and territories included 
in the index. Year 2012 index includes 176 countries and territories. 
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The civil service only accounts for slightly more than 3% of the total 
labour market (excluding the informal sector), despite the fact that 
during its early development between 1945 and 1968 it was 
intended to generate employment (Rohdewohld, 1995). Female 
participation in the civil service and the formal labour market at 
three points in time over the last three decades is summarised in 
Table 1-1. Overall levels of female participation in the public and 
private formal sector combined are broadly consistent with those 
reported in the 2011 GII (37.5%).  
Table 1-1 also shows that between 1986 and 2008 there was a 
marked increase in the proportion of female civil service workers, 
with no comparable change in the private sector. Even in 1986, 
female representation in the Indonesian civil service was higher 
than in other Asian countries such as Bangladesh (10%), India 
(10%) and even Japan (19.6%) (Burns and Bowornwathana, 2001a). 
Intentional government initiatives appear to have played no role in 
this rapid increase and there have been no changes to the Civil 
Service Law or regulations. This rising female participation is 
mainly the consequence of the increasing number of female 
university graduates entering the labour force. In Chapter 6 I 
discuss why these educated women choose to work in the public 
sector, and whether it reflects any specific advantages in terms of 
gender-friendly working arrangements.  
Although a higher proportion of civil service workers are women 
relative to the private sector, the small size of the civil service means 
that the majority of women in the formal labour market work in the 
private sector. In other words, there are more female private sector 
than public sector managers. This thesis focuses on the latter, 
partly out of opportunism, given my own professional background, 
and also in recognition of the wider influence that key government 
organisations can exert on many aspects of gender relations. 
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Table ‎1-1 Female participation in the formal labour market and the 
civil service 
Year 
Civil Service 
(% of civil servants who are women) 
Total labour force, 
including civil service 
 (% of workers who are 
women) 
1986 29.43% 39.22% 
1998 35.37% 38.79% 
2008 44.72% 38.23% 
Table based on data from BKN and BPS 
1.3 Why the Ministry of Finance? 
Before embarking on a PhD I worked in MOF for 15 years. I studied 
at its State Accounting College (STAN) from 1990 and 1993, and 
from 1993 to 2005 I occupied various posts, mainly dealing with 
teaching at STAN and managing training for various MOF 
departments. 
During my employment, as well as being aware that as a woman I 
was part of a minority, I often came across situations where women 
were directly or indirectly discriminated against in daily procedures. 
As will be seen in later chapters, MOF decided that women are 
‘naturally unsuited’ to working there due to the nature of its jobs 
and functions, which require a rotation around all of Indonesia’s 
challenging geography. 
I also observed that once they were married and had children my 
female colleagues found it difficult to progress in their careers 
because they seemed to have to choose between home and work, 
while their male colleagues did not. Yet I also knew that compared 
to their counterparts in the west, middle-class Indonesian women 
(the category that female employees of MOF fall into) are in a good 
position to combine work with their family responsibilities. The 
cheapness of labour in Indonesia makes au-pairs and full-time 
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nannies affordable for those earning an MOF salary. In fact, every 
person that I know who works at MOF has at least one helper 
(called a pembantu). Furthermore, the way the family support 
system works in Indonesia often makes it possible for grandparents 
to take over childcare. Despite this, the excuse given for the small 
number of women in managerial positions was always ‘family 
obligations’. Only a handful of women at MOF are directors, and 
none are directorate generals or deputy ministers.  
Apart from my personal links with MOF there are good academic 
grounds for focusing a case study on this organisation. Many 
approaches have been adopted to make sure that women’s share of 
the benefits of development are equal to that of men. Despite the 
limited success of GM and efforts to engender public sector 
bureaucracies (health, education and other public services) having 
become the norm, one policy area is known to be particularly 
resistant to feminist incursions: macro-economic decision making, 
which is usually under the authority of finance ministries. In both 
national and international agencies, gendered machinery still makes 
it difficult to succeed in this field, which is increasingly dominated 
by men with neo-classical economic backgrounds (Miller and Razavi, 
1998, Razavi, 1998, Sen, 2000).  
The importance of doing gender research at finance ministries is 
justified by Gita Sen (Sen and Commonwealth Secretariat., 1999, 
Sen, 2000), who sets out a strong rationale for mainstreaming 
gender in finance ministries, identifying potential entry points for 
change at the levels of ongoing macroeconomic management and 
structural reform and in the specific context of credit liberalisation 
and the provision of micro-credit. Although Sen provides some 
advice about how to deal with attitudinal change she has not 
studied this process of change itself in an actual organisation, 
perhaps due to difficulties in obtaining access to internal 
information about finance ministries in low- and middle-income 
countries.  
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My personal experience, however, places me in a privileged position 
to pursue this topic. This thesis observes organisational dynamics 
in MOF‘s efforts in implementing gender mainstreaming, without 
systematically assessing levels of gender mainstreaming in MOF’s 
work itself. To do so would require macro-economic analysis, which 
is currently unfeasible due to a lack of gender-disaggregated data. 
Instead, the thesis focuses on internal processes in the Ministry as 
a gendered organisation. When analysing the GM effort at MOF, my 
focus is on the internal processes that can bring about GM policies 
rather than on the policies themselves. The critical starting point for 
any process of meaningful change is to change the people before 
changing the institution (Cassar and Bezzina, 2005). At MOF, this 
translates into how to get the predominantly neo-classical male 
economists from traditional Indonesian family backgrounds to 
realise that they need to engender what they are doing. As 
Mukhopadhyay et al (2006 p.13) note, ‘Mainstreaming is not only 
about institutionalising gender concerns in policies and programmes, 
but also requires addressing gender issues within organisations 
themselves. There is an acknowledgement that organisations 
themselves are gendered, and this is related to their outcomes’. 
To achieve this, detailed knowledge of MOF, both as an organisation 
and from the points of view of the public officials who staff it, is 
necessary. We need to know who they are, their values and 
ideologies and to what extent these provide the basis for their 
behaviour. Furthermore, we need to identify bureaucratic policies, 
standard operating procedures and new initiatives (Staudt, 1997). 
Given the male-domination of MOF there are grounds for focusing 
this research on masculinities.  
Critical mass theory, which I elaborate and discuss in Chapter 2, 
posits that women’s voice in an organisation will be skewed towards 
the majority (i.e. male voices) until they have exceeded tokenistic 
representation (Dahlerup, 1988, Kanter, 1977b). Given the small 
number of women at MOF, to understand what hinders their 
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participation it is necessary to study the women working there. It is 
also important to seek to understand gender relations from their 
point of view and to assess the extent to which they have shaped 
MOF as an organisation. This thesis focuses on women’s 
experiences of working at MOF, and while it sometimes elicits the 
perspective of male workers it does not attempt to make a 
systematic comparison between men and women at MOF. 
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
Analysing a state bureaucracy such as MOF from a gender 
perspective requires expertise on gender and development debates 
and thorough knowledge of the nature of state bureaucracy in a 
particular country, including its structures, procedures and 
processes. Lastly, it requires knowledge of the local context. This is 
an area where the literature is lacking, and this thesis seeks to fill 
the gap.  
In this thesis I am interested in looking at the whole problem of 
women’s unequal access, presence and influence (using the three 
types of political engagement and control suggested by Goetz and 
Hassim, 2003) in public employment. This is done from different 
perspectives: from women’s positions, the point of view of MOF as 
an organisation, and considering the wider institutions of 
household, community, market and the state. Given these complex 
and multiple dimensions, Goetz’ gendered archaeology of 
organisations is an appropriate framework for the thesis. 
I analyse the Indonesian MOF as a gendered organisation seeking 
an answer the overarching question: ‘What hinders women’s career 
progression at MOF?’ Using Goetz’ framework, this thesis offers a 
comprehensive approach to gender issues at MOF. This goes beyond 
an exclusive focus on the organisational point of view, which is 
typically found in management studies (see, for example  Woodall et 
al., 1997).  
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The gendered archaeology framework involves looking at the 
organisation’s gendered cognitive context, gendered culture and 
gendered participants. It also involves scrutinising MOF’s approach 
to structuring time and space in employees’ work-lives and 
observing the gendered authority structure both within and outside 
MOF as a gendered organisation and assessing how these affect its 
female employees. Central to this research is an understanding of 
women at MOF as ‘gendered participants’. Consequently I 
investigate how these female managers exercise their agency in the 
organisational structure and culture, the strategies and choices 
they employ and how these in turn shape MOF as an organisation.  
Taking into account the history of the politicisation of the 
Indonesian civil service during the Suharto era, which led to the 
establishment of the Civil Service Law that applies to all employees 
of Indonesian government organisation, I also investigate which 
parts of MOF’s organisational culture make it difficult for women to 
pursue their careers. 
Within this framework there are three areas that I am particularly 
interested in: education, discretion -‘the idea that administrative 
officials should be free to employ their expertise and training in the 
pursuit of the policy responsibilities delegated to them’ (Vaughn and 
Otenyo, 2006 p.xii), and corruption. As the women who work at 
MOF are educated middle-class women rather than illiterate 
peasants, I am interested in the extent to which their education has 
empowered them in a civil service organisation in terms of both 
exercising and being on the receiving end of discretion, bearing in 
mind that corruption is rampant. 
This approach requires linking gender and power theories to 
feminist notions of the ‘gendered organisation’ (Acker, 1990, Halford 
and Leonard, 2001a). It also requires an analysis of structure and 
agency to reveal the nature of the relationship between a gendered 
organisation and the wider development sector (Rao and Kelleher, 
1997, Rao et al., 1999).  
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1.5 A word on methodology and approach 
Because of my previous employment with MOF this research 
involves research in a familiar environment. During the second year 
of my PhD I returned to Indonesia to do my fieldwork, which 
enabled me to look at MOF from a different perspective as I was no 
longer an employee. As Chapter 3 on the research methodology 
elaborates, researching in familiar surroundings has numerous 
institutional, cultural and social advantages, especially related to 
ease of access. It also, however, poses some challenges when it 
comes to positionality and subjectivity.  
Having once worked at MOF, where I was on the receiving end of its 
gender discriminatory policy to some extent, my experience 
unavoidably shapes the way I think about MOF and thus the way I 
approach the whole research project. However, the research is 
about women currently working there in mid- and top management, 
not my personal experience. 
1.6 Organisation of the thesis 
Chapter 2: The Gendered archaeology of the Indonesian 
MOF 
This chapter elaborates the formulation of the research questions 
and the extent to which Goetz’s (1997) framework of the gendered 
archaeology of the organisation is adapted in this research. I have 
modified and adapted two elements of Goetz’ gendered archaeology – 
gendered organisational culture and gendered participants – and 
instead of presenting them as I do the other elements, in single 
chapters, they are themes running throughout the thesis. 
The chapter also discusses and analyses concepts relating to gender 
and bureaucracy in developed countries and international 
development settings, and sets out how I have adapted them to suit 
this study.  
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodological approach to answering the 
research questions set out Chapter 2. It also looks at issues of 
subjectivity related to my previous employment at MOF, which, 
while facilitating the fieldwork in many ways, also posed challenges 
and dilemmas. 
Chapter 4: MOF as a subsystem of the Indonesian 
bureaucracy  
This chapter serves as a contextual instruction to the wider 
institution to which Indonesia’s MOF belongs, by analysing the 
general state of the country’s gendered bureaucracy. It begins with 
a general discussion of the history and development of the 
Indonesian civil service up to the time of my fieldwork. Then it sets 
out the formal organisational structure of Indonesian bureaucracy, 
and MOF as part of it, with a brief exploration of MOF’s organisation. 
This is followed by a gender analysis of civil service HR statistics.  
Chapter 5: The gendered cognitive context of Indonesian 
bureaucracy 
Based on the information supplied in Chapter 4, this chapter deals 
with three specific questions: (1) what are the gendered implications 
of civil service regulations? (2) what is the gender ideology behind 
the rules and regulations in Civil Service Law?  (3) how does the 
Indonesian bureaucracy value gender empowerment goals in its 
own organisation? I approach the latter by analysing GM in 
Indonesia’s bureaucracy as a national effort, and the extent to 
which it serves its purposes. 
Chapter 6: Gender discrimination as a formal policy in 
MOF’s recruitment process 
The discussion and analysis in this chapter focus on gender 
discrimination in MOF’s recruitment process. While discrimination 
can be direct or indirect, this chapter deals with the former. It 
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reveals the extent to which gender discrimination is overtly applied 
in recruitment, denying more than 1,000 women employment in the 
Ministry every year. 
Chapter 7: Diploma Disease: To what extent does 
education empower women at MOF? 
In this chapter I focus on how the Indonesian civil service values 
education and how this affects women working at MOF. The core 
question is the extent to which education empowers the women at 
MOF. The chapter reviews all the education and training 
requirements at MOF and civil service in general and how accessible 
they are to women, and shows how MOF’s approach to formal and 
informal training is not always accessible, let alone convenient, to 
women with family obligations. 
Chapter 8: ‘Would you mind if we promote your wife?’ 
Gendered Discretion in Promotion  
This chapter looks into the general rules on civil service career 
progression and how they translate into MOF internal policies. I 
discuss how the gendered authority structure in wider society spills 
over into the organisational terrain and how women in public 
positions of power are still seen as anomalies. I pay special 
attention on how MOF links promotion with relocation and analyse 
how discretion works at MOF in terms of promoting women; 
perceptions of women, and how they perceive themselves as 
managers; and the kind of treatment they receive once they reach a 
managerial position. 
Chapter 9: Money talks: Disentangling gender from the 
knot of corruption 
In this chapter I discuss how gender issues can be buried under the 
issue of corruption. MOF is perceived as one of the most corrupt 
government organisations in Indonesia and serious efforts are being 
made to combat corruption and improve the Ministry’s public image. 
The core question in this chapter is to what extent corruption 
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affects the working experience of MOF’s female employees. I observe 
how women are often excluded from the bureaucratic ‘game’ by 
their unwillingness or inability to engage in corrupt behaviour. 
Lately, under the bureaucratic reform, women have been used to 
improve MOF’s public image as public relations workers. In either 
case, this treatment sidelines women from the core tasks of the 
organisation. 
Chapter 10: Locating the identities of MOF women in 
relation to MOF’s gendered space and time  
This chapter analyses how female employees respond to their 
workplace situation in relation to their domestic responsibilities and 
societal expectations. I analyse the individual agency and strategies 
that they employ and their views on work-life balance. I also analyse 
the domestic front: how childcare decisions are made, what kinds of 
support are available to the women and how families cope. I discuss 
how female managers support their husbands’ careers and what 
happens if women’s positions or ranks exceed their husbands’. 
Chapter 11: Gender Mainstreaming at MOF 
This chapter analyses MOF’s gendered incentive and accountability 
system through the setting up, implementation and day-to-day 
operation of GM efforts, including how budgets and activities are set 
and decided, as well as what has been achieved and how far these 
initiatives benefit MOF’s female employees. Put into the wider 
context, the chapter links these achievements and failures to the 
bureaucratic reforms recently implemented at MOF. 
Chapter 12: Conclusion 
The conclusion revisits the theoretical discussion and analysis of 
empirical data set out in the previous chapters and assesses how 
MOF’s gendered archaeology affects both women’s empowerment 
and internal organisational processes of change. I assess the 
usefulness of Goetz’s gendered archaeology framework and suggest 
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some modifications for its application in public bureaucracy 
settings in developing countries. As part of this discussion, I 
consider the wider implications of the case study for women’s 
empowerment in public administrations across low- and middle-
income countries.  
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2 The gendered archaeology of MOF, a 
conceptual framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter laid out the scope of this research and placed 
it in a wider context. This chapter sets out the main theories, 
concepts and assumptions I use in examining the Indonesian 
Ministry of Finance through a gender lens as a bureaucratic 
organisation. This thesis makes use of existing theories and 
concepts relating to gender and bureaucracy in general and applies 
them in the context of a developing country. To this end, it also 
draws on theory and literature from development studies. While the 
thesis does not create substantial new theory, it makes significant 
contributions by assessing the validity of existing theoretical 
frameworks in a specific setting and, where necessary, adapting 
them. 
Until recently, the literature on gender and state bureaucracy had 
been dominated by cases from developed countries focusing on 
issues such as equal opportunities and the glass ceiling (Cockburn, 
1991, Halford and Leonard, 2001a, Kanter, 1977a, 1993) while case 
studies on gender issues in organisations in developing countries 
mainly centred on NGOs working for women in the development 
arena. With the introduction of GM in 1995, feminists started 
applying their analysis to state bureaucracies of developing 
countries. However, these analyses are generally more concerned 
with what has gone wrong in terms of mainstreaming gender into 
development programmes and projects than with looking at the 
gendered state bureaucracy itself (Clisby, 2005, Daly, 2005, 
Kusakabe, 2005). 
Kabeer (1994b) suggests that gender training should enable and 
encourage development planners to reflect on how exclusionary 
structures work in their own institutions through their hierarchies 
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of authority, rules of recruitment, privileged disciplines and the 
division of resources and responsibilities. As such, planners should 
direct their attention to their own experiences rather than 
constantly looking outside their organisations. 
In this chapter I discuss Goetz’s (1997a) concept of the gendered 
archaeology of organisations. I focus on the different elements of her 
framework and consider the extent to which they are applicable to 
my own research, and why. Following the Goetz framework I 
discuss how the concept of gendered organisation is used by other 
writers to analyse their case studies (Rao et al., 1999). 
2.2 Formulation of the research questions and 
identification of the conceptual framework 
I have shown in the previous chapter that the Indonesian MOF has 
very few female employees and even fewer female managers, and 
that while female participation at MOF is growing it remains 
significantly lower than in other Asian countries where women are 
also under-represented. This research seeks the causes and 
consequences of this under-representation and asks whether the 
growing number of female managers represents a genuine 
opportunity for empowerment, both for the women personally and 
for Indonesian women more generally. 
Different approaches to examining a development organisation and 
how it operates in its institutional framework through the lens of 
gender have been suggested, including that of Goetz (1997a), whose 
framework proposes that the gendered nature of an organisation 
can be understood by engaging in an ‘archaeological’ investigation 
that: ‘... involves disinterring and reinterpreting histories, scrutinizing 
artefacts such as favoured concepts, terms of inclusion or exclusion, 
symbols of success or failure...’ (Goetz, 1997a; p.16).  
Goetz outlines eight elements in this framework, namely the 
gendered organisational and institutional history; gendered 
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cognitive context; gendered organisational culture; gendered 
participants; gendered time and space; gendered authority structure; 
gendered sexuality of the organisation and the gendered incentive 
and accountability system. This thesis adapts Goetz’s framework to 
examine to what extent and how MOF’s gendered archaeology 
hinders women’s participation at MOF, studying each element of its 
gendered archaeology to find ‘patterns of exclusion’ (Goetz, 1997a 
p.16) that affect MOF’s female employees.  
In the following section I elaborate some concepts and assumptions 
and explain how I have employed and adapted Goetz’s framework to 
answer the main research question and develop the detailed 
research questions that stem from the overarching research 
question: ‘What hinders women’s participation at MOF?’, and how 
Goetz’s framework is used to answer them. Table 2-1 sets out the 
sub-questions and relates them to specific elements of the 
framework. 
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Table ‎2-1 Goetz’s framework and this thesis’ research questions 
Elements of the Gendered 
Archaeology of MOF 
Specific Research Questions 
Gendered institutional and 
organisational history  
 Historically, how have women been treated by the 
state, and to what extent does this affect women at 
MOF? 
Gendered cognitive context of MOF  What are the underlying values of the Indonesian civil 
service, and which aspects of these values affect 
opportunities for women to participate? 
 How do these values translate to regulations, and to 
what extent do these regulations affect women? 
 How does the Indonesian bureaucracy value the goal 
of women’s empowerment, and to what extent does 
it reflect the views of the Indonesian state? 
Gendered organisational culture  Given the low number of female employees at MOF, 
does the recruitment process discriminate against 
female applicants? 
 Once women are inside the organisation, what 
aspects of MOF culture (beliefs, values, norms, 
symbols and practices) facilitate/obstruct their 
participation? 
 Is there any direct/indirect discrimination against 
women in daily practices and procedures, and if so, 
what is it? 
 To what extent does MOF value the education of its 
employees? 
 To what extent does corruption affect men and 
women’s careers differently at MOF? 
 
Gendered participants  Where are men and women in MOF hierarchy? 
 Who are the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of MOF 
Bureaucratic ‘Game’?  
 How many women does it take to change the 
organisational culture? 
 Has there been a collective effort from MOF’s female 
employees to change the organisational dynamics? 
Gendered authority structure  To what extent does discretion play a role in 
promotion? 
 To what extent does discretion against women limit 
their career progression? 
 How are women perceived as leaders? 
 What other structures are imposed on women? 
 
Gendered space and time  How does MOF accommodate gender roles across the 
work/home divide? 
 To what extent does MOF’s approach to structuring 
time and space affect women’s participation? 
 How do women reconcile their career and domestic 
lives? 
 How do women negotiate their gendered (and 
multiple) identities at MOF? 
Gendered incentive and 
accountability system 
 To whom is GM accountable? 
 To what extent do GM activities help MOF to change? 
 To what extent do the internal gender dynamics 
within the GM team affect their external outcomes? 
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The next section explores the individual elements of Goetz’s 
framework. In each case I begin with Goetz’s definition and 
suggested application, and follow this with a discussion about how 
each element relates to existing theories on gender and bureaucracy 
in the context of developing country settings. Finally, I explain how I 
have adapted the particular element to the purpose of this thesis. 
2.3 Gendered archaeology of the organisation 
2.3.1 Gendered institutional and organisational history  
While the terms ‘institution’ and ‘organisation’ are often used 
synonymously, when discussing how bureaucracy reinforces biases 
in larger society we must be clear about the distinction between 
them (Goetz, 1997a, Rao et al., 1999). ‘Organisation’ refers to a 
social entity with collective goals, linked to the external environment; 
‘institutions’ are defined as the rules for achieving social or 
economic ends (Kabeer, 1994a). These rules dictate who does what, 
who gets what and who decides on the allocation of resources, tasks 
and responsibilities.  
Kabeer (1994a) identifies four levels at which institutions operate: 
household, community, market and state. While neoliberal 
economics assumes that the household operates according to 
altruism under the leadership of a benign household head, 
feminists have identified the family as a highly gendered arena that 
produces and reproduces unequal power relations, hindering 
women’s empowerment. While in the past the market and the state 
have been regarded as relatively gender-neutral, these days 
discussions of gendered market failures and gendered public 
institutional failures are included in feminist analysis (see for 
example Elson and Cagatay, 2000, Elson, 1999). 
As I am analysing Indonesia’s MOF, and since the civil service has 
been manipulated by Suharto as discussed in the previous chapter, 
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the immediate environment of relevance is the history of the 
Indonesian state. Contrary to the situation in the West, where 
women were initially excluded from the public sphere (among others, 
see Pateman, 1988), the Indonesian Constitution guarantees the 
equal rights of Indonesian men and women, including the right to 
vote. Nevertheless, in Indonesia the state’s views on women and 
their place vis a vis the market, state, community and family is 
strongly influenced by the views of the current president. Therefore 
in this thesis I carry out an analysis of gendered institutional and 
organisational history in tandem with an analysis of the gendered 
cognitive context of the organisation. 
2.3.2 The gendered cognitive context of the organisation 
Goetz argues that identifying the gender interests that have shaped 
their broader institutional frameworks over time is a starting-point 
for analysing organisations by gender. To analyse an individual 
bureaucracy such as the Indonesian MOF she suggests looking at 
the state as the broader institutional framework (1997a p.16). As 
she (1992) argues, what is needed is ‘an appreciation of the 
connections between gendered social relationships and gendered 
organizational relationship in public administration’. 
Since this thesis focuses on MOF as a state bureaucracy it is useful 
to briefly look at the literature on gender and the state and the rules 
and norms embedded in the developed and the developing world. 
Savage and Witz (1992), citing Weber, who perceives the modern 
state as ‘absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic basis’, argue that 
there is a parallel between the relationship between gender and the 
modern (Weberian) bureaucratic state and the relationship between 
gender and the government bureaucracy as a workplace, where the 
gendered state is reflected in the gendered nature of bureaucratic 
government organisations.  
Franzway et al (1989) argue that the state is involved in the 
patterning of gender relations and gender order, and that the 
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gendered nature of bureaucracy manifests (and can thus be 
analysed) in four ways: (a) in the basic constitution of the realm of 
the state (related to the notion of the paternalistic nature of the 
state); (b) in the composition of the controllers of the state 
apparatus; (c) in the staffing of the state machinery and its internal 
organisation; and (d) in what the state does, who it affects and how.  
In asserting the gender-blindness of the state, Mills and Tancred 
(1992) maintain that women suffer from dual structures of unequal 
representation: first, the state’s failure to accommodate ‘women’s 
issues’, 2  and second, women’s powerless position in the 
bureaucracy, which makes it difficult for them to challenge the 
state’s failure to accommodate their interests. 
These two elements are adapted in this thesis to answer the 
following questions: 
1. Historically, how have women been treated by the state, and 
to what extent does this affect women in the civil service in 
general? 
2. What are the underlying values of the Indonesian civil 
service, and what aspects of these values affect the 
opportunity for women to participate? 
3. How do these values translate into regulations, and to what 
extent do these regulations affect women? 
4. How does the Indonesian bureaucracy value the goal of 
women’s empowerment, and to what extent does it reflect the 
views of the Indonesian state? 
2.3.3 Gendered organisational culture 
Goetz does not define exactly what she means by organisational 
culture, but she quotes Ferguson (1984, p.18) that male dominance 
is embedded in distinctive features of bureaucratic culture ranging 
                                           
2In the development arena the terminology of gender interests and 
gender needs is preferred. I deal with this in the section on 
gendered participants. 
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from top-down command and communication systems to 
specialisation and aggressive goal-oriented styles of management. 
Other authors of organisational studies extend the concept of 
culture well beyond the managerial style, some describing the whole 
process within the organisation as part of its culture. For example 
Rutherford’s (2011) model of gendered organisational culture 
includes the organisation’s background , gender awareness, 
physical layout and artefacts, management style, the public/private 
divide, informal socialising, long-hours culture, sexuality, and 
language and communication (Rutherford, 2011 p.29). Smircich 
(1983) discusses two major ways in which culture in organisations 
has been studied: as a variable and as a root metaphor. The first 
focuses on causality, whereby culture is an independent variable 
that affects a dependent variable, for example productivity or 
leadership. This is a simplified way of looking at culture, since 
culture itself is not easily defined. The second approach focuses on 
understanding how organisational members create cultures and 
how these cultures affect them in turn. Here, culture is seen as a 
process and not as a product or a variable.  
Another widely-cited author on organisational culture is Hofstede 
(1994), according to whom organisational culture bears the 
characteristics of being holistic (referring to a whole which is more 
than the sum of its parts), historically determined (reflecting the 
history of the organisation), related to the things anthropologists 
study (such as rituals and symbols), socially constructed (created 
and preserved by the group of people who together form the 
organisation), and difficult to change. Hofstede’s description 
coincides with Smircich’s second category of how organisational 
culture is viewed. If this broad definition of organisational culture is 
applied to Goetz’s framework, the other elements – gendered 
cognitive context, gendered space and time, the organisation’s 
sexuality, gendered authority structures, and gendered incentive 
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and accountability systems – can all be subsumed into the gendered 
organisational culture.  
Wilson (1998) suggests that organisational culture can serve as the 
biggest barrier to women advancing in their career paths while at 
the same time enabling men to ‘sail through’. Kanter (1977a) 
believes that gender stereotyping, differences and inequalities derive 
from traditional values outside the organisation that are sustained 
within it. She regards organisations as arenas in which outmoded 
beliefs, customs and prejudices continue to operate. The result is a 
glass-ceiling effect, where women seem not to face any barriers but 
cannot reach the top of the hierarchy.  
Itzin and Newman (1995) claim that women fail to achieve their 
potential and to match their performance with men in top 
managerial positions due to organisational culture which includes, 
amongst other things, long hours expected from senior managers 
that are incompatible with women’s domestic responsibilities; 
obstruction by supervisors; lack of encouragement from male 
managers; lack of motivation and confidence; and the prevalence of 
gender stereotyping. While their claim is based on a study set in 
developed countries, other studies focusing on the civil service in 
developing countries (Amos-Wilson, 1999, Ogenyi, 2004, Zafarullah, 
2000) report the same barriers. 
I define the organisational culture of the Indonesian MOF simply, as 
‘the way things are done around here’ (Deal and Kennedy, 1982), 
with ‘here’ referring to MOF. This analysis takes into account the 
assumption that an organisational culture has subcultures (Deal 
and Kennedy, 1982, Schein, 2004), so while MOF may have an 
overarching culture, every department may also have some 
distinctive cultural elements. 
Hofstede (1991, 1994, 2001, 2005) identifies national culture as one 
of many factors that can shape organisational culture. This link has 
been used to understand corruption based on comparisons of 
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different nations (Scott et al., 1993, Seleim and Bontis, 2009). I 
analyse the effect of corruption on MOF female employees in this 
study, although it is not explicitly included in Goetz’s framework. 
Like the other elements of the gendered archaeology of organisation 
discussed so far, I look at MOF’s organisational culture for patterns 
of women’s exclusion. The detailed research questions here are: 
1. Given the low number of female employees at MOF, does the 
recruitment process discriminate against female applicants? 
2. Once women are inside the organisation what beliefs, values, 
norms, symbols and practices within MOF’s culture enable or 
obstruct their participation?  
3. Is there direct or indirect discrimination against women in 
daily practices and procedures, and if so, how? 
4. To what extent does MOF value the education of its 
employees? 
5. To what extent does corruption at MOF affect women’s 
careers there? 
In asking these questions I adapt and go slightly beyond Goetz’s 
specific focus on managerial styles, without touching on the other 
aspects of organisational culture that she covers in other elements 
of the gendered archaeology. 
2.3.4 Gendered participants 
This section discusses three related issues: identification of the 
decision makers in the organisation, which is linked to the issue of 
‘which group’s interests are served’ (Goetz 1997 p.19); how to define 
‘gender interests’; and the extent to which women exercise agency to 
get their interests onto the agenda. 
Itzin and Newman (1995) note that one way to look at a gendered 
organisation is looking at the people working there. Staudt (1997 
p.12) suggests that in the terrain of government bureaucracy we 
turn our attention to public officials (‘who they are, what are their 
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values and ideologies, and to what extent do these ideologies provide 
the bases for their behaviour?’) to understand the people behind 
public policy. Besides being policy makers, public officials, also live 
in households and have community level relationships (Rao 1999). 
Given the small number of women at MOF, especially at the 
managerial level, it is instructive to observe the gender dynamics in 
the organisation. In terms of public policy generated by MOF as a 
state bureaucracy, what is the likelihood that a larger proportion of 
women in a bureaucracy would make a difference? 
There is a longstanding argument about the link between the 
proportional representation of women and their effectiveness in 
public forums (Dahlerup, 1988, Kanter, 1977b). The basic 
assumption of this argument is that there is a positive link between 
descriptive representation (the number of women in a public body) 
and substantive representation (decisions made in the interests of 
women), based on the idea that a small number or percentage of 
women would act on behalf of and in the interests of other women, 
because women’s actions when elected as political representatives 
are affected by the way they experience the world (Williams, 1996).  
The impact of gender representation on decision making has been 
studied in several areas besides government bureaucracies (Dolan, 
2002), including corporations (Kanter, 1977b), legislatures (Bratton, 
2005) and the judiciary (Collins et al., 2010). Different writers 
propose different proportions of females to males as necessary for 
effective female representation. Kanter (Kanter, 1977b) argues that 
in the corporate setting 15% of women is considered a token 
presence, 15-40% increases effectiveness and 40-50% provides a 
balance and an effective presence. Lovenduski (1997) argues for 20% 
and Dahlerup (1988), 30%, which is later referred to as ‘critical 
mass’. This 30% figure is the quota prescribed for effective political 
representation by the Beijing Platform for Action and in general 
recommendations of the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and has been adopted by 
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parliaments in more than 50 countries around the world. Indonesia 
has ratified this convention, although so far only at the level of 
legislation, and it has yet to come into practice (CEDAW, July 2012). 
Given the low representation of women at MOF (less than 22% and 
only 12% at managerial levels) it would be interesting to assess their 
substantive representation in the organisation.  
In the context of developing countries, Agarwal (2010), focusing on 
the decision-making process rather than on decisions made, noticed 
a critical mass effect in decision-making in local forest governance 
because women felt encouraged to speak up when there were other 
women present. She also noticed that women engaged more actively 
when the discussion was on a subject that directly affected them.  
Over the last decade discussion about ‘critical actors’ (Dahlerup, 
2006) has added a new dimension to the critical mass debate. By 
paying attention to individuals, the critical actor approach focuses 
more on the question of substantive representation than on 
assessing the percentage of women needed to get their issues 
represented. For example, McAllister and Studlar (2002 p.248) note 
that substantive representation by female politicians requires more 
than just a rise in the number of female politicians; it requires 
‘feminist attitudes’ in the legislature. Grey (2006) concludes from 
reviewing the existing literature on gender and critical mass that 
four factors need to be investigated besides the role of critical mass 
in bringing changes to political processes and outcomes: the 
position of the female politicians in question; their time in office; 
their own and their political party’s ideology; and the reactions of 
and to women politicians. 
The term ‘gender interests’ is used in this thesis rather than 
‘women’s interests’ following Molyneux (1985), as the latter does not 
take into account the fact that different women in different social 
positions may have different interests, even if they may still have 
certain general interests in common. According to Molyneux, gender 
interests are ‘those that women (or men for that matter) may develop 
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by virtue of their social positioning through gender attributes’. 
Molyneux further categorises gender interests as practical and 
strategic according to their urgency and whether or not they 
challenge the existing gendered division of labour and women’s 
subordinate position. Moser’s (1993) gender planning framework 
uses the term ‘gender needs’ to capture the means that women need 
to experience empowerment. While ‘needs’ implies a top-down 
bureaucratic approach to planning, ‘interests’ are more related to 
rights.  
In terms of policy-making, Goetz (1998 p.46) argues that ‘what we 
are looking for is the establishment of a strategic presence for 
women’s gender interests in policymaking, where there is legitimacy 
for the expression of interests of women as a gendered social 
category endowed equally with values and resources, and with 
potentially different ambitions for the way policy is pursued’ 
In this thesis, however, I limit the discussion to the gender interests 
of the female members of MOF in relation to their employment at 
MOF, and do not include the gender interests of Indonesian women 
in general as the recipients of MOF public policy. Kabeer’s 
formulation of practical gender needs and strategic gender interests 
is useful in the analysis of MOF’s personnel policy, including, but 
not limited to, promoting women to managerial positions, tours of 
duty and filling posts in remote areas.  
This thesis also addresses women’s agency in the state bureaucracy. 
In trying to capture the gender interests of female managers of MOF 
I recognise that women do not always exercise their agency 
according to how GAD professionals and feminists define their 
priorities (Fierlbeck, 1997, Jackson, 1997). In a different setting, the 
context of participatory rural appraisal (PRA), Jackson (1996: 500) 
argues: ‘For women who are excluded from dominant world views 
and male vocabularies (Ardener 1975), it is not wise to assume that 
they can, or will, simply express their priorities as PRA assumes.’ 
This consideration is essential in the interpretation of the female 
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manager interviews, especially in relation to decision-making and 
choices made during their careers. 
The broad research questions concerning gender participants are: 
1. Where are men and women in MOF hierarchy? 
2. Who are the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of MOF Bureaucratic 
‘Game’?  
3. How many women does it take to change the organisational 
culture? 
4. Has there been any collective effort from MOF’s female 
employees to change the organisational dynamics? 
Unlike the other elements, I do not analyse ‘gendered participants’ 
separately but include it in analysis of the other elements. So, for 
example, when discussing gendered time and space I also discuss 
how MOF employees, as gendered participants, respond to how 
MOF structures their time and space. By doing this, instead of 
portraying MOF’s women as objects of the MOF’s bureaucratic 
structure, I am highlighting their agency which in turn shapes 
MOF’s gendered organisational dynamics. 
2.3.5 Sexuality of the organisation  
This element is not discussed in a separate chapter, featuring 
instead in the analysis of the other elements. For example, in the 
recruitment process it is clear that MOF wants to keep its 
organisation as masculine as possible by limiting women’s 
participation. Setting out this issue in a specific chapter would lead 
to repetition of the same point. Furthermore, sexual harassment, 
one of the core issues in discussion of the sexuality of the 
organisation, did not explicitly emerge from my research fieldwork. 
This may have been due to embarrassment or the stigma of being 
harassed, or because sexual harassment is an alien concept for 
government officials whose state does not yet acknowledge marital 
rape. Exploring these issues involves specific ethical challenges and 
would require a specific research project of its own: it was not 
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possible to deduce its prevalence and effect from the data collected 
for this study. Despite excluding sexual harassment, the other 
elements of gendered archaeology provide clues about the sexuality 
of MOF as an organisation, as I discuss in the conclusion to the 
thesis. 
2.3.6 Gendered authority structures  
Weber (Weber and Parsons, 1947) elaborates specifiable 
organisational structures that he refers to as the ideal type of 
bureaucracy. The characteristics embedded in his ideal type of 
bureaucracy involve functional specialisation, a clear hierarchy, 
precise contracts of employment, the standardisation of rules and 
procedures, credentials (where each member of staff is appointed to 
a specific job based on their technical skill and competence), and 
rewards strictly determined by  a worker’s place in the hierarchy 
(Weber and Parsons, 1947, Halford and Leonard, 2001b p.39-40, 
Albrow, 1970).  
Clegg (1990) and Witz and Savage (1992) reject the Weberian 
concept of bureaucracy, arguing that bureaucracy is not the only 
means of organising and that there are many examples of 
organisations that do not conform to Weber’s ideals. With regard to 
gender, recent years have seen an increasing number of 
organisations, including government agencies in developing 
countries, claiming to emphasise the work-life balance by 
introducing part-time work and job sharing. In the absence of such 
flexible arrangements in Indonesia’s civil service one might suspect 
that MOF has not moved away from Weberian ideals. Chapter 4 
discusses how Indonesia’s Civil Service Law, which is still actively 
used and referred to in every single case involving civil servants, 
still embodies traditional, rigid Weberian principles. 
Weber believed that the establishment of a bureaucratic system 
could ensure the most efficient form of modern organisation, since 
bureaucracy operates according to competence regardless of the 
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characteristics of its players. Bureaucracy is ruled by organisational 
structures that permit only one sort of power, which is rational-legal 
authority. This power is acquired through the strict application of 
objective procedures. All individuals are judged by their merits and 
ability rather than by personal attributions such as gender. 
Therefore according to Weber, the dominance of the rational-legal 
form of power means that processes and procedures are totally 
objective. Another bureaucratic characteristic assumed and 
imposed by Weber is impersonality. This suggests that gender does 
not and should not matter in bureaucracy as long as the people 
there are (1) selected and recruited according to their professional 
qualifications and (2) once in the bureaucracy they do their job 
properly according to the job description. 
Kanter (1977a), who shares Weber’s assumption about the gender-
neutrality of the organisation as a terrain, identifies the gender-
neutrality of organizations as a central problem and observes: 
‘While organizations were being defined as sex-neutral machines, 
masculine principles were dominating their authority structures’ 
(Kanter, 1977a p.46). 
Kanter (1977a, 1993) observes links between levels of management 
and the use of personal discretion. She found that ‘the importance 
of discretion increases with closeness to the top of hierarchical 
organisation’ (ibid. p.52). This situation arises as the criteria for 
good decisions or good management performance become less 
certain the closer one gets to the top managerial levels.  
Discussion of the use of discretion at MOF links back to the fact 
that women are in a minority of 22% in total and 12% at managerial 
levels in the organisation. According to Kanter (Kanter, 1977b), this 
level of representation is only slightly beyond ‘tokenistic’ and falls 
short of ‘tilted’. In this context, rather than looking at how the 
women exercise discretion it may be more appropriate to ask how 
they are affected by discretion. 
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I explore this element of MOF’s gendered archaeology through the 
following questions: 
1. To what extent does discretion play a role in promotion? 
2. To what extent does discretion against women at MOF limit 
their career progression? 
3. How are women at MOF perceived as leaders?  
4. What other structures are imposed on women at MOF? 
2.3.7 Gendered space and time 
This element of Goetz’s framework mainly stems from the divide 
between gendered private and public life and how this relates to the 
physical and social structure of an organisation’s work. For example, 
men’s social capacity frees them from domestic responsibilities, 
including childcare, allowing them to invest more time in the 
workplace. For women, however, this boundary is blurred; in fact 
the main problem for women with and within organisations is that 
organisations have been constructed with ‘male-centred 
assumptions about the extent to which the private can be marked off 
from the public’ (Halford et al., 1997 p.192). This assumption rings 
especially true in bureaucratic organisations such as MOF, where 
there is a career hierarchy to climb. While a man’s bureaucratic 
career usually relies on the existence of a wife to look after his 
children and mind his household the reverse does not automatically 
apply to female bureaucrats. Women’s experience in the 
organisation cannot easily be separated from their domestic 
situation, often to the extent that domestic responsibilities and 
identities become central to workplace life, as Halford et al (1997) 
found in their study of banking, nursing and local government in 
the UK. In a further study, Halford and Leonard (2006a) look at the 
effect of gendered space and time on gendered identities in the 
gendered organisation. They argue that understanding the mobility 
and fluidity of the concepts of time, space and place is essential to 
understanding power and agency. 
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In this thesis, ‘gendered space and time’ refers to practices at MOF 
that deal with placement, relocation and overtime, how MOF female 
managers respond to these policies and the extent to which this 
experience shapes their identities. While these issues would be 
formulated as ‘procedural justice’ versus ‘work-life balance’ in 
mainstream management studies (see, for example, Poelmans and 
Beham, 2008), in this thesis I look at them from an international 
development perspective, taking into account the Javanese cultural 
understanding of expected gender roles. This is the area that Rao et 
al (1999) refer to as ‘the split between work and family’.  
Acker (1990) argues that people who are qualified and do not have 
to divide their commitment are able to get to the top regardless of 
their gender. As her research is mainly based on developed country 
experiences, her argument may be informed by western lifestyles in 
which people manage their domestic responsibilities without 
external help. In countries like Indonesia, however, many 
households have a servant or a maid, making it easier for women to 
advance in their careers. The thesis assesses the extent to which 
this is the case in Indonesia’s MOF.  
In dealing with the concept of time, I use a sociological life-course 
framework (Elder, 1996, Elder, 1994) to analyse the choices that 
MOF female managers make about their careers in order to 
reconcile their work and family life. 
This element of MOF’s gendered archaeology is explored through the 
following questions: 
1. How does MOF accommodate gender roles across the 
work/home divide? 
2. To what extent does MOF’s approach to structuring time and 
space affect women’s participation? 
3. How do women reconcile their career and their domestic 
lives? 
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4. How do women negotiate their gendered (and multiple) 
identities in MOF? 
2.3.8 Gendered incentive and accountability systems 
As Goetz (1997a p.22) explains: ‘Incentives may be tied more to 
quantitatively measurable performance targets than to qualitative 
matters such as promoting empowerment processes. Accountability 
may be oriented towards more vociferously demanding constituencies 
(...) rather than downwards or horizontally towards women’s groups’. 
As other research (see for example Miller and Razavi, 1998) shows, 
the process of implementing GM usually has more to do with 
external pressure and accountability to donors than with 
accountability to female employees. 
I discuss these gendered incentive and accountability systems 
through the lens of the setting up and implementation of a GM 
effort at MOF. The main research questions in this chapter are:  
1. To whom is MOF’s GM effort accountable?  
2. To what extent does GM help MOF to change as an 
organisation? 
3. To what extent do the internal gender dynamics within the 
GM team affect their external outcomes? 
2.4 Other approaches to the gendered 
organisation 
Goetz’s framework assumes that organisations are not gender-
neutral terrain. In the past, it was assumed that the limited number 
of women in bureaucracies was a reflection of wider society, 
including their lower participation in higher education and 
disparities in the distribution of social and economic goods (Goetz 
1992). These days however, it is widely accepted that the 
organisation is gendered terrain in its own right. 
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Ferguson (1984) argues that bureaucratic organisational structures 
cannot be separated from gendered power because bureaucratic 
organisational structures are masculine. She suggests that 
contemporary bureaucracy should be understood both as a 
structure and a process. Male dominance will persist no matter how 
the structures are redesigned, because bureaucratic principles are 
much closer to the male way of doing things, from the 
establishment of office hours that do not take into account the 
needs of the family at home, to how out-of-office networking is 
arranged. The only way to overcome this is for women to establish 
alternative forms of organisation that suit their needs and 
aspirations. 
Ferguson’s argument suggests that a bureaucratic organisation is 
not gender-neutral terrain. This assumption is developed by Acker 
(1990), who suggests that organisations are inherently gendered. 
Based on studies in developed countries, she sets out the theory of 
gendered organisation to make sense of the gender inequality in 
bureaucracies, arguing that organisations are gendered institutions 
due to five interacting processes: 
1. the construction of divisions along the lines of gender 
(labour; allowed behaviour; location in physical space; power, 
including institutionalised means of maintaining divisions in the 
structures of family; the labour market, and the state); 
2. the construction of symbols and images that explain, 
express, reinforce or sometimes oppose those divisions; 
3. interactions between men and women, women and women, 
and men and men, including all patterns that enact dominance and 
submission; 
4. the gendered components of individual identity that these 
constructions and interaction processes help to produce, which may 
include consciousness of the existence of other aspects of gender, 
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namely choice of work, use of language, clothing, and the 
presentation of self as a gendered member of an organisation; 
5. an ongoing process of creating and conceptualising social 
structures, including complex organisations. 
Acker (1990) argues that the concept of a job, although apparently 
gender-neutral, is actually gendered as it already encapsulates 
gender divisions of labour and separation between the public and 
the private spheres. Hierarchies are gendered because they are 
constructed with the underlying assumptions that those who are 
committed to employment are more suited to responsibility and 
authority and that those who must divide their commitments (i.e. 
women) are more suited to the lower ranks.  
If it is accepted that organisations in general are by definition 
gendered, it is necessary to assess the ways in which this occurs. 
Britton (2000) discusses three ways in which the concept of the 
gendered organisation is applied in academic writing. Firstly, the 
ideal-typical bureaucracy is inherently gendered, which means that 
it has been defined, conceptualised and structured based on a 
distinction between masculinity and femininity and will thus 
inevitably reproduce gendered differences. Both Ferguson and 
Acker’s conceptions of gendered organisation fall into this category. 
Secondly, an organisation or occupation can be seen as gendered by 
headcount: i.e. by which gender dominates in terms of 
representation. Thirdly, an organisation or occupation can be 
regarded as gendered in that it is symbolically and ideologically 
described and conceived in terms of a discourse that draws on 
hegemonically-defined masculinities and femininities (Britton, 2000 
p.420).  
Rao et al (1999), who combine feminist and organisational change 
theories, argue that the way to understand the gendered nature of 
organisation is to work with what they call the ‘deep structure’ of 
organisation. In this they include four elements: 1) valuing heroic 
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individualism, which encourages the culture of winning (and the 
winners tend to be men); 2) exclusionary power, which devalues 
participation and silences the voices that would present the 
alternative perspective and knowledge required for gender-equal 
outcomes (Rao et al., 1999 p.12); 3) a split between work and 
family; and 4) the monoculture of instrumentality (the tendency to 
focus narrowly on a single purpose and one course of action to get 
there, which often takes the attention away from the bigger picture 
of women’s empowerment).  
While ‘valuing heroic individualism’ can be paralleled with Goetz’s 
gendered cognitive context, and the ‘split between work and family’ 
resonates with her concept of gendered space and time, 
‘exclusionary power’ is a concept that is not easy to deal with in 
analysing an organisation, in this case MOF. It intersects with 
Goetz’s gendered authority structure, with more focus on the 
external organisational environment. Depending on one’s view of 
organisational culture, a monoculture of instrumentality could be 
pigeon-holed as part of it. 
2.5 Power and empowerment 
The overarching research question in this thesis is about the extent 
to which MOF’s gendered archaeology impacts on women’s 
empowerment. By ‘women’ in this context I mean the female 
employees of MOF. It is widely acknowledged that the word ‘power’, 
from which the concept of empowerment derives, has both negative 
and positive meanings (Kabeer, 1999). The negative notion of power 
refers to ‘power over’, the type of power that controls, dominates 
and subordinates others to achieve particular goals. The positive 
sense of power refers to people’s capacity to decide for themselves 
about what they want to do. This kind of power includes ‘power in’, 
‘power with’ and ‘power to’. ‘Power in’ represents self-confidence, 
self-awareness and assertiveness. People who have already acquired 
this type of power may join together (here the idea of ‘power with’ – 
power through collective action and solidarity – operates) to exercise 
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power to do something in their interest. In the sense of women’s 
empowerment, power cannot be granted. According to Kabeer, it 
should be acquired by the women themselves. As such, an 
institution or organisation can create an environment that enables 
disempowered women to gain power. 
Hall (1992) defines empowerment as individual self-realisation and 
self-assertion, while Oakley and Marsden (1984) extend this to 
control over decisions regarding all aspects of not only one’s life but 
also one’s livelihood. 
Many theories of empowerment are small-scale and tend only to be 
applied to poor rural men and women, rarely touching the subject of 
the urban middle classes in developing countries. It has long been 
acknowledged that women in developing countries commonly 
perceive themselves differently to how western feminists portray 
them (Momsen and Townsend, 1987), and I argue that even in an 
urban middle-class setting this difference still holds. A female 
manager at MOF may hold a master’s degree from a developed 
country but this does not necessarily mean that she thinks and 
regards herself the same way her counterparts in developed 
countries do. 
In this thesis the term ‘empowerment’ is used loosely to describe a 
process that a female employee goes through from being less 
empowered to becoming more empowered in the sense of 
negotiating her existence at MOF. Power is not seen as a top-down, 
systematic, one-way journey imposed from the organisation onto 
the employees. Instead, I choose to see power as dispersed, with 
everybody at MOF, as a bureaucratic organisation, exercising power 
in their daily lives to negotiate their identities in the organisation in 
relation to other organisational members, which in the end makes 
their identities fluid rather than stagnant. 
Post-structuralist perspectives on gender and the organisation rest 
on different understandings of power. Rather than being restricted 
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to the hands of a dominant few, power is seen as circulating 
between all social actors and operates through the construction of 
language and discourse. This shapes how people perceive 
themselves and how they see the world around them. (Foucault, 
1986 p.233-234) discusses this at length: 
Power is not that which makes the difference between those who 
exclusively possess and retain it, and those who do not have it and 
submit to it. Power must be analysed as something which circulates, 
or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It 
is never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never 
appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed 
and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do 
individuals circulate between its threads; they are always 
simultaneously in the position of undergoing and exercising power. 
They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also 
elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the 
vehicles of power, not the points of its application. 
 
Based on post-modernist/post-structuralist understandings of 
power, my research does not assume that agency rests only with the 
government of Indonesia exercising its power to sustain a gendered 
civil service; neither do I assume that women in the Indonesian 
bureaucracy are powerless and oppressed by all powerful 
bureaucratic men. I see both women’s and men’s relation to power 
in a bureaucratic organisation as complex and shifting, where both 
may have power and be subject to power. For example, a female 
manager has power over her male subordinates but at the same 
time is constrained by the director who is her immediate boss.  
Women at MOF may have their own strategies for making their way 
through the bureaucracy. They may also be shaping the 
organisation, or some posts in it, to enable themselves to achieve 
goals in other aspects of their lives. For example, some may not 
57 
 
strive to achieve a position in top-level management, feeling that 
mid-management is a more convenient position which leaves them 
time and energy to play with their young children. Again, this can 
be seen as a conscious choice rather than one made ‘under 
oppression’ or ‘false-consciousness’.  
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter elaborates the research process relating to the 
questions set out in the analytical framework chapter, including the 
planning and execution of the fieldwork and the analysis and 
interpretation of the data. As established in the framework chapter, 
the research exposes the ‘gender archaeology’ (Goetz, 1997a) of the 
Indonesian Ministry of Finance’s bureaucratic system. 
The research is mostly qualitative, applying organisational 
ethnography, and is mainly focused on women in top and middle 
management.  UNDP’s GEM (1995-2010) suggests that decision-
making positions are located at these two managerial levels, and 
hence they constitute one of the four GEM indicators. Although 
GEM was replaced by the Gender Inequality Index in 2011, as 
discussed in the introduction to this thesis, it played an important 
role in the design of this research framework.  
This chapter pays attention to my positionality as a researcher 
because of my own working experience in the Indonesian MOF. 
Before embarking on a PhD I was a MOF employee for more than 
ten years. I gained my familiarity with MOF after studying at the 
State Accounting College (STAN), a college belonging to MOF whose 
graduates are automatically employed by MOF all over Indonesia. 
After graduating I worked in the Training Agency (TA), a unit that 
meets the training needs of all MOF employees. I also became the 
gender focal point for the TA. I resigned from the organisation after 
twelve years. 
I studied finance and accounting for my undergraduate degree, so 
gender research represented a shift in my career interests. The 
turning point was a result of working in MOF, where I noted blatant 
gender discrimination in recruitment and throughout my colleagues’ 
careers.  
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This study does not constitute action research (Argyris et al., 1985, 
Reason and Bradbury, 2001), as its results and findings do not aim 
to directly improve practices within MOF; nor was it commissioned 
by MOF for its own benefit. My employment there ended before I 
started my PhD. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the broad methodological 
approach used to answer the set of research questions laid out in 
the framework chapter. From there, I explain how the methods were 
operationalised, and the chapter closes with a discussion on the 
effectiveness of the research strategies.  
3.2 Methodological Approach 
I conducted an organisational ethnography in the organisation 
where I had worked and in my own cultural setting with the aim of 
reporting the results to an international readership. Although some 
writers would define this research as autoethnography as it involves 
me translating my ‘home’ culture for an audience of ‘others’ (Reed-
Danahay, 1997, Karra and Phillips, 2008), my personal experience 
is not central to the research, nor did it become the main source of 
the data gathered and analysed.  And being autoethnographic in the 
sense of translating my ‘home’ culture, for me the choice of research 
site was also opportunistic (Reimer, 1977), as I did not make a 
special attempt to seek out and gain access to an interesting field 
location. Instead, I found myself in an interesting organisation and 
then decided to do research on it. 
I am familiar with two parts of MOF, which became my research 
loci. The first is the TA, where I was mostly based during my 
employment. Included in the TA is the STAN, where I had studied 
before my employment in MOF. The second is the Gender 
Mainstreaming (GM) Team, an inter-organisational matrix 
programme with members from across the Ministry.  
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My personal involvement with MOF’s GM programme began when I 
returned to work there after completing a Masters degree in Gender 
and Development in the UK. Upon my return I was not immediately 
reinstated in my previous managerial position but placed in the 
Human Resources (HR) Division in TA without a formal job 
description. Since I was less busy than my colleagues, I was sent to 
attend meetings outside TA that the Director could not attend, 
including GM meetings. Everybody at MOF knew that I was the only 
person in the ministry with a specialised degree in gender and 
development, but since the GM team had been set up while I was 
abroad, my initial involvement was rather limited. I also attended 
meetings to represent the head of HR, reporting back to her 
afterwards. I became more involved in the programme in the 
following fiscal year, when I was chosen as the focal point for the 
TA. This gave me a place on the team, allowing me to be more active 
in shaping MOF’s GM strategy for the five months before I resigned 
and moved to the UK.  
During these five months I formed acquaintances with everybody 
who was involved in and related to GM in MOF. I also made detailed 
notes on all my meetings and interactions within MOF and with 
people from outside MOF. These five months formed a foundation 
for the research chapter on GM in MOF. When I returned for my 
fieldwork a couple of years later, I not only knew my way around 
and which people I should approach for what information, I was 
also welcomed by the staff as a returnee. 
In organisational ethnography it is very important to immerse 
oneself in the researched organisation, which involves shifting one’s 
position between that of insider and that of outsider (Bell, 1999, 
Neyland, 2008, Ybema, 2009).  During my fieldwork I was moving 
between the two positions all the time depending on which office I 
was observing. In the training office I had to shift from insider to 
outsider; in the tax and treasury offices I was mostly outside their 
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group, but still an insider in the sense that I belonged to the 
Ministry.  
I was and am an outsider in the sense that I am no longer working 
for MOF. Meanwhile, whilst switching between being insider and 
outsider, my position as an outsider was still different from that of a 
western social scientist researching Indonesian bureaucracy. As 
someone born and bred in Indonesia, I was doing research in my 
own cultural context for presentation in an international audience 
and for the people at MOF. So from this perspective I might be 
considered an ‘insider’. 
Also, having been part of MOF for so long and knowing so many of 
its staff, I could not help being perceived as an insider by my 
research participants, some of whom did not even realise at the 
beginning of their interview that I not been working there for a 
while. Even after I told them I had resigned from MOF a year before 
starting my PhD, they still treated me as ‘one of them’. All of this 
helped to establish rapport and trust, as I discuss in section 3.8.3 
of this chapter. 
My experience working in MOF granted me easier access to it as a 
research setting than would have been possible for someone without 
a similar background, let alone a western academic conducting a 
similar study. My feelings about certain aspects of MOF shaped the 
research questions and how I phrased them in the interviews. My 
subjectivity and emotions as a researcher unavoidably played some 
part in shaping the knowledge that I produced through this 
research. 
Acker et al (1996) discuss power relations in research, not only 
amongst the researched subjects but also between the researcher 
and the researched. My positionality as insider (or the researched 
subjects’ perception of me as an insider) created interesting power 
relations between us. I had feared that power issues would interfere 
with my fieldwork when I interviewed people who had been my 
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superiors at MOF. This would have represented the case where the 
researcher, too, can be vulnerable in terms of power relations with 
the researched (Cotterill, 1992). In most cases this did not happen 
as the participants did not exercise their power in such a way as to 
hinder my data-gathering activities, for example when I was 
investigating the MOF recruitment system, which I found gender-
discriminatory.  Although some of the participants from higher 
managerial levels assumed a superior position to me, as someone 
who used to be or could have been their subordinate, I did not 
challenge their patronising attitude. I accepted that as a researcher 
I was learning from them, by way of the interview, about their lives 
and their views on MOF. 
Another issue that I faced, especially during my fieldwork, was my 
concern about exploiting my friendship with ex-colleagues in MOF 
in return for data that I needed for my research. In feminist 
research this anxiety about trading off friendship has been related 
to power relations between the researcher and the researched 
(Acker et al., 1996, Kirsch, 2005), and emerges when the researcher 
forms friendships with research participants in order to encourage 
open communication. In my case the friendships predated the 
research and my concern was about exploiting long-term 
friendships. I chose not to exclude these friends from my research, 
mainly because by doing so I would have reduced the number of 
research participants. Since the total number of female managers in 
MOF was already limited, excluding friends would have been a 
major limitation. I also included them because some were very keen 
to be part of my research. The only strategy I could think of to 
minimise the danger of exploiting them was to ask them, when the 
interview got very personal, whether they minded if I included this 
part in my direct quotation and analysis. 
3.2.1 Formulating the research questions 
The research questions for this PhD are derived from the conceptual 
framework elaborated in the previous chapter and dictated by the 
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availability of data. As discussed in the conceptual framework, this 
thesis applies Goetz’s (1997a) concept of the ‘gender archaeology’ of 
organizations, several aspects of which are investigated in this 
research (see Table 2.1).  
3.2.2 Research timeframe 
This thesis is based on observations made intermittently during my 
employment at MOF from 1993-2005 (with an interruption in 2002-
2003), and during my fieldwork in 2006 and 2007. At the time of 
analysis and writing up I was still in contact with respondents to 
clarify some issues and get updates of subsequent events. 
3.2.3 Choice of fieldwork site 
MOF Personnel Bureau data show that women in senior and mid-
level management tend to be based in medium to large cities and 
not in remote areas. My research was mainly located in Jakarta and 
in several offices in big cities on the main islands of Indonesia: 
Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Medan. The Ministry of Finance is 
administered centrally, and employees are moved around to posts 
across Indonesia every three years. By basing the research mainly 
in Jakarta plus some big cities, I expected that it would be possible 
to obtain a representative sample of women at the top levels of 
management.  
3.2.4 Design and sampling 
3.2.4.1. Local organisational knowledge: MOF 
At the time of this fieldwork, MOF comprised eleven ‘echelon I 
units’. Some of these units were called Directorate Generals (DGs) 
and others Agencies. MOF is a holding company whereby individual 
units have job descriptions that are independent of each other, 
instead of forming a production line. Every echelon I unit is directed 
by an echelon I official, whose title depended on the name and type 
of the organisation. Each echelon I unit comprised several echelon II 
units which managed some echelon III units. Table 3.1, showing the 
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structure of MOF, is based on my first fieldwork visit in July-
September 2006.   
Table ‎3-1 shows that all of the heads of echelon I units were men. 
Immediately after my fieldwork period the TA’s leadership was given 
to a woman. Before I managed to arrange an interview with her, 
however, she was moved to another ministry. In the next chapter I 
explain that echelon I positions are highly political rather than 
career-based appointments. 
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Table ‎3-1 Structure of MOF 
No UNIT 
Echelon I Echelon II Echelon III Echelon IV Echelon V 
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
1 Training Agency 1 0 1 7 0 7 26 7 33 86 15 101 18 5 23 
2 Stock Market Agency 1 0 1 7 0 7 23 8 31 79 28 107 5 4 9 
3 Fiscal Policy Agency 1 0 1 4 0 4 21 2 23 50 16 66 88 30 118 
4 DG of  Budget Planning 1 0 1 8 0 8 34 4 38 115 32 147 200 62 262 
5 DG of Customs and Excise 1 0 1 22 0 22 152 3 155 734 80 814 942 147 1,089 
6 DG of Fiscal Institution 1 0 1 4 0 4 14 1 15 67 13 80 92 45 137 
7 DG of Tax 1 0 1 42 0 42 418 16 434 2,615 460 3,075 3,444 1,231 4,675 
8 DG  of Treasury 1 0 1 30 7 37 356 21 377 813 78 891 1,700 507 2,207 
9 State Assets Management 1 0 1 12 2 14 93 5 98 374 55 429 0 0 0 
10 Internal Audits 1 0 1 7 0 7 3 0 3 24 3 27 51 23 74 
11 Secretariat General 4 0 4 9 0 9 44 12 56 131 62 193 181 90 271 
TOTAL 14 0 14 152 9 161 1,184 79 1,263 5,088 842 5,930 6,721 2,144 8,865 
Note: DG Directorate General 
Source: MOF Personnel Bureau, July 2006 
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I obtained the data for table 3.1 from the Personnel Bureau, which 
is under the Secretariat General Office. However, to get the details 
of each person in the table I had to go to their units because MOF 
personnel records were not integrated. Also, Personnel Bureau 
records were updated annually whereas promotion and other 
placement activities occur two or three times a year. This system 
was under review as part of the bureaucratic reform programme 
launched by the Ministry in the year I was doing my fieldwork. 
According to the GEM, the women included in the calculation are 
those at the middle and top managerial levels, which are 
represented by echelons I, II and III in the Indonesian civil service I. 
Since MOF had no women in the first echelon at the time of my 
fieldwork, I focused my research on echelons II and III.  
During my fieldwork period MOF was undergoing major 
restructuring with offices changing from one month to the next. 
Restructuring took several forms: a whole office might merge with 
another, part of one office might merge with another, several parts 
might be merged to form a new office or restructuring might occur 
within the same office. There was also the possibility of forming a 
new unit from scratch, followed by recruitment to fill the new 
positions.  
To get a picture of the organisation’s culture I decided to observe 
the offices that were least affected by the restructuring process, or 
at least were only undergoing internal restructuring that did not 
involve merging with other offices. In this way I hoped to avoid bias 
resulting from the instability of the newly-formed organisation when 
observing relationships and gender dynamics. 
This left me with five offices to choose from: TA, the Secretariat 
General, the Directorate General of Treasury (DGTR), the 
Directorate General of Tax (DGTX) and the Directorate General of 
Customs and Excise. From these five, I chose three: the TA, the 
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DGTR and DGTX. Each of these three offices had regional branches 
and a more-or-less comparable gender composition.  
The Secretariat General is an administrative unit dealing with the 
needs of the whole Ministry. Its main tasks relate more to internal 
ministerial issues than to dealings with external organisations. 
Unlike the other four offices, the Secretariat General has no regional 
offices and is located in a single building. By contrast, Customs and 
Excise has regional offices dealing with the general public and a 
long-established structure. The reason I did not choose this 
organisation was because it is so male-dominated, with only three 
echelon III women out of 155 workers (see Table 3.1). Although it 
would have been interesting to study the struggles that these 
women faced, it would not be representative of MOF in general.  
3.2.4.2. Sampling 
The choice of participants was not entirely mine. Before setting off 
to Indonesia I had sent emails and faxes to inform MOF that I was 
hoping to do this fieldwork. My experience had taught me which 
unit and person I should direct these letters to in order to get 
favourable responses in good time. I sent a fax to the Minister’s 
office and within three working days received a reply signed by the 
Deputy Minister, agreeing to my plan and asking me for a list of the 
people I would like to interview and a timetable, so ‘they can make 
this a priority.’  
Before replying with a suggested timetable, I approached the 
Personnel Bureau and asked for a list of female mid-level managers 
who worked in the three units I had selected, and was given the 
details of 53 women. I replied to the Minister’s office with their 
names but without offering fixed interview dates, as I did not know 
whether the women would be willing to participate. Instead, I 
mentioned that I would be in Indonesia for four months and asked 
if they would be available during that period.  
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Meanwhile, using contact details from the Personnel Bureau, I 
contacted the women and asked if they would be willing to 
participate in the study. In the process of setting up interviews I 
learned that the data given to me were out of date. Three people on 
the list had retired, more than ten had been promoted, rotated or 
relocated, and more women appeared to hold the echelon 3 
positions in the DGTX than the list had indicated. 
I managed to trace these female managers and their contact details 
with the help of friends and ex-colleagues. Some agreed to 
participate and did so, while others agreed but never found a 
convenient time to be interviewed. While none directly refused to be 
interviewed, five people told me that in principle they had no 
objection to being interviewed but did not think they would be able 
to find the time.  
Table ‎3-2 Interviews 
  
Interview 
types 
  
Units 
Tax Budget Training 
Secretariat 
General 
Total 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Key 
informant 
interviews 
25 10 20 3 12 3 2 2 59 33 
Gatekeeper 
interviews 
4 3 3 8 5 13 3 5 15 14 
Total 29 13 23 11 17 16 5 7 74 47 
3.2.4.3. Key Informant Interviews 
According to King (1994), the types of interviews that can be 
considered qualitative vary from ‘deep’, ‘exploratory’ and ‘semi-
structured’ to ‘unstructured’. I chose to use semi-structured 
interviews in order to obtain comparable data with some flexibility 
for exploration when needed. During my first fieldwork visit I 
conducted some preliminary interviews and found that most 
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interviewees could not give me more than an hour and a half of 
their time. This time constraint convinced me that semi-structured 
interviews would work better than unstructured or in-depth ones. 
The research made use of two types of semi-structured interview: 
key informant interviews sought to explore the informants’ work 
and family lives, and gatekeeper interviews mainly focussed on 
understanding MOF’s internal organisational structure and culture. 
In some cases these two types of interview overlapped with the same 
informant. 
A set of questions was put to participants about their careers and 
working experiences.  I focused on women in senior management to 
get a picture of the complexity of women’s experiences in a 
bureaucratic organisation, including how they used discretion and 
how it was used against or for them, and how their careers 
intersected with other priorities. 
In conducting the interviews I did not totally disengage myself from 
the interviewees. This was made possible by my previous 
employment in MOF, which helped me to understand how things 
were done in the organisation. My knowledge of the research site 
helped my respondents to open up to me, both as a woman and as 
somebody who was familiar with MOF, although not all had known 
me in person before the interview.  
Ideally, I would have liked to stratify the interviewees, for example 
according to age, ethnic group or religious belief. However, I had to 
bear in mind that not all of these female managers (who were few in 
the first place) would be willing to participate. Therefore my strategy 
was to send an invitation to participate in the research with a 
request for an interview to all women holding echelon III positions in 
the three units. I decided that if everybody agreed to participate, 
which seemed highly unlikely, I would be able to stratify them when 
I did the analysis. Nearly everybody agreed to be interviewed.  
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Just before my second fieldwork period there was another round of 
restructuring at MOF. This time the Budget Office was restructured 
and divided into two units: the Budget Office and the Treasury 
Office. Most of the women I had previously identified and who had 
agreed to be interviewed went to the Treasury Office. Consequently I 
chose this rather than the other branch. As soon as I arrived in 
Jakarta I phoned the Secretariat and checked that people were able 
to participate in the interviews as I had proposed. We modified the 
timetable a little to accommodate individual preferences, but in 
general the interviews were conducted according to plan. I had 
recruited a research assistant (RA) who accompanied me to several 
interviews so that she would be able to interview people who were 
unavailable during my fieldwork period and clarify points based on 
the interview transcriptions. In the end she only conducted 11 of 
the 121 interviews and I carried out the rest. All interviews were 
digitally taped and transcribed on the same day to ensure the 
quality of the result. This meant that I could go back the next day, 
or ask my RA to do so, if there were points to clarify or follow-up 
questions.  
I found that people in DGTX tended to follow their standard 
operating procedure and stick to appointments that I had made, 
which was reassuring when it came to the interview schedule. 
Respondents were always where they had said they would be, and 
never more than an hour late. I had spaced my interviews with a 
two hour interval between them in order to give me time to write 
notes and to allow for tardiness. 
I had nearly finished the interviews and observation in the Treasury 
Office when I started at the Taxation Office. The Secretary General 
had sent a letter informing the office about my research, but there 
had been no reply from the Director General of Taxation. Instead of 
going through the official channels I talked to people I knew from 
my time working there and was pleasantly surprised to find that 
they were extremely helpful, despite their tight schedule.  
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One contact that I knew from STAN was a member of a pengajian, 
or Koran reciting group, held during lunch breaks. She contacted 
some female managers she knew and scheduled interviews for me. 
The following day, as I was waiting in a corridor for an interview, the 
person I had just finished interviewing was chatting with someone 
else and mentioned that like me, the latter was married to a 
westerner. This new contact turned out to be very useful, 
introducing me to all the female managers in the Tax Office that she 
knew through work or church. In the end I interviewed 25 female 
managers, none of whom I had known at the beginning of my 
research, within a couple of weeks despite not going through formal 
channels.  
On the tapes and transcriptions there is no obvious difference in 
terms of content between interviews resulting from this informal 
approach and those arranged formally. I had anticipated that people 
who formally arranged to be interviewed might have been reserved 
in criticising MOF or volunteering delicate information about 
corruption, but as it turned out, everybody seemed to speak their 
mind about their colleagues and MOF as an organisation. Moreover, 
apart from people in TA where I had previously worked, I did not 
know most of the respondents. In TA I was welcomed as part of the 
team and nearly everyone volunteered to be interviewed, even before 
being asked. It felt a little like researching members of my own 
family, with all its associated advantages and disadvantages, as I 
had worked with these respondents for more than ten years. 
As much as I would have liked the data to be comparable, I did not 
try to quantify the responses since the main purpose of the research 
was not to generalise the findings but to explore some possibilities. 
The concluding chapter of the thesis raises the issue of whether 
these women’s experiences may be representative of women working 
in other organisations. 
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3.2.4.4. Research Participant Profiles 
3.2.4.4.1. Female managers in MOF: qualifications, family and 
marital status  
As mentioned above, 59 mid- and top-level female managers of 
DGTR, DGTX, and TA were amongst the people who participated in 
this research. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were used to 
obtain their personal stories.  
The Indonesian civil service has a very complex grading and ranking 
system which is not based only on employees’ performance. There is 
a wide difference in career paths and achievements depending on 
people’s academic qualifications when they first join MOF (see 
Chapters 4 and 5). With this in mind, I divided the interviewees into 
three MOF recruitment categories: those who joined from high 
school, those who joined on completing the STAN three-year 
diploma course; and those who joined as sarjana (university 
graduate recruits) (Table3.3).  
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Table ‎3-3 Female Managers 
Recruitment Number of interviewees 
SMA 11  
STAN 9  
Sarjana 39  
Total 59  
 
Table 3.4 shows the age of the informants at the time of interview. 
Since very few people over 30 years old join the civil service (most of 
my interviewees joined MOF directly after graduating), their length 
of service corresponds with their age: older employees would have 
longer term of service than the younger ones.  
Table ‎3-4 Age at time of interview 
Age Number of interviewees 
38-44 25  
45-50 18  
51-56 16  
  
Table ‎3-5 Marital status 
Marital status Number of interviewees 
Married 42  
Never married 8  
Divorced 5  
Widowed 4  
 
Table 3.5 shows that 8 of the 59 female managers, or 10 percent of 
the sample, are not married. Fifty-one women were or had been 
married. Amongst them, only one was already married when she 
joined MOF. STAN prohibits its students from marrying (see 
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Chapter 6), but there was no such requirement for the sarjana 
intake.  
Among the 42 interviewees who were married when interviewed, 27 
had partners working as civil servants; the others’ partners worked 
in the private sector. This categorisation was made with the 
understanding that civil servants can be required to move around 
Indonesia, so where both partners worked in the civil service it 
would be interesting to see how they managed such rotation and 
relocation, and whether and how their respective careers were 
affected (see Chapters 6 and 8 for more on this subject). 
3.2.4.4.2. Male participants 
When I started my first fieldwork period I was hoping to be able to 
hold similar semi-structured interviews with men employed in MOF. 
I interviewed my male ex-colleagues from the TA, intending to cover 
the same range of issues as with their female colleagues. However, 
these interviews were much shorter than those with women and 
tended to reveal a clear boundary between work and domestic life, 
which was not the case with the women.  
The male employees were generally less inclined to do ‘this kind of 
interview’, as one of them put it. One suggested that I should be 
more efficient about taking their time, and proposed that I use the 
assembly hall for half an hour, standing at the front and going 
through my questions, which they would answer in turn from left to 
right. However, the men in the TA agreed to participate in a focus 
group discussion about organisational culture and how it enables or 
disables women’s participation.  
When I tried to approach male employees in the DGTR and DGTX I 
got a similar response. I mostly had to catch the men on my way to 
other interviews. For example, I bumped into some men who had 
been at college with me, and they offered five or ten minutes of their 
time for an interview. Often during an interview with a female 
manager some of her male colleagues appeared for one reason or 
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another, usually related to their work, and chipped in on the 
interviews, offering their views on particular subjects. As the tape 
was running, their responses were recorded as well, and they did 
not mind me using what they said in my analysis. In total, including 
those who ‘chipped in’, we interviewed 33 male MOF employees (see 
Table 3.6). 
Table ‎3.6 Male interviewees 
Recruitment 
SMA 3  
STAN 18  
Sarjana 12  
Age 
38-44 22  
45-50 8  
51-56 3  
Marital status 
Married 33  
Never married/ 
divorced/widowed 
0 
 
 
3.2.4.5. Gatekeeper Interviews 
Apart from the core interviews with women and men in the top 
managerial positions described above, I also conducted some 
interviews with ‘gatekeepers’ to investigate the nature of power 
relations in MOF. These gatekeepers included the people 
responsible for recruitment, posting and promotion, and those 
responsible for combating corruption at MOF. These interviews 
covered the history of MOF, its organisational culture, informal 
structures, the elite circles found in each of the three echelon I 
units, and how decisions were made. 
3.2.4.6. Direct Observation 
As in most organisational ethnography, observation played a big 
part in the fieldwork. Junker (1960) looks at four different positions 
that an ethnographer can occupy: complete participant, participant 
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as observer, observer as participant and complete observer. Neyland 
(2008) does not recommend the positions of complete participant or 
complete observer. I kept shifting between participant as observer 
and observer as participant. In part, this resulted from changes in 
my own work status and official relationship to MOF. 
I started observing MOF long before I embarked on the PhD. My 
decision to apply to do a Masters in Gender and Development in 
2002-2003 was driven by the high level of discrimination against 
women that I had faced for my ten years as an MOF worker. On 
returning from doing my Masters to work at MOF I started keeping 
a personal journal based on my experience and observation of daily 
practice at MOF. Although the journal is personal and includes my 
feelings at the time, I had been expecting to refer back to it when I 
did my interviews, although to do so I would have to ask staff’s 
permission to use the material gathered before I started my PhD. 
During this time my position was that of ‘participant as observer’. 
After two more years I resigned from MOF to move to the UK and 
start my PhD. In the second year of my studies I returned to MOF to 
carry out my fieldwork, this time as ‘observer as participant’. 
Further discussion of my role as insider and outsider and its 
implications for the research follow later in this chapter as part of a 
reflection on the effectiveness of the fieldwork strategy. 
At the same time as conducting the interviews I also made 
observations in the workplace. According to my experience of the 
preliminary research and of working in MOF, most people (1) 
wanted to be interviewed in their office so that they would not have 
to leave their work, and (2) were late for the interview, usually 
because they were dealing with issues that had just come up and 
needed an immediate response, in which cases I had to wait for 
some time.   I used this waiting time, too, to observe and talk to 
other people, generally subordinates of the female manager 
respondents, in the office. Key aspects of observation included the 
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layout of the office, the way people dressed, and how employees 
communicated with each other their seniors and their subordinates. 
3.2.4.7. Focus Group Discussions (FGD) 
Initially I did not expect focus group discussions to be feasible in 
the two Directorate Generals, where it was difficult enough to 
arrange a meeting with the top managers individually, let alone get 
them together at the same time and place. However, an opportunity 
arose unexpectedly. While I was waiting to conduct a key interview 
at DGTX, several people that I was going to interview that day 
happened to be having a meeting together. When their own meeting 
finished, they asked me if it would be possible for me to interview 
them together to save them time. I took this opportunity to run an 
FGD about which aspects of MOF’s organisational culture enable or 
disable women’s participation.  
In the end this FGD at DGTX took more of the respondents’ time 
than all the individual interviews together would have done. I stayed 
in their office from 9am-2pm and was even given lunch. As I was 
leaving, they thanked me for ‘helping them to offload’. This put me 
on the spot, as I had to be very careful about managing their 
expectations of my research, which was not meant to be action 
research and to emphasise that they would not benefit directly from 
participating. This FGD was taped but not fully transcribed because 
of its length: while listening to the recording I just made notes of 
points I wanted to use when writing about certain subjects. 
3.2.4.8. Secondary data collection 
Secondary data and grey literature, including data about internal 
HR management and development, were obtained from several MOF 
sources, particularly the Secretariat General, a unit of which has a 
housekeeping function for MOF including planning and budgeting 
to which the GM programme is attached. HR statistics were used to 
obtain a general picture of the gendered participants (Goetz, 1997a) 
78 
 
of MOF and to locate the sample for interview early on in the 
research.  
MOF had a reasonably good archive system and did not dispose of 
old documents. To access the appropriate documents, however, it 
was necessary to know the right questions to ask the right people. 
This required considerable familiarity with the organisation. Most of 
the statistics were found to be correct when triangulated with other 
sources of information, although this did not seem to apply in other 
government ministries. When I was trying to develop a comparative 
analysis with the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) I found many 
mistakes in the HR statistics that could not be traced or 
triangulated. Even the HR statistics on their websites did not add 
up.  
The policy documents were mostly used to collect data for Chapter 
11 on GM. Chapter 11 draws upon several forms of data: my 
personal work experience, my fieldwork, official documents from the 
Ministry of Women Empowerment (MOWE) and some international 
funding agencies, all the notes and files kept by the GM team 
between 2003-2010 plus various updates that they continued to 
supply me with, and documents available on the Internet. 
As I was not involved when the GM effort started, the section on 
MOF is based on interviews I held during my fieldwork period with 
men and women involved in the programme. These were 
triangulated with formal documents such as the minutes of 
meetings, MOF’s internal and external correspondence and other 
forms of documentation. Later in my research these internal 
documents and interview data were also triangulated with national 
and international reports on GM in Indonesia such as a UNDP 
country report on GM (Cattleya, 2006). 
Another source of information was the laws and regulations about 
specific financial issues that have gendered impacts on people’s 
lives and livelihoods, such as taxation law, and other secondary 
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data obtained from formal documents, internal and external 
reports, journals, newspapers and magazines. 
3.3 Interpretation and analysis 
At the end of my fieldwork I had interview transcripts, field notes, 
audio recordings, and many official reports and policy documents. 
These were analysed and categorised into themes according to my 
conceptual framework. Initially I used NVivo to categorise and 
analyse the data. The software kept crashing my computer, so I 
performed a manual coding and categorisation based on my 
interpretation of Goetz’s gender archaeology of organisations.  
Throughout the research process I needed to be constantly aware of 
my own positionality. As mentioned in the introduction, my own 
working experience in MOF has played an important role in shaping 
this research. Accurate observation was a delicate issue as it was 
impossible to entirely mask my personal perceptions and opinions.  
3.4 Reflections on positionality and the 
effectiveness of the strategies 
3.4.1. Researching in a familiar setting 
Researching in a familiar setting created both opportunities and 
challenges.  Karra and Phillips (2008 p.549) identify four strengths 
in doing research in one’s own cultural setting: ease of access, 
reduced resource requirements, increased ability to establish trust 
and rapport and reduced problems with translation. In my own 
research another strength became apparent apart from these four: 
the ability to triangulate information from research participants and 
the ease of keeping in touch even after the fieldwork finished.  
3.4.2. Ease of Access 
Studying at STAN gave me the advantage of knowing college 
colleagues who took up positions in units across MOF after 
graduating. My familiarity with MOF in general gave me another 
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point of contact with people of various ages, positions and 
managerial levels from other MOF units. These factors helped me to 
negotiate my re-entry to the organisation as a researcher rather 
than an employee. 
My personal familiarity with MOF was advantageous in numerous 
ways. It enabled me to navigate through a very complex 
organisational structure and personnel hierarchy. At the time of my 
fieldwork, MOF was going through a major reorganisation; because 
my research is about the organisation and the people there, 
knowledge of these gave me an important head start.  
3.4.3. Establishing Trust and Rapport 
My familiarity with staff at MOF helped me considerably in setting 
up interviews and arranging direct observation. I knew someone I 
could interview or who could point me to someone else who could be 
interviewed in each unit and nearly every office. This is particularly 
important when doing research in a government agency in 
Indonesia, where nearly every piece of information has to be 
handled with extreme confidentiality. It would have been difficult for 
a stranger to access the information that I obtained. 
My advanced knowledge of the MOF’s organisational culture helped 
me not only to identify the most relevant questions to put to my 
interviewees but also to tailor the questions in a way that did not 
offend them or make them uncomfortable. Furthermore, my 
interviewees felt confident enough to share stories and gossip about 
what was going on in MOF and rumours about the future with me. 
Some of this was off the record, so I could not draw on it directly to 
support my analysis. Nevertheless, it gave me a more complete 
picture and sometimes provided me with the opportunity to revisit 
these issues with other informants who were prepared to discuss 
them openly, without jeopardising my original source.  
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3.4.4. Reduced resource requirements and reduced 
problems with translation 
As an Indonesian my research costs were low, as I did not have to 
pay for accommodation during my fieldwork and there was no need 
for translation; the latter also meant that no detail was lost in 
translation. I could capture expressions and nuances and put them 
into the context of the interview, resulting in a higher degree of data 
reliability. Speaking the same language also helped me to oversee 
the quality of the work that my research assistant produced. 
3.4.5. Triangulation 
Triangulation is one of the strengths of the research design, and 
this is inseparable from my familiarity with MOF. First, I had access 
to the employee database, including the details of the people I 
interviewed. So, for example, if an interviewee stated that she had 
passed a test to study abroad but in the end had not gone I could 
crosscheck this with the MOF database, including when it had 
happened, what had been done about it and who had been handling 
the case, and could follow this up with another interview if 
necessary.  
Second, the contacts and acquaintances that I made when working 
in TA helped me to identify the recruitment batch that interviewees 
came from, and in some cases their life stories self-triangulated with 
others’. Here is an example of how this was done:  
Respondent A (talking about recruitment):  
I joined MOF in 1981. In my batch there were four people who got 
posted in this office:  Norma, Timbul and Rusdi and myself. Oh, 
actually it was five ... with Edward. But then Edward was reposted 
to the Secretariat General, and in the end he left MOF and became a 
lecturer in Yogyakarta, and Norma moved to the Treasury Office, so 
there were the three of us left... 
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I immediately noticed that the three people the respondent 
mentioned were on my interview list. From the HR database I could 
see that Norma was at the same level of management as 
Respondent A, and had an overseas Masters degree, but had only 
taken up that position ten years later. When I interviewed Norma 
later I asked her why she had been promoted so late, despite her 
degree. It came to light that a year after she joined MOF she had 
asked to be placed in Central Java to follow her husband, who 
worked there. Given the organisational culture, including how 
promotion was handled around that time, she might have been 
overlooked because she did not want to be moved to another city. 
Meanwhile, I could see from the organisational structure and HR 
data that both Timbul and Rusdi had been directors for ten years at 
the time of interviews. 
This ability to triangulate the data also proved useful for finding out 
whether a respondent was being truthful. One interviewee 
mentioned that she had passed a test to study abroad but at the 
time she was about to get married. There were no records on people 
who did not go abroad after passing the required test to do so, so I 
would have not been able to verify this had another women not 
brought up the subject. According to two different respondents who 
were interviewed at different times and in different places, this 
particular respondent did not pass the test. They stated that she 
had always claimed to have deliberately failed the test because she 
was getting married.  
Internal triangulation is linked with my ability to understand the 
key terminology and concepts used by my interviewees.  For 
example, when they referred to mutasi (tour of duty) I could 
immediately relate to this concept, having once worked in HR 
development. My knowledge of working in the Training Centre 
enabled me to compare the situation in their particular office to the 
offices where I had been based and other offices where my other 
interviewees worked. 
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Third, I was allowed access to important internal documents that 
facilitated triangulation. For example, when dealing with GM effort 
in MOF I was given all the relevant internal reports, minutes of 
meetings and tapes of meetings. I also managed to get access to the 
national evaluation of GM written by the Ministry of Women’s 
Empowerment-MOWE- (Kementerian Negara Pemberdayaan 
Perempuan, 2006) and UNDP’s country report (Cattleya, 2006). 
Both reports included MOF in their evaluation, which enabled me to 
crosscheck with MOF’s internal report. I do not believe that this 
would have been possible had I not been keeping up good 
connections with so many people in MOF over the years.  
3.4.6. Keeping in touch after the fieldwork had finished 
When doing my fieldwork, everybody I interviewed kindly gave me 
their email address and told me that I was welcome to get in touch 
in case I needed clarification or to follow up on anything. Initially I 
thought this was just politeness, but when I sent them all a small 
souvenir through my research assistant they all emailed me their 
thanks and asked if there was anything else I needed. I took this 
opportunity to ask them some follow-up questions and they all 
responded in detail within a week. 
All my key informants and some of the interviewees have Facebook 
accounts and they all added me as a Facebook friend. As I did not 
use Facebook systematically I did not formally include it as one of 
my research methodologies. During my data analysis, however, 
people’s status on Facebook sometimes served as a useful starting 
point for follow-up and triangulation with what they had said 
during an interview. 
Despite these important advantages there were also challenges in 
being a semi-insider, especially those related to my positionality as 
a researcher, as I discuss below. 
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3.4.7. Lack of critical distance 
During my fieldwork, and when I was analysing the research 
findings I took things for granted which a complete stranger would 
have found interesting or not understood; I missed them because 
they were familiar. These problems were reduced by obtaining 
feedback from my research supervisors and other readers 
unfamiliar with the specific setting. 
3.4.8. Conflicting roles? 
My initial involvement in MOF’s GM efforts sometimes put me in an 
awkward position during my fieldwork. When I was part of the GM 
team, people often turned to me for advice as the only person with a 
degree in gender analysis in development. Once I resigned from 
MOF I kept in touch with them as part of my research, in order to 
review the progress of the MOF’s GM effort. The people responsible 
for it, however, still saw me as a gender expert and kept asking my 
advice on where to direct their activities and channel the budget. 
This put me in a difficult position, because if I helped them there 
would have been a conflict of interests in the sense that I would be 
reviewing my own organisational agenda. On the other hand, I felt a 
certain sense of responsibility and did not want them to waste 
resources on activities that were unlikely to succeed. In the end I 
helped them to put forward a funding proposal to a European 
bilateral donor for a gender training programme, after they had 
independently come to the conclusion that they needed it. 
3.4.9. Asking ‘obvious’ things 
Being familiar with the surroundings also brought some challenges 
in the interview process, especially when people started their 
sentences with: ‘You know what I mean about [such and such]...’. It 
was apparent that they expected me to share their views on certain 
MOF bureaucracy issues. This put me in an awkward position, 
especially when, unavoidably, I interviewed friends and former 
colleagues. Some respondents found it bizarre that I asked certain 
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questions. For example, once I asked a respondent about the 
importance of religion in her life and she responded: ‘...Of course it 
is important, you know it is the most important thing in life. Why do 
you ask me that question? Have you become atheist now that you’ve 
lived abroad for a while?’ The next time I asked a similar question I 
had to find a more indirect way of putting it to avoid offending the 
participant by appearing to question their religiosity. 
My religion and nationality also posed a challenge during the 
fieldwork. Most of the research participants were interested in 
whether I changed my religion and my nationality to follow my 
British husband after I left MOF and Indonesia to settle in the UK 
with him. Those who have known me for a while knew that I am not 
a practising Muslim, although Islam is entered as my religion on my 
Indonesian identity card. Most of my friends accept this, and others, 
although disagreeing, avoid talking about this subject with me. In 
Indonesia it is not acceptable to directly admit that you are an 
atheist, agnostic or even that you are not practising your religion. It 
is best to avoid discussing it. I found it very difficult, however, when 
somebody asked me about my religious beliefs, as it is common for 
Javanese people to ask such personal questions. I was reluctant to 
give a straight answer as I did not want to offend them. There was 
an element of hypocrisy in this, since I was asking them about their 
personal lives and expecting them to be truthful. 
3.4.10. Ethical issues 
The description of the methods above makes it clear that the 
research participants were not dependent on the researcher in any 
way. Participation was voluntary, the participants were free to 
withdraw at any stage of the research, and I obtained informed 
consent forms from them all. The participants were mostly women, 
with some men in senior positions at the Ministry of Finance who 
were fully informed about the purpose of the research and could 
decide whether they wanted to participate.  
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All data were anonymised. I was careful not to mention the 
positions at MOF of interviewees who could be identified by them.  
Sometimes participants said something that did not represent the 
view of the organisation. I respected their right to make an off-the-
record statement which would not be quoted verbatim but might 
still be used to help in the data analysis. At the end of the research, 
the interview transcriptions were sent to the respective participants 
for confirmation of their content. Some sent the transcription back 
with minor corrections about the details of places and dates, and 
one person changed her mind about an event she had told me 
about and asked me to keep it off-record. 
The notes taken during the period when I was not officially doing 
fieldwork were only used to help in my analysis. Although I 
described some events in my notes in a very detailed way, I did not 
use direct quotes without the permission of the participants 
concerned. On several occasions when these detailed accounts 
could be useful to support my argument I discussed them with the 
participant in question during an interview, both to confirm my 
observation and to get the participants’ first-hand account of the 
event. 
3.5 Limitations 
The research has two key limitations. First, it does not provide a 
comparative study of men and women’s experience of working in 
Indonesian MOF. Instead, it focuses on women’s life experiences 
working in a male-dominated bureaucracy.  Second, it does not 
systematically analyse what each of MOF’s directorate generals 
could have done in mainstreaming gender in their line of work. To 
do so would require macroeconomic analysis, which is not my area 
of expertise, and gender disaggregated data that currently do not 
exist. More details on the limitations of this thesis will be discussed 
in my concluding chapter.  
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4 MOF as a subsystem of the 
Indonesian Bureaucracy 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives background information on the civil service 
system in Indonesia and MOF as a subsystem of the Indonesian 
bureaucracy. It serves as a prologue to the discussion about how 
this formal setting affects the careers of the men and women 
working there in different ways. It also introduces some key terms 
that are useful for understanding relationships in the hierarchy of 
Indonesian bureaucracy. 
The chapter is divided into five main sections. The first three 
examine the civil service system in Indonesia, including its 
historical development, characteristics and relationship to changing 
political scenarios. The fourth section deals with the civil service’s 
organisational structure and job hierarchy. It looks at the 
hierarchical structure of MOF as a government organisation, the 
positions and jobs within the structure, the relationships between 
them, and the requirements for different positions. The fifth section 
deals with current and future female representation in MOF. It 
examines the gendered composition of MOF’s civil servants and the 
extent to which it is representative of the civil service as a whole. 
The last section deals with the current bureaucratic reform. 
4.2 The civil service system in Indonesia: an 
overview 
According to the Civil Service Law, the Indonesian civil service is 
made up of people working for central government, regional 
governments, and ‘other civil servants’ (including those in the 
military, the Ministry of Defence and embassies).   
In 2010, the number of civil servants in Indonesia was around 3.7 
million, about 1.65% of the total population. Although Table ‎4-1 
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shows an increase compared to 1974, the ratio to total population 
remains small compared to other South East Asian countries 
(United Nations, 2004, World Bank, 2003b), and is more 
comparable to the situation of countries like China and India (2008). 
Table ‎4-1 Ratio of civil servants to total population 
Year Total Population * Civil servants ** % CS of population 
1974 129,083,000  1,640,733  1.27%  
1986 167,881,000  3,159,652  1.88%  
1998 201,559,000  4,090,437  2.03%  
2008 228,553,000  4,083,360  1.79%  
Source: * Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics  
           ** Data from National BKN 
4.3 The development of Indonesia’s civil service 
Dwiyanto and Partini (2006) divide the history of Indonesia’s 
bureaucracy into three eras: traditional (pre-colonial) bureaucracy, 
colonial bureaucracy and New Order bureaucracies. This division 
helps understanding shifts in the collective attitude of public 
servants to the nature of their work and in their wider status. In 
this respect, the history of the Indonesian bureaucracy is little 
different from civil services in developed countries. This saw the civil 
service evolve from serving the emperor, to acting in the interest of 
the colonial/feudal state, and then to serving the general public 
without taking the side of the political regime in power (Burns and 
Bowornwathana, 2001b).  
During the pre-colonial era, civil servants served individual 
kingdoms which now form the national jurisdiction. In the colonial 
period they were Dutch public servants, referred to as ambtenaar, 
who served the interests of the colonial state rather than the native 
population (then referred as inlander/bumiputera). The 
Proclamation of Independence in 1945 created two separate civil 
service divisions, the Dutch colonial government and the Indonesian 
government. These were merged in 1950, when the Dutch 
government acknowledged Indonesia’s independence.  
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In most developing countries the civil service has shifted from being 
state servants (serving the interests of the ruling regime which acts 
in the name of the state) to the servants of the people (regardless 
the regime in power). The Indonesian experience is rather different: 
civil servants retained their position as serving the state, while at 
the same time serving the people. According to the 1974 Civil 
Service Law, they were both Abdi Negara (state servants) and Abdi 
Masyarakat (public servants). During the Suharto regime, however, 
more emphasis was placed on their being state servants and the 
civil service became an extension of the state and a tool of the ruling 
power. After Suharto’s downfall, despite the bureaucratic reform 
prescribed by international donors such as the World Bank, this 
position as servant of both the state and the people remained 
unchanged, as there has been no amendment to this clause of the 
Law. Despite their status as both state and public servants, civil 
servants are directed to serve the best interests of the general public. 
4.4 Characteristics of Indonesian Bureaucracy 
4.4.1 Political influence in the Indonesian Civil Service 
The main characteristic of the New Order bureaucracy was the 
centralisation of power in the hands of President Suharto. Once he 
assumed power in 1968, he started to depoliticise civil servants who 
had previously held divergent political views. He also removed 
members and supporters of the banned Communist Party from the 
civil service and discredited religious movements, making them 
unpopular. This effort to control civil servants and their attitudes 
continued with the foundation of the Ministry of Civil Service, 
MenPAN. Suharto formed BPKP (the State Audit Board) as the main 
state auditor. The BPKP superseded the older State Audit Agency 
(BPK), which had independent powers backed by the Constitution. 
The BPKP, by contrast, was seen as less independent as it reported 
directly to the President. Since Suharto’s fall, the BPK has slowly 
been regaining its role as external auditor.  
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Suharto declared that Indonesian civil servants were the ‘guard of 
Pancasila’ (Indonesian state philosophy). The term Pancasila dates 
back to Independence and was coined by Sukarno, Indonesia’s first 
president. It comprises five principles: belief in one God, a just and 
civilised humanity, a united Indonesia, democracy under the wise 
guidance of consultative representation, and social justice for all 
Indonesia’s peoples. During Sukarno’s presidency, these principles 
were compressed into three (socio-nationalism, socio-democracy 
and belief in God), and then further into ‘cooperation’. When 
Suharto took power he declared that Indonesia should return to the 
original concept of Pancasila ‘purely and consistently‘, but along the 
way he reinterpreted the concept to suit his own political agenda, 
elevating it to a quasi-religious status. Suharto’s interpretation was 
based on Javanese feudalistic culture which he used extensively 
during his presidency (Sarsito, 2006). Suharto only allowed a single 
interpretation of Pancasila: any other was considered subversive. 
Although he claimed that Pancasila should be flexible, it was he 
who determined its flexibility, and he was heavily criticised by local 
political activists for making Pancasila a monolithic ideology 
(Rohdewohld, 1995). Much effort and energy, not to mention money, 
was spent on indoctrinating the entire population, from primary 
school pupils to the highest echelon of bureaucrats, with Pancasila. 
Suharto’s authoritarian and oppressive government was also 
notorious for imprisoning its political enemies and anybody who 
criticised the government for ‘subversive action’, accusing them of 
endangering Pancasila and the unity of the nation.  
4.4.2 A role model for society 
Another characteristic of the New Order period was the civil 
service’s strong presence in public life as a representative of the 
state. The civil service set an example to the wider public about how 
to behave, not only in their work but also in their daily lives. To this 
end, the New Order Regime introduced a comprehensive regulation 
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of the Indonesian civil service. I explore the gendered effects of these 
regulations in Chapter 5. 
4.4.3 Military influence 
Another influence that coloured Suharto’s civil service was the 
Dwifungsi ABRI, or dual function of the armed forces: guarding the 
country and holding administrative power. This was not originally 
Suharto’s concept; it was proposed just after Independence by the 
head of the army at the time. It advocated that military personnel 
should be given political and administrative positions, in an 
individual rather than institutional capacity, to take up posts in the 
upper echelons previously occupied by colonials. The dual function 
was expanded and formalised by Suharto, who himself had a 
military background, enabling officers to hold civil service positions 
in an institutional rather than an individual capacity. Suharto even 
extended the dual function, involving the armed forces not only in 
government and politics but also in social and economic arenas 
(Callahan, 1998). For example, the leadership of Pertamina, the 
national Indonesian gas and oil company, was given to a military 
general. Unlike other South East Asian countries such as Thailand 
and Burma, where the military regimes promised a transition to 
civilian government, Suharto brought the military into his 
government without claiming that it was a temporary measure. As a 
consequence, the armed forces played a significant role in central, 
regional and local government, limiting the power of civilian officials 
(Said, 2006). 
In the Suharto regime, working in the civil service was much like 
working in the armed forces. As a consequence of Dwifungsi ABRI, 
the Suharto government encouraged civil servants to idolise their 
military heroes by imposing semi-military regulations on them. 
These hero figures are also still represented in the way the civil 
service conducts recruitment: it is only willing to admit people who 
appear prepared to put their loyalty to the country and its ideology 
above everything else.  
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Semi-military discipline applied in the civil service, including but 
not limited to marching, a flag-raising ceremony on national days 
and a day of military training on the 17th of every month. The in-
service training also included a course called kesamaptaan in which 
workers were taught to do exercises such as crawling under barbed 
wire, and in some cases to use weapons. Civil Service colleges such 
as the Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri or IPDN, owned by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, were managed similarly to the Indonesian 
Military Academy. Top-level managerial training for civil servants 
was carried out jointly with armed forces officers and a large 
proportion of the course dealt with national ideology. 
After Suharto’s fall in 1998 it was proposed that the dual function 
of the armed forces be gradually reduced and eventually eliminated 
(Gonggong, 2004). However, this has yet to be done, and is observed 
that the military still needs to redefine its role and transform its 
capabilities in the new democratic polity (Sebastian and 
Iisgindarsah, 2011).  The military still influences the working values 
of the civil service, as most senior managers were recruited during 
the Suharto era and due to the top-down culture of Indonesian 
bureaucracy.  
Despite this, Indonesian civil servants have long been associated 
with a culture of corruption, time delays, laziness and inefficiency. 
They are rarely fired, despite the long lists of threats in the 
regulations drafted to manage their lives. The machinery of the state 
suffers from bureaucratic inertia, which makes many plans and 
programmes disappear into thin air (Dwiyanto et al., 2006).  
4.4.4 Corruption and public perception 
The Indonesian civil service is perceived as corrupt by the 
Indonesian public. The Corruption Perception Index produced by 
Transparency International ranks Indonesia 118 out of 176 
countries (Transparency International, 2012). The World Bank 
notes that corruption is a serious problem in the civil service, as 
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acknowledged by civil servants themselves (World Bank, 2003b). 
Civil servants are a key part of public service accountability, both 
creating regulations and delivering services to public. I explore the 
relationship between corruption and gender issues in Chapter 9. 
4.5 Hierarchy in the Indonesian Bureaucracy 
4.5.1 Organisational structure and job hierarchy 
According to Presidential Decree No. 44/1974 (GOI, 1997b), a 
cabinet ministry consists of:  
1. A cabinet minister as the head of the ministry 
2. A secretary general as the minister’s aid, who reports directly 
to the minister and leads an office called the secretariat 
general 
3. An inspector general, as the control element, who reports 
directly to the minister and leads an office called the 
inspectorate general 
4. Several director generals as executing agencies, each of 
whom reports directly to the minister and leads offices called 
directorate generals 
5. Heads of agencies or centres  
6. Heads of vertical units at the regional level, which can be 
department/ministry regional offices or, in the case of MOF, 
directorate general regional offices 
7. Expert staff.3 
                                           
3These positions are usually given to members of the public who have not 
previously worked in the civil service, but whose expertise is needed by the 
Minister. On some occasions, however, these positions are also provided as 
a “safe deposit box” for echelon I officials who have recently committed a 
serious error or are regarded as so incompetent that he (there has never 
been a female at this level) needs to be removed from his position without 
being forced to resign from the civil service. More discussion on this is 
found in the next chapter.  
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People occupying the positions in points 2 to 6 above (secretary 
general, inspector generals, director generals and so on) are usually 
referred to as ‘pejabat eselon I’ (echelon I officials). The term echelon 
indicates the structural level of the position, and these 
organisations are referred to as echelon I units. Each echelon I unit 
consists of several echelon II units (one secretariat of the directorate 
general, several directorates, and several regional offices). In turn, 
each echelon II unit has several echelon III units (sub-directorates), 
the latter consisting of several echelon IV units (sections). When 
necessary, some echelon IV units are allowed to have echelon V 
units (sub-sections), but there are few of these. For each echelon 
level there is another category: ‘a’ and ‘b’. The scope of the work, the 
number of staff and size of the area managed in echelon I-a is 
slightly higher than in echelon I-b.  
While the Government Minister appoints echelon V, IV and III 
positions, echelon I and II are appointed by the President, based on 
the recommendation of the Minister. To have this recommendation, 
one needs to be recognised/acknowledged by the person in power, 
which requires good networking skills.  
This categorisation has impacts on personnel management 
regarding eligibility for posts, scope for promotion and allowance 
entitlement. In the next section I discuss how civil servants are 
categorised into grades and ranks. 
4.5.2 The grade and rank system 
Indonesian civil servants are ranked into grades from I to IV, I being 
the lowest grade. Each grade is then segmented further into ranks a, 
b, c, and d, except for grade IV which includes a rank e. Unlike the 
echelon system, where lower roman numbers denote a higher 
echelon, in the grade system the reverse applies. 
Civil service regulations (GOI, 1997b) stipulate that grade/rank 
corresponds to formal education qualifications, and in practice this 
regulation tends to be rigidly applied (King, 1998). According to Law 
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No. 8 1974 on Civil Service Personnel and PP 99/2000, revised by 
PP 11/2002, there are minimum educational requirements for each 
civil service grade. The grading based on formal qualification shows 
how much Indonesian civil service values education, which I am 
going to explore later in Chapter 7. Grade I is occupied by people 
who have graduated from primary and junior high school or who are 
using their primary or junior high school diploma at the time they 
apply for a civil service position. Grade II is the entrance point for 
people who have graduated from high school (grade II/a), or hold a 
non-degree undergraduate diploma (grade II/b). While the highest 
grade is grade IV, the highest entrance qualification is for grade III. 
The system allows university graduates to apply for positions open 
to people with lower qualifications as long as the applicant is willing 
to take a lower post. The fairness of this system is questionable, as 
people with university degrees can compete in the entrance exam 
with high school graduates.  
Civil servants’ grades are advanced every four years. According to 
article 18 of the Civil Service Law (GOI, 1974a), this is their right, 
and it is applied automatically unless there is a valid reason not to 
do so (such as people who are facing a disciplinary action). It is 
accompanied by a pay rise on top of a regular pay increment every 
two years, and increases the chance of promotion to a managerial 
position. As such, regardless of work performance a person with a 
high school qualification who has been working for 20 years will 
have a higher grade than a university graduate who has been 
working for three years.  
While grade advancement within ranks (for example from II/c to 
II/d) occurs automatically, advancement to another rank (for 
example from II/d to III/a) requires an examination called Ujian 
Dinas (see Chapter 7). There is a point, however, when an 
employee’s grade cannot advance any further, which is set 
according to their education and whether or not they hold a certain 
managerial position.  
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Table ‎4-2 illustrates the grades that people can be assigned 
according to their education when they apply to join the Civil 
Service and the point at which they cannot proceed any further 
until they retire. 
Table ‎4-2 Entry and maximum grade based on education level 
 
*   based on PP no.11/2002, these are the first grades they are assigned when they 
apply using the diplomas on the left-hand side column. 
** based on PP no.12/2002, these are the maximum grades people can get if they 
are not in a structural or functional position (see section 4.5.4) and have not 
obtained other qualifications during their service. 
Source: Civil Service Regulations 
 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the minimum 
educational requirements still apply to the maximum grade. To have 
their grade advanced, applicants must also upgrade their formal 
education, such as by attending night school. 
4.5.3 The link between the grade and echelon systems 
The main civil service system is based on seniority. Regulations 
oblige every unit to maintain a list of employees’ ranks, called 
Daftar Urutan Kepangkatan or DUK (GOI, 1979b). There is a rule 
that no two or more individuals can have the same position in DUK 
in the same office. This rank list will depend on their grade, echelon, 
length of service, in-service training and formal education. Article 6 
of Regulation No.100/2000 (GOI, 2000) on Civil Servants’ 
appointments to structural positions reads:  
Education Entry-Grade* Maximum Grade** 
SD (Primary School) I/a  II/a  
SMP (Junior High School) I/c  II/c  
SMPK (Specialised Junior High School) I/c  II/d  
SMA (Senior High School) II/a  III/b  
D-1 (1 year Diploma) II/a  III/b  
D-2 (2 year Diploma) II/b  III/b  
D-3 (3 year Diploma) II/c  III/c  
D-IV/S-1 (Undergraduate) III/a  III/d  
S-2 (Masters Degree) III/b  IV/a  
S-3 (Doctorate Degree) III/c  IV/b  
97 
 
To appoint a structural official, close attention needs to be paid to 
seniority in terms of grade, age, education and training as well as 
experience. 
(Article 6 Regulation no. 100/2000). 
PP no.13/2002 dictates a set of requirements for the minimum and 
maximum grades of people in structural positions (see Table 4.3).  
Table ‎4-3 Grade span of Structural Levels 
Echelon Minimum Grade Maximum Grade 
I-a  IV/e  IV/e  
I-b  IV/d  IV/e  
II-a  IV/c  IV/d  
II-b  IV/b  IV/c  
III-a  IV/a  IV/b  
III-b  III/d  IV/a  
IV-a  III/c  III/d  
IV-b  III/b  III/c  
V-a  III/a  III/b  
V-b  II/d  III/a  
Source: GOI, PP no.13/2002 
Civil Service Law does not state the minimum educational level 
needed to occupy structural positions, as long as one’s grade is 
within the range required. In MOF, however, the educational 
requirement is regulated internally. 
Box 4.1 provides a hypothetical illustration of how this works in 
practice. 
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Suppose Mary joins the civil service after she graduated from university with a 
Bachelor degree. After finishing her probation period, she is ranked as grade 
III/a.  
If she does not hold a structural or a functional position and remains a 
pelaksana (junior member of staff), she will continue to be awarded an 
increment to her salary every four years up to III/d and then stay on that grade 
with a salary adjustment every other year until she retires.  
If, when she is at grade III/b, she is assigned to an echelon IV position, the 
highest grade she can reach in her career is also grade III/d. If, however, she 
continues her studies during her career and gains a master’s degree but is still 
in her echelon IV position, she can advance to grade IV/a. And if she gets a 
doctorate and is still not promoted to a higher position, she will advance 
further to grade IV/b. 
If, after a period of being an echelon IV manager, she is promoted to echelon 
III, she advances to grade IV/b and stays there until her retirement. 
If, instead of pursuing a structural/managerial career, she prefers to be in a 
functional post, her grade will advance according to the credit points that she 
accumulates. 
Box 4.1 Application of the rules on grades 
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4.5.4 Functional Positions 
Functional positions (jabatan fungsional) were first introduced in 
the 1980s to accommodate people in professional occupations with 
less managerial responsibility than in structural positions, such as 
teachers/university lecturers, tax auditors and extension workers. 
Their grade does not advance automatically every four years, unlike 
those in structural positions or junior staff.  To advance their 
grades they have to meet particular requirements that include 
formal education and specific or technical training. Their work is 
assessed in terms of points applied according to their main 
activities, and they must accumulate a certain number to progress. 
It is possible to advance in less than four years if they accumulate 
the necessary points. The sets of rules that apply to functional 
officials differ according to position.  
MOF has several functional positions in its organisation: tax 
auditors, customs and excise auditors, tax extension officials, land 
and building tax surveyors, IT specialists and teachers (at STAN, 
MOF’s college, and in TA). At MOF, the functional position that gives 
the widest career span is IT specialist, where people can start with a 
high school diploma and by upgrading themselves through formal 
education and technical training can retire at the highest grade in 
the civil service, IV/e, equal to a structural colleague at echelon I 
level. 
4.6 Female participation in the civil service 
Error! Reference source not found. shows that the gender gap in 
ivil service employment closed significantly between 2003 and 2010, 
although male levels of employment remain somewhat higher. 
100 
 
Figure ‎4-1: Sex Composition in the Indonesian Civil Service 
 
Source: BKN 2010 
 
Tables ‎4.4 and ‎4.5 illustrate trends in the sex composition of the 
Indonesian civil service, based on data from the Civil Service Agency 
(BKN). Female representation in the Indonesian civil service has 
been studied by at least two researchers: Logsdon (1985) and Oey-
Gardiner (2002). Both were interested in total numbers of female 
civil servants, as well as their grades and managerial levels in the 
bureaucracy.  
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Male
Female
101 
 
Table ‎4-4 Sex composition of the Indonesian Civil Service according to grade 
Year 
Grade I Grade II Grade III Grade IV 
Male Female 
Female 
share 
Male Female 
Female 
share 
Male Female 
Female 
share 
Male Female 
Female 
share 
1974 769,329 112,929 12.80% 506,506 175,198 25.70% 61,576 8,716 12.40% 6,103 376 5.80% 
1978 567,528 89,023 13.56% 691,804 302,080 30.39% 95,384 17,451 15.47% 8,484 677 7.39% 
1984 643,732 90,575 12.33% 1,163,739 625,933 34.97% 188,521 45,671 19.50% 14,552 1,420 8.89% 
1990 531,428 78,305 12.84% 1,548,914 986,333 38.90% 431,740 158,269 26.82% 29,847 3,653 10.90% 
1998 327,510 36,576 10.05% 1,162,245 721,404 38.30% 1,073,810 670,982 38.46% 80,080 17,830 18.21% 
2000 230,053 26,150 10.21% 983,163 606,742 38.16% 1,150,800 808,811 41.27% 87,257 34,170 28.14% 
2005 64,833 6,669 9.33% 599,798 351,731 36.96% 1,193,161 947,314 44.26% 333,679 244,310 42.27% 
2010 112,693 10,912 8.83% 768,440 665,013 46.39% 1,142,515 1,035,529 47.54% 436,635 426,363 49.40% 
Source: BKN  
  
102 
 
 
Table ‎4-5 Sex composition of Indonesian Civil Servants according to educational background 
Year 
Primary and Jr High School High School Non-degree Diploma University Graduates 
Male Female 
Female 
share 
Male Female 
Female 
share 
Male Female 
Female 
share 
Male Female 
Female 
share 
1978 763,629 128,619 14.42% 520,048 254,210 32.83% 85,060 19,511 18.66% 48,968 9,209 15.83% 
1984 688,168 81,875 10.63% 1,099,775 600,573 35.32% 129,110 41,504 24.33% 85,178 21,808 20.38% 
1990 797,467 142,471 15.16% 1,325,554 878,029 39.85% 233,590 135,193 36.66% 187,813 71,168 27.50% 
1998 593,971 85,959 12.64% 1,417,768 1,034,779 42.19% 251,822 166,501 39.80% 380,084 159,553 30.13% 
2000 456,403 71,254 13.50% 1,332,097 1,008,349 43.08% 258,054 197,249 43.32% 404,719 199,021 32.96% 
2005 213,444 22,161 9.41% 804,692 569,483 41.44% 445,437 527,950 54.24% 727,898 430,430 37.16% 
2010 237,006 24,163 9.25% 971,663 721,452 42.61% 502,952 748,772 59.82% 848,462 678,002 44.42% 
Source: BKN 
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Until 1995 the total number of civil servants according to their 
educational background does not correspond with the total number 
according to their grades/rank, nor does it match the annual totals 
reported by BKN. This difference is due to temporary workers, who 
are not on the formal payroll, mainly labelled by the BKN as 
‘unspecified workers’. These totalled around 11,000 in 1983, but 
their number decreased from 1984 until in 1996 there were none.  
As observed by Logsdon (1985), between 1974 and 1984 the 
composition of Indonesian civil servants changed in terms of grade, 
with a higher proportion in higher grades. Table ‎4-4 shows that this 
continued in the 90s and since 2000. This is also a reflection of the 
change in composition based on educational background, because, 
as explained, there is a direct link between grades and formal 
education. While in 1974, civil servants were mainly in grade I, in 
the 1980s most were in grade II, and since 1990 the number of both 
males and females at grade III has increased. Since 2000, people in 
grade III have outnumbered those in grade II, possibly simply 
because the population has become better educated over time.  
In terms of female participation, Oey-Gardiner(2002) observes there 
has been a promising increase in the number of women in grades III 
and IV, which has continued since her article was published. 
Table ‎4-4 shows the proportion of women in grade III increased from 
12.40% in 1974 to 47.54% in 2010. The same increase also 
occurred in grade IV: from 5.80% to 49.40%. 
The change in composition of civil servant grades can partly be 
explained by the change in their formal education. Table ‎4-5 shows 
that in 1978, primary and junior high school graduates formed the 
biggest group, but since the 1980s this group has been overtaken 
by high school graduates. The proportion of primary and junior high 
school graduates in relation to groups with higher educational levels 
fell over time. In 1984, 62% (1,099,775 male and 600,573 female) of 
all civil servants were high school graduates. In 2010, although they 
were still the biggest group, they only made up 36% of civil servants. 
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By contrast, the proportion of university graduates kept increasing, 
from 58,177 (3.2%) in 1978 to 1,526,464 (32%) in 2010. A 
promising sign is that 44% of those university graduates were 
women, which may represent an opportunity for women’s 
empowerment. The main question, however, is whether and how far 
the trend of increasing grades and education levels takes women 
into decision making positions in public life. In her analysis using 
data from the end of the 1990s, Oey-Gardiner is optimistic that the 
increasing number of women in grade III means that ‘it is probably 
only a matter of time before at least some of these women move up 
to level [grade] IV, ready to occupy structural posts currently filled 
by men’ (Oey-Gardiner, 2002 p.110).  
In the civil service regulations there is no specific clause stating the 
minimum education requirement for a civil servant to occupy 
certain managerial/structural functions. However, every ministry 
has its own internal policy. A university degree is required to occupy 
even the lowest echelon. As a result, if most women in grades III/a 
and III/b are only educated to high school level, they are unlikely to 
have a promising future in the civil service, as their grade III will not 
lead onto more senior managerial positions.  
Therefore, as well as observing the number of women who hold a 
managerial position it is useful to consider (1) the actual 
grade/rank of the composition (III/a, III/b etc) rather than just the 
bulk of the grades (grade I, II, III or IV); (2) the number of women 
with a university education, as they have more chance of 
progressing in their careers; and (3) their age. A detailed calculation 
of what the future holds for women in the civil service based on 
these three points is provided below. 
4.7 The future of women in the Indonesian 
bureaucracy 
By 2010 there had been an increase in the proportion of women in 
managerial positions. However, although the proportion of women 
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with university degrees nearly equalled that for men, the proportion 
of those in structural positions was still far smaller at only 22% (see 
Table ‎4-6); and these women were concentrated at the bottom levels 
(echelons IV and V). 
We have seen that grade III consists of a range from III/a to III/d. 
Table ‎4-2 shows that grade III/b is the maximum rank that can be 
achieved by a person with a high school diploma if they are not in a 
managerial position. Once this person reaches the maximum rank 
they will stay there until they retire.  
Statistics for 2010 show marginally more women were at grade IV/a 
(25% of all female civil servants, 90% of women in grade IV) than 
was the case for men (20% of all male civil servants, 80% of men in 
grade IV). Does the high share of women in IV/a mean, as proposed 
by Oey-Gardiner (2002), that women will reach managerial posts in 
the near future? To assess this, we need to know whether these 
women at IV/a are on a structural career path. As discussed, civil 
servants can choose whether to follow a structural career path 
(which means that they can be promoted to a managerial post) or a 
functional one.  
Regulations on the grade span (see Table ‎4-2 andTable ‎4-3) show 
that to be managers or to be eligible for a promotion to management, 
people in grade IV/a must hold a structural post and have either a 
master’s degree, or be in echelon III or IV (in practice it is very 
unlikely than a person in echelon V would have a master’s degree). 
BKN data for 2010 show that throughout the civil service 27,029 
women had a master’s degree, 40,483 were in echelon IV and 5,882 
in echelon III positions. If none of these categories of women were to 
overlap, this would give a total of 73,394 women who were either 
managers or eligible to be promoted to a managerial post. This 
compares to 396,969 women at grade IV/a, be they in a structural 
or functional post. In other words, only a small proportion of women 
at IV/a can expect to be managers. In fact, this substantially 
overstates the real proportion, since the categories of women with 
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master’s degrees and those in either echelon IV or III must overlap. 
Publicly available BKN data are structured according to fixed 
categories and so it is not possible to analyse these data more 
flexibly. 
Using a separate BKN dataset, it is possible to assess the 
proportions of civil servants at each grade who are in structural and 
functional positions.  According to BKN, from 2007 to 2010 around 
80% of functional posts were occupied by primary and secondary 
school teachers. Of these, marginally more than half (56%) were 
women. In theory teachers’ careers span from II/a to IV/e. However, 
in practice, according to the Ministry of National Education (GOI, 
2009) around 400,000 male and female teachers were still at level 
IV/a in 2008 and were unable to proceed to IV/b because they 
could not fulfil the requirement of writing an academic essay. In 
other words, the large majority of women in IV/a are in fact 
teachers who will not rise above this grade.  
This analysis demonstrates the importance of going beyond simply 
counting the numbers of women with different bureaucratic grades, 
to take into account the actual jobs and positions that they hold. It 
is possible that there are some inconsistencies between BKN and 
Ministry of National Education data on personnel, but it is 
extremely unlikely that even 20 percent of women in grade IV/a 
have the prospect to go onto grade IV/b, let alone reach echelon III 
or a higher level of management. As such, Oey-Gardiner’s optimistic 
prediction about the future prospects of female civil servants should 
not be taken for granted. 
Although the great majority of women at grade IV/a will never 
become managers, the rapid increase in the absolute numbers of 
women at this grade means that there has been an rise in the 
absolute number  who go on to make it into senior positions. This is 
seen in Table 4.6, which shows that male domination of managerial 
has fallen since 1984. Nevertheless, the increase in female 
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representation remains concentrated at the lower levels (echelon V 
and IV).  
Table ‎4-6 Percentage of managers who are female by echelon  
Years 
Echelon 
TOTAL 
I II III IV V 
1984 8.14%  3.98%  5.70%  9.58%  12.36%  11.14%  
1996 4.26%  5.42%  6.88%  11.55%  13.19%  11.98%  
1998 4.85%  4.00%  7.40%  12.70%  16.57%  14.13%  
2000 11.65%  5.03%  8.72%  14.10%  17.95%  15.77%  
2003 8.47%  6.82%  13.18%  21.65%  21.49%  19.47%  
2005 9.77%  6.71%  13.56%  22.09%  22.32%  19.89%  
2010 8.70%  7.55%  15.70%  24.90%  25.34%  22.80%  
 
The civil service career ladder is very rigid, and it is rare to hold, for 
example, an echelon III position without having progressed through 
echelon IV. Consequently, the increasing number of women who 
hold echelon IV positions and those with university degrees may 
indicate that there will be more high-ranking women in the future. 
This, however, depends heavily on whether upper-echelon officials 
in the Ministry, especially those responsible for HR development 
and management, consider women suited to upper echelon 
positions. The civil service regulations state: ‘A structural position 
reflects trust, on the part of the institution, invested in an 
individual assigned such a job.’ This creates considerable space for 
discretion in decisions to promote men and women into these senior 
positions. Later chapters examine how this discretion is exercised in 
MOF. 
Echelon 1 is an exception to this hierarchical system. Since it is a 
political position, those who occupy it do not have to climb the 
career ladder from the bottom but can be chosen from across 
ministries. This also explains why, as Table ‎4-6 shows, there were 
more women than ever in echelon I units in 2000 (11.65%). During 
his presidency, President Wahid demonstrated concern for gender 
equality and encouraged government ministries to include more 
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women in their upper echelons. The number fell after his presidency 
ended. 
The preceding analysis has shown it is necessary to look at 
bureaucratic processes and structures in more depth for a full 
appreciation of the consequences of the rise in female civil service 
employment. This will be developed in greater depth in the later 
chapters, with reference to MOF.  
4.8 The history and structure of Indonesia’s MOF 
4.8.1 History 
MOF in its current form dates back to the Dutch colonial era. In 
1999 the Indonesian government decentralised most of its 
government ministries apart from the Ministries of Finance, Defence, 
Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Religious Affairs. Since its structure 
and performance were not affected by the 1999 decentralisation, 
MOF’s employees have remained part of central government and its 
human resources are still managed at the central level. This covers 
its employees’ entire careers from recruitment and development to 
retirement.  
MOF is one of the largest public employers in Indonesia operating at 
the central level and according to the personnel records employed 
62,000 people in 2008, of whom more than 75 per cent were men. 
Civil servants working in MOF are bound not only by MOF 
regulations but also by civil service regulations. Every MOF 
regulation has to comply with the higher Civil Service Regulation 
based on Law No.8/1974. 
4.8.2 Structure 
MOF’s structure has undergone a major reorganization following the 
Bureaucratic Reform which it is committed to implementing over 
the next four years, with a possible extension. At the time of writing 
this chapter, MOF comprises twelve units: the Directorate General 
(DG) of Budget, DGTX, DG of Customs and Excise, DGTR, DG of 
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State Assets, DG of Fiscal Balance, the Debt Management Office, 
the Stock Market Office, the Training Agency, the Fiscal Policy 
Office, the Secretariat General and the Inspectorate General. MOF is 
a holding company in which each DG operates independently and 
does not form a stream of work (GOI, 2006b). The units are not 
normally related to each other, apart from the Secretariat General 
and the Training Office, whose main jobs are related to personnel 
administration and MOF employee training respectively, and the 
Inspectorate General, MOF’s internal auditor.  
Of the twelve units, the three largest in terms of number of 
employees and coverage across Indonesia are the DGTX, the DGTR 
and the DGCE. These have offices down to district level all over 
Indonesia. They have around 30,000, 12,000 and 11,000 employees, 
of which only 28, 38, and 17% are women respectively. As 
mentioned in the methodology chapter, my research focuses on the 
departments of DGTX, DGTR and TA. Some reference is also made 
to DGCE, but without an in-depth organisational analysis for the 
reasons mentioned in the methodology (there is a very limited 
number of women in that unit, as it has not recruited women for 
the last decade or so). The Training Office employs around 850 civil 
servants, of which more than 75% are men.  
As elaborated above, each echelon I unit has several echelon II units, 
one of which is the Secretariat of the Directorate Generals/Agency. 
The main task of the secretariats is to coordinate other echelon I 
units within their ministry. They are also responsible for 
housekeeping functions for all units, including, among other things, 
the management of HR for all MOF employees. The HR division is at 
the third layer of management, echelon III. Theoretically, all HR 
managers, report both to their Secretary of the Directorate 
Generals/Agency and the head of the HR Bureau, an echelon II unit 
under the Secretariat General. However not every HR development 
issue is tackled at this level of management. Personnel training, 
which is theoretically part of HR development, is managed centrally 
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by the Training Office. In later chapters I discuss how the 
placement of the HR division as an echelon III rather than an 
echelon II unit can create a power asymmetry when dealing with 
higher-echelon officials. 
4.9 MOF HR statistics 
4.9.1 Overview 
This section shows where female employees are located within MOF 
and their prospects for reaching senior management positions. It 
uses an HR database to reveal the numbers of men and women 
working at different levels of the MOF hierarchy, their levels of 
education and hence their prospects for upward mobility. 
4.9.2 Structural Positions 
Table ‎4-7 shows that women are underrepresented in every grade, 
especially grades I (the lowest) and IV (the highest). Recruitment for 
grade I targets high-school and middle-school graduates, who are 
most likely to be given a position as office assistants, making tea 
and delivering or photocopying documents. Recruits for grade I can 
also start as temporary employees, and when there is a permanent 
position they take an examination. In MOF this is the only 
recruitment process that is semi-informal and allows a degree of 
discretion on the part of higher management. For example, security 
guards who have been temporary workers for years may be 
permitted to sit the exam if their performance has been good. 
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Table ‎4-7 MOF Employees and Indonesian Civil Servants according to grade 
Grade Male Female Total % Female 
I 
MOF 896 81 977 8.29% 
Indonesian Civil Service  59,146 5,868 65,014 9.03% 
II 
MOF 23,485 6,055 29,540 20.50% 
Indonesian Civil Service  561,324 332,031 893,355 37.17% 
III 
MOF 22,912 7,217 30,129 23.95% 
Indonesian Civil Service  1,150,003 924,379 2,074,382 44.56% 
IV 
MOF 1,934 210 2,144 9.79% 
Indonesian Civil Service  338,743 261,767 600,510 43.59% 
Total 
MOF 49,227 13,563 62,790 21.60% 
Indonesian Civil Service  2,109,216 1,524,045 3,633,261 43.59% 
Source: GOI, MOF Human Resource Bureau 2006 
Men are more likely to be found in grade II than other grades, but 
interestingly there are more women in grade III than any other 
grade. This may be a good sign, in the sense that in the near future 
these women’s careers may progress, as managerial positions can 
only be held by people with grade III and above.  
Despite the numbers of women in upper-middle managerial 
positions, there are very few at Grade IV, the top grade. Civil service 
regulations state that their grades will stop at grade III/d and will 
not advance further unless they hold an echelon III position (see 
Table 4.2). If they are in echelon IV, they must have a postgraduate 
degree acknowledged by the Ministry of National Education and are 
only permitted to advance to grade IV/a. Thus, having more women 
in grade III does not necessarily guarantee the same proportion of 
women will be in grade IV in the future. 
When we compare MOF with the Indonesian civil service, however, 
we find that the small proportion of women in MOF is not typical. 
Table ‎4-7 shows that in the entire civil service, most employees of 
both sexes are in grade III. However, while women make up almost 
44% of civil servants in grade IV, fewer than one in ten of MOF 
employees in that grade are women.  
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To investigate this discrepancy further it is important to compare 
MOF managerial positions with national data. Whilst every unit will 
have up to echelon IV levels, not all of them have echelon V units. 
This depends on the structure of the ministry or government 
organisation, such as how many people they employ, whether they 
deal directly with the public and whether they have regional 
branches around Indonesia. Several echelon I units in MOF have 
echelon V officials, while others do not. Table ‎4-8, below, illustrates 
the current situation in MOF and in the civil service in general.   
Table ‎4-8 Managerial Levels in MOF and National Civil Service 
Echelons Male Female Total % Female 
I 
MOF 15 0 15 0% 
Indonesian Civil Service  580 65 645 10.08% 
II 
MOF 208 7 215 3.26% 
Indonesian Civil Service  10,108 727 10,385 6.71% 
III 
MOF 1,344 101 1,445 6.99% 
Indonesian Civil Service  46,290 7,351 53,641 13.70% 
IV 
MOF 4,551 779 5,330 14.62% 
Indonesian Civil Service  156,821 45,965 202,786 22.67% 
Total 
MOF 6,080 887 6,967 12.73% 
Indonesian Civil Service  224,322 57,235 281,557 20.32% 
Source: GOI, MOF Human Resource 2006 
While I was doing my fieldwork all the top managerial positions at 
MOF were filled by men, as has historically been the case. Only one 
woman in MOF’s history has occupied a top position, whereas at 
least 10% of women in the civil service hold this prestigious position. 
This explains the scarcity of women in grade IV in MOF compared to 
those in the whole of the civil service (Table ‎4-7). 
4.9.3 Functional Positions 
At the time of interview, 2,905 people in MOF held functional 
positions. Of these, only 327 (11%) were women. One of the women 
I interviewed said that it was more suitable for her to be in a 
functional job because there she only competes against herself to 
accumulate points, rather than competing with the whole office, 
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which is dominated by men. This said, female tax auditors in the 
DGTX have to compete with their male colleagues in accumulating 
their points because of the organisational culture amongst tax 
auditors, who prefer to keep the jobs and work for the men, as 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
Table ‎4-9 Functional Positions in MOF 
Functional Positions Male Female Total 
Tax Auditors 1,653 213 1,866 
Customs Assessor 182 10 192 
Internal Auditors 190 33 223 
Land Property Tax Assessors 357 12 369 
IT Specialists 61 16 77 
Teachers 102 11 113 
Researchers 22 1 23 
Others 11 31 42 
Total 2,578 327 2,905 
 Source: MOF 2006 
4.10 Bureaucratic Reform 
Bureaucratic reform has been an on-going effort funded by 
multilateral donors such as the World Bank since the mid-1990s, 
even before Suharto stepped down. One of the plans was to 
implement zero growth in civil service employment from year to year. 
According to data from the BKN, this aim has been more or less 
achieved. 
The most recent development in the Indonesian Bureaucratic 
Reform has been a pilot project conducted in MOF with World Bank 
funding. The reform consists of three pillars: organisation, business 
processes, and HR. In terms of organisation there are two main 
objectives:   organisational restructuring and reinvention. The 
business processes element includes job-evaluation analysis, 
creating standard operating procedures for individual activities and 
workload analysis. The HR element covers four areas: a training 
assessment centre to evaluate employees’ working performance, 
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tour of duty arrangements, a Personnel Management Information 
System and development of a specific set of disciplinary codes. 
However, this bureaucratic reform does not involve changing the 
Civil Service Law. Instead, the reform is imposed on an add-on basis. 
For example, instead of wholly reforming the employee grading 
system, grades have been created within the existing grades, 
making the already complicated system even more complex. This is 
already in place in some MOF offices. It will stratify and specify the 
grade system imposed by civil service regulations in order to decide 
employees’ benefits. According to the new system there will be 27 
grades in MOF (Table ‎4-10). 
Table ‎4-10 Grading system under MOF Bureaucratic Reform 
Echelon Grade Range 
Echelon I 24-27 
Echelon II 20-23 
Echelon III 17-19 
Echelon IV 14-16 
Echelon V 13 
Junior Staff 1-12 
 
So, for example, under the new system, a civil servant who holds 
grade III/a could be allocated grade 8, 9, or 10, depending on the 
type of job they are assigned to.  
As a result of this new job grading, many employees in grade III/a 
have had their salaries reduced by up to 2 million rupiah per month 
(GBP 100), whereas some others’ salaries have increased by up to 
400,000 rupiahs (GBP 20). Once all the job grading is in place, it 
will be instructive to see whether men and women have gained or 
lost out.  
A more meticulous system is being developed to link business 
processes to the HR reforms; for example employees’ working 
performance will be evaluated according to targets and related to 
standard operating procedure alongside the traditional performance 
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assessment sheet required by Civil Service Law. Some of these 
issues are discussed in Chapter 8. 
4.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided background information on the 
Indonesian civil service in general and on MOF as its subsystem, 
including details about the complexity of its grading and ranking 
system, with an overview of female representation in the Indonesian 
civil service.  
Statistics show that during the last 30 years there has been a 
considerable change in the number of women working in 
Indonesia’s civil service and the gender gap has nearly closed. 
Rather than resulting from affirmative action by the Indonesian 
government, this is simply due to an increase in the number of 
educated women who choose to work in the public rather than the 
private sector. The Civil Service Law and other regulations remain 
the same.  
The chapter questions Oey-Gardiner’s claim that the rising 
proportion of Grade III civil servants who are women will inevitably 
lead to increased female representation in managerial positions. The 
closing of the gender gap in total civil service employment does not 
automatically mean that there are equal numbers of men and 
women at managerial levels. While the number of women in 
managerial positions has increased from 11% in 1980s to 22% in 
2010, they are concentrated at the lowest managerial levels. To 
predict what the future holds for women’s managerial positions, it is 
necessary to conduct a comprehensive organisational analysis 
involving formal and informal organisational structures as well as 
the organisational culture of an individual organisation. These are 
provided in the following chapters.  
This chapter has also presented a specific analysis of MOF’s HR 
structure and the extent to which it conforms to the Indonesian civil 
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service in general. The sex composition of people occupying grades 
I-III in MOF is in line with the total composition of those grades 
across the entire civil service, but MOF has significantly lower 
numbers of women occupying grade IV. Since only those in grade IV 
are eligible for promotion to top managerial levels, these data do not 
send a promising signal about the prospects for women in MOF. 
Based on the background information provided in this chapter, the 
next chapter discusses the cognitive context of the Indonesian 
bureaucracy and its gender ideology. 
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5 The gendered cognitive context of 
Indonesia’s bureaucracy 
5.1 Introduction 
Following Chapter 4’s discussion of how structural hierarchies and 
functions work in Indonesia’s bureaucracy, this chapter examines 
the bureaucracy as a gendered organisation. The gendered cognitive 
context – the second element of Goetz’s framework – of the 
bureaucracy is examined together with the gendered history of the 
organisation.  
Chapter 4 has shown that Indonesia’s bureaucracy has very rigid 
hierarchies and is male-dominated in terms of the ratio of male to 
female civil servants. This chapter explores how the bureaucracy 
assumes the gendered division of labour of civil servants: that it is a 
male job and that there is a clear separation between home and 
work and whose domain it is. In some ways the cognitive context of 
Indonesia’s bureaucracy is similar to that of a military organisation. 
Carreiras (2006 p.40) argues that the military is an extreme case of 
gendered organisation: it is based on gender both in terms of its 
hierarchical structure and its division of labour, there are more 
male than female employees and its culture is masculine.  
This chapter deals with three specific questions:  
1. What are the underlying values of Indonesia’s civil 
service, and which aspects of these exclude women from 
equal participation? 
2. How do these values translate into regulations that affect 
women? 
3. How does the Indonesian bureaucracy value the goal of 
women’s empowerment? 
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This chapter comprises two sections. The first looks at the gender 
ideology behind values and beliefs in the Indonesian civil service, as 
part of the service’s wider socio-political environment. Changes in 
this ideology are traced from the Suharto regime, when the Civil 
Service Law was first enacted, to the current government. 
As the civil service is considered one of the most important 
institutions in Indonesia, it is necessary to assess the extent to 
which civil service bureaucracy generates policies that reflect state 
gender ideology. This is especially relevant for the Ministry that is 
supposed to deal with women’s empowerment. In the second section 
I analyse how the goal of women’s empowerment is valued by 
reviewing GM efforts across Indonesia’s bureaucracy. 
5.2 Indonesian Gender ideology 
State gender ideology refers to ‘assumptions about gender on which 
the state acts and the way it attempts to influence the construction 
of gender in the society’ (Blackburn, 2004 p.9). While there are 
numerous ways of analysing a state’s gender ideology, I do this 
according to different presidencies, since these tend to correspond 
to key historical shifts in gender ideologies and the associated 
institutional arrangements. This analysis pays particular attention 
to the role and changing status of what was to become the MOWE. 
5.2.1 The Suharto Era 
5.2.1.1 Ibuism and State-ibuism 
As previously mentioned, although the New Order ended more than 
ten years before this fieldwork was conducted, the old regime has 
had a lasting influence on the civil service and other aspects of 
Indonesian life. The New Order had a fairly consistent gender 
ideology based on the strong belief that a woman’s place is at home. 
Wieringa (1995) provides an extensive analysis of how the regime 
crushed the women’s progressive movement and replaced it with 
women’s organisations that conformed to traditional gender roles. 
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Feminists have written about how the Suharto regime sought to 
domesticate women entirely (Blackburn, 2004, Suryakusuma, 1991, 
Wieringa, 1995, Wieringa, 2002). This effort started very early in 
Suharto’s presidency, when he declared that Gerwani, a women’s 
organisation associated with the Communist Party, was responsible 
for torturing generals murdered during the coup (Wieringa, 1995). 
Suharto labelled Gerwani a product of atheist socialism, gaining 
support from Islamic groups, at least in the area of domesticating 
women, despite the fact that his regime oppressed conservative 
Islamic groups. 
A widely-accepted concept to describe Suharto’s gender ideology 
was coined by Suryakusuma (1991), who refers to ‘state ibuism’. 
This draws on a paternalistic view that places men as the core 
element of a state and women as secondary. Ibu means both mother 
and woman. State ibuism is related to the notions of 
‘housewifisation’  (Mies, 1982) and ibuism (Nieuwenhuis-
Djajadiningrat, 1987). Housewifisation refers to: 
a process by which women are socially defined as housewives, 
dependent for their sustenance on the income of their husbands, 
irrespective of whether they are de facto housewives or not. The 
social definition of housewives is the counterpart of the social 
definition of men as breadwinners, regardless of their actual 
contribution to the family’s subsistence.(Mies, 1982 p.131). 
Ibuism is derived from a combination of gender concepts of Dutch 
colonial bourgeois and elite/upper class Javanese women (the wives 
of high-ranking civil servants) in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries. These women were required to be subservient and to look 
after not only their families but also the colonial state in a quiet and 
understated way, while authority and power remained with their 
husbands (Nieuwenhuis-Djajadiningrat, 1987). Suryakusuma 
(1991) saw parallels between this concept and the gender ideology 
formulated by Suharto’s New Order regime, whereby men were 
120 
 
subjects of the state and development efforts, and women were seen 
as passive objects.   
Women’s duties as wives and mothers are prescribed in Panca 
Dharma Wanita4, which means women’s five duties: (1) as loyal 
companions to their husbands; (2) as procreators for the nation and 
educators of children; (3) as managers of households (4) as social 
workers or secondary earners of additional household income; and 
(5) as Indonesian citizens. These all are mentioned in the 
Indonesian State’s Development Guidelines (GBHN) which are 
issued every five years and are a reference point for every 
government agency (Indonesia, 1999). The first three duties bound 
women to the domestic sphere, and even the fourth only allowed 
them to be involved in society for reasons of charity or, if absolutely 
necessary, to earn additional money to help their husbands. 
This domestication was promoted consistently alongside other 
characteristics of the New Order, which controlled the whole of 
society centrally through the army and the bureaucracy. In the civil 
service arena, the state controlled every aspect of public workers’ 
lives through the Civil Service Law. To make sure that their social 
lives were monitored closely, Suharto’s regime formed the KORPRI, 
or civil servants’ corps. This association of civil servants addressed 
members’ welfare issues and encouraged them to engage in 
activities that included their family members. Unlike labour unions 
(declared unlawful due to their left-wing associations), which act for 
the benefit of their members and can represent them against the 
employer, KORPRI was manipulated to keep the regime in power.  
To make sure that civil servants’ families were included in 
sustaining the regime, the Dharma Wanita organisation for civil 
servants’ wives was founded in 1974. All similar civil servants’ wives 
organisations at that time were merged into this big centralised 
organisation. Dharma Wanita’s structure was similar to that of 
                                           
4 This is not to be confused with the organisation for civil servants’ wives, 
Dharma Wanita (see below). 
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Dharma Pertiwi, the organisation for military wives, in which 
members’ status depended on that of their husbands. The whole 
organisation was directed and monitored by the central 
bureaucracy. Put simply, the state controlled the lives of its civil 
servants, who controlled their wives, who in turn controlled the 
wives of their junior colleagues, and so on.  
At the grass-roots level, in 1973 Suharto also formed the PKK 
(Family Welfare Programme), to accommodate women not included 
in Dharma Wanita or Dharma Pertiwi. The PKK served both as a 
vehicle of state control and as the lead agency for the extension of 
welfare services, including family planning and education to women 
in lower socio-economic strata. This could be understood as part of 
the regime’s attempt to promote human development, both as a 
means to enhance economic growth and to sustain its legitimacy 
among less privileged Indonesians (Emmerson, 1999). It broadly 
conformed to the Women In Development view that prevailed among 
international development agencies at that time (Hadiwinata, 2003 
p.171). As a result, female literacy and educational qualifications 
improved significantly (Emmerson, 1999 p.256). As seen in the 
previous chapter, this was a key factor in the increased numbers of 
women entering the civil service over subsequent years. However, 
the regime’s enthusiasm for family planning and female education 
was not seen to contradict its wider ideology of state ibuism 
(Suryakusuma, 1991, Wieringa, 1995, Wieringa, 1998). Education 
was viewed instrumentally as a means of reducing fertility and 
enhancing women’s capacity to be good mothers to their children, 
rather than as a means of transforming their status (Sen, 1998, 
Wolf, 1992).  
Below is a quote from Suharto’s speech at the 1984 celebration of 
Hari Ibu (Mothers’ Day):5 
                                           
5Hari Ibu in Indonesia celebrates not only women as mothers but also 
women in general, which is clear from the origin of the date itself. It was 
created to commemorate the first Indonesian Women’s Congress in 1928 
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Women are the keepers of cultural morals and national values which 
must be passed down through the generations. It is the special duty 
of Indonesian women to filter out influences from other cultures which 
have penetrated Indonesia, to develop self-discipline and to prevent 
their children from developing destructive elements such as egotism 
and vanity. (Berninghausen et al., 1992 p.31) 
The Suharto regime established boundaries and gender norms such 
as Panca Dharma Wanita to make sure that neither the WID 
programmes nor Dharma Wanita and Dharma Pertiwi’s activities 
would lead to female militancy. The regime also separated its WID 
programme from the activities of civil service and military wives’ 
organisations. WID was directed at improving the welfare of poor 
rural women, and was channelled through the PKK. This 
organisation was part of the Panca Dharma Wanita framework, 
which clearly defined women’s position. As such, Suharto’s gender 
ideology was not challenged by the implementation WID polices, 
which sought to promote women’s role in development rather than 
pursue a women’s rights agenda (Tickamyer and Kusujiarti, 2012). 
5.2.1.2 The establishment of the Junior Ministry of Women’s Role 
The Junior Ministry of Women’s Role was founded in 1983 following 
the First World Conference on the Status of Women in 1975. Its 
main tasks were to (1) formulate policies to enhance the role of 
women in all fields of development; (2) co-ordinate all government 
institution activities concerning programmes involving women; (3) 
submit regular reports, information and recommendations to 
various government institutions concerning the enhancement of the 
role of women in development. 
The establishment of the Junior Ministry for the Role of Women did 
not mean that Suharto was thinking differently about gender roles. 
First, the status of Junior Ministry is bureaucratically lower than 
                                                                                                           
which had a progressive agenda to advance women’s capacity and 
contribution to the colony’s socio-economic development.  
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that of a Ministry or a Department, which represented an obstacle 
when coordination was required (see Chapter 11 on Gender 
Mainstreaming in MOF). Second, it was made very clear in the 
GBHN that ‘women’s role in national development should be in line 
with their duties as wives and mothers’, referring, of course, to the 
Panca Dharma Wanita.  
There were four Ministers for the Role of Women during the Suharto 
era. The first, Lasiyah Sutanto, was also the first woman to head a 
cabinet office under Suharto. After her death she was replaced by 
Sulasikin Murpratomo, who pioneered the foundation of Women’s 
Study Centres at the University of Indonesia, her alma mater, and 
several other universities. Discussion about feminism at these 
Centres was not always in line with Suharto’s views on gender. 
Outside the academic environment, however, Sulasikin was a 
Suharto supporter: she was reported to have argued during a 
discussion on violence against women that the concept of ‘marital 
rape was not appropriate under the state ideology, Pancasila, and 
did not fit with Indonesian culture (Baso and Idrus, 2002). 
Towards the end of his regime, Suharto used this ministry to 
further his own political ambitions. After Murpratomo, the office 
was given to the wife of a crony, Mien Sugandhi, and just before the 
end of Suharto’s presidency, when he was seeking Muslim votes, he 
appointed Hj Tutty Alawiyah, an Indonesian Islamic scholar, to lead 
the office despite her conservative views on gender relations (for 
samples of her sermons, see Alawiyah, 2009). She was a cabinet 
minister when a riot broke out in Indonesia in May 1998, towards 
the end of Suharto’s regime, which involved the gang rape of 
Chinese women (Heryanto, 1998, Strassler, 2004), which for some 
resulted in pregnancy. Responding to this, she claimed that she 
‘had not found any rape victims so far’ and asked for ‘concrete 
proof’ of the incident (Oki, 1998). The event was followed by debate 
about abortion, which she said was ‘against the Quran and 
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therefore should be forbidden for whatever reason’ (Handayani, 
1998 p.5). 
5.2.1.3 Introduction of the Marriage Law and its implications for 
civil servants 
In 1974, Suharto’s regime enacted the Marriage Law (GOI, 1974b), 
which is largely based on Islamic principles. This law has been 
heavily criticised by Indonesian feminists (Mulia, 2001) on the 
grounds that: 
(i) While the definition of marriage is a relationship between 
a man and a woman, in practice it is a contract between 
two men, i.e. the husband and the wife’s father or male 
guardian, since the woman is not permitted to say 
anything during the wedding ceremony. 
(ii) The regulation defines the husband as both the head of 
the family and the breadwinner and the wife as a home-
maker.  
(iii) The regulation leaves space for polygamy.  
This Marriage Law became the basis for the regulation of civil 
servants’ marriage and divorce, and has remained so. While most 
employers in the world would regard their employees’ marriage and 
divorce their own private business, the Indonesian government feels 
that it is in its interest to make sure that civil servants ‘set a good 
example to both their staff and the general public as good citizens, 
including leading a good family life’  (GOI, 1983, GOI, 1990). In 
order to set a good example, according to the Civil Service Law civil 
servants are not allowed to engage in extramarital sex or live 
together without being married. If they fail to comply with these 
rules they may be subjected to disciplinary measures.  
Permission is not needed for a civil servant’s first marriage; people 
need only report their marriage to their Minister through the chain 
of bureaucracy in their office up to a year after it takes place. This is 
related to payment of family allowances.  
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Since the Indonesian Marriage Law recognises polygamy, civil 
service regulations cannot rule it out completely, although it states 
that ‘the civil service marriage law is based on monogamy’ (GOI, 
1974b). However, regulations make polygamy difficult for civil 
servants, who must ask permission from their line manager, who 
will need to consult at a higher level. Permission to engage in 
polygamous marriage can be granted if one or more of the following 
conditions are met: (1) the wife cannot fulfil her ‘obligation’ (which 
refers to her domestic obligations, including providing sexual 
pleasure to her husband); (2) the wife has become disabled or 
chronically or terminally ill; and (3) the wife cannot bear children. A 
further set of requirements applies: (1) there must be agreement 
from the first wife; (2) the civil servant in question has enough 
income to finance both wives; and (3) there is a written agreement 
that the civil servant will treat all his wives and children equally. 
All of these conditions are directly taken from the Indonesian 
Marriage Law and concern the need of the man to enjoy sex, have 
children and have someone to take care of his house and children 
(Mulia, 2004). Female civil servants are not allowed to engage in 
polygamy, either by taking more than one husband (even if their 
husband cannot fulfil his obligation, becomes ill or cannot give her 
children) or  by becoming anybody’s second, third or fourth wife. 
Whilst not being allowed to take more than one husband applies to 
all Indonesian women, not being allowed to become anybody’s 
second, third or fourth wife only applies to female civil servants. 
Civil servants also need permission from their ministry before they 
can file for divorce. Upon receiving an application, the respective 
authority (who is typically their line manager’s line manager) should 
demonstrate that they have done their best to reconcile both parties 
and prevent the divorce. Among other things, the divorcing couple 
and/or witnesses are usually interviewed personally by the line 
manager. This divorce procedure can only be applied to those whose 
religion permits divorce; therefore a Catholic civil servant will never 
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be granted permission to file for divorce. Even for those whose 
religion permits divorce, because of this bureaucratic procedure the 
process can take as long as four years. 
Civil service divorce regulations are based on Islamic codes that 
treat men and women differently. Men can divorce their wives by 
simply pronouncing ‘talaq’ (translated from the Arabic ‘I divorce 
you’) to them. Women are not permitted to apply for divorce unless 
they can demonstrate that their husband left them at least three 
years previously without providing any support for them or their 
children. If this is not the case, divorce is impossible, unless the 
husband agrees and initiates the procedure. The combination of 
these religious requirements and the drawn-out, intrusive, 
bureaucratic process serves to prolong and complicate divorce, 
which can be stressful for both male and female employees, with 
women in a potentially more vulnerable position.   
There are disciplinary measures for civil servants who fail to comply 
with these regulations. Even here there is a gender bias in terms of 
the penalty applied. Male and female civil servants are liable to 
serious punishment if they fail to report a divorce. The same applies 
to male civil servants who fail to report second, third or fourth 
marriages. The punishment ranges from (a) temporary demotion by 
one level for six months to a year: (b) temporary removal from a 
managerial post for at least a year; (c) dismissal with honours 
(pension entitlement, reference letter, etc), and (d) dismissal without 
honours. 
For female civil servants who marry as a second, third or fourth wife 
and are caught, the regulations (article 15 item 2) state that there is 
just one punishment: dismissal without honour. This is the level of 
punishment meted out to civil servants convicted for crimes such as 
robbery, rape or serious assault. In theory, men may also face this 
level of punishment. However, most male civil servants who fail to 
report their second, third or fourth marriages only face temporary, 
category (a) or (b) type sanctions. This discriminatory approach is 
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linked to a male bureaucratic culture of tahu sama tahu in the civil 
service (literally translated as ‘we all understand that’, and meaning 
‘turning a blind eye’), which is inclined to forgive men their marital 
misdemeanours. This forgiving attitude is not extended to female 
civil servants who become a second, third or fourth wife. Instead of 
recognising the potential vulnerability of at least some women who 
are drawn into such polygamous arrangements, this draconian 
treatment appears to reflect highly negative judgement of their 
behaviour. 
Box 5.1 illustrates how divorce can put female civil servant in a very 
difficult situation with the bureaucracy. 
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BOX 5.1: Case study of Sari 
Sari found out that her husband had been unfaithful to her, and he left her and her 
children for another woman. Nobody knew his whereabouts; some said that he 
had moved abroad.  
According to Islamic law, which also serves as the basis of marriage law in 
Indonesia and applies to Muslim civil servants, if a husband has left his wife for 
two years without any ‘legitimate reason’, has not supported her at all during 
those two years and the wife is unhappy about this, she can file for a divorce. 
However, this is far from easy to achieve. According to the civil servants’ marriage 
regulations, Sari first needed permission from her line manager, who would have 
to investigate the grounds for divorce by listening to both parties and trying to 
persuade them to stay married before referring Sari to apply for permission to 
proceed with the divorce through the bureaucratic channels. In Sari’s case this was 
impossible, since her husband had disappeared. The line manager, who, according 
to Sari, was very sympathetic, told her to go to the Islamic Court and proceed with 
her divorce. The divorce process itself, which under normal circumstances and 
with both parties present would take six months, took more than two years. The 
one and a half extra years were spent trying to contact the husband to prove that 
he had genuinely disappeared. 
The story did not end with the granting of the divorce. When Sari reported to the 
MOF that her divorce had been finalised in the Islamic court, headquarters were 
unhappy that they had been skipped in the process. Sari was demoted from her 
position (the local terminology is ‘non-job’, which refers to being expelled from her 
structural position but keeping her status as civil servant, i.e. going back to a 
support/junior staff post) as her punishment for not processing her divorce 
through the proper bureaucratic channels. She was even threatened with the 
severest punishment, dismissal, but for some reason this did not happen. The 
officials who granted her permission to proceed were warned that they had 
crossed the line and undermined the headquarters’ authority. After three years on 
‘non-job’ status, Sari was reinstated in her echelon IV position. Only in 2006, about 
ten years after the protracted divorce process ended, was she promoted to an 
echelon III position. 
In Sari’s case there had been a lack of coordination between headquarters (Kantor 
Pusat) and the regional office (Kantor Wilayah), and headquarters felt that the 
regional office had undermined its authority. Instead of looking at the case 
thoroughly and trying to understand it with the best interests of the employee in 
mind, the bureaucracy was inflexible and busy fighting over territory. As a result 
the system punished the employee rather than helping her to resolve her family 
problems.  
It is claimed that the way the state imposes its gender norms on its civil servants 
can encourage civil servants to keep their marriage only as a status symbol 
(Suryakusuma, 1991). Rather than going through what my interviewee 
129 
 
experienced, many civil servants stay married only for the sake of not losing face in 
the bureaucracy. From the bureaucratic point of view there is no sanction if a civil 
servant does not report a separation. They only have to report divorce. As long as 
the civil servant does not instigate the formal divorce process, their spousal 
allowance is still paid regardless of whether the money is channelled to the person 
entitled to it. Even though this practice constitutes a drain on government’s 
finances, it has not been challenged. 
5.2.2 President Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie (1998-1999) 
Following Suharto’s downfall, the regime’s hierarchical structure of 
social control collapsed. As a result, minority interests, including 
women’s organisations that were oppressed under Suharto, 
flourished. There are no longer sanctions for not participating in 
Dharma Wanita, which still exists as an organisation where wives 
can meet and socialise but no longer has an overt political agenda. 
As before, members’ status reflects their husbands’ official position 
in the respective government organisation, although this is not 
interpreted as strictly as in the past.  
BJ Habibie, Suharto’s vice president, replaced him in 1998, and 
during his presidency the Law for Regional Autonomy was enacted, 
giving the regions more autonomy in all aspects of government 
apart from foreign affairs, monetary policy, defence, justice and 
religious affairs. It was hoped that this new law would empower 
people in regional societies through democratic means. It was 
enacted in the spirit of acknowledging the diversity within 
Indonesian society that had been suppressed and oppressed under 
Suharto. Not all aspects of the legislation were conducive to gender 
equality, particularly in regions that practice Sharia law, where the 
emphasis of the regulations is mostly on restricting women’s 
freedom from the way they dress to their movements (Noerdin, 
2002). 
During this short presidency there was no significant change in 
gender policies or the status of the Junior Ministry of Women’s Role. 
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5.2.3 President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) 
The years from 1999 to 2001 were a promising time for democracy 
and gender empowerment. Abdurrahman Wahid had become 
President when parliament played a ‘gender card’ against the 
winning party, which was led by a woman, Megawati (Van Doorn-
Harder, 2002, Sen, 2002). The parliament decided to give the 
presidency to the runner up, Abdurrachman Wahid. Despite this, 
the new President encouraged policies favouring diversity and 
gender equality. During the short-period of his presidency, 
supported by the First Lady, who had a degree in Women’s Studies 
and conducted research and teaching in the field of Islam and 
gender studies, he issued a presidential decree on GM to integrate 
gender issues into the development process (Inpres no.9/2000).  
Wahid is also famous for promoting diversity and gender equality at 
the grassroots level.  
President Wahid appointed Khofifah Indar Parawansa, a feminist 
Muslim (Blackburn, 2004), to head the Ministry for Women’s 
Affairs, and she changed its name to the MOWE. Wahid also made 
Khofifah Head of the Family Planning Board. The idea of locating 
these two government organisations under the same person was to 
ensure that family planning issues were tackled from a gender 
perspective. This contrasts with Suharto’s approach, which saw 
women as targets for population policy and family planning as 
primarily women’s responsibility (Robinson, 1998). 
Under Khofifah’s leadership, all four deputies worked with GM in 
mind. The Deputy for Policy Development established programmes, 
projects and activities to mainstream gender; the Deputy for Gender 
Equity coordinated all the sectoral ministries to mainstream gender; 
the Deputy for the Improvement of Women’s Quality of Life mainly 
dealt with affirmative action, and the Deputy for Social Participation 
maintained and developed the involvement of NGOs in working with 
the government to mainstream gender. These four deputies 
functioned as ‘catalysts, facilitators and mediators in implementing 
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the GM strategies in all ministries and other government agencies, 
provinces and kabupaten or municipalities (Inpres no.9/2000). 
5.2.4 President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004) 
In 2001 Wahid was ousted from the presidency and succeeded by 
the former vice-president, Megawati. Although she had previously 
been prevented from becoming president because of her gender, she 
did not pay particular attention to women and gender issues. She 
was not in favour of affirmative action for women, opposing a 
proposal for a 30% quota for women in parliament. In a speech on 
Mother’s Day she claimed that a quota system would have negative 
effects, ‘undermining women’s dignity and role as well as weakening 
the institution that applies the preference’ (Secretary of State, 
2001). She was reported not to be keen on the idea of the state 
pursuing gender equality because she felt that it already existed, 
and it was up to women themselves to prove their ability 
(JakartaPost, 1999). Some of Megawati’s gestures clearly lacked 
gender sensitivity. For example, she presented a ‘polygamy award’ 
initiated by a businessman, Puspowardoyo, who was promoting 
franchising his restaurant to each of his four wives and trying to 
persuade other people to do the same with their businesses 
(Nurmila, 2005).  
Under Megawati’s presidency, the leadership of MOWE, which had 
been radically reformed during Wahid’s presidency, was given to Sri 
Rejeki Sumarjoto, a member of the Golkar Party. This appointment 
was more a matter of keeping the Golkar Party happy than due to 
the capacity of this individual, as Sri Rejeki had no track record 
whatsoever in the women’s movement. During her leadership, 
MOWE was disconnected from the Family Planning Board and given 
the additional task of overseeing children’s welfare. Indonesian 
feminists regarded this as a backward movement: instead of seeing 
women as subjects with their own merit, their identity was 
dependent on their status as mothers (Cattleya, 2006). It was a 
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clear setback from the efforts of the previous era when reproductive 
tasks were seen as the responsibility of both married parties. 
5.2.5 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-present) 
Megawati’s successor, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(known as SBY) is from a military background and was one of 
Suharto’s escorts. With regard to his stand on gender issues, it is 
interesting to analyse some speeches given on Mother’s Day. In 
2008, to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the first Women’s 
Congress (which also happened to be 10 years after Suharto’s 
departure), the Indonesian Military Commander gave a speech 
advocating that women should never deny their kodrat (natural 
destiny) as mothers, indicating that the state’s gender ideology had 
progressed little in terms of gender equality: 
Women’s emancipation for Indonesians should not be contrary to a 
women’s kodrat. Instead, every effort and struggle to advance 
women’s role and performance should be channelled to strengthen, 
enrich and give added value so that women can be more respected 
and noble in their natural destiny. One thing that must never be 
denied, let alone eliminated, is women’s destiny to be a mother: to 
give birth, nurture and educate her children and the new generation. 
It is in this role that women must ensure that this nation will have 
well-behaved children and a young generation with strong character 
and personality. (Saleh, 2008) 
On a similar occasion two years later, the tone of the President’s 
speech resembled that of his military commander: 
There are various agendas picked up by women’s movements, 
including the NGOs and women activists, these days. Which is fine, 
because life is diverse; this nation faces many problems and 
challenges. Of course we are happy and grateful, we appreciate all of 
these women’s movements where women activists are filling the gaps 
to develop the nation and tackle the problems we are facing. 
Nevertheless, I must remind you all not to forget to put the care of 
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the children as the first and utmost agenda. How you are going 
to do it is up to each organisation and woman’s movement. (President 
Yudhoyono’s speech on Mother’s Day, 22 December 2010) 
Islamic conservatism, which was oppressed and controlled during 
the New Order, has since surfaced with a significant number of 
supporters. In several regions they have succeeded in enforcing 
Sharia law, especially in relation to women and their behaviour. 
These regional laws restrict women’s movement (they are not 
allowed to travel on their own or work night shifts) and even their 
freedom to choose their attire (they must cover their head). 
Headlines such as ‘A woman had her head shaved for not wearing a 
jilbab’ (head scarf)’ and ‘A pregnant woman was arrested and 
detained for four days’ for standing on the street in the middle of 
the night’ are now seen in Indonesian newspapers. It is rumoured 
that President SBY dislikes these new regional laws, but cannot do 
anything about them (Suryakusuma, 2010). In September 2010, the 
local government of Jambi proposed to run virginity tests for all 
girls before they could enter state school in response to ‘the rise of 
premarital sex amongst teenagers’, but the proposal was turned 
down (Afrizal, 2010). 
Believing that Indonesian women should find their cultural roots, 
President SBY appointed an academic anthropologist who was also 
a senior official in the Ministry of Tourism and Culture as Minister 
of Women’s Empowerment. During SBY’s second presidency (2009-
present) the Ministry’s responsibility for child protection was 
recognised by changing its name to the Ministry of Women’s 
Empowerment and Child Protection. At the same time, leadership of 
the Ministry was given to the wife of one of SBY’s four-star generals, 
whose capacity to deal with gender issues was questioned by 
Indonesian feminists on the grounds that her involvement in 
women’s organisations was limited to the organisation of army 
wives (Cattleya, 2009).  
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Table 5-1 illustrates how the organisation of MOWE has evolved 
over time. Developments during the last two cabinets under the SBY 
reveal the government’s view on women. Instead of a deputy for 
gender equality, there is now a Deputy for the Protection of Women, 
which gives women the same status as children. This shift can be 
seen as a step in the opposite direction to previous GM efforts, from 
addressing power relations between both sexes to achieve gender 
equality to regarding women as a vulnerable group.
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Table ‎5-1 MOWE's organisational structure 
  Kabinet Reformasi Kabinet Gotong Royong Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu (2nd term) 
(1999-2001) (2001-2004) (2004-2009) (2009-2014) 
President  Abdurahman Wahid Megawati Susilo Bambang Yudoyono Susilo Bambang Yudoyono 
Name of the Ministry MOWE MOWE MOWE MOWE  and Child Protection 
Minister and their background 
  
Khofifah Indar Parawansa  Sri Redjeki Meutia Hatta  Linda Gumelar 
(feminist Muslim) (Lawyer, member of Golkar 
Party) 
(anthropologist, senior civil 
servant of the Ministry of 
Tourism and Culture) 
 
The main Deputies (echelon I units) Policy Development Development and Information Gender Mainstreaming Gender Mainstreaming 
(for Economic Sectors) 
Improvement of Women’s Life Quality Quality of life of Women Improvement of Women’s 
Quality of Life 
Gender Mainstreaming(for Political, Social 
and Law Sectors 
Gender Equality Gender Equality Protection of Women Protection of Women 
Community Participation Welfare and Protection of 
Children 
Protection of Children Protection of Children 
  Community Participation Empowerment of Community 
Organisations 
Development of Children 
Source: MOWE website, accessed between 2001-2010 
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Another change under SBY was the creation of a new Deputy for 
Gender Mainstreaming. This led to a shift in the perceptions of 
MOWE employees from believing that they should mainstream 
gender in all their duties to seeing GM as the sole responsibility of 
that particular deputy (Cattleya, 2006). This meant that only people 
from the Deputy of GM were sent to assist government ministries 
and agencies, limiting the human resource pool available for these 
efforts. Under the last government, women’s issues have been 
further side-lined: there is no longer a Deputy for the Improvement 
of the Quality of Women’s Life. Instead, children’s issues now have 
two deputies. 
As Table 5-1 illustrates, these changes have happened gradually 
and the structures reflect changing government views about women 
and gender in general. When new cabinets are announced, a 
newspaper article is often published the next day commenting on 
how some ministries should be eliminated or merged, and MOWE is 
usually one of these (See for example Zuhro, 2009), followed by 
limited discussion amongst women activists defending MOWE’s 
existence (Dian Kartika Sari, 2009). Other than that, there has been 
no major political debate or resistance from women’s NGOs, which 
in itself is suggestive of the low profile of GM in wider Indonesian 
society and politics. 
Having discussed state gender ideology in Indonesia from the 
Suharto era to the present day, it is pertinent to ask how the goal of 
women’s empowerment is valued in the bureaucracy. The next 
section looks at efforts to mainstream gender in the work of 
Indonesia’s bureaucracy. This will provide both a foundation and 
essential background information for the more specific analysis of 
gender and bureaucratic reform in the Ministry of Finance in 
Chapter 11. 
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5.3 Gender Mainstreaming in the Indonesian 
Government 
Despite the changes set out in the previous section, MOWE has 
become the key agent for ensuring that GM is implemented in every 
government ministry and agency, at both the central and regional 
levels. MOWE is the advisor and coordinator for all GM activities. 
Along with MOWE, other actors involved in GM are BAPPENAS (the 
National Development Planning Agency), the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Women/Gender Study 
Centres at provincial and district levels and NGOs such as the 
Women’s Research Institute and Centre for Regional Information 
and Analysis (Pattiro).  
Table ‎5-2 illustrates the tasks and functions of each organisation, 
ensuring the implementation of GM at the national and regional 
levels. 
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Table ‎5-2 Different Actors in Mainstreaming Gender in Indonesia 
Actors 
 
Responsibilities 
Government 
agencies 
MOWE Advocate the appointment of Gender Focal Points within 
government agencies.  
Supporting the formation of Working Groups 
Encourage working groups to find and seek solutions to gender-
related problems in their institutions 
Provide technical assistance 
Prepare tools to implement GM 
Evaluate GM implementation in other government agencies 
National 
Development 
Planning Agency 
BAPPENAS 
Advocating gender equality and promoting GM within public 
sector development planning and the budgeting process 
Coordinating Ministry 
of Social Welfare 
Ensure coordination amongst the work of line ministries involved 
in social welfare issues: 
Ministry of Health 
Ministry of National Education 
Ministry of Social Affairs 
Ministry of Religious Affairs 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism 
Ministry of Environment 
Ministry of Women’s Empowerment 
Ministry of Administrative Reform 
State ministry of Housing 
Ministry of Sport 
Other government agencies  
In its structural line, one of the posts was Deputy for Women’s 
Empowerment 
Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
Ensure the implementation of gender mainstreaming at regional 
levels 
Universities Women/Gender 
Study Centres 
Act as a source of technical expertise in the area of gender-
sensitive policy research 
Working in coordination with the regional women’s 
empowerment divisions (WEDs), a regional division of the MOWE 
NGOs Women’s Research 
Institute 
Assist in capacity building for government officials 
Research in gender budgeting 
Pattiro Mainly in gender budget initiative research at the regional level 
International 
organisations 
UNDP Build capacity in technical support and advocacy for gender 
mainstreaming 
Provide support to regional stakeholders  
Improve the national policy framework 
Supporting the establishment of a gender mainstreaming strategy 
UNIFEM Strengthen and build capacity for the national machinery 
Assist with gender responsive budgeting 
CIDA Build capacity of the national machinery (MOWE) 
ILO Assist in mainstreaming gender in labour-related areas for the 
Ministry of Man Power and Transmigration 
GTZ Gender advocacy in Population administration reform  
Asia Foundation Gender aspects of Islamic Law 
ADB Gender mainstreaming in poverty reduction 
Source: MOWE, UNDP, Bappenas 
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In 2002, MOWE produced a Guidelines Manual for the 
implementation of GM programmes. The manual defines ‘gender 
mainstreaming’ as a strategy to ‘achieve gender equality through the 
integration of male and female experiences, aspirations, needs, and 
issues in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
policies, programs, projects, and activities in various development 
fields’.  
In the next section I analyse the practice of GM in one of Indonesia’s 
ministries. 
5.3.1 Gender mainstreaming and the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs 
The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) mainly carries out 
government policies for the officially recognised religions – Islam, 
Catholicism and other branches of Christianity, Hinduism and 
Buddhism. Since Islam is the majority religion in Indonesia, the 
Ministry deals with the interests of Muslims more than those of 
other religious believers. They manage Islamic religious activities 
such as the hajj (Islamic pilgrimage) service, marriage registration, 
divorce procedures and inheritance matters. 
We have seen in the previous section that the Marriage Law drew 
criticism from feminists for its discrimination against Indonesian 
women, particularly Muslim women. This is one of the issues that 
GM in MORA tried to address. 
GM activities in MORA started in 2002. After a discussion with 
MOWE during the initial phase of GM implementation (Bambang, 
2004) MORA’s GM team suspected that the current Compilation of 
Islamic Law (CIL), a holy reference source for Islamic judges in 
religious courts, could encourage domestic violence against women, 
not least because it recognises polygamy, as reflected in the 
Marriage Law (Mulia, 2004, Nurmila, 2009). MORA decided to 
establish a working group to analyse the CIL from a gender 
perspective. For a couple of years the working group conducted 
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desk studies and fieldwork in different regions and consulted fiqh 
books (Islamic jurisprudence) with Muslim ulemmas (clerics).  
In 2003 the result of the analysis was published as a counter legal 
draft of the CIL. This proposed changes to aspects of Islamic law 
seen as containing gender bias and discrimination against women. 
The changes focussed on three issues: Marriage Law, inheritance 
law and waqf (the donation of property for religious purposes). 
Where the Marriage Law was concerned, proposals were made, 
among other things:  
(i) to define husbands and wives as equals (as opposed to 
the  husband being the head of the household, as stated 
in the current Marriage Law),  
(ii) to forbid polygamy/polyandry (the Marriage Law allows 
up to four wives and does not allow polyandry),  
(iii) to allow women over 21 years of age to marry without the 
permission of a guardian (currently, whatever their age, 
women need the permission of their guardian to get 
married), and  
(iv) to give both husbands and wives the right to 
reconciliation after a divorce (which under the Marriage 
Law is only the right of the husband). 
This work obtained support from gender and human rights 
activists, as well as NGOs, including Muslim women’s 
organisations. The chair of the GM team, Dr Musdah Mulia, gained 
celebrity status and was invited to give talks, seminars and 
interviews. This gave traditionalists an opportunity to brand the 
team as ‘western agents’, because of their use of concepts such as 
pluralism, gender equity and human rights. The counter legal draft 
was proclaimed heretical by Muslim traditionalists and there were 
highly charged discussions in the media. Headlines such as Pikiran 
Sesat anti Islam Kuasai Departemen Agama (Heresy has taken over 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs) (Hutapea, 2004) adorned 
conservative Islamic magazines. 
141 
 
After massive pressure from the grassroots, on February 2005 the 
Minister of Religious Affairs forbade the GM team leader and her 
team from conducting seminars and workshops in the name of the 
Ministry and instructed them to return all pertinent documents 
(Irianto, 2006, O'Shaughnessy, 2009). The Minister was quoted 
saying: ‘In principle, we should never put reasoning above the Holy 
Revelation’. (Romly and Agil, 2003). This ban stopped the draft 
proposal from being discussed at the House of Commons (HC) with 
a view to legislation. 
This case provides an ironic example of GM in the Indonesian 
bureaucracy. While many government agencies’ response to GM was 
lukewarm (see below), within two years MORA’s GM working team 
had identified a tangible issue with the potential to alter the fate of 
women across the country. This shows that despite supposedly high 
levels of civil service inertia, there was capacity to perform in 
Indonesia’s bureaucracy, given the right leadership and 
commitment. Yet, despite the support from senior levels in MORA, 
the   proposed revision to the marriage law was dropped. This 
reflected a lack of political will in other parts of the government, 
coupled with the degree of resistance from some social sectors. 
The fact that there were Muslim women amongst the opponents to 
the revision can be read in two ways. One interpretation is that the 
GM working group was trying to represent women in Indonesia, but 
that Muslim women refused to be represented in this way and 
preferred their current lives. This is seen by progressive Muslims as 
living under male domination. Another interpretation is that these 
women had a false sense of security and were unaware of their 
disadvantaged position (see, for example, Furseth and Repstad, 
2006 for discussion on women and religion). Instead of referring to 
the Constitution, which guaranteed gender equality, and in this 
spirit, holding a meeting among the parties that disagreed, the 
Minister gave way to mass pressure and used his male authority to 
freeze the activity. 
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One could also say that the GM team was too ambitious in setting 
its goal and was neither strategic nor diplomatic in conveying its 
results to the general public. Perhaps this was because the team 
consisted of academics who did not engage with public sentiments. 
In terms of strategy, coordinating with other ministries and lobbying 
Muslim groups, including those in opposition, might have produced 
a better result. 
Since these events, the GM focal points and working groups in the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs have continued to work in other, on less 
controversial areas. For example, they run training events for the 
penghulu (marriage registrar) on giving marriage sermons that 
promote gender equality.  
Table ‎5-3 Ministry of Religious Affairs, Personnel Statistics 
  Male Female Total  
Total employees 106,195 84,119 190,314  
Structural posts: 9,167 1,054 10,221  
   Echelon I 13 1 14  
   Echelon II 106 3 109  
   Echelon III 997 91 1,088  
   Echelon IV 7,064 663 7,727  
   Echelon V 987 296 1,283  
Functional posts* 81,013 69,766 150,779  
Junior Staff 16,015 13,299 29,314  
* Functional posts include Marriage Registrars (2,066 males and 20 
females) and are mostly occupied by religious teachers in primary and 
secondary schools (63,555 males and 64,628 females). 
Source: MORA 
To what extent did MORA’s efforts in implementing GM in external 
policies, such as the marriage law, match its commitment to GM 
within its own organisation? Table ‎5-3 shows MORA’s statistics for 
its human resources (HR). The head of the GM team, Dr Musdah 
Mulia, whom I interviewed during my fieldwork, stated that she was 
not particularly concerned about the number of women in the 
Ministry. She said it was difficult to change overnight, but they 
could still seek to sensitise existing personnel to gender issues. I 
argued that it is difficult to sensitise personnel about gender issues 
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when the number of women in the organisation does not reach a 
“critical mass” (see Chapter 2). As such, it would seem that MORA 
had done less to embrace GM internally than it terms of outward-
facing policies. I return to this issue with reference to MOF in 
chapter 11. 
The next section looks at progress in mainstreaming gender in other 
government agencies. 
5.3.2 Evaluation of gender mainstreaming 
implementation in selected government 
ministries/agencies 
In 2006, six years after the presidential decree, MOWE and 
BAPPENAS conducted a joint evaluation of twelve government 
organisations in nine sectors which had been running GM for at 
least five years. In total, eleven were included in the evaluation: the 
Ministries of Manpower, National Education, Law and Human 
Rights, Agriculture, Cooperative and Small-Scale Industries, Health, 
Social Welfare, and Environment; the National Police, the Attorney 
General’s Office, the Supreme Court and the Family Planning 
Agency. The report was funded by UNIFEM.6  
The report evaluated five aspects of GM implementation in these 
government organisations: political commitment, policies, 
institutions, information systems and HR. This analytical 
framework followed a standard model used by international donor 
organisations to evaluate GM (see, for example, Asian Development 
Bank and Cambodian Ministry of Women's and Veterans' Affairs, 
2004). Each sector was evaluated by an independent expert via 
SWOT analysis, and the overall evaluation was compiled from the 
individual reports. Although the format of the report was not 
                                           
6 In the same year, UNDP also commissioned a gender mainstreaming 
assessment from a local independent consultant, which I return to later in 
Chapter 11. Also in the same year, a country gender assessment was 
carried out jointly by the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and 
some other donors to mark the Beijing plus 10, as they also did in several 
other developing countries. I also return to this report in Chapter 11. 
144 
 
consistent across sectors, the following points can be extracted from 
its 265 pages (Kementerian Negara Pemberdayaan Perempuan, 
2006). 
Political commitment. MOWE considered whether a government 
institution had political support in terms of a ministerial decree to 
ensure the integration of GM into its system (a de jure aspect of GM 
at the ministerial level). All of the evaluees had this political 
commitment. The problems lay in the communication and 
dissemination of these ministerial decrees, the regulation of lower-
level units and with monitoring and evaluation. None of the 
organisations possessed a good monitoring and evaluation system. 
The lack of clear planning and defined goals, objectives and time 
frames made it difficult to measure the progress of GM efforts.  
Policies. This considered whether the government ministries 
produced gender-sensitive policies. Several ministries still did not 
appreciate GM’s core issues or understood GM as a women’s project 
as part of a WID approach. Another issue that came to the surface 
was the frequent lack of coordination between the regional offices of 
decentralised ministries and policy at ministry level, let alone with 
national policy. 
Institutional mechanisms. This examined the appointment of focal 
points and the establishment of gender working groups. In most of 
the organisations GM was still managed by ad hoc teams which had 
to be renewed every year, as is the case in MOF. The Ministry of 
Manpower was the only ministry that included a gender-related 
division in its organisational structure, as an echelon II unit. This 
unit’s task was mainly to deal with gender-related issues in the 
labour force and with female workers. Another common situation in 
the government agencies assessed was that they had an echelon III 
and in some cases even an echelon IV official as a focal point in 
each of their echelon I units. The bureaucratic culture  requires 
everybody to respect hierarchy more than expertise, as it is 
assumed (often wrongly) that those with more expertise are at the 
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higher level. This means the focal point does not have enough power 
to influence policy and decision making in their echelon I unit. One 
of the evaluators put it in very strong terms: ‘This situation, along 
with lack of planning and exact targets for the activities, as well as 
incompetence and lack of advocacy from MOWE makes the GM 
programme ineffective’. 
The Ministries of Agriculture and of Cooperatives and Small Scale 
Industries were the only organisations with focal points down to the 
regional level. Apart from the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of 
Social Welfare and the Ministry of Environment, all of 
ministries/government agencies had formed internal working 
groups to tackle gender-related issues in their work places.  
Information systems. This mainly considered whether there were 
sex-disaggregated data in the information systems. The Ministry of 
Manpower/Labour Force has been sex-disaggregating its data since 
1989, even before the GM programme started in its organisation 
and these sex-disaggregated data had been accessible on its 
website. Their  was, however, no evidence that these data had ever 
been put to any specific use. Another ministry that had gender-
disaggregated data accessible on the web was the Ministry of 
Education. These were the only two ministries that had 
disaggregated their data. 
Human resources. In this section there is inconsistency between 
the individual expert reports. Only one evaluator – for the law sector 
(comprising the National Police, the Ministry of Law and Human 
Rights, the Attorney General’s Office and the Supreme Court) – 
included an institutional analysis, to see if HR management was 
gender-sensitive. In the law sector, none of the assessed 
organisations had implemented a gender-sensitive internal HR 
policy. They were all still operating under gender-neutral 
assumptions, without paying attention to women’s specific needs, 
which resulted in a low level of female participation amongst 
decision makers. The other evaluators only considered whether or 
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not most decision and policy makers had been trained in gender 
issues. A problem highlighted in this respect is that several 
ministries had no record of who had participated in gender training. 
Considering that relocation is a common occurrence in the civil 
service, this recording system is needed to keep track of who has 
been trained and to decide whether a sensitisation programme 
should be run in a particular area. Another typical problem in this 
regard is the difficulty of bringing the higher echelons together to 
discuss the direction of GM in their institution. Round-table 
meetings initiated by the MOWE were supposed to bring together 
these echelon I officials. However, these officials delegated the task 
to junior staff, as they were busy doing things they considered more 
important.  
The evaluators claimed there was considerable confusion across 
these ministries about how to approach GM. They report tended to 
criticise these ministries for “doing GM in the wrong way”, by saying 
they ‘still had the mindset of WID’. This implied that targeting 
disadvantaged women was no longer relevant, as WIDhad been 
superseded by GM. In fact, mainstreaming gender perspectives can 
include targeting activities for women or men who need them. 
Experience with multinational donor organisations in other 
countries tells us that often both approaches are carried out 
simultaneously (Jahan, 1995, Moser and Moser, 2005). Rao and 
Kelleher (2005b) point out that ‘the most pernicious 
misunderstanding is the separation of gender mainstreaming from 
women’s empowerment work’, showing that in many cases women’s 
empowerment projects have been abandoned for the sake of 
mainstreaming. 
Another interesting aspect of the report is criticism of MOWE as the 
key agent in GM at the national level. One evaluator noted that 
MOWE was not included in the evaluation and said it should have 
been the first institution to be assessed. MOWE was seen as not 
providing enough guidance and advocacy to the government 
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ministries/agencies. In the National Police, for example, the GM 
programme was not defined clearly and had no obvious direction. 
The evaluator questioned MOWE’s intervention and asked why was 
this not picked up earlier, since they had been sent reports 
annually and a MOWE official sat on the GM team in the National 
Police. For the Family Planning Board, the evaluator’s criticism 
related to a lack of knowledge about family planning issues and 
priorities on MOWE’s part. This had prevented it from 
mainstreaming gender into the Family Planning Board’s activities. 
5.3.3 The National Plan of Action for Gender 
Mainstreaming  
Six years after the Presidential Instruction, some progress had been 
achieved. Increased funds had been allocated for the 
implementation of GM in government departments, some country-
specific analytical tools had been developed, coordination 
mechanisms between central and regional governments had been 
put in place and there were some examples of best practice. Despite 
this, there were still many weaknesses and constraints, such as 
different views and understandings of GM amongst the decision 
makers and the fact that gender issues were still not mainstreamed 
in development planning (Kementerian Negara Pemberdayaan 
Perempuan, 2006). 
In 2006 MOWE felt it necessary to draft a National Plan of Action for 
GM that included capacity-building activities, gender analysis, and 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. This included the Parahita 
Ekapraya Award, which is given to government 
ministries/agencies/local government that have made particular 
efforts to ensure gender equality in their line of work. This award 
has three categories: Pratama (beginner), Madya (intermediate) and 
Utama (advanced) that are awarded according to how long an 
institution has been mainstreaming gender within its area of 
authority. The award has no monetary value. MOF received this 
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award in the Madya category in 2010, and the Utama category in 
2012. 
This section has examined the institutional framework for GM in 
Indonesia’s bureaucracy in general, along with a review of its 
implementation in various government agencies. This analysis, 
along with later chapter’s discussion of formal and informal 
structures in the MOF and its wider organisational culture, provides 
essential background information for understanding how GM fared 
in MOF. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has brought together three pieces of information that 
are crucial to understanding gender issues in the Indonesian 
Ministry of Finance. Following the previous chapter’s discussion of 
the Indonesian civil service and its wider environment including 
socio-economic, social and political issues, this chapter pays 
particular attention to gender issues at the state level and in the 
civil service bureaucracy. It also discusses the extent to which the 
bureaucracy, as an organization, values women’s empowerment.  
The relationship between society, the state and the civil service is 
not linear. There are different layers of influence and complex 
relations between them. These include the state in a general sense 
(which is itself more multi-faceted than monolithic), the civil service 
(which was the key state institution in Suharto’s era), and wider 
society (which increasingly includes a range of influences from 
liberal feminism to conservative Islam). The patterns of this 
relationship change over time, posing different challenges to 
women’s empowerment. 
Although the New Order regime reduced gender gaps in education 
and employment, it had a patronising attitude towards women and 
limited their movements by promoting state ibuism. Suharto did not 
promote gender discrimination in education because he believed 
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that a clever and educated mother is needed to bring up future 
generations. Working mothers were was not condemned either, as 
long as they put the family first. The new regional laws introduced 
in the post-Suharto era are similar, if not worse than state ibuism, 
limiting women’s physical freedom of movement in the name of 
Islam.  
The chapter has demonstrated that Indonesian civil service law was 
shaped to fit Suharto’s gender ideology and has not changed in the 
13 years since his departure. Indonesians seldom refer to gender 
discrimination as a characteristic of Indonesian bureaucracy. In 
fact there is a common perception that working for the civil service 
is more suitable for women than working in the private sector, due 
to its flexibility. Yet this common perception is at odds with the fact 
that far from being flexible, civil servants are highly regulated. 
Chapter 4 discussed how their working lives are hierarchical and 
full of jargon reminding them of their duty as state and public 
servants: to be loyal to the state and the national ideology. Their 
codes of conduct require them to prioritise their work over their 
families, ‘work day and night untiringly’ and be prepared to be 
relocated around Indonesia at any stage in their employment. This 
chapter has revealed that their lives are also regulated outside 
work, even down to domestic affairs such as marriage and divorce, 
due to the expectation that they set a good example for wider 
society.  
Goetz’s gendered cognitive context considers how women’s 
empowerment is pursued within organisations. As well as looking at 
specific ministries, it is useful to look at Indonesian bureaucracy at 
the national level. This chapter has reviewed the experience of GM 
across the civil service. The available information suggests that GM 
has not progressed far in addressing internal organisational issues.  
In Chapter 11, I return to the topic of GM in the MOF and discuss 
the link between internal organisational dynamics and external 
outcomes. 
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6 Gender discrimination as a formal 
policy in MOF’s recruitment process 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 analyses the gender ideology of the state and the extent 
to which the women’s empowerment agenda has been pursued over 
the past 40 years. It demonstrates that, although there have been 
some shifts in the way the state approached women’s 
empowerment, there has been no change to the Civil Service Law, 
which remains gender-biased. 
The rest of the chapters in this thesis focus on MOF. Bearing in 
mind that as part of the national bureaucracy, MOF civil servants 
are bound by the gendered civil service laws and regulations, this 
chapter examines the third element of a gendered bureaucracy: 
gendered organisational culture. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
concept of organisational culture is employed in this thesis to 
examine MOF practices that hinder women’s equal participation. 
Before we examine daily practice within MOF in general, there is an 
important question to address. Given the low number of female 
employees in MOF, does the recruitment process discriminate 
against female applicants? This question is set out as part of, and 
an opening to, a broader question: ‘Which aspects of organisational 
culture facilitate and hinder women’s participation?’ 
Research on gender in organisations and bureaucracy reveals that 
gender discrimination usually occurs in the informal structure 
through power relationships amongst the people in the organisation 
(Savage and Witz, 1992). In the case of MOF, however, gender 
discrimination also exists at the formal level, is openly embraced by 
senior management in the recruitment process and acts as a barrier 
to entering the organisation.  
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6.2 Background to civil service recruitment 
Until Suharto’s regime ended, a civil servant had to undergo a form 
of screening test during their probation period which included 
assessing whether the person in question, or any member of their 
family – which, given Indonesia’s extensive family and kinship 
system, includes very distant relatives – had any connection to the 
1965 coup, however remote. If this was suspected, the applicant 
was barred from joining the civil service.  
The recruitment regulations state that to be eligible to apply for a 
civil service career, one should not have any form of disability and 
be in very good health. Even if the job assigned does not involve 
physical work, the civil service does not admit disabled people. This 
again reminds us of the organisational culture of the military, where 
the emphasis is upon physical standards, implying that masculinity 
is determined by a healthy body rather than a healthy mind 
(Carreiras, 2006 p.41). Unlike other countries such as India or 
China, which hold a general exam for entry to the whole of the civil 
service, in Indonesia each ministry manages its own recruitment 
according to its needs, but must make an agreement with MenPAN 
before beginning the recruitment process.  
Following a generalist rather than a specialist system, everybody 
recruited to the Indonesian civil service starts in a junior or non-
managerial position. At recruitment a warning is issued that a civil 
servant should be ready to be placed anywhere in Indonesia. This 
clause refers not only to geographical location but also to the type of 
job that might be assigned, which may not be related to the 
applicant’s expertise. 
6.3 Recruitment practices in MOF 
6.3.1 Overview 
As the title of this chapter suggests, there is blatant gender 
discrimination in MOF recruitment. While discrimination against 
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women in recruitment processes is usually discrete and therefore 
has to be proven systematically (Petit, 2007, Yoder et al., 1989), 
discrimination in MOF happens as a matter of policy. Although 
some people at the top managerial levels denied this, others 
admitted it. The relaxed way in which some senior managers made 
this blunt admission partly reflects the small number of women 
currently working at that level in MOF. It is unlikely that they would 
be as comfortable making such statements if women were already 
well represented amongst them (Johnson and Schulman, 1989). 
As well as being unjust, this practice is also contradictory. At the 
national level such discrimination is against the law, since the 
Constitution guarantees gender equality in employment (articles 28 
D (2, 3) and rules that everybody should be free from discrimination 
of any kind (article 28 I (2)). Indonesia ratified the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) in 1985, with only one reservation to article 29 about 
which body should settle any dispute about the interpretation or 
application of the Convention. Indonesia also introduced the 
National Action Plan (United Nations, 1998) following the Beijing 
Platform for Action, although the quota of 30% of women in 
parliament was never implemented. Such contradiction, however, is 
not new, as UNIFEM (2005) notes the existence of laws that have 
yet to be harmonised with the provisions of the Convention in areas 
such as the family, marriage, economic rights and health. What is 
more surprising is the contradiction within the Ministry itself. Since 
2004, MOF has set up an internal gender mainstreaming 
programme, yet to date open discrimination in recruitment coexists 
with this programme.  
The recruitment process is handled centrally by MOF, rather than 
at the directorate general or agency level. Every year, each unit 
within MOF must state how many employees it will need for the 
next three years based on its HR planning. The numbers for every 
unit are then compiled and form the basis for recruitment. MOF 
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employees are currently recruited from two sources: the public, with 
MOF holding a one-day recruitment exam for university graduates 
who meet the minimum criteria, and STAN, the ministry-owned 
accounting college.7  
6.3.2 STAN 
6.3.2.1 Ministry-owned College 
Around 70% of MOF employees are hired through STAN. This 
college was founded in 1959 to cater for the needs of MOF 
employees specialising in public finance. Its programmes follow the 
pre-bureaucratic reform structure of the Ministry’s organisation and 
include Taxation, Treasury, Customs and Excise, State Receivables 
and Action Administration, Land and Building Valuation and Public 
Accounting. The college admits high school graduates and provides 
free education for three years (some other schools  also offer one-
year training courses), and on passing the final exam they are 
recruited to MOF as civil servants. When they apply to sit the MOF 
exam, applicants choose their preferred speciality, although their 
choice is may not be granted depending on the positions available.  
MOF applies a set of difficult and competitive entry exams to recruit 
2-3,000 high school graduates every year. Once students 
successfully complete the MOF exam, the ministry guarantees them 
civil service employment, normally for life.  
6.3.2.2 Eligibility to take the exam 
The recruitment process is conducted in several stages. Each year, 
MOF invites A-level graduates to take the STAN entrance test. There 
are certain eligibility requirements to sit the exam, including A-level 
passes with a minimum average of 70 percent in all subjects and 
none below 60 percent. Ministry of Education Statistics (GOI, 
                                           
7 In Indonesia it is common for a ministry to own a college from which it 
recruits graduates. The Interior Ministry does this on a larger scale and 
employs graduates in local government around Indonesia. This approach 
provides tailor-made graduates, as the programmes the ministerial colleges 
offer are not available at state or private universities.  
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2006a) reveal that the average grades in high school exams in 
Indonesia in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 were 48, 48, 57 and 59 
percent respectively. STAN’s requirement of a minimum average of 
70 percent therefore filters out more than half of all high school 
graduates. Amongst the other requirements, which vary from year 
to year, participants must not have any form of disability or be 
addicted to narcotics or other substances, as confirmed by a letter 
from a GP or health institution local to where the applicant is 
registered.  
Furthermore, applicants must be under 21 and have never been 
married, as confirmed by the applicant’s local authority, and if 
accepted they must agree not to marry before they graduate. The 
same criterion of never having been married is used nowhere else in 
Indonesia, apart from in the Indonesian military academy (2007).  
MOF requires its recruits to be single because it funds their study 
and claims that it cannot afford to lose people as a result of  
marrying, pregnancy and child-care, and there is no maternity 
leave.  At this stage there is indirect discrimination against women. 
According to Indonesian law, the children of unmarried parents are 
only registered under their mothers’ name and in such cases the 
authorities will not issue a statement that the mothers have never 
married. Instead, they include the information that they have had 
an ‘unregistered marriage’ in the past which resulted in one or more 
children. The fathers are still considered single and can therefore 
apply to take the examination.  
Not allowing a year’s maternity leave during the study period is 
inconsistent with STAN’s policy for underperforming students. The 
minimum pass grade is a Grade Point Average (GPA) of 2.65 (out of 
4)8 with no D marks and no mark below C for core subjects. If a 
student does not reach this in the first or second year, s/he is 
obliged to leave. If this happens in the third year, however, the 
                                           
8 Marks range from A to D, which is a fail. A has value of 4, B=3, C=2, and 
D=1. 
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student is allowed to repeat the whole year in all subjects, not just 
particular subject(s) that s/he has failed in. Like the first three 
years, this extra year is fully funded by MOF. If the student still 
does not pass in the repeat year s/he is expelled.  
This policy not only appears unfair to the student but is also a 
waste of MOF resources. The drop-out rates in the first and second 
year are high at 15-20% per year, and around 3% of students repeat 
their third year. The contrast with maternity leave is stark. Since 
STAN students do not have civil servant or MOF employee status, 
MOF is not bound by statutory civil service maternity leave 
regulations, and has no direct responsibility for the student.   
The customs and excise course applies further requirements: only 
fit, healthy and non-disabled men are admitted. Again, the only 
organisation that applies this kind of gender discrimination is the 
Indonesian military academy, which never admits women, who join 
the military via a separate entrance process as university graduates 
or directly from high school to serve as low-level officers.   
The Customs and Excise course is run in a semi-military style. 
Students learn how to handle guns in the second semester and are 
exposed to various basic military training methods. This course 
recruited women until the mid 1990s, when it suddenly stopped 
admitting them. Managers at the Customs and Excise office argued 
that their duties are very complex and dangerous, and it would be 
difficult for women to go on beach or sea patrol because ‘The patrol 
vessels do not have toilets. If these ladies are prepared to wee in the 
sea standing up then they’re welcome. But I don’t think that is the 
case’. This contrasts with HM Customs and Excise in the UK, which 
shifted from being very male-dominated until 1972 to becoming an 
award-winning government department for equal opportunities 20 
years later (Palmer, 1996). At the time of my fieldwork there were 
few women in Indonesia’s Customs and Excise Offices as a result of 
the past years’ recruitments. While their justification for not 
accepting women is highly questionable and based on prejudice, the 
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Custom and Excise Office has been starkly honest about this form 
of discrimination by openly stating that only men can apply to the 
course. The other schools are less overt in their discriminatory 
practices, but they know the exact number of women and men they 
are willing to accept every year, as I discuss in the next sections. 
6.3.2.3 The entrance exam 
As a fully-funded course, STAN has proved very popular among 
bright students, especially those who come from non-wealthy 
backgrounds and from outside Jakarta. Despite the eligibility 
requirements, more than 120,000 candidates (between 5-7% of total 
high school graduates) from across Indonesia participate in the 
entrance exam every year, making it as popular as Seleksi 
Penerimaan Mahasiswa Baru (SPMB), the entrance exam for 
Indonesian state universities. Table 5.10, below, illustrates the 
numbers of high school graduates and STAN applicants. Compared 
to other ministries whose recruitment, especially at the regional 
level, tends to involve corruption, bribery and nepotism (Kristiansen 
and Ramli, 2006),  and despite the rampant corruption alleged 
against MOF, all of my interviewees believed that STAN has been 
relatively free from this kind of problem. 
According to the Ministry of Education’s statistics, around a million 
people pass the final high school exam every year. As detailed in 
Table ‎6-1, 5 to 7% of graduates apply to take the STAN exam. 
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Table ‎6-1 High School Graduates and University Examination Participants 
Year 
Passed High School 
Exams 
Sat in State Universities 
Exams (SPMB)* 
Sat in 
MOF Exam 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
2003 806,925 722,523 586,697 471,212 41,605 45,232 
2004 862,853 727,915 525,193 554,379 27,835 31,293 
2005 859,729 759,825 364,661 585,405 38,521 43,399 
2006 884,602 815,513 403,774 494,717 57,625 62,003 
2007 901,289 816,531 459,395 467,922 61,375 63,910 
2008 900,108 828,969 688,309 701,188 46,728 48,637 
2009 959,038 882,493 727,864 763,004 42,542 46,202 
2010 1,044,935 943,494 599,457 634,035 55,766 57,783 
Source: Data from MOE and MOF 2003-2010  
* SPMB is run yearly for students who have graduated from high school that year 
or the year before. The exam for entry to a state university is nationally 
administered. 
Table ‎6-1 shows that although fewer women than men finish high 
school each year, more women apply to STAN. Statistics from the 
Ministry of Education reveal that, although more boys participate in 
the final high school exam (probably meaning that more boys attend 
high school than girls), on average girls tend to outperform boys in 
these exam results by 3%. The pass rate is also higher for girls than 
for boys. This means that, despite the smaller number of female 
high school graduates, more of them are qualified to take the STAN 
exam. Higher rates of female participation in the STAN exam may 
also show different gender interests when it comes to higher 
education. It might also be due to the fact that STAN does not ask 
for a tuition fee, and families with tight budgets might prioritise 
boys’ education over girls’ (UNICEF, 2007 p.39). 
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The STAN exam itself covers maths, English, Indonesian language 
and general knowledge in multiple choice format. Only about 3% of 
applicants pass the test every year. The exam results are posted on 
the Ministry’s webpage on a named day and are also available at the 
registration locations. Table ‎6-2 shows the proportion of test 
participants accepted at STAN in 2003-2010. 
Table ‎6-2 STAN Admission Rate 
Year 
STAN Applicants Accepted Admission rate* 
Male Female % Female Male Female % Female Male Female 
M+F 
admission 
rate 
2003 41,605 45,232 52.09% 2,368 381 13.86% 5.69% 0.84% 3.17% 
2004 27,835 31,293 52.92% 2,550 374 12.79% 9.16% 1.20% 4.95% 
2005 38,521 43,399 52.98% 3,055 670 17.99% 7.93% 1.54% 4.55% 
2006 57,625 62,003 51.83% 1,990 378 15.96% 3.45% 0.61% 1.98% 
2007 61,375 63,910 51.01% 1,693 321 15.94% 2.76% 0.50% 1.61% 
2008 46,728 48,637 51.00% 1,960 365 15.70% 4.19% 0.75% 2.44% 
2009 42,542 46,202 52.06% 1,967 369 15.80% 4.62% 0.80% 2.63% 
2010 55,766 57,783 50.89% 2,905 865 22.94% 5.21% 1.50% 3.32% 
Source: MOF Training Agency 
Admission rate is the percentage of males/females admitted per 
male/female applicant 
 
Since more women apply every year and women tend to outperform 
men in the high school exam, the low number of women gaining 
admission to STAN is surprising. Every year fewer than 20% of 
those named on the pass list are women, even though each year 
roughly 10% more women than men take the exam. Less than one 
in a hundred female applicants was accepted in 2003 and 2006-
2008, and only slightly more than one in the other years.  
As a comparison with state university admission, Table ‎6-3 
illustrates the number of men and women participating in SPMB. 
The proportion of women enrolled as new students more or less 
corresponds with the proportion of female applicants.  
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Table ‎6-3 State University Examination Admission 
Year 
Sat in state university 
admission examination 
Enrolled as new students Admission rate 
Male Female % Female Male Female % Female Male Female 
2003 586,697 471,212 44.54% 130,130 109,230 45.63% 22.18% 23.18% 
2004 525,193 554,379 51.35% 121,024 125,026 50.81% 23.04% 22.55% 
2005 364,661 585,405 61.62% 117,638 138,055 53.99% 32.26% 23.58% 
2006 403,774 494,717 55.06% 100,438 116,165 53.63% 24.87% 23.48% 
2007 459,395 467,922 50.46% 88,999 100,564 53.05% 19.37% 21.49% 
2008 688,309 701,188 50.46% 135,836 153,569 53.06% 19.73% 21.90% 
2009 727,864 763,004 51.18% 194,441 248,732 56.13% 26.71% 32.60% 
2010 599,457 634,035 51.40% 187,008 246,358 56.85% 31.20% 38.86% 
Source: Biro Pusat Statistik (BPS), Kemendiknas 
Comparing Tables 6-2 and 6-3, it can be seen that in 2010, 23 % of 
admissions into STAN were women, but women accounted for 57% 
of admissions to state universities. This is surprising, since women 
outperform men at high school and this is a criterion for eligibility 
to take the STAN exam, but not for the state university exam. An 
admission committee member who wished to remain anonymous 
told me that the low percentage of women who are accepted into 
STAN/MOF exam is not due to their exam results; in fact women 
tend to perform better in the exam. The only thing that prevents 
them from gaining admission is MOF itself.  
This key informant lent me the 2003-2007 recruitment dataset and 
helped me to analyse it, first by showing me how the data were 
processed step by step to come up with the number and 
composition shown in the announcement, and then, using the same 
set of parameters but removing the gender-discriminatory quota, 
calculating how many women had been disadvantaged. 
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Every year, regardless of the number of the applicants, MOF only 
accepts as many people as the organisation is expected to need in 
three years’ time when the students graduate. As the college has a 
quality standard to maintain, only people who give more than 70 
percent of correct answers proceed to the next round in the 
selection process. This is not difficult to achieve and STAN has 
never had to lower its standard, as every year more than 100,000 
applicants have already been filtered by the registration 
requirements. 
Table ‎6-4 Numbers of STAN Applicants 
Year 
Applicants 
Candidates in the final 
round  
(mark 70 % and above) 
Accepted 
Male Female TOTAL Male Female TOTAL Male Female TOTAL 
2003 41,605 45,232 86,837 8,214 7,399 15,613 2,368 381 2,749 
2004 27,835 31,293 59,128 9,028 9,304 18,332 2,550 374 2,924 
2005 38,521 43,399 81,920 8,185 7,380 15,565 3,055 670 3,725 
2006 57,625 62,003 119,628 13,826 13,689 27,515 1,990 378 2,368 
2007 61,375 63,910 125,285 13,131 13,181 26,312 1,693 321 2,014 
2008 46,728 48,637 95,365 n/a n/a n/a 1,960 365 2,325 
2009 42,542 46,202 88,744 n/a n/a n/a 1,967 369 2,336 
2010 55,766 57,783 113,549 n/a n/a n/a 2,905 865 3,770 
 
Year 2003-2007: based on interview with people from Student Admission 
Records 
Year 2008-2010 based on follow up through announcement on MOF’s 
website 
 
Table ‎6-4  shows that more women than men are eligible for the 
final round of the selection process. In 2006 only 378 women were 
accepted: 2% of those who had achieved a mark of 70 or more. In 
some other years the figure is as low as 3 per cent. For men in 
2006, the respective figure is 14%, and for 2005 it is as high as 
37%.  
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Why were so few women accepted for STAN? One explanation might 
be that among the applicants who scored 70 and above, men scored 
significantly higher.  However, the official responsible for compiling 
these data provided a rather different explanation: 
We always end up with more than 15,000 people above this 70 
percent threshold. As you can see in the database, there is no specific 
trend of women doing better or worse; it really depends on the 
applicants every year. However, since most of the directorate 
generals in MOF prefer male to female employees, their shopping list 
will also be gender-segregated. Based on the employees’ needs 
analyses for each Directorate General for the next three years, we 
compile a ranked list of results of the entrance exam and then 
selected the top x number of women and y number of men from that 
list. 
(Key-informant MZ, interview no. 21/BPPK/2007-Aug) 
If candidates were selected purely on the basis of their exam scores 
and not their sex, the proportion of men and women accepted would 
have been very different. Table ‎6-5 shows that despite being 
outnumbered by men in total, women were concentrated in the 
ranks of the highest scorers. Taking 2006 as an example, MOF had 
a total requirement of 2,668 employees. Of the highest 2,668 exam 
scores, 1,538 were achieved by women. In a gender-neutral scenario 
all of these women would have been accepted. In reality, as seen in 
the final column of Table ‎6-5, only 461 women were appointed and 
the other 1,077 posts were transferred to men. This shows the scale 
of the discrimination in this process. 
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Table ‎6-5Number of posts transferred to men 
Year 
Total 
Employees 
Needed* 
Met the 
Requirement** 
Accepted Posts Transferred 
to men*** 
Male Female Male Female 
2003 2,749 1,227 1,522 2,368 381 1,141  
2004 2,924 1,168 1,756 2,550 374 1,382  
2005 3,725 1,649 2,076 3,055 670 1,406  
2006 2,668 1,130 1,538 2,207 461 1,077  
2007 2,014 828 865 1,693 321 544  
2008 2,325 n/a n/a 1,960 365 n/a  
2009 2,336 n/a n/a 1,967 369 n/a  
2010 3,770 n/a n/a 2,905 865 n/a  
 
Year 2003-2007: based on interview with an informant from Student 
Admission Records 
Year 2008-2010 based on follow up through announcement on MOF’s 
website 
* Total employee needed in the year x+3 regardless of sex 
** Numbers are based on the compiled ranked list (not gender segregated) 
***the difference between the number of female candidates who met the 
requirement and the number of those actually accepted. 
n/a : data unavailable, the person contacted said that they ‘could not find 
the data’ 
 
Based on the data in Table 6-5, we can deduce that every year more 
than 1,000 women are denied access to employment at MOF purely 
on the basis of their sex. Their places are given to less-qualified 
men, showing that MOF is prepared to compromise the quality of its 
recruitment considerably to keep women out of the system.  
According to Law no. 39/1999 article 46, elections in the legislature 
and judicial and executive appointments arenas have to ensure 
female representation. In 2007 Parliament noticed that STAN was 
admitting very few women and questioned the Finance Minister 
about its recruitment policy. In internal meetings, the Minister 
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challenged MOF’s misogynist environment, but before Parliament 
she defended the policy to limit the recruitment of women. She said, 
as quoted by one of my key informants, that while MOF is working 
towards gender equality within its organisation, at the moment they 
believe that most of their positions in remote parts of Indonesia are 
not safe for women. Consequently, MOF will not send women to 
these locations until work has been done to make these offices safe. 
Since Parliament did not offer an applicable solution for this 
problem, MOF has retained its discriminatory practice. 
The latest development, in 2010, is that under pressure from 
Parliament and the gender mainstreaming team, MOF told 
Parliament that they were willing to increase the intake of women to 
a maximum of 30 percent (although the number of qualified female 
applicants exceeds 50 percent). This is a novel interpretation of the 
30 percent quota to increase the participation of women in 
Indonesia’s Parliament. The Parliament quota was established to 
make sure that there is a minimum of 30 percent of women, while 
in MOF this quota will operate as a cap. Despite this policy change, 
in 2010 the female share of recruits was still only 22 percent. 
When finalising this chapter, I asked the Head of the TA if they still 
applied this gender discrimination policy. The reply was: ‘We never 
discriminated. Everything is based on the needs of the end users. 
They want such and such a number of women, so that’s what we 
process and present to them. There is nothing discriminatory about 
it’.  
Effectively, MOF applies a policy of affirmative action in favour of 
male applicants. There are parallels between this and a separate 
policy aimed at boosting the number of recruits from eastern 
Indonesia. This region is slightly poorer than the western part of the 
country and has benefited from an affirmative action initiative to 
hire putra daerah’ (translated literally as ‘local boys’ – but not local 
girls, of course). Indonesia’s experience of unequal development has 
made Java and to some extent Sumatra much richer than other 
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areas, especially those in the east; MOF’s centralised hiring system, 
which has very high standards, also means that only people who 
have attended relatively good high schools (most of which are 
situated in Java) can pass. These are then sent to occupy positions 
all over Indonesia, including the east. This situation has created 
envy among local people in the region, who feel that they themselves 
should have positions in these offices but do not yet have the 
qualifications to get them. The affirmative action policy is also 
pursued as an effort to reduce tensions between local people and 
the ‘immigrants’ from western Indonesia. This demonstrates that 
affirmative action can be made to work if there is the political will. 
However, the opposite happens in the case of women. 
The threshold of 70% is sufficiently low that, even with the 
affirmative action policy, nobody below this mark needs to be 
accepted, and so “standards” can still be maintained. One official 
told me, that sometimes they also have to accept orders from high 
position officials, members of parliament, cabinet ministers and so 
forth to admit their children. He said that as long as these children 
achieve more than a 70% mark, the request can be considered.9  
When STAN students have finished their training they are formally 
recruited as MOF civil servants10 in grade II/b, the grade given to 
people who hold Diploma III certificates. Internal MOF policy 
stipulates that STAN graduates should receive special treatment, 
and that after two instead of the normal four years in service their 
grade should advance to II/c. This policy does not apply to 
employees who obtained their Diploma III elsewhere. 
                                           
9 Once one of former president Suharto’s grandchildren sat the MOF exam 
in 1995, and the whole Ministry, especially the recruitment team, was 
under pressure to admit her, but she failed to score more than 70% and 
was not admitted. The story went that the Director of the School was 
removed from his position and given a new position as an Expert Staff. 
10 Until 1997, formal recruitment took place in the second year of training; 
therefore in the past, second-year trainees had already been given their 
Employees Identification Number and were entitled to receive 80%of the 
basic salary of civil servants in grade II/a.  
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6.3.3 Direct recruitment from local universities 
There were no comparable data available for the recruitment of 
university graduates, mainly because this is not a regular 
recruitment process and the last time it had occurred before my 
fieldwork trip was in 2002. MOF recruits university graduates when 
it needs staff with non-financial backgrounds such as lawyers to 
deal with the legal side of government accounting, psychologists 
mainly for psychometric testing, which is applied at every level of 
recruitment and promotion, engineers, and – rarely –librarians. 
From the various interviews I did for this research, however, I 
gathered that the same rule applies to this recruitment: every unit 
states how many new women it can tolerate, a fact never mentioned 
in the vacancy announcement. Customs and Excise, of course, does 
not want any women and clearly states that only men should apply 
in every advertisement. 
The recruitment process for private and state university fresh-
graduates takes place in three stages. First, applicants complete an 
academic exam comprising a set of multiple choice questions on 
basic mathematics, English, and general knowledge lasting around 
3 hours. There is no essay-writing involved, making the exam easy 
to mark. From this, a set of parameters are applied to decide which 
candidates can go on to the second stage, the psychometric test. 
Those who pass the psychometrics are invited for interview. 
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Table ‎6-6 Univesity fresh graduate recruitment 2002 
Stage of recruitments Male** Female** Total* 
Applicants 38,600 31,582 70,182 
Passed the academic test and invited to 
take the psychometric test 
1,020 1,208 2,228 
Passed the psychometric test and invited to 
the interview 
796 456 1,252 
Accepted 779 256 1,035 
Initial recruitment target 935 101 1,035 
Discrepancy -155 155   
*GOI, MOF press release 2002  
** MOF internal HR data 
 
In June 2002, MOF announced 1,035 vacancies and invited 
applicants to take the exam. As my informant told me, MOF had 
internally (and quietly) decided that it wanted only 101 women 
amongst those 1,035 recruits. This was a unanimous decision, 
despite the fact that there were several women on the recruitment 
committee. Table ‎6-6 outlines the stages of the process MOF applied 
to select the candidates. As shown, while men accounted for a 
higher share of initial applicants, around 20 per cent more women 
passed the academic test. After the psychometric test, more than 
three-quarters of the men and only a third of the women who had 
succeeded in passing the previous stage were invited to the 
interview.  
Since I could not obtain the data about this psychometric test I can 
only speculate about what might have happened at this stage. The 
first possibility is that only 796 men and 456 women passed the 
psychometric test. While there is evidence that there are gender 
differences in psychometric test results (Balderson and Broderick, 
1996, Codorniu-Raga and Vigil-Colet, 2003), the psychometric test 
in this case is not designed to anticipate such differences. Not only 
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that, but MOF’s team of psychologists has designed one test for all 
applicants, despite the fact they will have different jobs in different 
settings, depending on the echelon I units they are deployed to. The 
extent to which this process may have discriminated against women 
would require analysis from a trained psychologist and is therefore 
beyond the scope of my research. The second possibility is that 
more women than men passed the psychometric test but only 456 
were invited to the interview. This is a possible scenario as only 101 
women were wanted. 
Fifty-six per cent of the women invited to interview and 98 per cent 
of the men were successful and were offered the position. As a 
result the distribution of successful applicants is significantly 
skewed towards men. This is predictable, since the gatekeepers are 
the interviewers, who are the same directors who set the quota of 
men and women from the very beginning. It turned out that they 
had to make a compromise and recruit 155 more women than they 
were initially willing to tolerate, probably because not enough male 
candidates met the minimum criteria. Even after accepting 155 
more women than they had initially intended, I suspect that this 
still left some women out despite their scoring better than the men 
who were recruited, as in the case of STAN recruitment. 
Women have been seen as undesirable employees in MOF for a long 
time. MOF has always claimed that it has difficulties allocating 
women to posts in various parts of Indonesia and therefore does not 
wish to employ too many, as I discuss later. When asked whether 
they realised that by implementing that system in the admission 
exam they are clearly denying women employment in the Ministry, 
which equates to discrimination against women in the institution, 
one of the directors of the TA replied:  
Let’s think that our Training Centre is a restaurant, and we are the 
cook. We prepare the food according to the guests’ order. Can you 
imagine coming to a restaurant and being forced to eat the food you 
don’t order? They don’t want women, so obviously we can’t send 
women to their offices… The Directorate General of Tax and the 
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Directorate General of Treasury in fact would like to limit their 
recruitment to men only, but they can’t do that because of Parliament. 
(Key-informant NF, interview no. 08/BPPK/2007-Apr) 
According to another key informant, in 2008 MOF allowed women 
increased access (i.e. not strictly the 15% limit but slightly more) to 
training programmes conducted outside Jakarta on the assumption 
that they would stay in the region where they received their 
education and not ask to be moved elsewhere. The policy only 
applies to one-year Diploma-1 (D-1) programmes that supply lower-
grade employees. Furthermore, while Indonesian universities 
recognise the credit points that applicants have achieved in D-3 
training, allowing them to transfer their credits when they decide to 
continue their education elsewhere, their D-1 education is barely 
acknowledged by universities, especially state ones. If somebody 
with a D-1 diploma wishes to continue their education for a better 
chance of progressing in their career (see the section on Training 
and Development in Chapter 7), they must enrol at a university as a 
high-school graduate rather than using the credits from their D-1 
units. As a consequence, they find it difficult to continue their 
formal education, which affects their career progression. Allowing 
more women to occupy lower positions in MOF sustains the current 
situation in which women are not welcome at higher management 
levels. 
Kanter (1977a) speculates that group processes are influenced by 
the gender composition of the group. I present details of the 
decision-making processes in the following chapter, but it is useful 
to remember here that the management composition in Table 5.3 
shows that very few women hold middle and top managerial 
positions. It is likely that these women find it difficult to challenge 
the decision to hire as few women as possible; Goetz (1997a p. 21) 
recognises that ‘gendered ideology and disciplinary structures can 
leave little space for women to validate their perspective…’. From late 
2005 to early 2011 the Indonesian Finance Minister was a woman. 
Did she challenge the institutional practice of denying women 
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employment in MOF? I did not get the opportunity to interview her 
myself, but from what I could gather during interviews with top 
managers at MOF, the Minister had felt disturbed by the fact that 
there so few women at STAN. She expressed these concerns to the 
TA Director, who simply replied that ‘there may not be many women 
in this school, but the ones we have are of the best quality’. This is 
true, because according to an interviewee, ‘from year to year on 
graduation day we always announce the best ten graduates of the 
year, and most of them will be women…’.  
We would expect, then, that these ‘best people’ to be at the top of 
the management pyramid. However, this is not the case. Instead, 
women face double discrimination – first in recruitment and then in 
promotion, which I address in Chapter 8. HR statistics shows that 
women occupy about a quarter of managerial positions. Considering 
that in total women only make up 20% of the whole MOF workforce, 
the statistics confirm the senior official’s statement, above. 
However, women are concentrated in the lower managerial levels. 
Currently there are no women at echelon I level and only seven in 
echelon II positions compared to 208 men. Women continue to 
occupy the bottom rank, and when they do get to managerial levels 
they remain in the lower ranks of these.  
6.4 Women’s motivations for joining MOF 
It came to light during the interviews that none of the female 
managers I interviewed had been aware of the gender discrimination 
in this government organisation before they joined MOF. At the 
same time, however, career advancement was not one of their 
reasons for seeking employment with MOF.  
As discussed before, MOF has several entry points depending on the 
HR vacancy. While the biggest intake is through STAN, there is 
recruitment for those with an undergraduate diploma and those 
who complete high school (who are employed straightaway without 
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three years of training at STAN). Nine of my interviewees joined 
MOF via this route. One said: 
You know university was very expensive in those days. My father 
had not retired by then, but all my siblings were boys. Actually I 
passed the test to Undip [University of Diponegoro in Central Java], 
but I knew my father would not pay for my education so I tried to find 
a safer option. I learned that MOF was recruiting from High School 
and that those who passed the test would be given a year’s training 
in the IIK (the old name of STAN) as a pembantu akuntan 
(accountant-assistant). But later it simply didn’t happen; instead we 
were sent around Indonesia on placements. Some men left and some 
others have now become echelon I and echelon II officials [naming 
some people]. Yeah, they all started from high school just like me, but 
you know, they are all men… 
In general, most female managers recruited from STAN had parents 
who were not wealthy and either could not afford to send their 
children to university or prioritised their sons’ education. The 
women were only funded to finish high school and then were left to 
decide whether they wanted to get married or go to work (and, 
hopefully, quickly find themselves a husband). STAN provided a 
good opportunity for them, as it was free and they would not have to 
ask their parents to support them. Until the end of the 1990s, STAN 
students were given salary starting from their second year of study 
and were guaranteed a place at MOF once they graduated.  
Although most women from the university graduate intake had 
parents who were financially sound, surprisingly they told me that 
it had not been their own decision to work as a civil servant, let 
alone at MOF. Theoretically having a degree, especially from a 
reputable university, should give them more agency to decide what 
was best for them. Instead, they were persuaded by their parents or 
siblings – usually elder brothers, who are seen as father figures, 
especially if the age difference is big. Although there is no 
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requirement to be single when joining MOF from university, most of 
the women I interviewed were single when they were hired. 
According to non-STAN female managers: 
… from the very beginning I had made up my mind to take the first 
job offer: whoever called me first, there I would pledge my loyalty. To 
be honest with you, I got offers from BULOG (a government-owned 
rice distribution company) and PLN (the  national electricity company). 
Even PLN placed me in Gambir, while BULOG placed me in 
Surabaya. Then BRI offered me a place as well... But my late brother 
told me that I should accept MOF’s offer instead of the bank’s. He 
said: ‘You are a woman, this is your place’. (Padma) 
We women sometimes find this stuff a real dilemma. At the time I had 
a boyfriend, and some people were a bit concerned that I wouldn’t get 
married. During my employment in the private sector I enjoyed my 
work a little bit too much because my boss fully trusted me and my 
creativity really developed. As a consequence, I wasn’t thinking about 
settling down and having a family. That scared my parents a lot. I’ve 
got an auntie who didn’t get married until just before she retired and 
my parents were worried that I might end up like her... Well, then, in 
the beginning I didn’t take it very seriously when I applied to join 
MOF. A friend asked me if I would take the exam, and I said why not. 
And I found myself passing the test. Then I thought, I’d been 
successful in finance, and this was also about finance, so why not 
give it a try? According to some of my friends, it would be better for 
me because of the job security, the pension and other stuff. That was 
what interested me, so I moved to MOF.  (Marina-DJPBN). 
I got an offer from one of the national banks but my parents didn’t 
allow me to work there. They said that for a woman it’s better to 
become a civil servant, so you can divide your time between minding 
the children and working. (Wita-DJPBN) 
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This set of answers provided a stark contrast to the responses I got 
when I asked the same questions of male MOF managers, most of 
which referred to long-term security, good pension benefits and 
being able to work ‘at their own pace’ as well as ‘the satisfaction of 
contributing to the country’s welfare rather than to private or 
multinational corporations’.  
The female interviewees were not just thinking about what would 
give them the most economic satisfaction. They chose a type of 
employment that would suit them as Indonesian or Javanese 
women. Even though they were still single when they decided to 
work in the civil service, and had a range of possibilities open to 
them, they were already projecting several years ahead to when they 
would be wives and mothers. In some cases, as quoted above, the 
choice was not even theirs. Although nobody forced them to work as 
civil servant, they were persuaded to accept their main duty and 
role as a woman, a wife and a mother, and to engage in a type of 
employment that would not distract them too much from their main 
responsibilities. As such, it is not surprising that opportunities for 
career advancement were not a priority. Ford and Parker (2008 p.3) 
summarise this situation in another setting very well: 
When we come to study real women working in Indonesia, we come 
to understand that we are dealing with single women, daughters, 
mothers and wives who are not free to make market-based decisions 
about what will provide most income or the best career for them as 
individuals. Rather, they make choices about work – or sometimes 
have their decisions made for them – and in the process they 
constitute their own identities as full, gendered human beings: as 
good mothers, capable wives, virtuous daughters or reputable, 
marriage-able young women. 
The above testimonies suggest that the informants felt that the 
public sector would be a more accommodating employer for women 
than the private sector. This view is sometimes proposed in the 
women-in-management literature (Lewis, 1992, Blank, 1985). As 
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this thesis demonstrates, however, the extent to which these 
perceptions reflect the reality of life in MOF is highly questionable. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the extent of gender discrimination 
in MOF’s recruitment process. From the outset, MOF has 
established a reverse-quota of a maximum of 15% (lately increased 
to 22%) of women in all new intakes. The statistics reveal that 
women score better than men in the recruitment exams, and that 
every year this discriminatory procedure denies more than 1,000 
women decent employment. In terms of HR staffing, it also means 
that MOF admits a larger number of less competent men just on the 
basis of their sex. 
This chapter clearly answers the research question: the recruitment 
process in MOF is gender-discriminatory, as formally acknowledged 
by the management of MOF. The next chapters examine other 
aspects of the organisational culture that hinder women’s equal 
participation.
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7 Diploma disease: to what extent 
does education empower women in 
MOF? 
7.1 Introduction 
After reviewing the recruitment process in the previous chapter, the 
discussion now turns to how the Civil Service career structure is 
implemented at MOF via internal regulations and policies. This 
chapter deals primarily with gendered organisational culture, 
although it also touches the issues of gendered time and space. 
I have shown in Chapter 4 that formal education plays a major role 
in civil servants’ lives. It determines what grade they are allocated 
when they join the service, and during their working life a higher 
diploma can take them to a higher grade. As well as being a 
requirement for holding a given grade, educational qualifications are 
necessary for holding a managerial position.  
Haque (1997) states that the nature of the civil service in developing 
countries is heavily influenced by Western and colonial rules and 
education, which has led to the creation of, among other things, 
‘diploma disease’. It is a terminology coined by Dore (1976, 1980, 
1997) to criticise the excessive reliance on formal education that 
results in a requirement for higher educational levels for jobs that 
previously did not need them and which do not necessarily prepare 
people to do the work. The misfit between employees’ qualifications 
and the requirements of the position they hold in the Indonesian 
civil service, especially at the regional-level, is identified by King 
(1998). Amongst his findings is the fact that often an employee’s 
field of educational specialisation is unrelated to the employing 
agency. 
The establishment of STAN was to avoid this kind of misfit, but in 
general the civil service still has ‘diploma disease’ to the extent that 
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diplomas determine position on the ‘seniority list’ more than real-
time performance assessment, and this system affects MOF 
promotion practice. 
This chapter analyses the extent to which education empowers 
women in MOF. It is widely accepted that education empowers 
people generally, not only because it transfers useful knowledge but 
also because it opens up better-paid employment opportunities. In 
the Indonesian civil service, education is already being used as a 
filter to select its employees, who are entitled to a relatively well-
paid job for life. The higher the qualifications, the higher the grade 
initially allocated and the greater chance of reaching a (higher) 
managerial post. 
Whilst this grade allocation seems to be gender-neutral at the 
recruitment point, the civil service regulations that set the links 
between education, grade and echelon makes the whole system 
more complicated in practice, and moreover, they are gendered. 
This chapter investigates gendering practices within MOF 
concerning employees’ education and the extent to which it 
empowers women to reach managerial positions. Included in the 
discussion is the issue of in-service training, which forms part of 
civil servants’ career development. 
7.2 Where would your diploma take you in MOF? 
Once graduates leave STAN they are channelled into echelon I units 
according to their specialisation. Graduates of the Diploma 
Programme on Taxation are posted to one of the offices of the DGTX; 
graduates of the Diploma in Customs and Excise gain a post in the 
DGCE, and graduates of the State Accounting School (given the title 
Junior Accountant), may be posted to any directorate generals, BPK 
or BPKP. 
While recruits from other state and private universities occupy 
upper and middle management levels, graduates of the STAN three-
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year degree programme are allocated to middle management levels, 
and those with a one-year diploma are channelled to lower positions, 
replacing employees previously recruitment from A-level graduates. 
Unlike STAN graduates, who do not need further technical training 
after their three years at the MOF academy, newly-recruited 
undergraduates (sarjana) are given short orientation courses, 
varying from one unit to another, to make sure there is no gap in 
their knowledge. These sarjana, however, are allocated to grade 
III/a, which is higher than the grade II/b assigned to STAN 
graduates. In practical terms, this means that they are separated 
from each other by 12 years in terms of their career paths, taking 
into account the fact that all staff grades advance every four years. 
The seniority rule in the Indonesian civil service means that these 
sarjana have a head start in being promoted to managerial level. 
This rule applies equally to both sexes, but there is a gender 
difference in the way it works. Most male MOF managers were 
recruited from STAN. In the case of the female managers in the 
three DGs studied here, only 5% came from STAN. This suggests 
that for STAN women, the double disadvantage of their sex and 
their mode of recruitment combined to substantially reduce their 
prospects of becoming managers. 
Their reproductive role may be one of the reasons that female STAN 
recruits do not fare as well as female sarjana where promotion is 
concerned. The average age at first marriage for women in urban 
Indonesia is 19 to 24 (BPS, 2002). STAN students are prohibited 
from marrying during their studies (typically between the ages of 19 
and 22), and many female STAN graduates marry shortly after 
joining MOF. For most women, assuming they have children 
relatively soon after marriage, the reproductive career is at its most 
demanding in the first decade of married life. This means that 
female STAN recruits experience this critical reproductive period 
when they are in grades II/a-II/d. Their female sarjana colleagues 
are already in grades III/a-III/c. 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, grade III/is a minimum requirement for 
a junior managerial position in the Indonesian civil service. MOF 
also requires at least an undergraduate degree to hold a junior 
managerial position, so STAN graduates take evening classes to 
achieve this. Female STAN recruits have to juggle their 
undergraduate studies, work responsibilities and reproductive tasks. 
Their sarjana colleagues, who may be promoted from pelaksana 
(junior staff) to junior managers shortly after they enter MOF, only 
have to deal with work and family commitments.  
Educational background also plays an important role in holding a 
mid-managerial post at echelon III which entails supervising a 
number of echelon IV staff. According to the Civil Service Law, 
formal education and qualifications are not a requirement for such 
a managerial position. According to the Law, education is only 
comparatively important: for example, if there are two candidates 
with the same grade and length of service, the one with higher 
education and more training is placed higher in the DUK (list of 
ranks). MOF internal regulations, however, make education a 
requirement for certain managerial positions. Since the early 2000s, 
MOF has had an unwritten regulation that echelon III management 
posts can only be given to a candidate with a master’s degree. I 
found that this unwritten regulation applied strictly to both men 
and women. 
During a civil servant’s career there are opportunities to upgrade 
education qualifications to increase the chance of being assigned a 
(higher) managerial post. This opportunity seems gender-neutral at 
first sight, but is in fact highly gendered. The next section observes 
how this gendering process occurs in the pursuit of a higher 
diploma. 
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7.3 Opportunities to obtain further degrees 
7.3.1 MOF Scholarships 
Further study can be self-funded, or supported by MOF or donor 
agencies such as the World Bank. When MOF pays for this 
education, it can be provided at STAN, a local university or abroad. 
Overseas study is a prestigious opportunity for MOF employees to 
pursue a further degree in a developed country, which opens up 
better career prospects, partly because the study itself is conducted 
in English which is seen as an important skill. 
When STAN graduates have served their first three years they are 
allowed to sit an exam for another two years of fully-funded study. 
No gender measures are applied; the exam is marked blindly and 
those whose scores meet the minimum requirement are invited to 
study for the two years. The number of women in this cohort is 
already very low due to the quota applied in recruitment. However, 
the number of females who sit the exam and are accepted is even 
lower. When these men and women graduate they will have a higher 
qualification as a government accountant,11 which is equivalent to 
an undergraduate degree. When MOF pays for the study, the 
scholarship recipients sign a compulsory service contract which 
obliges them to keep working for MOF for a certain period of time, 
depending on the duration of the study and the amount of money 
MOF spends on them during the study period.  
                                           
11Between 1999 and 2004, there was a standoff between the MOF and the 
Ministry of National Education (MNE) about the status of STAN. The MNE 
insisted that the accounting degree provided by MOF should not differ 
from those offered in other state universities, and therefore the MOF 
should cease conducting this programme and leave it to the state 
universities. This unresolved argument between the two ministries affected 
employees who wanted to continue their studies to a higher level, since the 
degree they took at STAN was not acknowledged by state universities. The 
problem was only resolved in 2004 when the former Finance Minister was 
appointed Education Minister.  
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Every year, depending on its budget (usually funded by donors), the 
TA offers a placement test for employees wishing to study for a 
higher degree overseas or at a local university. Those who score 
highly in English language are prioritised for overseas study. One of 
the TA’s requirements is that applicants must be under 35 to be 
eligible for the selection process. While this should not make any 
difference to men, it has an effect on women. Most of the female 
employees under 35 have young children, and since children are 
seen in Indonesia as mainly the mother’s responsibility this stops 
mothers from applying for the programme.  
The TA does not retain time-series data on applicants, but table 7.1 
below shows applicant data for 2007:  
Table ‎7-1 Selection for a scholarship in 2007 
  Male Female 
Invited to take the test 318  63  
Sat in the exam 301  29  
Passed the exam 82  18  
Source: Personnel Training Centre, 2007 
As those who were invited to take the test have more or less equal 
academic capacity, the figure is interesting. More than 90% of the 
invited men but less than 50% of the women turned up for the test, 
which was conducted in several training centres around Indonesia 
rather than centrally in Jakarta. MOF pays travel expenses for 
applicants who have to go to a training centre in a different city 
from where they work. The fact that only half of the eligible women 
participated in the test might be due to family constraints, as I 
discuss in the next chapter. However, of those who did the test, 60% 
of women and only 25% of men passed.  
Not everybody who passes the selection exam takes this opportunity 
to upgrade their formal education, especially in the case of women. 
All the married women that I interviewed framed their decision in 
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terms of whether their husband allowed them to study abroad. 
Some husbands were not willing to give permission to their wives 
when these opportunities arose. Several female managers simply 
chose to exclude themselves from these scholarships.  
Me? Studying abroad? It’s guaranteed that my husband will never 
give me permission to do that. So I’m just kind of resigned in that 
department. If I’m going to get a further qualification, then I’ll find a 
local university. 
When Zainab said this there was no trace of anger in her voice. She 
merely stated it as a fact and did not seem concerned or resentful. 
Interestingly, none of my interviewees faced with similar situations 
appeared angry with their husbands. Some female managers told 
me that they had taken the test but then decided not to go: 
I sat the selection test together with my husband, who was also a 
MOF civil servant. That was the second time I did the test. The first 
time round I passed, but since I’d just got married I didn’t go for the 
degree programme. I just took a short course for three months. This 
time I passed again, but he failed. By this time we’d been married for 
six years and still had no children. I asked my husband what I 
should do, and his answer was: ‘Terserah’ [up to you]. This is what I 
found very hard. He did not say ‘Go ahead’ [which would have meant 
that he was supporting me]. In the Javanese context, terserah can 
have two meanings: one actually means ‘No, do not do that’, and the 
other one is ‘It’s your choice, and don’t blame me if anything goes 
wrong’. Neither had I found easy. On one hand I wanted to further 
my career, but on the other I didn’t want my marriage to collapse. 
That was my reason when I went to see the Director to express my 
doubts about going away after what my husband had said. [The 
director] was angry: he said, ‘I’ll find him and talk some sense into 
him’. But I asked him not to, because I thought that would only make 
the situation worse with my husband. In the end I decided not to go… 
I’m Javanese. In the Javanese tradition, successful as I might be in 
my career, my ‘real’ success is still measured by my ability to keep 
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the household going. In principle I would never sacrifice my marriage 
just for the sake of my career. If I can do both, then I will, but if I have 
to choose, I will choose my marriage. Padma 
It’s difficult to be a woman; we can’t just focus on our career. 
Although sometimes I think, ‘would I be happy anyway if I just 
focused on my career?' How can I not take my husband and children 
into account in deciding to go overseas to study? If I’m not sure 
whether my family would be fine during my absence, what am I 
looking for? For me, if I study or have a good career, it’s supposed to 
have a good impact on the whole family, not just for my personal 
satisfaction. You see, a man wouldn’t think like that. As long as his 
wife supports him, which many would do anyway, then he would go. 
If my husband has a chance to do a PhD, for example, I will support 
him. But I wouldn’t do it myself. So even before he prevents me from 
going, I’ve stopped myself. Yanti 
 
I passed MOF’s internal test but decided not to continue with the 
process of applying to an overseas university. I’d got married by then 
and had two children. My husband said he would let me go for it only 
if I took both of the children with me. He might as well have said no – 
that wouldn’t have made any difference. How could I be expected to 
study in a foreign country, in a foreign language, and at the same 
time look after two children on my own? Of course I decided not to go. 
Haryati 
 
Unlike Haryati, Irma did not find it impossible to take two of her 
children with her to study abroad. Even then, she still felt 
supported by her husband:  
 
My late husband was very supportive. When I got a scholarship to 
study in Europe, he supported me, he didn’t mind at all. When there 
was an opportunity to take a test to get an MOF scholarship to study 
abroad, I asked him: ‘Pa, can I go for the test?' He said, ‘Yeah, do it’. 
Then when I surprisingly learned that I passed, I asked him again: 
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‘Can I go?' And he said, ‘OK, off you go’. I was so lucky, not 
everybody’s husband is like that you know...’ 
 
Twelve of my fifty-nine interviewees were, like Irma, married, but 
managed to get their husbands’ permission to study abroad. I did 
not come across any women who went against the wishes of their 
husbands or families, and when I asked about other cases, nobody 
seemed to know anyone who had done this. 
Table ‎7-2, below, summarises the 59 interviewees’ decisions about 
studying abroad: 
Table ‎7-2 Women's decision in term of overseas study 
Overseas study status 
Number of People Recruited 
Before the 1990s In the 1990s onwards 
Did not take the test 12  4  
Took the test and failed 3  6  
Passed the test but decided not to go 4  4  
Passed the test and went 6  20  
 
Table 7-2 shows that female interviewees recruited from the 1990s 
onwards were more likely to go abroad. I discuss this in detail in 
Chapter 10.  
Of the 16 women who did not take the test, 9 paid for their own 
master’s degree at a local university in their home town, in order to 
progress in their careers. 
7.3.2 Self-funded study 
For their own reasons, some of those who do not pass the exam and 
gain a MOF scholarship, or who do not wish to be bound to 
compulsory service, prefer to fund their own study outside office 
hours. According to BKN regulations, once they have finished their 
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studies and when their diploma has been certified by the Ministry of 
Education, if it is from an overseas or non-state university, they can 
submit it to have their grade adjusted accordingly. MOF, however, 
applies a set of requirements. 
Before starting the study, the employee must get written permission 
from their director for the study to have an effect on their 
career/rank and grade. Permission is only given under certain 
circumstances; for example, the area of study suits the needs of the 
organisation, the candidate’s length of time in service, their 
minimum grade and the length of time they have been occupying 
that grade, and that their performance has been satisfactory for the 
preceding two years. Although there is general guidance from MOF, 
every DG has different internal regulations based on its own 
requirements. While the TA requires candidates to have been in II/c 
grade for at least two years (which it applies to candidates who work 
in TA), DGTX insists on them being in their second year of II/d. This 
means that people in DGTX will only gain two years from this 
particular exam, as there are four years between II/d and III/a. 
DGTR follows the TA’s requirements without adding further 
conditions. 
According to MOF’s HR Bureau database, about 78% of all female 
employees who have master’s degrees had been funded by MOF to 
study overseas or at a local university. The remaining 22% were 
self-funded. By contrast, around half of the men had self-funded 
their master’s degrees. Some women find it almost impossible to get 
a master’s via self-funding. One of my female interviewees expressed 
suspicion about this:  
Where do [these men] get the money from? You see how much their 
salary is, and compare it to the tuition fees in state universities. The 
numbers don’t add up. Us women, we put our children first. Once our 
oldest child finishes studying, then there are the younger brothers 
and sisters. Women would only start to think about getting their own 
graduate degree once all the children have finished.  
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Fees at private universities are significantly higher than at state 
universities, which raises the question of how male employees are 
able to finance their studies. The most likely sources of finance for 
most men are the unofficial forms of income that I discuss in 
Chapter 9, to which men have greater access than women. 
Additionally, men are more prepared to spend money on their 
personal education. One male manager commented:  
As the head of the family, it is my responsibility to support the family. 
In this age of competition, everybody needs to upgrade themselves, 
so paying for a master’s degree is an investment. I prefer doing it at a 
local private university by attending night classes; it means I can 
keep supporting my family fully. You can’t do that with overseas 
study. Your income would be slashed. (Ali) 
7.3.3 Third-party scholarships 
Some scholarships are available from foreign institutions such as 
the the British Council (the British Chevening Awards), the 
Japanese Embassy (the Monbusho Scholarship), the Dutch 
embassy and the US embassy (the Fullbright Scholarship). These 
organisations invite anybody who meets their criteria to take their 
test. When MOF civil servants pass the test they have to negotiate 
with their office about the status of their study. Discretion is 
applied. Some offices might grant the study leave period the same 
status as for people MOF sends to study abroad: their salary is fully 
paid and the time taken is counted as service. Other offices may 
refuse permission, in which case the civil servants must quit their 
civil servant status or turn down the scholarship. Another possible 
route is to take unpaid leave. In practice, this kind of leave is rarely 
granted at MOF for the purpose of study as it is reserved for women 
to follow their husbands abroad, not to go abroad for their own 
purposes (see Chapter 10). 
Third parties sometimes offer scholarships to the institution rather 
than individuals. In this case the initial selection is done by the 
185 
 
employer. At MOF this kind of scholarship is administrated not by 
the TA but by the Secretariat General. There have been complaints 
in the past that the competition is not transparent, and sometimes 
the Secretariat General distributes invitations at the last minute 
after preparing its own candidates, so people from other DGs do not 
have time to prepare. Although the TA has expressed its 
unhappiness about this arrangement, the practice continues. 
In the first two sections of this chapter I have discussed how the 
Indonesian civil service values formal education and university 
diplomas. While formal education is essential for both men and 
women in the civil service, I have shown that the opportunity to 
pursue a further degree is gendered. Women have to choose 
between staying with their family and going abroad to study, and 
between using their own money to upgrade their formal education 
and spending it on their children. Men are more likely to choose to 
go abroad for study and to self-fund their study.  
Given the civil service’s emphasis on education, the next question is 
to what extent this gendered opportunity in pursuing further 
education affects the number of women appointed to managerial 
positions. The next section discusses how far MOF’s female 
employees’ educational levels contribute to the limited number of 
women in higher grades and managerial posts in the civil service in 
general. 
7.4 Educational Background of MOF employees 
According to BKN statistics, the average educational level of MOF 
employees is higher than that of employees in other ministries. Oey-
Gardiner (Oey-Gardiner, 2002) pronounces her optimism that the 
increasing number of women at grade III in Indonesia’s civil service 
in the 1990s will have a positive impact on women’s careers in 
government. Although some of these women might make their way 
to the top, it is not that simple. As explained in Chapter 4, it is not 
possible to advance beyond grade III/d unless the employee has a 
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master’s degree (S2) or higher, or is in an echelon III position or 
above. In MOF, especially since the implementation of bureaucratic 
reform, educational background is seriously considered in 
appointments to structural positions. In the case of functional 
positions, educational qualifications have always been an important 
factor in promotions.  
Table ‎7-3 illustrates the educational background of people in MOF 
at all levels, from junior staff and functional officials to managers. It 
shows that among the 12,572 male employees who have 
undergraduate diplomas, 55% are in managerial or functional 
positions while the rest are still at junior level. Among women with 
undergraduate degrees, only 40% occupy managerial or structural 
positions. Because in the civil service candidates (even from inside 
the organisation) never apply directly for a position, this may 
indicate MOF’s preference for appointing men rather than women 
with the same qualifications. By contrast, only 15% of women with 
master’s degrees are employed as junior staff compared to 20% of 
men with the same qualification. 
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Table ‎7-3 Educational background of MOF employees 
Education 
Echelon I Echelon II Echelon III Echelon IV Echelon V Functional Junior Staff TOTAL 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Primary school 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 2 2 0 1,062 21 1,071 23 
Middle school 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 62 15 7 1 1,752 294 1,827 311 
High School 0 0 0 0 14 1 641 66 3,223 1,214 539 46 17,848 6,463 22,265 7,790 
3 year diploma 0 0 2 0 16 0 343 12 762 222 632 76 6,939 1,408 8,694 1,718 
Undergraduate 3 0 57 3 790 35 2,719 491 2,425 640 1,081 175 5,677 1,952 12,752 3,296 
Masters 5 0 123 4 516 64 841 209 242 51 315 29 529 65 2,571 422 
Doctorate 7 0 26 0 8 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 2 47 3 
Total 15 0 208 7 1,344 101 4,551 779 6,721 2,144 2,578 327 33,810 10,205 49,227 13,563 
Source: Human Resource Bureau, MOF, December 2006e 
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While Table ‎7-3 presents a general picture of the educational levels 
of MOF’s employees, Table ‎7-4 focuses on middle managers in the 
three directorates general in which the research was based. Table ‎7-
4 indicates the highest qualifications of people in echelon III, not the 
degree they held when joining. It shows that most women in echelon 
III positions have a master’s degree or higher, compared to only half 
of the men (only a quarter in the DGTR) in the same echelon. These 
statistics raise the possibility that men at MOF are trusted to hold 
management posts regardless of their educational attainment and 
women are only trusted when they have a master’s degree. I explore 
this when I discuss promotion in Chapter 8. 
Table ‎7-4 Educational background of middle managers in the DGTX, DGTR and 
TA 
Education 
DGTX DGTR TA 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Diploma 3 and 
below 
20  0  4  0  3  0  
Undergraduate 193  0  263  6  10  1  
Master’s  204  25  88  18  17  12  
Doctorate 3  1  2  0  1  0  
Source: MOF Human Resource Bureau 2006 
Formal educational qualifications determine employees’ initial 
grades at the point of recruitment education, and continue to play 
an important role though a civil servant’s career. Another form of 
learning during civil service employment is provided through in-
service training, some of which is crucial to civil servants’ promotion 
and career development. This is   discussed in the next section. 
7.5 In-service training 
During Suharto’s New Order, State Administration Agency (LAN) 
was set up to be in charge of civil service training and development. 
Although this body was created to develop the civil service, its 
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underlying purpose was to create a government apparatus 
(borrowing their terminology, aparat pemerintah) whose loyalty was 
only to Pancasila and UUD’45, the state ideology and constitution, 
as prescribed by the New Order. 
Under LAN’s guidance, members of the Indonesian civil service are 
subject to pre- and in-service training. Pre-service training (diklat 
prajabatan) is based on a curriculum designed by LAN. At MOF, 
every batch of STAN graduates attends this training between 
finishing their studies and being sent to their new offices. University 
graduate recruits participate in a similar programme aimed at 
higher-rank employment. The training lasts about two months and 
emphasises discipline and loyalty to the state ideology. 
According to Regulation No.14/1994 (GOI, 1994), in-service training 
consists of: 
 structural training: career development training, mainly 
focused on managerial and interpersonal skills. It is called 
Pendidikandan Latihan Pimpinan (Diklatpim), and consists of 
Diklatpim IV (to prepare people to occupy echelon IV 
positions) and Diklatpim III (for echelon III positions) 
 functional training: professional training for functional post-
holders. This training, following LAN guidelines, is given by 
government ministries whose curricula strongly relate to the 
core function of each government organisation 
 technical training: training related to the core task of a 
particular job, regardless of trainee’s managerial or 
functional position.  
In MOF, the Personnel Training Centre is responsible for delivering 
pre-service and structural/managerial training for all MOF 
employees. It liaises with LAN to get certificates upon completing 
these programmes, as certificates are regarded highly in Indonesia. 
Other training centres cater for particular DGs (the Taxation 
Training Centre meets the training needs of the DGTX; the Customs 
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Training Centre those of the DGCE and so on), and are responsible 
for functional and technical training.  
7.5.1 Structural/Managerial Training  
Managerial training is required before allocation of a managerial 
position and before promotion to the next managerial level, or 
echelon. It is provided as in-house training programmes lasting at 
least a month and, as prescribed by LAN, a quarter of the training is 
on national ideology. The structural training programmes are also 
in-house, and last three to six weeks depending on the level – the 
higher the level, the longer the training –and require full attendance; 
participants are not allowed to miss classes. 
MOF policy does not offer managerial training to everyone. There is 
a selection process before an employee can participate in the 
training, involving internal selection by the line manager and a 
formal test. Every year the Personnel Training Office (an echelon II 
unit under TA) issues an invitation to all echelon I units to send 
their employees to take a test for a particular managerial training 
course, along with a quota for each unit. The quota is not gender-
discriminatory; it is based on a list of employees by rank (Daftar 
Urutan Kepangkatan, or DUK). Each HR division then sends 
employees whose rank, education and other prerequisites meet the 
minimum requirement, and those who pass can join the training 
programme, provided they have no urgent work.  
The procedure described above has several potential problems: 
1. The DUK operates on the basis of seniority rather than 
capability. Although the test itself is a filtering system, the 
participants are chosen from this DUK. Although there are 
no obvious gender-specific issues in this case as no junior, 
male or female, is invited, women may still be disadvantaged 
compared to men when they have experienced career 
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disruption due to maternity or unpaid leave (see Chapter 10), 
which pushes them further down the list.  
2. Line manager permission is required to participate in both 
the test and the training course. Therefore even if one passes 
the test but the training times are not convenient for the job, 
the line manager has the authority to postpone the 
employee’s participation in the training. 
3. A candidate may not be available on the day of the test or 
even for the training programme itself. Given Indonesia’s 
gendered culture, women are more vulnerable here. 
According to several key informants in TA, over the years 
some women have withdrawn themselves from the test or 
from the training due to their family situations. These 
informants, however, could not provide statistics on the exact 
number of women who did so. Women who are pregnant, 
nursing or have a young family often miss their turn to 
participate in this training. Every DG has a different policy in 
this respect. Some do not re-invite an employee who has 
turned a training programme down more than once; others, 
like the DGTR, are more flexible and keep their names on a 
waiting list, offering a training place at every opportunity.  
4. People who do not pass or do not attend exams are invited 
once more in the next round, but if they still fail they are not 
invited again. Currently, different units have different policies 
for women with young families or expecting a baby. Units 
with a good database system (not the case in every unit) can 
postpone inviting these women or ask them whether they 
would like to participate in the training. In units without a 
good database or which are less concerned about their female 
employees, such women may be passed over for several years 
and may never get the chance to take the training course, 
preventing them from achieving a managerial position.  
Many women who have young families find it difficult to participate 
in these training programmes because they have to leave their 
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families behind. MOF‘s six-week training takes place at a training 
centre in Magelang, Central Java, where the Personnel Training 
Centre is located. Accommodation is provided, but there is no 
crèche . 
7.5.2 Technical Training 
Technical training is offered through the respective training centres. 
Some female junior staff I interviewed complained that they tended 
to be invited for secretarial and clerical training (not necessarily 
linked to their daily responsibilities) while their male colleagues 
were offered places on more job-related and technical courses. 
These technical training courses may not correspond with their 
current job, but are often useful in the future. For example, people 
who are not in the IT division but receive some IT training benefit 
from it in their work and the training certificate might lead to a new 
assignment requiring the qualification. 
The bureaucratic reform proposed a competence-based training and 
development system which includes linking training to employees’ 
career paths, only giving training that matches the employee’s job. 
While this will make the training system more effective and efficient, 
without thorough consideration it could lead to pigeonholing people 
in a way that might disadvantage their future careers. At the 
moment there is a tendency to channel women into clerical or PR-
type jobs, and men into more technical ones (see Chapter 9). There 
is a danger that the new system could strengthen this tendency, 
and once employees are in a certain position they may not be able 
to move on. In the DGTX, for example, most women at middle 
managerial levels are given PR positions even though some have a 
master’s degree in tax auditing. According to key informants in 
DGTX, the excuse for this is that it needs to improve its public 
image, and since women project the ‘clean and respectable, free 
from KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism)’ image, the DGTX 
wants them in their front line. 
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7.5.3 Distance learning in MOF 
All of the training programmes are conducted in a traditional way 
(in a classroom with rows of chairs facing the trainer and a white 
board), with the exception of some distance learning technical 
courses conducted by Customs and Excise. The idea of delivering 
more distance learning programmes was developed between 1995 
and 1999. Distance training was seen as suitable for Indonesia, as 
it would save the cost trainees’ travel from their home to the nearest 
training centre. MOF received a grant from the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) and several people were trained in Japan; 
the TA was given a studio in which to produce and process 
multimedia and assistance in converting teaching materials to suit 
distance-learning processes. In 1999, the head of the TA decreed 
that several distance training courses would be launched.  
After several trials, however, an evaluation of exam results for the 
same training courses done in the traditional way and long-distance 
showed a significant discrepancy. The main reason given was that 
employees trained via distance-learning were not freed from their 
routine tasks by their line managers, but were expected to work as 
usual and study outside office hours. Studying after work can be 
difficult for women with young children and other family 
responsibilities, even when they do not have to leave their homes. 
Another reason was that during the initial period the interactive 
student support system had not been developed. As a result, 
participants found it difficult to absorb the training materials 
because only one-way communication was possible. By this time, 
JICA’s support for this initiative had ended. Instead of trying to 
improve the distance method by applying more time, support and 
infrastructure, the TA decided to freeze the programme’s 
development. Then, as often happens in Indonesian public service, 
the distance-learning experts trained in Japan were relocated or 
promoted to other posts with job descriptions unrelated to distance 
learning. As a result there was nobody left to take the programme 
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forward apart from the technical training schemes for Customs and 
Excise mentioned above.  
This is another example of MOF’s failure to apply a gender-sensitive 
approach. If developed properly, with proper support system, 
distance learning might reduce training costs as well as helping 
women to combine their career and family responsibilities. 12 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the extent to which education is 
valued in the civil service, not only at the recruitment stage but 
throughout employees’ careers. Because of this, the Indonesian 
bureaucracy permits its civil servants to study for higher diplomas 
during their service via a strictly regulated process. I have discussed 
how opportunities to get a higher degree, which enhances 
subsequent promotion prospects, are gendered. 
It is accepted that higher education usually empowers women not 
only to obtain better employment but also to challenge 
discriminatory practices within the family and society (Malik and 
Courtney, 2011). All the female managers I interviewed had a 
university diploma and, theoretically, fell into this category of 
‘empowered women’. However, as I have shown, the way MOF 
values education has to some extent disempowered these women. 
One can argue that in this case, unlike its policy on STAN 
recruitment, MOF does not directly discriminate against women in 
                                           
12The failure to continue developing the distance learning training was in large part 
due to the New Order’s policy of dividing budgets into routine and project 
components. This approach seems to prevent innovative practice. The state budget 
is evaluated in terms of whether monies are spent on the correct activities rather 
than by the actual outcomes of this investment. Once the funds have been spent, 
there is no particular incentive to obtain additional funding, even if it is essential to 
sustaining ongoing initiatives. 
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terms of providing equal opportunities for achieving a higher 
diploma. A woman may choose not to take the opportunity to study 
abroad, limiting her chances of promotion. However, the conceptual 
discussion in Chapter 2 shows that the ability to make a choice is a 
central element in empowerment. Being able to make a choice, 
however empowering, is still less powerful than being able to 
present other people with such choices or set the framework of 
decision making (see Lukes, 2005 for discussion of agenda setting 
power).  
At least some of the women I interviewed might have been more 
prepared to go abroad to study for a master’s degree if they had 
found it easy to take their children with them or have their children 
looked after while they were overseas, or if their husbands had been 
happy to accompany them or to let them go. Some of these women, 
however, were not offered this kind of support. Their husbands did 
not allow them to go, or to go and leave the children behind, and 
MOF offers no help with taking children abroad easier. 
While providing an allowance big enough to support the whole 
family during an overseas study period may be unrealistically 
expensive, in general MOF is not good at developing gender-friendly 
policies to support their employees’ education. There was a chance 
to make its training both more gender-friendly and more cost-
effective by implementing a distance-learning system, but MOF 
abandoned this once the external funding ran out. 
This chapter has shown the extent to which MOF’s gendered 
organisational culture makes it difficult for women to compete 
equally with their male colleagues in studying for higher diplomas, 
which in turn limits their chances of promotion. The next chapter 
looks at promotion in more detail. 
 
  
196 
 
 
8 ‘Would you mind if we promoted 
your wife?’ Gendered discretion in 
promotion  
8.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that education can potentially take 
women to managerial positions, but the ways in which MOF’s 
organisational culture values formal education and handles in-
service training disempower women, compared to their male 
colleagues, and limit their participation. This chapter continues to 
observe MOF organisational culture and practices, analysing the 
next element of Goetz’s gendered archaeology of the organisation, its 
gendered authority structure, by applying concepts relating to both 
bureaucracy and patriarchy.  
In public administration, the description of administrative 
discretion ranges from ‘freedom to make a choice among possible 
courses of action or inaction’ to ‘the idea that administrative officials 
should be free to employ their expertise and training in the pursuit of 
the policy responsibilities delegated to them’ (Vaughn and Otenyo, 
2006 p.xii). 
The use of discretion in Indonesian public service has been 
assessed in several studies (Dwiyanto et al., 2006, 
Koentjaraningrat, 1985). From their research on several local 
governments in Indonesia, Dwiyanto et al (2006) conclude that in 
general the level of discretion is very low. According to the authors, 
Suharto’s centralised government style is responsible for this 
phenomenon: the centralised, top-down bureaucracy makes people 
lower down the hierarchy reluctant and unable to think about and 
decide what to do when faced with an unusual situation at work. 
Twenty years before this research, Koentjaraningrat (1985) blamed 
the lack of discretion on the Javanese culture, which puts harmony 
above everything else: the fear of getting on the wrong side of 
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superiors leads subordinates to rely on them heavily and makes 
them fearful of deciding for themselves when an awkward situation 
arises.  
The use of discretion observed in Dwiyanto’s research (2006) refers 
to  local government employees’ interactions with the public, which 
in public administrative terms is referred as ‘discretion at the street 
level’. This chapter explores the use of discretion at a higher level of 
government, involving the management of MOF as a public 
organisation. 
The lack of women in senior management, where discretion is more 
commonly exercised in HR, makes it impossible to compare how 
men and women exercise discretion. Bearing in mind the discussion 
of critical mass in Chapter 2 and the small number of women in 
decision-making positions at MOF, this chapter focuses on 
administrative discretion towards women, rather than discretion 
exercised by women in MOF. 
It is to be expected that peoples’ understandings of the gendered 
division of labour at the household level affects how they behave in 
the workplace. When entering an organisation people bring with 
them their social understandings of gender as well as other sets of 
cultural values and expectations (Mills, 1988 p.356). A belief that a 
woman’s domain is the household, and that therefore she does not 
belong in the public sphere, means that women are not seen as 
men’s equals in this domain. For example, research on female 
managers in Nigeria’s civil service highlighted the fact that eight out 
of ten male civil servant  respondents thought that women should 
not be promoted to top managerial levels because women should 
‘care’ instead of ‘lead’ (Ogenyi, 2004 p.367). 
This chapter focuses on how women get into managerial positions 
and their experience once they are at that level of bureaucracy, 
where men form the great majority and hold the power to decide. I 
discuss how the gendered authority structure ‘further undermine[s] 
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efforts to establish direction and vision in women’s gender interests 
because of the lack of cultural association between women and 
“public” power, and because of the ways male authority is 
entrenched in hierarchies and command and control system’ (Goetz, 
1997a p.22). 
This chapter addresses four research questions: (1) to what extent 
does discretion play a role in promotion? (2) To what extent does 
discretion against women limit their career progression? (3) How are 
women perceived as leaders? (4) How do women at MOF respond to 
discretion and perceptions? To answer these questions, I begin with 
an analysis of civil service regulations on performance assessment. 
This is followed by an exploration of MOF’s gendered practices 
relating to promotion. These practices include the use of discretion 
against women and women’s reactions to such gendered practices. 
8.2. Civil Service Regulations on Performance 
Assessment  
A standard performance assessment form is completed each year for 
all civil servants (GOI, 1979a). The assessment is called Daftar 
Penilaian Pelaksanaan Pekerjaan (DP3) and, like other regulations 
in the civil service created at the beginning of the Suharto regime, it 
heavily emphasises loyalty to Pancasila and UUD 45, the country’s 
main ideology and its constitution, respectively. It consists of eight 
indicators: kesetiaan (allegiance – loyalty to Pancasila and UUD45), 
prestasi kerja (work performance), tanggung jawab (responsibility), 
ketaatan (compliance), kejujuran (integrity), kerjasama (teamwork), 
prakarsa (initiative) and kepemimpinan (leadership). The score is 0-
100, the latter being the perfect score. In Suharto’s New Order, and 
to some extent until now, there has been a consensus that the first 
indicator overrules the others: if someone scores below 70 for 
allegiance (signifying that they have committed a ‘subversive act’), 
the other scores do not count and the employee is seen as not 
performing well. During the Suharto era this was a very powerful 
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weapon used to get rid of the regime’s political enemies, and could 
even result in imprisonment. Today, ten years after the regime fell, 
this particular indicator is kept as a formality and most people are 
given a score of over 75.  
The ‘compliance’ indicator refers to compliance with the employee’s 
line-manager, and can be used against the interests of employees if 
necessary. Overall, the assessment is conducted top-down by a 
single line-manager rather than comprehensively by a wider team 
whereby the managers, peers and subordinates can evaluate an 
employee’s work performance.  There is no discussion between the 
evaluator and the worker during this process. Although there is an 
appeal mechanism once the evaluation has been made official, the 
procedure is very cumbersome and slow. Leaving the decision to a 
single person creates space for considerable discretion and, 
potentially, bias.  
The guidelines for filling in the DP3 form are not very clear, and 
each supervisor may have different marking standards. A problem 
occurs where there is a job rotation in which people change 
positions and thus are not supervised by the same line managers. 
The new line manager might have a more generous or stricter 
scoring system, and the newly-arrived subordinate’s score will not 
be comparable with their previous one.  
Some years ago, MOF decided that the DP3 was not sufficiently 
comprehensive to serve as a performance assessment, and for the 
last ten years it has been developing key performance indicators to 
complement the DP3’s second indicator, work performance. The key 
performance indicators and their weightings vary across the DGs, 
largely in line with the type of work characterising their individual 
units. Hence, for example, in Treasury Offices (part of the DGTR), 
the number of SPMs (payment orders) completed in a set time is 
assessed, while in DGTX it might be the amount of state revenue 
generated by a tax officials. 
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Even though these key performance indicators make the employees’ 
work more measurable and thus assessment more reliable, this 
does not mean that the assessment is bias-free, as it is conducted 
from the top down. For example, the teamwork component is 
assessed solely by the line manager without involving colleagues 
who have been working with the person in question. There is no 
discussion between the line manager and the member of staff being 
assessed about why a particular score has been given. As such, the 
person assessed cannot question their line manager about the score 
before it is formalised. Once the assessment is official, with the 
signatures of the line manager and their line manager, the employee 
is asked to sign it.  If s/he is unhappy with the score there is an 
appeal mechanism, which begins with a formal complaint via a 
bureaucratic procedure. A subordinate cannot assess or even give 
feedback on their superior’s leadership. Consequently there is 
always room for the superior’s discretion, which can reflect their 
bias towards the individual under assessment. As most top 
management positions are occupied by men and bottom positions 
by women, women are in a very vulnerable position. 
Having a high DP3 grade does not guarantee a place on the list for 
promotion. Other criteria also apply, as I observe below.  
8.3. Civil Service and MOF Promotion Regulations  
According to Civil Service Law, the Indonesian civil service is based 
on both an open (karir terbuka) and a closed career system (karir 
tertutup). In a “closed career system”, positions can only be filled by 
people already within that system who meet the required criteria.  In 
a “open career system”, vacant positions can be filled by anybody 
who meet the required criteria, even if they are from different 
institutions in the civil service (GOI, 1997b).  
Civil service regulations oblige every unit to maintain DUK, a list of 
employees’ ranks (GOI, 1979b). There is a rule that no two or more 
individuals in the same office can have the same rank. The 
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difference will depends on grade, echelon, length of service, in-
service training, and formal education. Article 6 of Regulation No. 
100/2000 (GOI, 2000) on Civil Service appointments to structural 
positions reads:  
To appoint a structural official, close attention needs to be paid to 
seniority in terms of grade, age, education and training as well as 
experience. 
Article 6 Regulation no. 100/2000, author’s emphasis. 
Based on this clause, the DUK is consulted in every promotion 
round, and those at the top of the list are picked for promotion. The 
decision to replace a structural official with someone who is not 
next in the queue must be properly justified. There is no system 
that allows employees to apply for a vacant managerial position: 
candidates are chosen by the HR Division according to the DUK and 
then presented to the Promotion Committee, whose members are in 
the higher echelons. 
Although Civil Service Regulations stipulate that the DUK should be 
used for ranking staff, each DG at MOF has its own policy that 
complements the DUK with other assessments or gives different 
weights to specific DUK components. Again, these criteria and their 
weighting vary among the DGs and are not always transparent. All 
of my informants, men and women, complained about the lack of 
openness in decision making. They said that apart from people 
directly involved in it, nobody knew what was going on, especially 
when it was related to promotion and relocation. One said:  
Nobody asks us, so how should we know? What is the reason behind 
the relocation, why is A being moved there but not here, why is B 
getting promoted instead of C – we never know. There’s no 
transparency here. So we just have to resign ourselves to it: if we get 
promoted we say ‘alhamdulillah’ (praise the Lord); not getting 
promoted we also say ‘alhamdulillah’. 
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Even people in the HR division of each DG admitted to me that 
although there are basic rules, the decision was always tergantung 
atasan (‘depends on what the boss wants’). The HR division only 
collect the data about people eligible for promotion and do not 
decide who to promote.  
While education plays a very important role in deciding who gets 
promoted, it is not the only consideration. There are still some grey 
areas that enable top management to exercise discretion when 
choosing their staff. We have seen in Chapter 4 that according to 
the Civil Service Law, grade advancement is an employee’s right as 
it is linked to the increments on their pay scale. By contrast, 
holding a managerial post is not a right but a kepercayaan 
(mandate) which can be conferred and equally taken away. 
Decisions about promotion cannot be challenged: a person who is 
not promoted may not complain that other people who perform less 
well have been promoted in their place.  
At the time of my fieldwork there was no integrated information 
system for personnel management in MOF, nor a standardised 
system for monitoring the workforce. For example, HR Bureau data 
had been compiled from individual units but the numbers did not 
match the total number from individual units, and the DGTX had a 
very disorganised and outdated HR database, with someone who 
had resigned several years ago still on the payroll and even in the 
previous year’s round of promotions. 13  This disorganisation 
seriously impeded personnel assessment, which in turn affected 
decisions about promotions, leaving more room for discretion.  
One of my interviewees cynically told me that once she had 
questioned her line manager about why X had been promoted 
instead of Y, who worked better, to which the line manager had 
replied by referring to the clause that promotion is about trust. ‘So 
                                           
13 According to one of the gatekeepers, when this information was leaked 
to the press the whistle-blower was identified and punished by having his 
salary cut down by 95 per cent for the next three months. 
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there you go. If the boss puts his trust in a low-rank, underperforming 
so-and-so, he’ll get the promotion, because he’s the one who is 
trusted. Since then, I never question a promotion any more, just take 
it as an act of God’. 
8.4. Linking promotion and relocation 
MOF has branches down to district level throughout Indonesia. As 
civil servants, all employees have to sign a statement that they are 
willing to be posted anywhere in the country. Postings outside Java 
are less popular than those in Java: the outer regions are less 
developed and many people prefer Java’s better services. The higher 
quality of education in Java means that more Javanese people are 
hired, and they prefer to work near their homes. In some cases 
promotion is used as an incentive for remote postings, and turning 
down the ‘tour of duty’ means losing the promotion.  
When people are first hired by MOF their initial post is based on 
their final exam score. However, their career journey almost always 
involves relocations, tours of duty and job rotation (known as 
mutasi in MOF). Mutasi are a major and constant cause of concern 
for all MOF employees; the problem is not the cost of moving, as 
MOF pays for the whole family to be relocated, including 
transportation fares and housing allowance, but the extent to which 
the relocation can fit around women’s traditional responsibilities as 
primary home makers.  
Despite the signed agreement about willingness to relocate 
anywhere in Indonesia, in reality there is a degree of discretion, 
which varies amongst MOF units. Units with regional offices such 
as the DGTX, DGTR, TA and DGCE have specific policies about 
relocating their female employees. For example, DGTR, which has 
Treasury Office in every municipality, is known as a branch of MOF 
where it is easier for women to get a placement. The type of work is 
quite general, making it easy for new people to learn and catch up 
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once they are on the job than, for instance, in the Tax Offices under 
DGTX.  
There is an unwritten regulation at MOF that a person take their 
first appointment at a higher managerial level in an office outside 
Java, and that these opportunities should be given to someone with 
experience of working outside Java. MOF values the experience of 
managing an office outside Java highly. According to one of my 
informants, there are two aspects to this outside-Java requirement; 
the formal explanation is that, given the lack of modern facilities 
and limited HR skills in regional offices, working outside Java is 
challenging. The informal explanation is that because of their 
distance from the capital, places outside Java are seen as training 
areas where making small mistakes is acceptable because you are 
hidden from the centre of power. 
Promotion is charged with gendered power relations in MOF. When 
men at MOF are promoted with relocation they simply go, taking the 
family with them, or leaving them behind and thus having two 
households to finance. Promoting women, however, is less 
straightforward.  
If promotions are only awarded to somebody as a new post or to 
somebody who has worked outside Java it is difficult for women 
with family commitments in Java to be promoted.  This creates a 
vicious circle, because if a woman has never been posted outside 
Java she cannot be promoted. The argument about the difficulty of 
placing women has been used to exclude them from recruitment, 
and tying relocation to promotion serves to exclude women from 
promotion to middle and senior management. 
The next section deals with gendered discretion in decisions about 
promoting women to echelon III and II positions. 
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8.5. Gendered Discretion in Promotion 
8.5.1. Promotion as a ‘family affair’ 
MOF tries to be flexible enough to allow women to join husbands 
assigned to other cities wherever possible. However, in practice this 
depends heavily on the DG. In the DGTR, the HR manager, a 
woman who seemed to have some grasp of gender issues, claimed 
that her DG had a meticulous system for deciding tours of duty and 
promotion. Family is one of the factors that they consider; for 
example they take into account where the husband works and 
whether it is possible to relocate both husband and wife if both 
work at MOF.  Some female DGTR managers confirmed this family-
friendly policy; one said: 
... I can see that our top management really understands their female 
employees. If a woman gets a promotion, of course she will have to 
leave Jakarta, but they will make sure that unless the woman wants 
to, she will stay in Java. You know that men tend to get new 
assignments outside Java when they’re promoted. In my case, they 
knew that my husband was in Jakarta, so they placed me in areas 
near Jakarta. Of course I don’t feel discriminated against in the sense 
of missing an opportunity to be promoted, because the Director 
General at that time really took family unity very seriously. (Ayu) 
The same HR Manager went on to say that echelon II positions in 
her office are only given to women when it is felt that they have 
finished their reproductive tasks, be it due to widowhood or old age. 
Women who are willing to be placed a little further from or even 
outside Java are preferred in promotion to echelon III. A third of the 
echelon III female managers I interviewed had been moving around 
Indonesia for the past ten years and some were living away from 
their families at the time of interview. The remaining two-thirds had 
had their promotions postponed because they had refused to be 
relocated. One said she had been offered a promotion to echelon III 
twelve years before she felt able to accept it. In the whole of the 
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DGTR, only one woman had been promoted without leaving 
Jakarta.  She had an IT background and her main responsibility 
was developing information technology for the DG, which is based 
in Jakarta. Ironically, she is single, so in fact might not have had 
any problems with being relocated. 
The HR manager of the Treasury Office explained that before 
appointing someone to a position involving relocation she always 
consulted the candidate about their domestic situation. When 
dealing with married women, especially those with continuing 
reproductive responsibilities, she also consulted their husbands’ 
employers to ensure that this would not conflict with their career 
prospects: 
Otherwise, the women might refuse to relocate and prefer to return to 
a junior position. This sometimes happens. For example, if the 
husband works as a local government official, there’s no way he 
could move to the same post in another region… 
Wives’ bosses, however, were never consulted about their husbands’ 
promotion. 
At the time of my interviews the DGTR had four women in their 
thirty-two echelon II positions, all in offices outside Java. They did 
not have young families, and three of them were divorced or 
widowed. When asked whether this meant that there was no chance 
of promotion to a higher managerial level for women of reproductive 
age, the HR manager simply said:  
In reality it is difficult. In the past I promoted a woman, only to find 
that the husband came to me the next day, very angrily, and told me 
that I should not mess with his family. In the end, the woman 
preferred not to take the promotion and stayed a junior staff member. 
Her statement was confirmed by a female echelon II director: 
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Once when I was at Head Office in Sumatra, the husband of a 
subordinate came to see me. He’d just received news that his wife 
had had an invitation to attend confirmation of her promotion, which 
involved relocation to a place six or seven hours from the family 
home. He said: ‘Please don’t promote her. Our son has a health 
problem and needs my wife’s attention, and I too need looking after’. 
I said, ‘It’s up to you; I’ll never force your wife to take up this 
promotion. This has been decided by headquarters; this is a big 
compliment to your wife. But the authority lies with you. Now you can 
decide, but let me give you the big picture. Behind your wife in the 
queue there are a lot of men and women holding III/c grades. More 
than that, in the headquarters in Jakarta, many women with III/b 
grades already hold echelon IV position. If your wife refuses this 
promotion she might never get promoted again. Now it’s your choice. 
If you forbid your wife to take this up, tell her not to come to the 
ceremony tomorrow’. In the end she didn’t come. Well that’s their 
decision, you manage your own household. On the other hand, I also 
asked head office to consider this problem because it would be sinful 
if we knew their family background and forced them to do this. There 
might be another chance in later rounds, not straight after this one. 
(Sukarni) 
Under the DGTR system, if women compete like men they can 
obtain an equal position to men if they can leave their household 
responsibilities behind. For most women this can only come 
relatively late in their careers; for some, the chance may never come 
at all. 
The DGTR appeared to blame this situation on the women 
themselves. As the HR manager put it:  
I always told these women not to be weak and complaining. I’ve been 
let down so many times by some of the women I tried to promote: 
they refused to advance their careers because of their families. If 
women want to have a place in the structure, they need to compete 
like the men and not be tied down by family matters. They have to 
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make their husbands understand that they have their careers as 
well. 
She went on to explain how she applied this philosophy with her 
own husband. Sometimes when she needed to work at the weekend 
she would take her husband to the office to keep her company, to 
show him that she was genuinely working and not being unfaithful.  
Not all female managers had a husband who recognised that women 
can have their own careers rather than simply being content with 
their husbands’ professional achievements. Of the women I 
interviewed, 80% reported that their husbands were not happy with 
the prospect of their moving away from the family to take up a 
promotion. One of my interviewees, Shinta, was married to an MOF 
director. She worked at the DGTR near Jakarta and he worked in 
another DG in Jakarta. Despite generally being recognised as a very 
capable manager she has remained in an echelon III position for 
more than 15 years. She has been rotated at the same level of 
management around every office in Jakarta and its satellite cities 
but has never reached a higher level, although most of her male 
colleagues from the same recruitment batch and with the same 
degrees were promoted long ago.  
After being overlooked for promotion several times, she planned to 
go the HR division to make it clear that she would not mind being 
placed away from her family. When she discussed this with her 
husband his response was very dismissive. She quoted him saying: 
‘But why? Your place is here right beside me. Who is going to look 
after you if you’re ill when you’re away? Who is going to give you a 
massage when you’re tired?’ Shinta later learned that after this 
conversation her husband had made it very clear to staff at the 
DGTR that he was against his wife’s promotion and relocation.  
Interestingly, Shinta blamed the HR division and not her husband:  
I find this so unfair. I finished my schooling at STAN and got to the 
position I have at the moment because I have been working so hard. 
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It was unrelated to my husband in any way. Now, when it’s time for 
me to get a promotion, why do they insist on relating it to my 
husband’s position? 
Another DGTR interviewee told me that when women are promoted 
they tend to be placed in echelon IV-b rather than IV-a units (the 
higher rank). As well as limiting their rank, this also confines them 
to a lower grade. HR confirmed that this is indeed the case. The 
main explanation was that these were the only positions available at 
the time, and that men are also affected by this restriction 
sometimes. However, I was unable to find examples of men being 
treated in this way. Many of the echelon IV-b units were in locations 
that would permit women to continue to spend a substantial 
amount of time with their families. My informants in HR claimed 
that family proximity has the most bearing on women’s promotion 
decisions, unlike those of men, who accord it less importance.   
So far, this section has focused on how concerns about women’s 
family affairs affect their chances of promotion in the DGTR. The 
TA’s smaller office and the location of branch offices in big cities 
made promotion more manageable. Nevertheless, the HR manager, 
again a woman, told me that she sometimes regretted promoting 
women: 
In my career as an HR Manager I’ve promoted two women to other 
cities, away from their husbands [who were working in the private 
sector in Jakarta and did not wish to accompany them] and both 
ended up getting divorced. I feel very sorry for them and their 
children. I should have realised that boys will be boys, and as soon 
as their wives are not around to look after them they’ll find another 
woman. Since then I always ask female employees if they’re willing 
to be relocated, and if their family will be okay. I never ask the male 
employees whether they wish to be relocated or not, because they’re 
the heads of the household. 
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The next section examines promotion practices in the DGTX. This 
DG was understood to have particular problems with corruption. 
The wider influence of corruption on MOF’s organisational culture is 
addressed in Chapter 9. 
8.5.2. Promotion related to corrupt behaviour 
The DGTX is the largest unit in MOF, with half of all of MOF’s 
employees and offices across Indonesia, even in very remote regions. 
Despite this, it has struggled to find a good system for HR 
development. In the past, and to some extent now, the location of a 
tax office corresponded with a particular set of taxpayers. Given the 
opportunities for corruption, some areas (called tempat basah, or 
literally ‘wet places’) were favourites and other places would be less 
popular (tempat kering, or literally ‘dry places’). Being posted to tax 
offices that deal with big, profitable companies can open up 
opportunities for tax fraud.  
A male key informant told me that the opportunity to commit tax 
fraud generates further corruption and collusion in the DGTX. 
According to this informant, a special fee is paid to people ‘close to 
the decision makers’ for a good posting. This starts at 10 million 
rupiahs (GBP 500) for a non-strategic location in Java and 
Sumatra. Being an HR Manager can be both influential and 
perilous, because many managers at higher levels have the power to 
appoint ‘their own people’, including those who pay a special fee. 
These senior managers sometimes override the HR managers’ 
authority in relocation as well as promotion. 
In early 2000, the then Director General of Taxes appointed 
someone from the TA as HR Manager in an effort reduce corruption, 
who, with his team, drafted a promotion system. There were three 
criteria for eligibility: a minimum grade, minimum level of 
education, and minimum length of service. These criteria were 
absolute and no one who did not meet them would be considered. 
There were also comparative criteria, such as leadership, motivation 
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and discipline, which varied depending on the job description. The 
line manager and his/her line manager were responsible for this 
comparative assessment, with a share of 75% and 25% respectively. 
Then the names of the eligible people and their scores would be 
compared and a ranking list drawn up to be discussed and decided 
in a closed meeting. At this meeting ranking was not the only 
criterion for promotion: a person’s main educational qualifications, 
their experience and whether they were considered ‘fit’ for a certain 
post (which is assessed using, among others, a psychometric test) 
was be taken into account. 
While this is theoretically the standard operating procedure, the HR 
manager told me that he and his team found it difficult to play by 
the rules. He told me he had to be very careful not to irritate 
‘powerful people’, because if they started to resent him he would 
soon lose his job and the anti-corruption programme would grind to 
a halt. He told me that he tried to: 
…accommodate what people want as much as possible. In my view 
it’s better to place people where they want to be placed, so that they 
can settle and do a good job for the DGTX. Of course, that’s not 
always as easy as it sounds…. 
Inevitably it was difficult to place everybody where they wanted to 
be. Most people wanted to be in a ‘wet office’ in Java, or at least in a 
big city with good amenities. Normally when people join the DGTX, 
those with the highest marks are located in Java and those with 
lower marks have to work off-island. Theoretically, further prospects 
for promotion depend on how people perform in the annual 
assessments. Frequently, however, the DGTX makes an exception 
for women. Even when a woman has a low mark or performs poorly 
she might still get a placement in Java (probably not in a ‘wet 
office’), although this placement might mean that they are 
overlooked in the next round of promotions. This policy favouring 
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women often made men very jealous and resentful of their female 
colleagues. One of them said: 
It is very nice to be a woman. Just smile and be nice and do a half-
decent job and your place in Java is guaranteed. I don’t find this fair. 
Women ask for emancipation, but where are they when it comes to 
mutasi? Everybody is just hiding behind their family. Don’t ask for 
special treatment. If you want to be treated equally you should be 
prepared to move around Indonesia, just like us. (Nasir) 
Another reason given for not relocating women to offices outside 
Java is that unlike the DGTR, whose offices are in Kabupaten 
regions (municipalities), the DGTX has offices at the kelurahan 
(district) level, ranging from big cities to the remotest parts of 
Indonesia, some of which are not considered safe for women.  
The DGTX has made particular efforts to reduce corruption through 
the recent wave of bureaucratic reform and modernisation. Almost 
all of the people involved in these reforms had recently been 
promoted. One of my interviewees said that she was very surprised 
that someone who she did not rate very highly got promoted: ‘How 
come they got promoted and I didn’t? They were much more junior 
than me and several of my colleagues who were not promoted in 
2006. Then I started seeing a pattern: those are the ones involved in 
the reform.’ 
This view was confirmed by most of my DGTX interviewees, apart 
from those who were themselves promoted. Some people (mainly 
men) who were promoted on that occasion and who were indeed in 
the modernisation team emphasised that they were chosen because 
their bosses realised their potential and not simply because they 
were in the reform team. Being in the team meant working until late 
nearly every night. Because women found it difficult to work 
overtime due to their family responsibilities, only a handful were 
selected for the team and so very few were promoted. 
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8.5.3. Other forms of gendered discretion 
The DUK list is followed more rigorously in the TA than in the 
DGTX.  There is an inherent flaw in the DUK; it tends to reflect 
seniority in terms of age and length of service rather than work 
performance. Also, I was told that in the TA people are often 
promoted because of their ‘visibility’ to senior managers. This 
approach to promotion sometimes reduced the quality of TA 
managers, and other units in MOF often complained about their 
performance.  
The way in which the TA applies the seniority system does not 
exclude women from the top of the list. However, there is clear 
gender discrimination with regard to the level of discretion applied 
to women lower down the list. In other words, a woman at the top of 
the seniority list will be selected; however, when a relatively junior 
position is available it tends go to a man. 
In early 2006, the TA promoted a female junior manager to a mid-
management position, despite many people’s doubts about her 
capacity. Somewhat unusually, this promotion did not involve 
relocation and the new post had previously always been held by 
men. After six months it became clear that the woman was not 
performing well in her job. She was moved to an equal position in a 
different division. Postings in that division are unpopular, as many 
people consider its work dull. Since this happened during the first 
half of my fieldwork I was able to observe people’s reactions. When 
men working at the TA did not want me to interview them, they 
used this incident to justify their objection to promoting women to 
middle management.  
One of the female managers I interviewed expressed her 
exasperation at this behaviour by her male colleagues: ‘When 
someone is unsuccessful and she’s a woman, people readily assume 
that she’s incompetent because she’s a woman. Why don’t people 
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ask themselves whether they have appointed the right woman for the 
job?’  
There were several women with better qualifications who might have 
done the job better, but they were further down the DUK list. After 
moving the incompetent female manager, a more junior person not 
at the top of the DUK list was given the job. This person was a man. 
Some respondents from the DGTX who were particularly cynical 
about the way promotions were managed claimed that there are 
only three criteria for promotion: kepandaian (a combination of 
formal education and competence to do the job); kedekatan (being 
in the inner circle of the people in power); and for women, 
kecantikan (physical appearance). All of my informants from the 
DGTX were of the opinion that the promotion of at least two of the 
twenty six women at middle managerial level had been based on 
their relationships with influential men. I managed to interview one 
of the two female managers in the DGTX, and my impression was 
that even though she claimed to hold a doctoral degree achieved via 
self-funded study at a local university, she did not appear 
competent to hold this post, unlike most other women at this level. 
Three years after my fieldwork period, however, she was promoted 
to an echelon II position.14 In that round of promotions, another 
female middle manager who was highly respected by everybody in 
the DG due to her competence was also promoted. 
Whether or not such strategies affect promotion, there are grounds 
for suspecting that women may be especially vulnerable to the 
accusations that they are using their relationships with influential 
men to get promoted. For example, none of my informants could tell 
me whether any of the men holding equal positions had also been 
                                           
14 One of my informants told me later that within a year of her promotion 
this woman had been reprimanded by the Minister of Finance at several 
executive meetings for being ‘incompetent, irrelevant and outside the 
context of the meeting agenda’. 
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chosen due to their proximity (in this case interpreted more broadly 
than sexual intimacy) to key decision makers.   
At the time of my fieldwork, the DGTR had four women in echelon II 
positions, all located outside Java. Why were none of these women 
given positions in Jakarta, where their families lived? I was told that 
in the DGTR, one criterion for someone to hold an echelon II 
position at headquarters was to have served in a similar position 
outside Java. It looked unlikely that those women in echelon II 
positions would ever be offered a position in the capital. When they 
have completed their reproductive careers they are promoted and 
sent out of Java, but by this time they are already approaching 
retirement.  
That said, when I checked the database on the DGTR’s echelon II 
officials located in Jakarta (who are all men), I found that two of the 
eight had never been placed outside Jakarta, let alone Java. So how 
did they reach their current positions? The only answer HR staff 
gave was that they were exceptionally high flyers. It is surprising 
that the two ‘high-flyers’ were men, since bias in the recruitment 
process meant that women needed higher scores to be accepted. It 
might be expected that high-scoring women would go on to become 
high-flying women. 
A year after I finished my fieldwork, the HR manager, who herself is 
considered by many to be a high-flyer and has good relations with 
powerful decision-makers, was promoted to an echelon II position in 
an obscure region outside Java even though her family is in 
Jakarta. This is another example of the problems faced by women 
categorised as ‘high-flyers’ and who, if they were men, would be said 
to deserve fast tracking.  
One of my female DGTR interviewees was recently promoted from 
echelon III to echelon II, and both positions were in Jakarta. Her 
promotion was not in her original DG and it is unlikely that she 
would have been able to get a similar post if she had stayed in her 
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original DG. There is no doubt that she was as much a high-flyer as 
her two male colleagues, who were also promoted without having to 
move. As in the case of the IT manager discussed before, she was 
also single. The logic appears to be that if you are a single woman 
you can perform as well as your male colleagues and are therefore 
entitled to some of the privileges which are denied to mediocre 
colleagues. 
8.5.4. Perceptions: ‘women are not after promotion’  
One male interviewee in the DGTX HR division gave me an 
interesting explanation for why there were only a few women in 
management. He claimed that there are too many cases where 
women had turned down the promotion, preferring to stay in 
Jakarta, or at least in Java, as a pelaksana (non-managerial/junior 
staff; see next section). He claimed that MOF’s offices in and around 
Jakarta are full of women with advanced grades who cannot be 
given clerical jobs, but nor can they be promoted as they have not 
met the criteria for promotion. According to him, this creates 
complications for other people’s promotion and job rotation as the 
civil service regulations do not allow managers to have subordinates 
in the same or a higher grade than their own. Meanwhile, he 
continued, there are ‘a lot’ (without quoting the exact number) of 
posts remain vacant in some remote areas, because nobody wants 
to go there. While there may be some truth in this, there are no 
time-series data on the number of people who have rejected 
promotion to allow statistical analysis of this issue. 
Female DGTX interviewees, however, provided a different 
explanation. They maintained that they were not offered promotion 
and that the HR division prefers to assume that they did not want 
it. They compared themselves to male colleagues who are climbing 
their career ladders and touring the country. Nevertheless, one 
female interviewee felt very strongly that women should not be 
treated the same as their male colleagues in terms of relocation:  
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We would be very, very, disadvantaged if we had to be relocated the 
way the men are. The Office [DGTX] has to prioritise our safety before 
they can move us anywhere’. And another woman said: ‘Also, as a 
mother and a wife, our responsibilities do not end with our office 
duties. At the end of the day, if we have to choose [between being 
promoted and relocated and remaining with our families without 
being promoted] we will choose the family first. At least that is what I 
think. 
Since the DGTX has decided to assume that women do not want to 
be promoted if this means being separated from their families, they 
tend not to promote many women either in remote areas or in Java. 
This is part of the wider policy of promoting few women in general. 
At the time of my fieldwork, no woman at DGTX held an echelon II 
position. This only improved in 2010, when two women were 
promoted to echelon II. As mentioned previously, one is said to have 
a special relationship with someone in a high place and the other 
was chosen for her competence. Both have teenage children and 
neither was moved away from Jakarta. 
8.6. Resisting promotion 
In general, MOF does not tend to relocate female junior staff (non-
managers) to cities away from their family home. MOF’s flexibility in 
keeping female junior staff close to their families often compromises 
the performance of an office. During interviews, key informants and 
gatekeepers consistently mentioned that some regional offices, such 
as DGTR’s KPPN Bogor, DGTX’s Kantor Pajak Solo and TA’s Balai 
Diklat Yogyakarta, are 60 percent or more staffed by women.  These 
offices, generally referred as “kantor ibu-ibu” or mothers’ offices, had 
been performing very poorly. 
Unfortunately the women working in these regional offices are 
among the least-motivated employees in terms of performance. They 
tend to come into the office later and leave earlier than they should 
and often do not meet their performance target, using family 
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obligations as an excuse. For example, an informant referred to the 
statistics for one of these offices with a high level of absenteeism, 
late arrival and going home early. A typical reason given was ‘taking 
my son to a swimming lesson’. 
This strategy often backfires on women in general: instead of just 
giving underperforming female employees a warning and without 
conducting a proper statistical analysis of female performance, MOF 
higher management arbitrarily decided that it was necessary to limit 
the number of female workers (by applying the reversed-quota 
system against female applicants) to improve performance. 
While female junior staff tend to be clustered in kantor ibu-ibu, for 
obvious reasons the same cannot be done with mid-level managers. 
Since the 2000s there has been a rise in female promotion at DGTX. 
Some women recruited after the 1990s were promoted away from 
Jakarta, where they had been based, shortly after finishing their 
MOF-funded study. The prospect of being relocated, however, had 
always been at the back of their minds as the higher somebody’s 
position is, the fewer the available posts, increasing the possibility 
of being relocated elsewhere at the same managerial level. Some of 
these women told me that they did not know what they would do if 
this happened; most would consider resigning.  
This is a bit traditional, I’m afraid. For me the important thing is that 
my husband and I share responsibility for standing by the children. 
The other day my husband and I discussed this issue. If my husband 
is relocated to another city which is too far away from where we are 
at the moment, the children will need one of their parents with them; 
then I will resign. I might even follow him. But we see other people -
they manage having their family living in different places. Therefore 
my husband said that actually it doesn’t matter if he goes and I stay 
here and keep working. [Nina] 
I’m not after a career and promotion. For me the most important thing 
is that working makes me happy, knowing that I’m contributing to 
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society. If I have to be relocated and that makes me unable to see my 
family – oh no, I don’t want that. I wouldn’t fight for that. There’s 
much more to life than just my career at MOF. I would just resign; I 
could always find a job somewhere else. And that’s my 
principle.[Yanti] 
None of the older generation who had joined before the 1990s said 
they would resign if they were relocated. Most had been placed 
outside Jakarta and claimed they were ready to go anywhere if told 
to. The commonest answers were along the lines of ‘Namanya tugas 
ya dilaksanakan’ (when it is a duty then it should be done), and one, 
who had never been posted anywhere but Jakarta) said ‘Wah mbok 
jangan, ya… (Oh please don’t let that happen to me, I would beg for it 
not to happen...).’ 
By contrast, amongst the younger female managers there was a 
sense that MOF is not the only place for a career. If they did not like 
what MOF had to offer them, for example if relocated, they would 
not hesitate to resign. They were confident that they would get a job 
somewhere else, and failing that they would still have a ‘proper job’ 
looking after their family. In part, this may reflect the increasing 
availability of managerial jobs in the private sector since the 1990s 
(Basri and Eng, 2004). 
Although the same preference (to resign if being relocated to an 
unfavourable remote office) might also apply to men, I did not come 
across any male interviewees who said they would resign if they 
were relocated to less favourable areas. All of my male research 
participants said they were ready to go anywhere, and one said: 
‘Bismillah aja dijalani’ (‘In the name of Allah’ I will go along). 
This difference in attitudes to relocation is one of the reasons why 
MOF limits the number of women it takes into the organisation, as 
confirmed by the person responsible for MOF recruitment. It 
appears that MOF views female employees as a bad investment 
because they are seen as less reliable than men in terms of 
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remaining at MOF. As part of my research, I did not collect data on 
the number of women who had resigned from MOF. None of the 
informants I interviewed during my fieldwork in 2006/7 have since 
resigned. Several said they would consider doing so, if they were 
required to move to a location that interfered with their family 
duties.  
As explained earlier, MOF obliges those who have been sent to 
study abroad or locally to sign a contract that they will remain in 
MOF’s employ for three times their study period plus an extra year. 
When this time has elapsed they are free to give notice, although 
this hardly ever done in practice, either by men or women. 
Once certain women do manage to gain MOF’s trust and are allowed 
to hold managerial positions they are still not treated equally to 
their male colleagues, as I show below. 
8.7. What happens to women when they become 
managers? 
Some of my interviewees found that even if their male bosses 
treated them politely, they seldom listened to their opinions in 
meetings. One was happy with her current superior, a man who 
was apparently not sexist, but she did not hold her previous boss in 
high regard:  
Very Javanese. To your face he would bow a lot to show his respect 
to women, but behind you he made it clear that he did not feel 
comfortable with having women at managerial levels. It seems that 
some men find it difficult to tell the difference between women as 
professionals and women in a biological and reproductive sense. In 
the meetings that my ex-boss used to chair, women were not given 
the chance to contribute their views; he always skipped over them 
and gave his attention to male colleagues whenever these women 
tried to speak. And when I interrupted (that seemed to be the only 
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way to get his attention) he would stare at me in such distaste, 
although obviously he could not stop me… 
When these women were involved in meetings which lasted late into 
the evening they would be asked to make their point and then, as 
one of my interviewees quoting her boss saying: ‘without belittling 
your contribution to the meeting, we should let you go back to your 
families’. While some women insisted on staying until meetings 
finish, others were grateful for this ‘privilege’. Although it gives them 
some flexibility, they can at the same time be excluded from having 
a final say in the meeting. On a subtler level, such a practice 
potentially restricts women’s opportunity to exercise their opinions 
and undermines their credibility and status. 
Some women in the DGTX admitted that they needed to be more 
assertive than their male counterparts in order to convey their point 
at meetings. One said, at a focus group discussion, that they were 
listened to when they demanded attention, for example by 
persistently telling different people the same thing until they got 
their way. Another woman mentioned that she preferred to stay 
non-judgemental: when she was ignored at meetings would tell 
herself that she had not come up with good ideas, and would try 
harder next time. 
Women in the DGTR reported that they had rather more 
opportunity to speak in meetings. One of my interviewees said that 
at meetings she had attended her boss always asked female 
managers to contribute by addressing them specifically: ‘I haven’t 
heard the ladies’ voice today, is there anything we need to know?’ 
Depending on the sincerity of the speaker, this could be 
encouraging or patronising. 
From my interviews it was apparent that older men tended to accept 
the presence of women in supporting or clerical positions. However, 
they tended to be uncomfortable in the presence of women at more 
senior managerial levels. I came across a director who was very 
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hostile about the possibility of promoting women to echelon II 
positions. Pointing out that no woman had either the capacity or the 
will to take up such a position, he added: ‘I can only think of one 
woman who is eager to be promoted to that level. But who wants to 
promote her? She’s so aggressive; she even scared her husband off 
and made him run away with another woman some time ago.’ 
Following Maddock and Parkin’s (1977a) typology of organisational 
cultures operating in public sector organisations, these patronising 
attitudes fit the description of the ‘gentleman’s club’ culture 
according to which women are accepted and respected in lower 
positions but are not expected to move up the career ladder and 
through the glass ceiling, which is seen as outside their traditional 
work role. 
8.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an account of the top-down and arbitrary 
nature of the promotion process in MOF, and how it leaves a lot of 
room for the application of discretion. While there is a growing body 
of literature on female managers in developing countries (Ogenyi, 
2004, Yousof and Siegel, 1994, Snyder and Hunter, 1995), none 
pays particular attention to procedures for promoting women. 
In terms of Goetz’s framework, this chapter has discussed the 
extent to which the way MOF structures space and time intersects 
with the gendered authority structure. MOF staffs offices all over 
Indonesia, including in its most underdeveloped and remote 
regions, and its postings and placements there are considered 
unsafe for unaccompanied women leaving their family homes in 
more developed areas. 
While it is obvious that all MOF offices need staffing, at the junior 
level women seem to have an advantage over men in that they are 
not sent far from their family homes. This is not the case at 
managerial levels.  There is an internal policy to link promotion with 
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relocation to offices outside Java, including to the remote areas. The 
overt rationale for this policy is that it allows managers to acquire 
experience; in some ways it resembles a rite of passage, a journey 
that a boy has undergo to become a man. It is also a ritual that 
differentiates a man from a woman, as often found in military 
organisations (Carreiras, 2006 p.41).  
This chapter has demonstrated that the policy of linking promotion 
with relocation is problematic for women with family 
responsibilities. Although civil service regulations give detailed 
guidance on HR management, discretion is often used in promoting 
women to higher managerial levels, with particular emphasis on 
perceptions of women’s family responsibilities. 
On the one hand, MOF is trying to accommodate its female 
employees’ practical gender needs to combine their domestic and 
career lives by giving them posts near their family homes. However, 
this policy compromises women’s career prospects and reaffirms 
MOF’s gendered division of labour at not only the organisational but 
also the family/household level. I have demonstrated in this chapter 
how a husband can interfere with a MOF decision to promote his 
wife. Instead of using his power in a nepotistic way to get his wife 
promoted, this works the other way around. 
Goetz’s (1997b) reports that in a research project she observed, 
male staff often first sought the permission of the project recipients’ 
husbands before working with women. This chapter demonstrates 
that seeking their husband’s permission is an issue not only for 
MOF’s female employees but also for its HR managers when it 
comes to promoting women. 
 
Many of the women I interviewed felt as if they were fighting with 
one hand tied behind their back. On one level, they had to fight 
according to the rules of the game, which were originally arranged 
exclusively for men, while on the other, a different set of rules was 
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being forced onto them by their families and society. This makes 
combining career and home responsibilities very difficult. Goetz 
(1997a) uses a basketball metaphor to describe this situation: 
Like pygmies competing with the Harlem Globetrotters on a 
conventionally designed basketball court, they will be unable to win, 
because they cannot change some of the basic ‘rules’ – like the height 
of the net or the size of the court. Most often, new participants have to 
adapt their behaviour to the existing rules. They may learn to win, 
but often at the cost of bringing their ‘different’ needs and interests to 
play. 
(Goetz, 1997a p.7) 
In the DGTX, while the main policy of linking promotion with 
relocation still holds, promotion policy is made more complex by 
corruption issues. 
I have also discussed the gendered treatment that women face, even 
after playing along with the bureaucratic game, in relocation and 
promotion. There is evidence that women who reach more senior 
positions are still not regarded as equal to their male colleagues. 
This chapter has observed and analysed how women reacted to 
MOF’s internal policy of linking promotion to relocation to remote 
areas. Many chose to stay at a junior level and did not seek to be 
promoted. This led to the phenomenon of the ‘mothers’ office’, and 
only confirmed the gender stereotypes that MOF already imposes on 
women in its service. One might view women’s decisions not to seek 
promotion as evidence of their disempowerment by the MOF 
bureaucracy, but it is possible that their decision reflects a genuine 
choice: that they were not ambitious for managerial responsibility 
and only wanted a good salary and to be with their families. I 
develop this issue in Chapter 10.   
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9 Money talks: disentangling gender 
from the knot of corruption 
9.1 Introduction 
The two previous chapters have observed and analysed aspects of 
organisational culture that enable and disable women’s 
participation in MOF. I have shown how MOF’s approach to 
structuring time and space, especially in the way it values 
education and links promotion to relocation, has made it nearly 
impossible for women to compete on equal terms with their male 
colleagues. 
Chapter 4’s general discussion of Indonesian bureaucracy noted 
that corruption is a serious and widespread problem which can 
occur in several forms such as embezzlement or accepting bribes. In 
government agencies whose main job involves spending money, the 
most common forms of corruption are embezzlement and kick-back 
payments (a portion of the contract value given to the bureaucratic 
organisation by the company to win the bid). In an organisation that 
collects money from the public such as MOF, embezzlement and 
accepting bribes are the most common forms of corruption. In 2010, 
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) rated Indonesia 
the most corrupt country in Asia Pacific (Wong-Anan and Marshall, 
2010). MOF is one of the government organisations most linked to 
corruption in public opinion; in fact the DGTX, one of my research 
sites, has been under public scrutiny for the corrupt behaviour of 
employees who, to date, have all been men (Kompas, 7 April 2010, 
21 March 2012). 
This chapter discusses the difficulty of separating gender issues 
from corruption in daily practice. While corruption itself is not an 
element of Goetz’s framework of gendered archaeology, it is 
embedded in the Indonesian civil service’s working culture and thus 
forms part of its organisational culture. There is a body of literature 
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that suggests that women are less likely to engage in corruption 
than men (Glover et al., 1997, Reiss and Mitra, 1998, Swamy et al., 
2001). The literature puts forward different explanations for this, 
including gender differences in moral standards (Reiss and Mitra, 
1998) and risk-taking behaviour (Wane, 2008). Goetz (2007) argues 
that men and women do not have equal opportunities to engage in 
corruption and, when they do, may do it differently. In her study of 
lower-level government staff in a micro-credit programme in 
Bangladesh she found that the corrupt behaviour of male 
fieldworkers typically involved making a deal with local elite men so 
that the credit went to these elite men’s wives. By contrast, female 
staff tended to advise their clients to use their credit to engage in 
dishonest activities such as putting chillies into vegetable oil and 
selling it as mustard seed oil. Honour et al (1998) discuss the 
importance of business links in the corruption of public service 
officials in India, noting that women in Indian public service had 
less access to these business links than their male colleagues. They 
also suggest, however, that idealised norms and expectations of 
female behaviour, such as being passive, virtuous and less 
materially ambitious than men, are likely to discourage corruption. 
Alolo’s (2005) study in sub-Saharan Africa concludes that when 
exposed to a corrupt environment, women may be no less corrupt 
than their male colleagues. Alolo found differences in the underlying 
reasons for engaging in corruption according to gender roles: for 
example women did so out of compassion and men out of a ‘thirst 
for money’. 
This chapter seeks to answer this question: To what extent does 
corruption affect women’s equal participation compared to their 
male MOF colleagues? This is divided into more specific research 
questions: 
1) What is the household division of labour in term of earning 
money, and what is expected from a working woman in terms 
of bringing money home? 
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2) How are the Indonesian civil service salary and remuneration 
structured, and to what extent are they (a) gendered, and (b) 
vulnerable to corruption? 
3) What do women think about corruption in their 
organisation? 
4) To what extent does MOF’s perception of women and 
corruption affect decisions about women’s postings? 
The chapter is structured as follows: to show how gender plays out 
in the financing of households, the first section discusses the 
household division of labour terms of financial matters. From there, 
the discussion turns to civil service regulations about remuneration, 
including common practices for managing salaries and obtaining 
additional income, and how these entail an element of gendered 
corruption. I consider the extent to which opportunities to engage in 
corrupt practice are open to both men and women, paying 
particular attention to women’s access to networks within and 
outside MOF. From there, I turn to women’s views of corrupt 
behaviour at MOF. The chapter ends with a discussion of the extent 
to which MOF’s view of women and corruption affects women’s 
promotion and placement. 
9.2 The household division of labour and finance 
Studies of corruption and gender tend to focus on the corrupt 
organisation rather than the wider setting in which corruption 
occurs (Alolo, 2005). This chapter demonstrates that the gendered 
aspect of corruption at MOF is to some extent related to the 
household division of labour. Consequently, it begins with a 
discussion of gender and finance in the household. 
According to Javanese values, a husband and wife should not argue 
about or discuss money with a third person when there is financial 
dissatisfaction between the couple. The participants’ responses to 
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my question about financial arrangements may reflect this culture. 
As in neighbouring Malaysia (Carsten, 1989), Indonesian women are 
expected to be the household money managers (Papanek and 
Schwede, 1988). While control over money is considered a form of 
power in western understanding, Wolf (2000) argues that managing 
financial resources is not necessarily empowering for Javanese 
women, as Javanese culture regards it as a low-level activity. Going 
back to the discussion of halus (refined) and kasar (crude/coarse) in 
Chapter 1, money, especially exchanging money for everyday 
necessities, is considered kasar. Men, particularly those in the 
upper classes or priyayi, do not deal with or discuss money. This is 
similar to Stirrat’s (1996) findings in a fishing community in Sri 
Lanka, where the fishermen saw money as ‘dirty’ and ‘unclean’. This 
was felt particularly strongly in the older generation: ‘…when older 
men were asked about money they would dismiss the topic by 
spitting out, chi – a term of approbation used of filth in general’ 
(Stirrat, 1996 p.99). Javanese men deal with things that are 
considered more refined and from which real power emanates 
(Anderson, 1990, Nieuwenhuis-Djajadiningrat, 1987).  
Although Wolf’s argument can be justified with reference to women 
who work as cheap labourers or market traders, it may not apply in 
the same way to those working as mid-level managers in the civil 
service. As they work in a western-style bureaucracy, it is 
interesting investigate whether the economic power they possess as 
a result of their education and employment has an impact on their 
agency in the household. 
An unpublished study by a women’s study centre in East Java 
(Sunaryo and Zuriah, 2002) explored decision-making patterns in 
families of female junior civil servants in Malang, East Java. The 
research revealed that women tend to make their own decisions 
about domestic matters, but decisions involving a large amount of 
money or their children’s education are made equally by husbands 
and wives. This echoes what my interviewees told me.  
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None of my female married interviewees expressed any discontent 
with their financial arrangements with their partners or reported 
that they ever had a disagreement about money. During my 
fieldwork, the majority of people in MOF still received their salary in 
cash on the first day of the month rather than as a bank transfer.  
At the end of the month the finance division in each office was given 
a single cash payment for employees’ salaries. This was distributed 
to every division, where someone would act as cashier.  
Six of fifty-nine female interviewees saw themselves as the backbone 
of their families. They maintained that they were the main 
breadwinner and that their husbands did not have much say in 
their career progression and work-life balance. By contrast, three 
were very dependent on their husbands, despite having their own 
career prospects. The rest felt that they shared the burden of 
financing the household equally. 
The way the interviewees handled money in the household varied. 
Most of the women who were married at the time of the interview 
told me that they kept separate bank accounts from those of their 
husbands, mainly with the bank operating in their office, although 
it was common for them to have several bank accounts. About 
three-quarters of the women were responsible for the financial 
management of the household, even when they were living away 
from home on a tour of duty. Ayu, who had recently been promoted 
to a position as head of one of the Treasury Offices in West Java 
and whose husband worked in Jakarta, said: 
Between me and my husband we never make a big fuss about 
money. His salary goes into a bank account, and these days mine 
comes in an envelope every month. Some of the bills can be paid 
using direct debit, so they’re taken from his account. My salary goes 
to pay for things that are not directly debited like the groceries. I keep 
the debit card [for my husband’s account]. So if we need some money, 
I get it from there. Then if it is running low, I have to warn him: be 
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careful, the well is drying up… Generally the household money is my 
responsibility. Yeah, that’s what we call women’s business. 
Everything that concerns money is dumped on me, from paying the 
bills to buying the rice – everything. Now that we have two kitchens 
we have to be more careful about money, though. Especially about 
the children… because you know what they’re like…[laughs] they 
might ask me for some money to get something and then ask their 
dad for the same thing. So we have to communicate when it comes to 
giving them money… 
Other interviewees stated that they kept joint accounts and 
communicated with their husbands about their cash flow. 
No, so far we’ve never had any disagreement about money. We 
discuss everything. If I have extra income 15  I discuss it with my 
husband, and vice versa. Usually he says: ‘Let’s not spend it, just 
save it for a rainy day’. (Sulastri) 
Latifa reported that she kept her income entirely for herself. Her 
salary was not used to pay bills or the mortgage, which were 
covered by her husband’s income. She said that she did not have to 
work to finance the household.  
So my salary pays for my personal needs. Well, I buy my children 
clothes or treats sometimes, but I don’t have to. My husband’s income 
is enough to pay for all those things. Besides, it’s his responsibility as 
he’s the breadwinner, not me.’ 
Latifa regards her husband as the head of the household as well as 
the main breadwinner. She, on the other hand, worked only for her 
‘social life’: 
Actually I would rather stay at home and mind the children and the 
household. It’s just that my husband said that I should keep working. 
We met each other when I was already working at MOF and he didn’t 
                                           
15 See the discussion about extra income in later in this chapter  
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want me to resign. He said that women who stay at home gossip a 
lot with their neighbours and friends, and he doesn’t like that. He 
likes me to dress smartly every morning ready to go to work, but he 
never expects me to use my earnings to contribute to the household 
needs. 
This arrangement is quite exceptional, as is Latifa herself. She was 
the only interviewee who was hostile to the idea of gender equality: 
‘What are those feminists looking for? Don’t they realise that we 
women belong to the house and our family?’ and said that equality 
would never happen because ‘God does not want it that way.’ 
9.3 Overview of civil service remuneration 
It is well-documented that Indonesian civil servants are not well 
paid, which contributes to the difficulty of attracting better qualified 
personnel (Rohdewohld, 1995). According to the World Bank, 
however, they are ‘not particularly underpaid relative to their market 
comparators’ (2003a page 15), considering that their income tax is 
covered by the government. Filmer and Lindauer (2001) show that 
civil servants with high school education or less are paid better than 
those with equivalent qualifications working in the private sector, 
while the pay of those with education beyond high school is 
marginally lower than in the private sector. 
9.3.1 Basic salary and other allowances 
The current remuneration scheme for civil servants is based on the 
Civil Service Law (GOI, 1974a, 1999) and regulated by Regulation 
no.7/1977 (GOI, 1977). Since 1977 this legislation has been 
amended with reference to basic salaries and additional allowances. 
Civil servants are also entitled to free health insurance, work 
accident allowance, home loans, bereavement payments and a 
defined benefit pension after working for a minimum of 20 years or 
upon reaching the age of 50, whichever is longer. 
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The civil service salary system is very complex and rigid and 
depends on grade, position and length of service. The salary 
consists of the basic salary, a rice allowance (20 kg per person plus 
10 kg for each family member up to a third child), a family 
allowance (also for up to three children), a special allowance for 
people holding structural/functional posts (worth between half to 
five times the basic salary), an income tax allowance (worth 15-30 
per cent of the basic salary), and variable allowances for those 
working in remote areas.  
On paper, it seems that the salary formula is gender-neutral and 
fair. In practice, however, the implementation of a formula based on 
conditions that are not clearly stated in the regulations can be 
unfair. The regulation states that (1) a civil servant who is married 
will be given a spousal allowance worth 10% of their basic salary 
and (2) If a married couple both work as civil servants the allowance 
will be paid to the person with the higher basic salary (this is 
reassessed over time). Although under very special circumstances a 
male civil servant is allowed to marry more than one wife (see 
Chapter 5), only one of his wives can get the spousal allowance. Up 
to three children, however, still attract allowances regardless of 
whether their mother is on the allowance list or not. 
While in theory a female civil servant can support her husband, in 
practice this is not straightforward and varies across ministries. In 
MOF, the civil servant in question needs to prove that she is the 
main breadwinner in order to include her husband in her allowance. 
This requires a formal letter from the local authority (kelurahan) 
and one from the Ministry of Labour to confirm that her husband is 
on its job-seeker list or a letter from the GP at the local surgery 
certifying that he is unable to work. To include a wife in a man’s 
allowance is not as difficult as including a husband. The wife’s 
allowance is added to the salary structure as soon as the male civil 
servant submits his marriage certificate. If the wife works in a 
private company and fills in her income tax form separately, the 
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couple has to provide this information to the BKN so that her name 
is not included in the civil servant’s family allowance. This default 
setting in the salary structure is another example of the state’s 
strong view that men are the main breadwinners and women the 
homemakers, as clearly stated in article 34 of the Indonesian 
Marriage Law (GOI, 1974b). 
9.3.2 Special Allowances for MOF employees 
Every employee of MOF receives special allowances. The rationale is 
that this will reduce the prevalence of corrupt behaviour when 
dealing with public finances. The special allowances are paid on 
condition that the employee works every working day of the month. 
When they are absent for non job-related reasons the allowance is 
reduced accordingly. Most MOF employees obtain substantially 
more remuneration via these various allowances than from their 
basic salary. 
When the basic salary is taken together with the various allowances 
and entitlements that employees are entitled to receive, it is 
arguable that civil service pay does not always compare 
unfavourably with the private sector. Take-home pay varies 
substantially across different units in MOF for two reasons. First, 
opportunities for augmenting legitimate income through corruption 
vary across units. Second, salary, allowances and other 
entitlements are topped up by yet another set of payments called 
honoraria, which vary substantially across units. They are 
determined by the task a particular unit performs and the role of 
the individual within that unit. In some cases the additional 
payment can be very high indeed. For example, in the TA people are 
paid honoraria for every hour they teach, set exam questions, mark 
exams, or engage in any other activity related to training. This is 
paid in addition to the monthly salary they already receive. 
Honoraria can affect men and women differently, as I show in the 
next section. 
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9.3.3 Membership of ad-hoc teams  
As mentioned in the previous section, salary is not the only 
payment that civil servants receive. Every year the different units 
propose an expenditure budget that contains routine elements like 
salary payments and office maintenance, as well as one-off elements 
that include, among other things, the formation of various task-
force teams. Often task-force teams are formed to carry out jobs 
that are already part of the unit’s job description and so should be 
done without additional payment. The policy to establish these 
teams, however, seems rooted in the government’s 
acknowledgement that civil servants are not well paid, and therefore 
various ways are created to compensate for this without making a 
future commitment (which would be the case if they simply 
increased the salary standards). 
Membership of these task-force teams carries additional payment, 
the amount depending on the role in the team. The rank of the team 
members corresponds positively with these payments, although 
usually the more junior members do most of the work. Even though 
the higher ranks do not carry out the actual work, they are 
responsible if anything goes wrong and is reported in the internal 
audit. The ranking system of the membership of these teams more 
often than not mimics the structural/managerial positions of the 
officials.  For example, the team advisor will be an echelon II official 
(with the highest honorarium but the least work); the head of the 
team is an echelon III official and the ordinary members, who do all 
the work, are echelon IV officials. 
As women are concentrated in the bottom layer of MOF’s 
managerial system, the payment gap between men and women is by 
default. Moreover, when the tasks are demanding and overtime is 
needed, women tend not to be chosen, which makes their exclusion 
even more prominent both in terms of social networking and 
earning additional income. One example of this exclusion is 
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membership of the bureaucratic reform team discussed in Chapter 
8. 
9.3.4 Budaya amplop (envelope culture): Taking bribes  
Before MOF’s Bureaucratic Reform, it was usual for the public or 
other government organisations that need MOF services to give the 
official on duty some money in an envelope either before the job is 
done to smooth things out, which is called pelicin (lubricant), or 
afterwards as a thank-you gift.  To some extent, in the unreformed 
offices of MOF (as the reform is carried out gradually), some corrupt 
employees still do what they can to get ‘an envelope’. For example, 
one informant told me that in the DGTR, which functions as MOF’s 
cashier, the commonest way of obtaining extra money is to impose 
‘additional rules’ or refer to old regulations (which in general 
requires more supporting documents) before their purchases can be 
reimbursed or money can be paid into the client’s account. 
When was doing my fieldwork, MOF employees seemed to disagree 
with each other about whether these envelopes constituted bribery. 
At a press conference the Finance Minister, who was championing 
the Bureaucratic Reform, complained that one high-rank official 
thought that as long as they did not ask for them such envelopes 
were halal and they could accept them (Napitupulu, 2008). One 
item on MOF’s bureaucratic reform agenda is the setting up of clear 
descriptions and boundaries regarding bribery, as people often 
claim that they have been given money without their knowledge. For 
example, it may be left by a client in the files they have to process, 
and when they try to return it the client denies putting it there. 
As a convention, just as hotel management manages customers’ tips, 
the person who receives the envelopes is expected to share the 
money with others and manage it as a combined resource to use if 
necessity arises. Men and women all get their share, but the 
proportion is left to the discretion of the seniors. This money is kept 
with money from other resources and can be used for the benefit of 
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the whole division or to cover expenses when there are guests from 
‘the centre’ or Jakarta. In the traditionally-run tax offices the 
amount of money in the envelope usually exceeds the individual 
salary and is managed similarly.  
9.3.5 Mark-ups and mark-downs 
In the Indonesian civil service people often mark up their 
expenditure budgets, although the Bureaucratic Reform is making 
this harder. Marking up is done by inflating invoices in collusion 
with the vendor. Verification involves reconciling the goods only 
with the invoice and not with the market price of the goods. 
Consequently, this kind of embezzlement is easy as long as there is 
a good relationship between the treasurer and the vendor. Even in 
the TA there are such opportunities, for example over-invoicing for 
office stationary or catering services for training workshops. The 
pickings are particularly rich for in-house training, for which the 
participants are provided with accommodation and three meals a 
day. One of my informants said that since other forms of corruption 
have become less available to people in the TA they take full 
advantage of these opportunities. 
Marking down is practiced by units dealing with state revenue. The 
DGTX is one such unit and there are major concerns about tax 
embezzlement by its officials. This kind of corruption requires 
collusion with taxpayers whereby the reported/assessed tax is less 
than it should be according to tax law; for this ‘service’ the tax 
official is given a sum of money. Tax disputes about self-assessed 
tax payment not corresponding with an official’s assessment during 
a tax audit, of which there are many, are also open to corrupt 
practices (Agung, 27 February 2012 ). 
9.3.6 Lembur fiktif (Falsifying overtime claims) 
Another common practice is falsifying overtime claims. Every month, 
each unit has a specific overtime budget that can only be used for 
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this purpose. Any unspent money should be returned to the State 
Treasury Office. In performance audits, every unit is assessed in 
terms of whether it has used up the budget as planned. Not being 
able to use the money it has been allocated is looked on 
unfavourably and the unit might not get the amount it requests in 
the next budget year. Due to fear of this sanction (and because 
people are happy to receive extra money), every month this money is 
paid to employees regardless of whether they have worked overtime 
or not.   
While some people fervently refuse this money (and of course refuse 
to sign the receipt), most consider it normal practice and take the 
money. One told me: ‘If you don’t like where this money comes from, 
or feel that it is haram to accept what you should not, then you 
should just give it away to charity rather than making a big deal 
about it as if you’re a saint.’  
Unlike most other forms of corruption, men and women engage 
equally in this practice despite the gendered practice in actual 
overtime hours worked (see chapter 10). In this sense some women 
are in the advantageous position of getting overtime payments at 
the official rate16 . This behaviour is mainly affected by religious 
identity as opposed to gender. Among my informants, most 
conservative Muslims fervently denied taking such payments and 
were very critical of this behaviour. Other informants drew attention 
to the generally poor time-keeping of these same conservative 
Muslims, who, they claimed, tended to arrive late and leave very 
early. The non-conservatives justified their own behaviour by 
comparing themselves to workers who took a full day’s pay for half a 
day’s work. 
9.3.7 Moonlighting 
A second job outside the MOF job may be done at weekends or out 
of office hours, during office hours without using office facilities, or 
                                           
16 There is a regulation issued every year about the day rate. 
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even within office hours and using office facilities. Most people 
exploit the expertise they already have.  
In the DGTX new recruits from STAN who have not yet been 
allocated a desk or are still in training are sometimes given clerical 
jobs by seniors who are not their line manager, as part of a tax 
audit. They receive as a fee for this kind of work (generally referred 
to as subkon, derived from ‘sub-contract’), which involves data entry 
or low-level auditing. The size of the fee depends on the discretion of 
the senior who gives them the work. 
In the TA, trainers and those capable of teaching sometimes teach 
at universities. The TA also has some teaching foundations that 
operate alongside its routine activities. The Finance Law of 1999 
stipulates that no civil servant can be a member of such 
foundations. However, it can still be arranged that some MOF 
employees can teach there without being formal members. 
Nearly all of the female participants found it hard to manage their 
work-life balance with additional work outside office hours, as I 
explore in Chapter 10. The men do not have problems juggling and 
combining their working and family lives. This difference increases 
the de facto pay gap between men and women in MOF. 
9.3.8 Gifts for the bosses 
Envelopes are not just passed from clients to civil servants. High-
ranking officials expect to be given their share of money collected by 
their subordinates. This is similar to how people in traditional 
Indonesian (mostly Javanese) kingdoms in the past made payments 
to their kings (Dwiyanto et al., 2006). In the Indonesian civil service, 
particularly MOF, it is called is upeti or setoran which means 
‘offering’ or simply ‘payment’. The DGTX has retained this culture. It 
is one of the factors that determine whether someone is in their 
superior’s inner circle, which in turn affects promotion, placement 
and relocation. 
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One of my informants from the DGTX claimed that the culture of 
keeping superiors happy with this kind of gift has marginalised 
women, since most, although turning a blind eye to this process, 
feel uncomfortable doing it themselves. Some women complained 
that they find it difficult to be ‘one of the chaps’, since it is claimed 
that they are not as effective as men at forcing taxpayers to pay up. 
As women tend not to take bribes from their customers, they have 
nothing to offer their superiors. On the other hand, male bosses do 
not expect payments from their female subordinates, and since they 
like to keep this money coming in they resent having women as 
their subordinates. 
9.4 Are women less corrupt? 
All of the 26 women managers based in the DGTX that I interviewed 
expressed strong unhappiness about the corruption in their 
organisation. They would have preferred to be placed where they did 
not have to deal with taxpayers, for example at headquarters doing 
administrative or PR jobs. For tax auditors, however, this is 
obviously impossible. The reasons the women gave me for not 
taking bribes were related to their status in the family as mothers 
and wives. One told me:  
I always think so far ahead when someone offers me a bribe. Like, 
what if then I somehow meet his family on the street? He would point 
at me and tell his family that this is the woman who is willing to take 
a bribe. Or can you imagine if it turns out that my children go to the 
same school as this person’s children? Then I’ll be infamous in the 
school, which would really embarrass them … Those kinds of 
thoughts so far have prevented me from taking bribes. (Nareswari) 
Another woman said:  
Why do I want to lower myself to take a bribe from taxpayers? I’m 
not a breadwinner. My husband keeps me well. I can keep my salary 
to buy whatever I want for myself. More than that, I’m working to 
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apply my knowledge, not to earn money. Well, money will come 
eventually, but that’s not my priority. (Jayanti) 
According to some of my informants, male bosses were preferred to 
female ones for this reason alone. As the women did not collect 
envelopes from taxpayers, their subordinates could not expect a 
share. 
Since the Bureaucratic Reform, 75% of Account Representative 
(those dealing with taxpayers) positions in the reformed Tax Offices 
have been given to women. The reformed offices promise tax payers 
a one-stop, speedy service. The appointment of women was not 
formal gender mainstreaming policy emerging from the reform. 
According to the HR manager, women were put in the front line to 
send a message to tax payers that the DGTX is serious about 
combating corruption. He was hoping that the tax payers would be 
more reluctant to offer bribes to courteous but businesslike women. 
In the meantime, traditional tax offices are still operating under the 
old system where corruption remains prevalent. 
One Account Representative told me that she and her female 
colleagues were very happy working under the new system, as their 
clients know very well that they should not try to offer bribes and 
everything is done according to standard operating procedures. In 
the reformed offices officials are paid four times what they used to 
earn and what their colleagues in the unreformed offices are still 
paid, which makes them happier to work under the new system. 
This aspect of the reform has been very beneficial for women in 
terms of pay, although Account Representative is not a senior or 
high-status post. 
One of my informants in the HR division of the DGTX told me, 
without quoting the exact number, that some male tax officials had 
preferred to delay moving to reformed offices. This gatekeeper 
speculated that although their salaries would be four times greater, 
this would be their only source of income. Under the old system still 
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in place in the unreformed offices, with the bribe money they could 
make ten or even twenty times their salaries. It is not surprising 
that some DGTX employees turned down the offer to take an exam 
for a place in the modern offices because they felt that their 
earnings would plunge without any chance to earn ‘additional 
income’. 
According to my informants, corruption still exists at a different 
level of management, even in the reformed offices. Taxpayers who 
think they are being asked to pay too much can lodge a complaint 
and ask to be reassessed by another tax authority under the same 
DGTX where things can be ‘settled’. In other words, instead of being 
eradicated, corruption has just become more localised. 
The fact that some men delay joining reformed offices does not 
mean that they are all happy with old regime. Their reactions varied, 
even among men who were not happy with the corruption in their 
workplace. While some shrugged their shoulders and accepted it as 
a rule of the game – ‘Well, that’s just the way it is here. We don’t 
want to be called extremist or hypocrites if we don’t do what other 
people do’ – some tried to justify it by the way they spent the money 
– ‘I never use that money to buy my children’s food or clothing, that is 
haram. I just use it for something else’. When I asked them what 
they meant by ‘something else’ they refused to tell me.  
One of my male informants said about his female colleagues who 
claim not to take bribes:  
All I know is that they do not want to collect it from the taxpayers. 
But when the money is already here and it’s time to share it among 
all the staff, then they’re very happy to accept it. I haven’t seen any 
women so far saying that they don’t want their portion. So what is 
this then? 
I cannot provide direct proof from the interviews that women in 
MOF, especially at the DGTX, were less corrupt than their male 
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colleagues, mainly because the interviews only relate to perceptions 
of corruption. There are no statistics kept specifically for this 
purpose anywhere in MOF. Since the Bureaucratic Reform only two 
major corruption cases in the DGTX have been made public: those 
of Gayus Tambunan, costing tax payers £40,000 (Kompas, 7 April 
2010) and of Dhana Widyatmika, £38,000 (Kompas, 21 March 
2012). Both were men, and both were dismissed from MOF and 
sentenced to seven and 12 years in prison respectively. Interestingly, 
Dhana’s case involved his wife, who is also an employee of the 
DGTX and worked with Gayus. Since she was not charged in person, 
she was not dismissed but only rotated to an administrative job. 
In the history of the TA only one woman has had to resign because 
of corruption. She was known to approach STAN applicants and 
offer to help them ‘pass the exam’. In fact, instead of influencing the 
exam results she simply claimed the credit for clients who passed 
and returned half of the money paid by those who did not. She was 
exposed when a dissatisfied client reported her to both the head of 
the TA and the local press. 
Now that its services are under the scrutiny of the Bureaucratic 
Reform, all high-ranking DGTR officials remind their staff at every 
meeting not to take envelopes from their clients. In a speech to 
celebrate Finance Day 2009, a director made a specific request to 
the Wives’ Association not to insist that their husbands bring home 
more than their official earnings, as this would push them into 
taking bribes. This implies that even when women are not involved 
in a corrupt act they are still accused of being behind men’s 
corruption, which shows that the Javanese proverb ‘Suwarga nunut, 
neraka katut’ (if her husband goes to heaven, she’ll get a lift there, 
and if he goes to hell, she’ll be dragged there too) still applies to 
some married women. 
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9.5 A question of opportunity? 
So far I have shown that the main reasons women do not obtain 
additional income, either legitimately or through corruption, are the 
limitations they face as women. These limitations affect their time 
(for moonlighting or out-of-office networking), their status (few 
women were ad hoc team members, as only a few were senior 
enough to meet the membership requirement) and their culturally-
ascribed roles (regarding dealing with men, specifically those in 
more senior positions). This section discusses further implications 
of gendered corruption, relating it to gender-based networking, 
which impacts on opportunities to engage in corruption. 
While there is a tendency for people to mix with others of the same 
origin, recruitment point, religious belief and other characteristics, 
gender also plays an important role in networking. For example, at 
MOF there is a tradition that on the big boss’ birthday (depending 
on the location, in a regional office this could be the Regional 
Director or the Office Head) the office staff celebrate it with a party 
out of office hours, usually at a weekend. As this is seen as a 
networking opportunity, people try their best to attend, even if just 
for half an hour, to show their loyalty. Most of my female research 
participants, however, said that they never went to this kind of 
occasion because they would rather spend the time with their 
families.  
One of my female informants in the DGTX told me that it was very 
difficult for women to compete with men in this informal network 
because there are many things that only men can or are approved 
to do:  
Men can approach their bosses or the tax payers (who are mostly 
men) quite easily, just by keeping them company outside office hours 
or joining in with whatever their hobby is: from fishing, playing golf, 
even taking them to visit sex workers. Obviously women cannot do 
this.  
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When strategic decision making can be influenced by this informal 
network, it is understandable that those who have limited access to 
this network also have limited access not only to promotion (Kanter, 
1979) but also to corruption (Goetz, 2007, Honour et al., 1998). 
9.6 Is women’s lack of engagement in corrupt 
behaviour the cause or the consequence of 
their marginalisation? 
In MOF there has been a general tendency to pigeonhole women 
into jobs and tasks that require ‘prudence’ such as administrative 
roles and jobs that rely on their supposed intuition, such as dealing 
with clients or employees.  
At the DGTR, an HR manager who seemed concerned about her 
female colleagues’ career development and tried to champion them 
admitted to me that she still felt that women were better than men 
at doing things that require tidiness and carefulness. She was very 
particular that at least one of her echelon IV staff should be female 
so that she could help with housekeeping issues such as dealing 
with the caterer or florists when organising events like a summit or 
conference.  
In the TA women tend to be placed in the evaluation division, where 
the main tasks are marking exams and producing statistical reports 
based on the results. One of my interviewees in such a position 
speculated that women must be seen to have the patience and 
carefulness needed to ensure that the process of marking 
thousands of exam sheets every week went smoothly. The Planning 
Division, on the other hand, tends to be headed by men. 
Views about women’s supposed people skills meant that they were 
disproportionately represented in the HR division. Women were also 
more likely to be promoted to managerial positions in this division 
than they were in other divisions. Even in the DGTX, where the HR 
manager position has always been held by a man, there were more 
245 
 
 
female than male subordinates in the HR division because 
maintaining the employee database requires particular care. Also, in 
the DGTX all the PR managers are women. 
A junior manager in the DGTX complained to me that in the 
beginning of her assignment she had been expected to serve tea and 
coffee to her male colleagues at meetings. She also tended to get 
boring assignments such as auditing cooperative shops while her 
male colleagues from the same recruitment batch were taken by 
their senior to audit foreign investment companies, and data entry 
while her male colleagues went to the tax court on interesting cases. 
Apparently she was not the only female employee who experienced 
such treatment, as confirmed by other interviewees. 
When I asked other senior female managers in DGTX about this 
they all stated that they had endured the same treatment from their 
seniors at the beginning of their careers until they proved 
themselves:  
It’s the rule of the game in this organisation. You have to prove that 
you’re capable of working hard before you can be trusted, and if 
you’re a woman then you have to prove yourself four times as much 
as your male colleagues. I know it seems unfair, but if we want to 
move on with our careers we must get on with it and stop whingeing: 
nobody would listen to us, and that would only prove that what [the 
men] say about us is right. 
She did not say, however, whether this also involved proving 
themselves in the ‘male’ world of corruption. 
Despite having master’s degrees in Tax Auditing, two of the female 
senior managers had never been given a post as tax auditor. Instead 
they had always managed PR and housekeeping at the tax offices 
they were posted to. By the time of my fieldwork, there had been no 
female tax investigator (whose job involves working with the police 
in cases of tax fraud) in the DGTX. 
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A male tax auditor said that he did not like having females in his 
team because they could not be expected to work as hard as the 
male auditors, either in terms of overtime or of investigating 
taxpayers suspected of committing fraud. When I asked him what 
aspects of the job women could not do in normal office hours, he 
only provided reasons such as problems with climbing ladders when 
women needed to get archives or counting shares: ‘That would be 
dangerous. Not just that she might fall, but what if people look up her 
skirt when she is up there getting the files?’ He did not appear to 
understand when I pointed out that what he had said was 
inappropriate. 
During the focus group discussion at the DGTX, all the male tax 
auditors agreed that auditing taxpayers can sometimes be 
dangerous and that it often involves overtime, especially when 
approaching deadlines. The men told me that they would not insist 
that female staff stay overnight or engage in intelligence tasks such 
as spying on taxpayers suspected of fraud, as this involves an 
element of danger as such people might become violent. One said, 
‘We don’t like it if our wives come home late or do dangerous tasks, 
so why would we ask other people’s wives to do that?’ 
The experience of women, in the DGTX in particular as well as the 
TA and the Treasury, indicates that they were sometimes denied 
important jobs with potential for career development or access to 
corruption (or, in the DGTX, both) because as a male participant 
put it very bluntly, ‘Women should not invade men’s territory’. 
9.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed how gender interplays with corruption 
issues in MOF. Corruption is not one of the elements of Goetz’s 
gendered archaeology, but I have shown that it is another 
dimension of organisational culture that interacts with wider 
societal status and norms, and is thus worth analysing. 
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There is a tendency, for example by the World Bank (World Bank, 
2001) to use essentialist arguments that women are inherently less 
corrupt to support an instrumentalist agenda to get more women 
into parliament or government bureaucracies. This simplistic and 
monolithic treatment of women may lose credibility if it is 
demonstrated that women who go on to senior positions are no less 
corrupt than men. If the primary purpose of promoting women is 
framed in terms of reducing corruption, this may undermine the 
wider women’s empowerment agenda. While some women claimed 
that they had moral grounds for not getting involved in corruption, 
there was also the issue of limited opportunity.  In the DGTX, for 
example, women are more likely to have administrative and PR jobs, 
where bribery is uncommon, rather than technical posts. 
Consequently, this gendered job distribution is also related to 
gendered opportunities to engage in corruption. Meanwhile, gender-
based networking in MOF makes it difficult for women to develop 
the informal contacts required for corruption, due both to time and 
space constraints and to norms about appropriate female behaviour. 
Gendered corruption presents both constraints and opportunities 
for women at MOF, although the former were more evident. The 
assumption that women are not or should not be interested in 
corruption – because they are not seen as the main breadwinners, 
because big tax deals with big companies are male business, or 
because women should be kept away from rough and dirty deals to 
keep their purity intact – increases the likelihood that they are 
posted to less attractive positions. According to general perception, 
since they tend not to engage in corrupt dealings why should they 
be given a lucrative post in a strategic office? On the other hand, 
the association of women with purity and integrity has been used to 
hide corruption and improve the public image of some MOF offices. 
The Bureaucratic Reform has opened up opportunities for 
advancement for some women, although usually these do not 
include higher status or more influential positions. 
248 
 
 
Some studies demonstrate how household finances can be affected 
by incidents of corruption, for example having to pay extra for 
health care (Sen and Ostin, 2007). This chapter has looked at the 
other side of this relationship, revealing how gendered corruption 
may be partly rooted in household financing arrangements. It shows 
that the gendered aspect of corruption in MOF is influenced by the 
perception that men are the main breadwinners, and so any 
opportunity to earn extra money should be more available to them 
than to female employees. 
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10 Locating the identities of MOF 
women in relation to MOF’s 
gendered space and time  
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at how MOF female managers negotiate their 
identities as managers, wives and mothers. It considers how women 
make their decisions and choices, and the strategies that underpin 
them. The chapter is based on semi-structured interviews 
conducted with 59 MOF female managers. As mentioned in Chapter 
3, I did not systematically gather the same data from men, mainly 
because most of the men I interviewed did not have time for an 
interview or were not interested in the subject. 
Chapter 9 showed that the majority of female interviewees saw 
themselves as sharing the burden of household financing equally 
with their husbands. This suggests that husbands and wives valued 
each other’s work equally. But did this mean that they valued each 
other’s careers, as opposed to just working to put food on the table, 
equally? 
Previous chapters have shown that women’s experiences of 
employment at MOF go beyond a simple division between office and 
home life. They also face the chance of being placed away from their 
family homes as part of their employment contract, temporarily for 
a study assignment or for longer tours of duty. While in developed 
countries the implications of work relocation as part of the career 
path for the family have been studied, this chapter addresses a gap 
in the literature on similar issues in developing countries. 
The chapter focuses on two of Goetz’s elements of the gendered 
archaeology of organisations: gendered participants and gendered 
space and time. Drawing on studies of marriage and kinship 
systems in Indonesia and especially Javanese culture, to which 
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most research participants belong, this section deals with questions 
about how female MOF employees negotiated their identities in the 
household and the workplace. It is important to take this 
perspective, as organisations should be viewed: 
as frameworks of human experience which have key implications for 
the construction and reproduction of gender relationships, but which, 
in turn, have implications for the development and existence of the 
organisation itself. (Mills, 1992 p.134) 
This chapter links and correlates some critical steps in these 
women’s career development with their domestic lives, taking into 
account their reproductive role and personal choices. Because of 
the nature of the participants and the focus of this study, the 
predominant concept of time that emerges from the narratives is as 
a ‘ladder’ (Halford and Leonard, 2006b p.136). The female managers 
describe themselves climbing to the positions they occupied at the 
time of the interviews. To explore the interaction between personal 
narratives, the wider environment and the women’s agency, the last 
section of this chapter draws loosely on sociological life-course 
frameworks (Elder, 1996, Elder, 1994). 
In the context of developing countries, women’s limited access to 
senior management in government bureaucracy is often related to 
traditional expectations about their domestic roles and 
responsibilities (Amos-Wilson, 1999, Ogenyi, 2004, Ogenyi Ejye and 
Victoria Odu, 2006), and thus MOF’s approach to geographical 
space and time may be one of the most crucial factors hindering 
women’s participation, especially in management. While much has 
been written about the difficulties women face in accessing 
positions in top managerial levels due to domestic factors, only a 
few studies have looked at the articulation of private and working 
lives (Guillaume and Pochic, 2009). This study addresses the work-
life balance from the organisational as well as individual and family 
perspectives. 
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This chapter seeks to answer the main research question: ‘How do 
women negotiate their gendered identities throughout their 
employment at MOF in relation to their domestic lives? The more 
specific research questions are: 
 How are gendered roles in the public and private spheres 
prescribed by society? 
 What are MOF’s regulations on daily working lives such as 
office hours and leave of absence? 
 How do women reconcile their domestic and work 
responsibilities on a daily basis and over their lifetime? As 
part of this, how do they set their priorities, and how do they 
feel about them? 
The chapter begins with a general account of family arrangements 
and gender roles in Indonesia followed by a discussion of civil 
service working regulations. From there the discussion moves to the 
daily experiences of female managers and their reflections on their 
multiple identities as civil servants, wives and mothers. 
10.2 Child- and husband-care 
‘Couples’ multiple work-family adaptive strategies cannot be 
captured by individual experiences separately but require couple-level 
analysis.’ (Moen and Sweet, 2004:219) 
Among anthropologists and other social scientists (Geertz, 1961b, 
Hull, 1986, Koentjaraningrat, 1985, Magnis-Suseno, 1991) there is 
consensus that Javanese women’s position is equal to that of their 
husbands, at least in the sense that they respect one another. There 
is, however, a clear gender division of labour, whereby women’s 
main domain is the household and men’s, the public sphere. 
Among the women I interviewed there was no uniformity in terms of 
their relationships with their husbands. The vast majority 
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considered themselves in an equal position to their husbands, 
whereby they took turns at balancing their career development 
while ensuring that they fulfilled their parenting role jointly. 
Whether this marital relationship was actually equal, and whether 
they did share their parental responsibilities equally is another 
matter. For example, two women who stated that they enjoyed an 
equal relationship with their husbands complained that their 
spouses always expected their wives to come home earlier than 
them. One, Laksmi, an echelon III in DGTX, whose husband also 
worked at the same managerial level in DGTR, said: 
He always calls me before the office hours end and asks whether I 
will be home on time. What does he mean by ‘on time’? Of course I’ll 
go home as soon as my work is done. But what he means is just 
leaving the office at bang on 5 pm. It’s not that easy, you know. The 
higher our position, the more responsibility we have, and sometimes 
it’s beyond our control what time a meeting finishes or a case is 
completely finished. He often comes home late –usually he calls to 
say he’ll be home late because there’s still some work to be done, in a 
sort of matter-of-fact way, and there’s nothing you can do about it – 
but he’s always in a bad mood when I do the same. It’s as if I have to 
beg to be allowed to come home late. 
The male managers confirmed the female managers’ views that, as 
head of the household by default, they are the main breadwinners 
and their wives are home-makers:  
It’s different for men. When our children are not well, we can still 
continue working. For women, it’s not that easy. I’ve been in a 
meeting with the [female] Minister. When she opened the meeting she 
apologised for having to keep her mobile on to be able to receive a call 
in case her son, who was not well in the morning, had to be 
transferred to hospital. We fathers do not have to do that. A sick child 
can be looked after by its mother. 
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Geertz (1961a) describes Javanese men as rather dependent on 
women, both emotionally and practically. She points out that they 
‘…rarely live alone self-sufficiently, whereas women frequently do; a 
man always needs someone to perform the household duties; a 
woman can do these herself in addition to doing her daily work’ 
(Geertz, 1961a p.123). 
Unlike some career women in developed countries who choose to 
remain childless (Wood and Newton, 2006), none of my interviewees 
had done this. In Indonesia, and particularly in Javanese society, 
motherhood is regarded as very important and nothing else can gain 
women more respect in the public eye than having children 
(Berninghausen et al., 1992).  
Eight of the female interviewees had never been married and did not 
have children. All of those who were or had ever been married had 
at least one child (see Table ‎10-1 Number of children of female 
managers). Two who had been childless for several years of 
marriage had adopted a child. The number of children they had 
corresponds well with MOF HR statistics, which show that 
employees had on average three children.  
Table ‎10-1 Number of children of female managers 
Number of children Female managers 
 One 7  
 Two 18  
 Three 20  
 Four 4  
 
Most female managers regarded their children’s education as their 
primary responsibility, and not even a shared responsibility between 
them and their husbands. I found this quite interesting, since when 
initially I asked whether they shared equal parenting 
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responsibilities with their partners, the answer was yes. When I 
probed into actual practice, however, a different story emerged. 
The interviewees believed very strongly that the division of labour 
between parents should be along the lines of the mother being 
responsible for the children’s education and the father for earning 
the money to sustain the family. Of the 51 women with children, 44 
stated that they did more than their fair share of child rearing:  
They do their homework with me. Usually they do what they can 
before I get home, then I check, and if there’s something that they 
don’t understand or get wrong then we do it together. Every day. 
Even if Daddy is home long before me they just wouldn’t ask him, 
and he wouldn’t interfere either.  
This is particularly clear in Prasasti’s case. She leaves for work at 
6.30 am, returning home at 7.30 pm. Her husband works from 
home but contributes little to childcare: 
Let alone when they’re not well, when they wake up in the morning 
it’s their mum they immediately look for, not dad. Well, you see, it’s 
true that he works from home and is physically there. But he’s 
constantly in front of the computer. If he plays with them, it only lasts 
for a few minutes…So it’s not strange that they’re closer to me even if 
I see them less.  
There was no evidence that husbands in younger couples were 
prepared to play a more substantial role in childcare or other 
domestic duties than those in older couples. 
Every interviewee referred to the notion of the husband as the head 
of household as a ‘fact’ that ‘nobody can deny’. Some people, men 
and women, cited the Koran or Bible to support this division of 
labour, and several compared their households to a ship. Maruti 
said:  
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The household is like a ship, it only needs one captain. If you have 
two people and each wants to go in a different direction the ship 
might even sink. And men are biologically superior to women; that’s 
why religion gave them the privilege of leading the household. 
Yanti, a manager at DGTX, explained her view of kodrat perempuan 
(women’s destiny) and her responsibilities as linked to Islam. She 
said: 
Many women join the workforce and start their career without having 
any idea whether the jobs they do every day are their choice or not. 
They don’t have any clue what they’re looking for in their job. As a 
result, that person is consumed by the job and goes off the rails. But 
if we realise the meaning of our life, our mission as human beings, 
we will understand our purpose. God created us as women and not 
men. What is it that women should do? Raise a family, that’s our 
responsibility. Our contributions to family life weigh more that those 
of men… Men are the other way round. For them, work weighs more.. 
This begs the question: how do women reconcile these beliefs with 
working full-time? I return to this after first examining civil service 
regulations on working hours and leave of absence. 
10.3 Leave of Absence, working hours and 
overtime 
10.3.1 Annual leave 
According to Regulation No.24/1976 (GOI, 1976), civil servants are 
entitled to several kinds of paid leave. All are entitled to twelve fully 
paid working days of annual leave. The minimum period of leave is 
three days. This inflexibility created a dilemma for many of the 
working mothers I interviewed. For example, if they needed to go to 
a child’s school for a parent-teacher meeting lasting a couple of 
hours, a half-day leave was sufficient. Since this option was not 
available they were forced into taking a full three-day leave or 
arriving at work late. The penalty for arriving late is usually a cut in 
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their next monthly allowance and is strictly applied with the 
bureaucratic reform. 
One of my gatekeepers mentioned that she had complained about 
this to the Civil Service Agency and expected them to propose a 
revision to the regulation. Instead, the response was: ‘For such 
purposes, women are advised to ask permission from their line 
manager’. According to my informant, under the bureaucratic 
reform measures this kind of permission, although allowed, would 
entail a penalty of £30.  
Since 2005, the Minister for Civil Service Planning and the Civil 
Service Bureau, along with the Ministries of Manpower and 
Religious Affairs, have regulated what they call cuti bersama or 
collective annual leave. This has arisen because during important 
religious holidays like Eid many people take leave in addition to the 
official public holiday17 , leaving the offices half-empty. This was 
seen as unprofessional and in 2005 it was decreed that the entire 
civil service must take a part of their annual leave at these times. In 
2007, collective leave for such occasions totalled eleven days, 
leaving a single day of annual leave which could not be taken as 
holiday due to the three-day minimum regulation (Table ‎10-2). 
This added to the inflexibility of the leave system. Given the gender 
roles in Indonesia, mothers are expected to deal with any problems 
that their children may have, for example when they are not well. 
This inflexibility adds to working mothers’ difficulties. 
  
                                           
17 There are 14 national holidays, three of which fall at the weekend. 
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Table ‎10-2 Civil Service Annual leave days 2005-2012 
Year 
Collective 
holiday* 
Total remaining 
day off 
2005 4 days  8 days  
2006 6 days  6 days  
2007 11 days  1 days  
2008 5 days  7 days  
2009 4 days  8 days  
2010 3 days  9 days  
2011 4 days  8 days  
2012 6 days  6 days  
*Data taken from www.menpan.go.id  
After working full-time for six years, a civil servant is entitled to 
take a ‘grand leave’ of up to 3 months. This is repeated every six 
years.  
10.3.2 Maternity leave 
According to civil service regulations, women are entitled to 
maternity leave for their first, second and third children and can 
apply for unpaid leave for the fourth child and beyond. The leave is 
three months and must be taken a month before the birth and two 
months afterwards. The intention may have been to enable women 
to rest before giving birth. However, many of the women I 
interviewed found it unhelpful as it reduced the time they could 
spend with the child after the birth. Among other things it also 
limited the period that they could breastfeed exclusively, contrary to 
Ministry of Health advice that they should do so for at least six 
months. At MOF there are no crèche services or private rooms for 
women who wish to breastfeed; and there is no paternity leave. 
10.3.3 Unpaid leave 
Civil servants can only apply for unpaid leave under very special 
circumstances, and there is no guarantee that it will be granted 
except in the case of unpaid maternity leave for the fourth child 
onwards. Unpaid leave can last a maximum of four years and the 
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employee is removed from her/his position. This time is not counted 
as service, which is reflected in promotion and pension entitlements. 
There is no guarantee that there will be a place to return to at the 
end of the leave, making it almost like a temporary resignation with 
the possibility of reinstatement in the same grade.  
To a large extent this form of leave was created with female civil 
servants in mind. It deals with the range of contingencies that 
women are more likely than men to confront: giving birth to more 
than three children (article 19), and the ‘need to follow one’s 
husband on a foreign assignment’ (article 26). In practice no male 
civil servant has ever been granted such leave, since Article 26 
makes no reference to ‘husbands who need to follow their wives on 
a foreign assignment’, reflecting the wider belief that it is 
inappropriate for men to submit to their wives and sacrifice their 
careers. 
When a woman returns from unpaid leave she is given the grade 
she held before leaving. However, after four years of absence her 
place in the DUK employees’ ranking is lower in comparison to that 
of others in the same office, who have been advancing in the 
meantime. This can have important implications: several of the 
women I interviewed found that one of their ex-subordinates had 
become their line manager. If promotion were based on work 
performance, high-performing women might eventually be able to 
recover their prior managerial level. However, the DUK system rates 
seniority more highly than performance. For the women I 
interviewed this created a ‘snakes and ladders’ effect – having 
slipped down the list, they often had to wait a long time before 
reaching the top of the list for promotion.  
On one hand, this system of unpaid leave of absence seems to offer 
women the flexibility to combine a career in the civil service with 
family life. On the other, the way it is regulated embodies a 
stereotyped view of the gender division of labour in civil servants’ 
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families. Even when both spouses are civil servants it is assumed 
that women are not the main breadwinners and that they should 
prioritise their families over their careers. As such, men are not 
expected to take unpaid leave. The perception that women should 
be less concerned than men about their careers has encouraged a 
system whereby most women return from leave to the same level of 
pay but have effectively been downgraded. The implication is that 
women work purely to be paid rather than pursuing a career.  
10.3.4 Working hours 
According to civil service regulations, working hours are 07.30 to 
16.00, with a break between 12.00 and 13.00. On Friday working 
hours are 07.30 to 16.30, with a longer break (11.30 to 13.00) to 
accommodate Friday prayers for Muslim men (Muslim women do 
not attend Friday prayers in Indonesia). MOF regulations set out 
rather longer working hours: 07.30 to 17.00, with a break between 
12.15 and 13.00. During fasting for Ramadan, where civil servants 
in other ministries and government agencies work shorter hours 
(08.00-15.00), MOF employees work from 07.30-16.30 and the 
lunch break is reduced to 15 minutes.  
The MOF clock works like a factory clock. In MOF headquarters in 
Lapangan Banteng a siren marks each working period. Since the 
bureaucratic reform, employees have clocked in and out using their 
fingerprint at each door.18 This creates a big administrative task at 
the end of each month, as every absence from the office has to be 
justified. Absences that cannot be justified result in cuts to the 
monthly allowance. 
                                           
18Before the bureaucratic reform there was more freedom and flexibility for 
civil servants, even in MOF, where standards tended to be higher. This fed 
into general public perceptions and encouraged a view that civil service 
work was suitable for women, since it would allow them to combine career 
and household responsibilities. 
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Some of Indonesian’s remote regions lack basic facilities such as a 
good transport system or reliable electricity supply and are therefore 
not considered safe places for women to work. Yet Jakarta poses a 
challenge of its own: traffic congestion (Haryo, 2010, Ooi, 2012). 
Most people in Jakarta spend at least three hours a day on the road. 
To get to the office before 07.30, all my interviewees and their 
colleagues based in Jakarta had to leave the house by 6 am at the 
latest. Because housing has become very expensive in Jakarta, 
people tend to live in the suburbs, adding to their travel time. Those 
living on the outskirts and who used public transport had to leave 
at 5 am and typically did not get home before 8.30 pm. This has a 
big impact on women’s ability to combine domestic and office 
careers effectively (Jeff Turner, 2012).  
Setting off to work early in the morning, often before their children 
woke, and only returning once the children were in bed meant 
leaving them in the hands of domestic helpers (see below). This 
increased the women’s determination to do a very good job of being 
managers. One, Kirana, said that she felt she had to justify her 
absence from home and her children by working as efficiently as 
she could. She seldom took a lunch break, ordering her lunch from 
the cafeteria and eating it in her room so that she could finish her 
work and leave at exactly 5 pm. Kirana said she hated having to 
work overtime because it meant that she would miss seeing her 
children before they went to bed, but also because not all the 
overtime was justifiable: some was just the result of other people’s 
inefficiency during the day. 
10.3.5 Overtime 
There is a specific regulation prohibiting companies from employing 
women in nightshifts without specific authorisation (GOI, 1997a). 
Additionally, the Ministry of Manpower decrees that overtime cannot 
exceed three hours a day and 14 hours a week. However, neither of 
these regulations applies to civil servants, as Indonesian civil 
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servants have their own labour codes. There is no specific 
regulation of civil servants’ overtime apart from its definition in the 
regulation about the rate paid per hour: ‘overtime is any work that 
has to be done by civil servants outside normal office hours to 
complete urgent and immediate jobs.’ (GOI, 1977, GOI, 1974a). 
A World Bank Report (Rodgers, 1999) argues against gendered 
protective labour market policies in developing countries on the 
grounds that they hinder women’s equal participation in the labour 
market and limit their potential earning power, as well as raising 
the cost to firms of hiring women. While this refers to the lower end 
of labour market where labour is paid on an hourly basis, the 
situation may be different at the other end of market such as for 
medium and high-level civil servants. Ines Smyth found that 10% of 
overtime was obligatory at the Asian Development Bank and thus 
could not be avoided, even by female employees with young families 
(Smyth and Turquet, 2012). 
In practice, the amount of overtime worked at MOF depends on the 
activities of a particular office. At DGTX and DGTR the workload 
usually intensifies towards the end of tax/fiscal year, in TA, STAN 
recruitment usually significantly increases the workload.  
In some cases overtime is needed because of employees’ low 
capacity to fulfil their job roles properly. Direct recruits from 
universities other than STAN have the same general capacity as 
STAN graduates. However, people recruited through other channels, 
such as directly from high school or by temporary work agencies, 
are not necessarily as competent.19 Supervisors tend to give jobs to 
                                           
19 An informant from DGTX told me that their department was going to 
recruit 35,000 employees between 2012 and 2017. They said this 
recruitment plan was not based on job analysis and had just come out of 
the blue. According to another informant, it is estimated that around 
3,000 DGTX employees are not productive, and if proper employment 
standards were applied they would be fired. A source in TA said their 
department had a joint plan with DGTX to train these 3,000 people with 
transferable skills. Thirty training sessions were planned, but only one was 
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people whom they are certain will complete them on time, leaving 
out people who are unable to do so and leading to unequal job 
distribution, with some people underutilised and others 
overburdened; the latter often have to do overtime. While this is not 
generally a problem for men, whether single or married, it creates a 
problem for women with family responsibilities. 
One of the female managers I interviewed told me that she had once 
had a warning letter about her performance because she was not 
doing overtime, mainly because she had a very young baby. The 
letter quoted an article in the Civil Service Law (GOI, 1974a, GOI, 
1999)  that says ‘seorang PNS harus bekerja dengan sungguh-
sungguh tanpa kenal waktu dan mengutamakan kepentingan dinas 
di atas kepentingan pribadi, keluarga maupun golongan’ (a civil 
servant must work hard day and night at all times and prioritise 
their duties over their own interests).  At the next round of 
promotions she was downgraded and relocated to a smaller office, 
although her echelon level remained the same. Although she was 
unhappy about it, she said she was resigned as there was nothing 
she could do. 
The World Bank argues that working hour restrictions applied 
specifically to women are no longer needed and should therefore be 
removed, as: ‘Protective measures that constrain women more than 
men in their working-hours can hinder women’s progress towards 
equity in the labor market’ (Rodgers, 1999 p.27). While the World 
Bank refers here to manual and factory workers, this study 
demonstrates that the potential effects of overtime rules on women’s 
interests may operate differently in other sectors of the labour 
market such as the civil service. 
                                                                                                           
given. The trainers gave up because only one or two people bothered to 
attend. 
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So far I have discussed how female MOF managers manage their 
working day. The next section discusses full-time working mothers’ 
daily household arrangements. 
10.4 Behind every successful woman there is a 
pembantu 
Instead of sharing the childcare with their husbands, female 
managers share it with another woman, be it their mother, their 
sister or a domestic helper. Susan Blackburn (2004) notes that for 
Indonesian people the concept of motherhood is not limited to the 
biological mother; children are used to being cared for by multiple 
mother figures including servants, grandmothers, aunts and even 
co-wives.  
All the women I interviewed had what is locally called a pembantu 
(literally, a helper); some had more than one. This is common in 
middle-class families regardless of whether the woman works 
outside the house.20 A third of female interviewees had employed 
the same pembantu for over ten years. My informants reported that 
they would not be able to cope without a helper. One told me:  
From the beginning of my career I always had somebody I could 
trust. For me the pembantu is so essential that I’d rather argue with 
my husband than tell my pembantu off.’ 
The pembantu is the backbone of many families, who depend on her. 
Children do not notice if their parents away from home, but once Si 
Mbak (literally ‘big sister’, as servants are usually called) is pulang 
                                           
20Research conducted by the ILO and the University of Atmajaya in 1995 
estimated that 1.4 million women were working as pembantu in Jakarta 
alone. According to Indonesian law, pembantu are considered informal 
workers as they work in domestic areas (Putusan P4 Pusat No. 
70/59/111/02/C tgl. 19 December 1959), and are thus not protected by 
law. This makes them vulnerable and increases the risk of exploitation of 
one woman by another.  
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kampung (going back to see her family in the village) the whole 
household is under stress.21 
All of the female participants said that they left the housework to 
their pembantus, from cleaning and tidying the house to washing 
and ironing. As Indonesian cooking tends to be labour-intensive, 
the pembantus do this as well. 
When I get home around 7.30 pm I’m usually worn out. All the 
household chores have been done by the pembantu. Sometimes the 
children have even finished their dinner – they ask if they should 
wait for me, and when I’m not sure when I’ll get home I say no, have 
your dinner without me. All of that has been sorted out by the 
pembantu. Just before I go to bed I may discuss with her what to 
cook the next day. Normally I get the groceries once a week, but it’s 
up to her what to cook. It’s really up to her what kind of food she’s 
going to feed my husband, my children [laughs]. I really never cook. 
In this way the female managers could afford to separate themselves 
from the traditional role of women as domestic worker by buying the 
time of a pembantu. There is a parallel between the pembantus, who 
leave their own families, including young children, behind with their 
extended family, and the lives of their female employers, who leave 
their children with the pembantu on a daily basis or their own 
extended family when they go on a tour of duty. This creates a 
degree of solidarity between some of the women I interviewed, 
although others were less aware of their parallel situations. 
                                           
21 Studies of working women in other countries draw attention to the 
childcare problems caused by long and inflexible school holidays (Moen, P. 
and Sweet, S. (2004) 'From 'Work-Family' to 'Flexible Careers'', Community, 
Work & Family, 7(2): 209-226. Having a pembantu meant that school 
holidays were not usually a problem for the informants in my research. 
The big problem, however, typically arises around Eid, when all pembantus 
go back to their own village for a period of time that exceeds the civil 
servants’ holiday. Another typical crisis occurs when the pembantu resigns 
to get married or for another reason.  
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Would a crèche at the office be a good idea? Some women would 
welcome such provision when the pembantu are pulang kampung. 
However, on normal days they preferred the children to stay at 
home, supervised by the pembantu. This might reflect Jakarta’s 
urban setting, where parents want to spare their children three 
hours in a traffic jam. 
A number of my interviewees also relied on the support of their 
extended families. The role of these relatives is supervisory, 
meaning that instead of doing all of the housework they supervise a 
set of helpers, a babysitter and driver to ensure that the household 
runs smoothly. In the event that a female manager has to be absent 
from her family for a longer period of time than normal holidays the 
children are often sent to live with the extended family, as I discuss 
below.  
The next sections look at the different situations that require female 
managers to be away from home outside their usual office hours.  
10.5 Family arrangements when women have to 
be away from home 
Indonesian ideals about the family define women as carers for both 
their husbands and their children. Therefore, not having small 
children or any children at all does not automatically free women to 
pursue their own careers; there is still the husband to look after. As 
a consequence, moving away from the family home to pursue their 
career is still uncommon for women in Indonesia.  
Chapter 7 observed that civil servants can apply for a scholarship to 
study abroad and that some women decide not to take this 
opportunity because of their domestic responsibilities. This section 
looks at those who do decide to go. Given women’s responsibility as 
money managers (see Chapter 9) and childcare managers, how do 
they cope with their responsibilities under these circumstances? 
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Table 10-3 summarises female managers’ family arrangements for 
studying overseas. It shows a diverse range of strategies, with most 
leaving their children with their own parents. Among the male 
managers I interviewed, 23 went abroad for study, of which 22 left 
their children and wives in Indonesia and one took his wife and only 
child. Data from MOF’s Overseas Training Centre show that over a 
period of 25 years only a handful of men took their families with 
them when studying abroad. 
Table ‎10-3 Strategies during overseas study 
Strategies when going abroad to 
study 
Number of interviewees who 
had a family by the time they 
went to study abroad (n=12) 
Taking the husband and children 
with them 
2 
Taking the children with them 2 
Taking only the husband 1 
Leaving the children with the 
husband 
0 
Leaving the children with their own 
parents (one of them took her 
husband with her but left the 
children with her mother) 
7 
Leaving the children with the in-
laws 
1 
Irma told me that her husband was very supportive of her studying 
abroad, although later it became clear that what she meant by 
being ‘supportive’ was simply that he did not prevent her from going. 
She took two of her children with her, leaving her youngest 
daughter in the care of her mother. Her husband was left largely 
free of childcare and even domestic chores such as cooking and 
cleaning: 
I did not take my youngest daughter because at the time she was 
only two years old and I was worried that I wouldn’t be able to look 
after her properly while studying. We were lucky that my mother 
lived very near us. So my daughter stayed with her grandmother. 
Every morning my husband would go there to see her, and again in 
the evening once he came back from the office. He also had his dinner 
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at my mother’s house. He just slept in our house and everything else 
was done at my mother’s.’ 
Hesti, a manager at the Training Office, was married to a tax 
auditor at the Tax Office and had a daughter, Farida. When Farida 
was three, Hesti passed the MOF selection test for a master’s degree 
abroad and got a place at a university in Japan. Her husband 
objected very strongly to living alone and looking after a three-year-
old, so he made her choose between taking Farida with her to Japan 
or leaving her with her family in Yogyakarta. Hesti chose the second 
option. This arrangement was kept for several months until it was 
time for Farida to go to primary school, which was far from the 
grandparents’ house but close to where Hesti’s sister, also in 
Yogyakarta, lived. Hesti’s sister and her husband did not have 
children and decided that Farida should stay with them, and Farida 
herself found no difficulty in adjusting to this new arrangement. 
While Hesti was studying, Farida only saw her father at weekends 
when he visited her.  
Of the twelve interviewees who were married with children when 
they were sent to study abroad, seven left their children with their 
parents and four took the children with them. Only one left her 
children (and her husband) with her parents-in-law. It is common 
for a woman’s family to help out when she goes away to study. To 
some extent these parents may have seen themselves as taking over 
their daughters’ responsibilities, including doing the cooking and 
the laundry. 
Saraswati, Puspita and Trisna took their husbands with them when 
they abroad to study. Their husbands all worked in private 
companies and they resigned from their jobs to follow their wives. 
Puspita, who left her son in Indonesia with her mother, had a lot of 
help from her husband: ‘He helped a lot with my reading list’. 
Trisna’s husband worked part-time and looked after their son while 
she attended lectures. Saraswati was not as lucky as her colleagues. 
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She took her husband and two children and ended up spending 
most of her time looking after them. She recalled: 
In the morning before going to campus I took the children to the 
nursery. Then I went to lectures, collected some books from the 
library and rushed to pick up the kids, stopping at the grocers on the 
way home. After that there would be the household chores, cleaning, 
cooking, dinner, bathing the kids and putting them to bed. When they 
were in bed it was their dad who needed looking after. Basically I 
could only work on my subject after midnight, when my two children 
and husband were sound asleep. 
Still, she remembered her time studying abroad as the most exciting 
time in her life. 
While going overseas for postgraduate study has a fixed duration, 
placements in other cities do not. Not many women are willing to go, 
either because they do not want to be away from their family or 
because their husbands dissuade them. 
When female managers had to relocate for a new managerial 
position, family arrangements typically involved leaving the children 
in the care of the husband; taking them all the children and leaving 
the husband in the marital home; taking some of the children and 
leaving others in the care of the husband; leaving the children in 
the care of the maternal grandmother while the husband stayed in 
the marital home; or leaving both husband and children in the care 
of either grandmother. This is not a fixed arrangement, and it 
sometimes varied for the same person. For example, Pramesti had 
been posted away from her family home twice. In one placement she 
took all her children with her. The other placement was more 
remote, so she sent her children back to their family home.  
Amrita, who joined MOF as a high-school recruit, was working as a 
junior manager in Jakarta (echelon IV) when her husband, who 
worked in a private company, was moved to Sulawesi. After a year 
269 
 
 
living at home with their three children in Jakarta she was 
promoted to an echelon III post in Sulawesi, but in a town about 
100 miles from her husband. After discussing it with her husband 
she accepted the promotion, left the children in Jakarta with an au 
pair, monitoring them twice a day over the telephone, and travelled 
100 miles to see her husband every weekend. The arrangement was 
still in place when I interviewed her. 
This supports Blackburn’s (2004 p.141) argument that western-
style notions of maternal deprivation do not necessarily discourage 
Indonesian mothers from sharing child-rearing with other women. 
The question is, however, whether they can accept the 
consequences of sharing their child care. In a different setting, 
Locke et al’s (2010) research on low-income rural-urban migrant 
labour in Vietnam reports that migrant labourers found the loss of 
everyday relations with children ‘painful’ and that ‘strategies of 
remote parenting become harder to sustain over long distances’ 
(Locke et al., 2010 p.12).  
According to several of my informants, being away from their 
children when they were very young could affect their relationships 
even long after they had been reunited. Some found that their 
children had established a strong bond with their carer and 
compared their mother unfavourably to her. As Hesti recalled: 
Sometimes when I think about this, it’s very hard to accept that my 
daughter is more attached to her aunt than to her own mother. When 
I’m with her and do things for her she always criticises me for not 
doing it ‘the way Bude – that’s what she calls her auntie – does it’, 
like ‘Your nasi goreng [fried rice] is not as nice as Bude’s’ or ‘you’re 
not as patient as Bude…’. Because I left her when she was at a 
critical age in a child’s development she’s never felt sure of my love 
for her. I think there’s been something missing in her development, 
something that I can never redo, and there’s nothing I can do about it 
apart from accept her the way she is. At the end of the day it was my 
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decision to leave her when she was little, and as a psychologist I 
should have been aware of the consequences.  
Hesti’s daughter was only eight years old at the time of the first 
interview, and Hesti was still looking for a way to reconnect with her 
without abruptly cutting her off from her aunt. Her efforts to be 
relocated to where the child lived with her aunt had failed and she 
was considering moving the child to live with her in Jakarta. When I 
returned to continue my fieldwork a year later Hesti’s husband had 
been posted back to Jakarta and they were both waiting for their 
daughter to join them when the new school term began. 
While Hesti accepted that her decision to leave her daughter behind 
had created a close relationship with her carer, Irma tried to correct 
the carer’s influence on her daughter during her absence. Her 
youngest daughter was 20 years old at the time of her interview. 
During her mother’s absence, she had grown to be independent and 
‘a bit stubborn and adventurous’, as Irma described it. She recalled 
that once she was back from studying she found that she had to be 
very firm with her daughter, who had been ‘spoiled soft’ by her 
grandmother: 
On my return from studying in the Netherlands, my mother and 
husband brought my youngest daughter to pick me and my other two 
children up at the airport. She didn’t recognise me, understandably, 
because for the past two years, since she was two years old, she’d 
only heard my voice over the phone and never seen me at all in 
person. I held her and said, ‘Hi, it’s mummy…’ but she just stared at 
me and pulled her body away from me when I carried her. She was 
four by then, so she didn’t really understand what was happening. 
But from what I’d read, as long as a child is not yet 5 years old 
there’s still a chance for me to catch up so that she accepts me as her 
mother. They said that if the child was older than five it would be 
more difficult. Although looking back now, there was nothing I could 
have done anyway, even if she were three years old – I still wanted 
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to go and get my master’s degree. My husband was really supportive 
to let my mother fill in for me.  
But once I was home, I realised what had happened. Well, you know, 
being brought up by a Granny is totally different from being brought 
up by your own parents. In general, Gran will spoil you soft. Granny 
doesn’t have responsibility towards the child, it’s the mother’s 
responsibility [laughs]. She was just feeling sorry all the time for the 
child: you poor thing, your mummy left you… and then she let the 
child get away with murder. As a result, my daughter turned a bit 
wild and naughty. When I came back she didn’t want to do what she 
was told. She refused to have a bath, didn’t want to do this and that. 
She had to have what she wanted there and then. If I took her to a 
shop and she asked for something and I refused, she’d cry and jump 
up and down…But I just had to be firm. I thought (going back to that 
article that I read before about 5 years old being the limit for trying to 
discipline a child), ‘I only have one year left, it will be harder when 
she’s five...’. In the end, she adjusted to having me as her mother. 
Now she doesn’t seem to remember that I left her when she was little. 
But for me, there’s always a nagging sense of guilt, although I try not 
to dwell on it too much, that I took my other children abroad but not 
her. When can I take her? I think every mother would like to be fair 
with all her children. Well, we just have to save some money: one day 
I’m sure it will happen…’ 
Despite this, none of the women I interviewed expressed any general 
regrets about leaving their children for their studies. They believed 
that their study had contributed to both their career and their 
personal development, which in turn made them better mothers for 
their children. Spending time abroad to study is not something that 
their counterparts in developed countries tend to do as they can 
enrol themselves in courses close to where they live. Even study at 
home can require compromises and changes to the normal pattern 
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of daily family life, but women managers in Europe and North 
America do not usually have to sacrifice the unity of their families. 
Interestingly, no informant explicitly mentioned the possible 
consequences of their being in work for their children’s welfare, 
although some referred to conflict when relocating away from their 
children. By contrast, numerous informants explicitly referred to 
the advantages that they felt their employment at MOF conferred on 
their children. 
Despite her past stagnant position at a lower managerial level, 
Sulastri’s children were very proud to have a mum as a government 
official. They had never known her as anything else because she 
had been working before she started a family. Sometimes she used 
this as a weapon against them if they misbehaved: 
Whenever they started getting out of control I would say to my 
husband that it was time for what I call ‘daster therapy’. He wouldn’t 
interfere in that case. Usually we went to the office together in the car, 
but on those days I wouldn’t go with him. I’d just stay in the house, 
still wearing my daster [a loose dress that Indonesian women wear 
at home]. Then my children would ask, “Why aren’t you dressed yet? 
Aren’t you going to the office?” I would say: “From now on I’ll stay at 
home and look after you all, because it seems that you cannot be 
trusted without direct supervision: you’ve crossed the line and not 
obeyed the rules that have been set up for you”. That would be 
enough to teach them: they’d say, “Okay, okay, I’ll do what I’m told, 
but you keep your job!”…  
Almost all the interviewees believed that their children benefited 
from having a career woman as their mother. One said that she 
would not be a good full-time mother anyway because she would be 
bored and stressed just being at home, so it would be the children 
who suffered. Nina believed this too, although she admitted that her 
five-year-old son often asked her to stay at home ‘to keep me 
company when I’m playing’. One day he was waiting at the front 
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door for her to come home from the office, and as soon as Nina 
appeared he said, ‘Mama, you know Ryan? I’ve just found out that 
his mother doesn’t work, she just stays at home, and apparently it’s 
all right, she doesn’t get into trouble with anyone. Maybe you can just 
try not to work; I think you’ll be OK too.’ Nina later realised that her 
son had thought that she would be arrested by the police if she did 
not go to work. 
10.6 Behind every successful man there is a 
woman? Being the wife of another civil 
servant 
10.6.1 Dharma Wanita activities to support husbands’ 
careers 
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, during the Suharto era which 
ended in 1998, Dharma Wanita, the civil servants’ wives’ 
association, played a prominent role. According to my informants 
and based on my own experience as an MOF employee, Dharma 
Wanita never really influences MOF in any area of policy, including 
decisions on staffing or promotion. Some female MOF employees, 
however, were married to male bureaucrats whose offices had 
required full Dharma Wanita participation. Despite their own 
professional duties, these female civil servants had not been 
exempted from this association and its activities. Of the 17 female 
managers aged over 50 at the time of interviews, 10 were married to 
civil servants and some remembered the Suharto era as ‘a tricky 
time’ because their participation in these activities had been 
important to their husband’s careers:  
The Dharma Wanita in my husband’s office put on a lot of activities 
and the Chair insisted that every member came and participated. If 
they didn’t, she would tell her own husband, who would then give 
the woman’s husband a ‘warning’. Sometimes it created tension 
between me and my husband. He would complain if I hadn’t been 
coming to Dharma Wanita at his office for the whole month, for 
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example at the end of the fiscal year when the work here was very 
hectic. Of course I wanted to support his career, but I had my 
responsibility towards my own job. I couldn’t just leave my staff 
meeting deadlines at the office to go visiting the Wacoal underwear 
factory with them. [Ria] 
Some women found that the branch of Dharma Wanita attached to 
their husbands’ office had fewer activities and the Chair was not so 
strict. They participated in meetings and relaxing get-togethers to 
maintain a good relationship with their counterparts in their 
husbands’ offices. 
After Suharto lost power, Dharma Wanita continued, but for a while 
its power was reduced. During Yudoyono’s government, however, 
there was a move to re-establish it, especially in regional and local 
government, the Home Office and the Attorney General’s Office. 
Between 2009 and 2012 local newspapers often carried headlines 
about governors’ speeches on the importance of ‘wives supporting 
their husbands’ careers through Dharma Wanita’ (Adnan, 2011, 
Pemda SumSel, 2011, Riswanto, 2011). 
10.6.2 When a woman’s position is higher than her 
husband’s 
In developed countries such as the USA there has been an increase 
in the number of dual-earner households, where the wife earns 
more than her husband (Winkler, 1998). The implications of this in 
terms of the woman’s increased bargaining position (Bergstrom, 
1996, Lundberg and Pollak, 1996) and decision-making power in 
household resource allocation (Thomas, 1990) have been studied, 
although the focus has been mainly on disparities in income rather 
than work status. A separate study of couples working for the same 
US private sector firm found that women in higher managerial 
positions than their husbands experienced higher ‘work-to-family 
spillover’, whereby work issues affected their family life. Issues 
noted included role conflict, for example when the wife could not 
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discuss confidential issues at work with her husband (Moen and 
Sweet, 2002). 
As discussed earlier, in Indonesia, and particularly in Javanese 
culture, the notion of the man as the head of the household is very 
prominent and is accepted as a fact of life. It is considered strange 
for a woman to have a higher position at work than her husband, 
especially when they both work for the same organisation. 
Padma’s husband Teja worked in a different unit at MOF to that of 
his wife and had once had a lower rank and position than hers. 
Padma joined MOF through sarjana recruitment and Teja entered 
through STAN. About ten years ago Teja managed to reach the level 
of middle management. Padma expressed her relief at her 
husband’s promotion. She recounted how, over the ten years during 
which her rank and position were higher than her husband’s, 
whenever they had an argument about anything, including 
domestic matters, he had always brought this up, for example 
saying sarcastically: ‘Of course you’re right. You’re always right, 
you’re the boss.’ Padma portrayed those ten years as the hardest 
time in her life. 
Irma, in DGTX, had faced a similar situation when she had been 
promoted to echelon III following her overseas study, while her 
husband, who only had a high-school diploma, stayed in echelon IV 
until he retired. Irma speculated that the only thing that saved him 
from feeling insecure about this was the fact that he was still the 
main breadwinner because somehow he was always placed in wet 
offices (see the Chapter 9) while she remained in dry ones. 
10.6.3 ‘I will follow him wherever he may go’: When the 
husband relocates 
As discussed above, general civil service regulations include a 
special clause for women to allow them to take unpaid leave ‘to 
follow their husbands who have been reassigned abroad’. When the 
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husband is relocated to another city or region in Indonesia, some 
wives want to be relocated with them. A large number of couples at 
MOF had met at STAN. When a couple goes on to work at MOF they 
are not always placed in the same directorate general, in which case 
the wife usually asks to be transferred to where her husband is 
serving. If this is not possible, she may consider resigning. Either 
way it can create problems for the HR manager. Transferring 
somebody to a different location simply to join her husband creates 
difficulties for the organisation’s HR planning, as does losing an 
employee. As a rule, when people ask to be relocated from Java to 
other islands it is granted fairly easily as long as the destination city 
is not too popular. Moving to Java, and particularly Jakarta, on the 
other hand, can be much more difficult. 
This situation affects the reputation of the female employees, 
although not all of them may want to move to follow their husbands. 
In some cases the wife is under pressure from her husband to seek 
relocation. Threats such as ‘If you don’t come with me, I can’t 
guarantee that I’ll be faithful in my new placement’ (Kartika’s 
husband) or even a threatening joke such as ‘Manado is known for 
its beautiful and attractive girls’ (Binu’s husband) suffice to make a 
women follow her husband regardless of the consequences for her 
own career. 
The HR Manager of the DGTR, who claimed that her organisation 
had a family-friendly policy (see Chapter 8) told me that she did her 
best not to separate couples. This was possible, she said, if both 
worked in the DGTR, when she would negotiate with the Kepala 
Kanwil (Regional Director) closest to where the husband was placed 
to secure a place for the wife in a different office in the same region. 
The negotiation process is not always easy, however, because there 
is a power asymmetry: Kepala Kanwil is an echelon II position and 
the HR Manager is in echelon III.  
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This convention is not straightforward. There is another rule of the 
game in MOF that states that husband and wife cannot be 
employed in the same directorate (echelon II unit) in Jakarta or in 
the same office (echelon III unit) in a regional area, to avoid a 
conflict of interests between family and work. Since in many cases 
there is only one echelon III unit in a municipality, many couples 
still have to live separately. I was unable to find evidence of 
discretion being used to allow men to join their wives. 
In DGTX, as I have shown, tours of duty are entirely a matter of 
discretion. According to the HR manager at the DGTX , relocation is 
heavily influenced by collusion, corruption and nepotism, and there 
is no scope for dealing with women who wish to relocate to be with 
their husbands. 
When a female employee’s wish to be relocated is granted, she must 
be prepared to start again as a pelaksana (junior member of staff) 
regardless of her previous managerial level. In a future promotion 
round she may be able to recover her former position, although 
some women remain junior staff.  
In an on-line group discussion on the subject of relocation among 
people at DGTR, one man claimed that when his wife had had to 
abandon her career it had been his sacrifice:  
Everybody makes sacrifices in this life. I got promoted, which means 
that I got better pay which benefits my family members. But to get 
that, I made sacrifices: being away from my family (because of 
relocation away from the family home). I had to do everything myself, 
no wife to cook for me. I also had to accept that my wife could no 
longer work, she had to resign from her office to look after my 
children now that I’m away from the family. So with her absence 
from paid work, I had to accept the fact that I have to shoulder all the 
financial burden. 
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10.7 Work and the gendered life course 
While for both men and women, time is continuously relational, 
gender difference reveals itself in the ever-shifting hierarchy of 
importance and the demands of lives as time slips by. (Halford and 
Leonard, 2006b p.134). 
The previous sections have shown how gendered time and space 
affect the experiences of female MOF managers in multiple and 
complex ways. It is useful to examine how these different influences 
play out over their working lives and not only at specific junctures. 
This section draws loosely on sociological life course frameworks to 
explore the interplay of personal biographies, historical events, the 
wider environment and individual agency (Elder, 1994, Elder, 1996). 
A number of studies have focused on gendered aspects of the life 
course, observing a disconnect between occupational career 
structures and expectations about women’s life trajectories (Moen, 
2001, Moen and Sweet, 2004): 
Widening gender disparities throughout the period of career and 
family building, as career decisions (having a child, moving to part-
time hours, leaving the workforce) result in the production and 
reproduction of gender, at home and at work’(Moen and Sweet, 2004 
p.214). 
This section compares these effects in the lives of three women, 
purposively selected from the wider set of informants because the 
starting points for their professional lives were similar. They are of a 
similar age, and all began their careers at MOF in the early 1980s 
and therefore experienced the same flow of historical change. They 
worked for the same department (DGTR) and were recruited from 
universities as sarjana rather than through STAN.  
10.7.1 Sulastri 
Sulastri was only ready to make room for her career when her 
children were old enough: 
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I joined MOF once I graduated from university in 1982. Then I was 
promoted pretty quickly to echelon 4, still in Jakarta, in 1983. I spent 
years in that echelon, being rotated from one position to another but 
still in the same rank, and always in Jakarta. In the mid ’90s I got an 
offer of promotion to echelon 3 which would involve relocation, and I 
discussed the possibility with my husband. He didn’t say no, he just 
tried to discuss it sensibly, I think. My argument was that I would be 
able to contribute to the country better if I took up the offer and 
worked in a higher position. His was: ‘If we’re both equally busy with 
our careers and work outside the house and the children are 
neglected, there’s a chance that they’ll become delinquent; doesn’t 
that mean that we aren’t contributing to society? Wouldn’t that mean 
that we will increase the crime in society?’ To be honest, when he 
said those things I could see that he had a point. In life we have to 
aim for the best. I think this is the best compromise. And this is also a 
responsibility that is no less important than my responsibility at the 
office.  
It is interesting that Sulastri had to put forward the argument about 
making a ‘higher contribution to society’, which shows that her 
career had to be justified more than just in terms of her own self 
esteem. 
As a consequence of this decision, Sulastri did not feel ready to be 
promoted and relocated until ten years later in 2005. During those 
ten years her husband, who worked as a widyaiswara (special 
trainer, see Chapter 4) in another ministry, finished his studies 
abroad and was promoted to the highest level in the teaching 
hierarchy. Sulastri’s case is broadly typical of female managers 
whose husbands have a prominent career in the civil service. 
10.7.2 Aisyah 
Aisyah, who joined MOF in the same recruitment batch and had a 
comparable work performance as Sulastri, accepted an offer of 
promotion in 1999 (later than Sulastri’s first offer) straightaway. It 
280 
 
 
required her to move out of Jakarta, where her old office and 
marital home were located. When asked whether her decision 
created tension between her and her husband, who then was a high 
school headmaster, she replied: 
Quite the contrary: it’s my husband who always supports and 
pushes me to progress in my career. When I was invited to take the 
SPAMA test, I asked [his permission]. He asked me what the 
consequences would be. I said that if I passed I would do this 
managerial training, and when I finished I might be promoted, but the 
first promotion would be outside Jakarta. He said OK, as long as it 
wasn’t too far away so I could still come home to see the children 
once a week…If he hadn’t given me permission, I wouldn’t have sat 
the test. 
Aisyah’s promotion took her to Garut, a five-hour journey from the 
family house in Jakarta. She was there for a year until the office 
was merged with the one in Sukabumi, three hours from Jakarta, of 
which she was head for nearly four years before she got an 
appointment at the same level in Jakarta. During the five years 
working away from her family she came home at weekends and her 
husband managed the children during the week with the help of a 
pembantu who took care of the housekeeping. 
When I asked Aisyah whether she felt that she was more productive 
when working away from the family due to the lack of household 
responsibilities, she said it was quite the opposite:  
When I was away, even at the office my mind often drifted to the 
family: I couldn’t focus 100% on the office. Since moving to Jakarta I 
think I do better, although I’m probably less present at home 
physically because of the different nature of the job. In Garut and 
Sukabumi I was only at the office between 7.30 and 17.00; 
sometimes I got back to my rented house even sooner than that. In 
Jakarta I leave the house much earlier and rarely get home before 8 
pm. In this office if I don’t finish and clear the decks the same day I 
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get double the next day. I don’t want that. But it’s not a problem, 
because even if I get home when my children have already gone to 
bed I can still look at them sleeping. So I’m more relaxed and calm. 
When I was away, even though I had a lot of time on my hands after 
work I was always worried about my family. 
10.7.3 Ratna 
Ratna has had a different career path. She married a colleague, 
Timbul, also a DGTR employee, four years after joining MOF when 
they were based in Jakarta. Not long after they married, Timbul was 
promoted to an echelon 4 position which required relocation to a 
small town in Sumatra where Ratna could join him easily because 
she was still a junior.22 A couple of years later, still in Sumatra, 
Ratna fell pregnant with their first son and Timbul was sent to 
study in England. Ratna did not go with him because she did not 
want to trouble her husband: ‘I was about to give birth to our first 
child at around the time of his final exam, so rather than distracting 
him I chose to stay in Indonesia.’  
From MOF’s point of view, Ratna had been given a concession in the 
sense that she was allowed to follow her husband to Sumatra. As a 
result her own promotion was compromised. When she did get 
promoted in the end she was placed in West Sumatra, but her 
husband had already been promoted again to Jakarta after his 
study abroad. She stayed in several posts in the same echelon for 
more than ten years, having to move around. At the time she was 
interviewed for this study she had just been promoted to an echelon 
3 post in a small town in Central Java.  
As a result of their employment with MOF, Ratna and her husband 
spent most of twenty years of marriage separated from each other. 
While Timbul managed to finish his study abroad and was 
promoted shortly afterwards, Ratna’s career lagged behind. When 
                                           
22 The more senior the position, the less flexibility in terms of placement 
due to the pyramid management structure. See Chapter 8 for details. 
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she asked the HR division why she had not been promoted, she was 
not given a proper explanation; she was teased that it would be 
inappropriate for her to have the same rank as her husband. Ratna 
said that there had never been tension between her and Timbul 
about whose career to put first and he was sympathetic about her 
delayed promotion: ‘He felt hurt as well to know that I was treated 
unfairly.’ 
Sulastri, Aisyah and Ratna’s narratives are typical of sarjana 
recruits who entered MOF in the early 1980s. Each had to resolve 
contradictions between the templates of their professional career path 
and the reproductive stage of their personal life course. While they 
resolved these contradictions in different ways, they were clearly 
expected to make more sacrifices than their husbands. Another 
female manager, Rita, a DGTX manager who joined MOF in early 
1980, had a similar experience and described how she had to keep 
shifting her priorities throughout her life and career: 
Year after year my priorities kept shifting. When my children were 
little they were my first priority. When my husband’s career started 
to take off I put a brake on mine – well, I was still committed to my 
work, I made sure I did the job well enough so I was in my boss’s 
good book, but at the same time [I made sure] not to excel, to avoid 
getting promoted, which might involve relocation… 
Rita told me that she would suggest doing the same to staff who 
sought advice about their work-life balance: 
When any of my female staff share their family problems with me, 
my advice is always along these lines: While you’re still young, as 
you are now, don’t make your career your priority. Think, and 
decide what’s most important in your life. You can’t have both an 
excellent career and a family life … well, maybe you could, but that 
would be a very hard target and reaching it might stress you out, in 
which case both might slip out of your hands. Don’t be too 
ambitious in your career, just do it moderately so that you can 
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combine it with looking after your family. Later, when your children 
have grown up, you can focus on your career. 
In practice, the early age of retirement for male and female MOF 
employees (at the age of 56 in general, or 60 in the cases of echelons 
I and II and widyaiswara/teachers), meant that the time left after 
their children had grown up to focus on their careers was very limited. 
This was a major constraint on their prospects of reaching a senior 
position. 
Life course frameworks note the interplay of personal biography and 
the wider historical context, raising the question of whether women 
who joined MOF the 1980s had different experiences to those of the 
older women discussed so far. Broadly speaking this was not the 
case, although the younger women who entered MOF as sarjana 
more recently tended to marry later than their older colleagues, 
delaying the start of their childbearing years and, unlike their older 
colleagues, allowing them to accrue several years of professional 
experience before they married and had a family. This later marriage 
reflects a wider tendency in Javanese society , but it may also be the 
result of the women’s specific strategies. Their later marriage and 
motherhood made it possible for them to take up the opportunity of 
studying overseas (see table 7-2 in Chapter 7). This shows the 
interplay of changing social norms about the age of marriage and 
childbearing with specific organisational factors, as well as with the 
women’s agency. 
Interestingly, this experience was less evident in the lives of female 
STAN recruits, most of whom were conservative Muslims who had 
opted to marry and start a family almost as soon as they completed 
their studies. Although they did not necessarily go on to work in 
‘mothers’ offices’, few were able to progress to managerial positions. 
This example fits a more general pattern whereby the differences 
between younger and older cohorts of female managers were 
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generally less significant than those between STAN and sarjana 
recruits. 
10.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how gendered time and space affect the 
experiences of female managers at MOF. It considers how their 
professional and non-working lives intersect, paying particular 
attention to their relationships with their husbands and children, in 
the specific context of urban Jakarta’s logistical challenges, the 
availability of cheap domestic labour and wider expectations about 
women’s domestic role. While this approach draws directly on a 
component of Goetz’s framework, few other studies have 
systematically investigated these effects, particularly in a developing 
country setting (amongst the few are Mustafa et al., 2012, Sumaira 
and Muhammad Azam, 2012, Yousof and Siegel, 1994).  
The main research question addressed in this chapter is how 
women negotiate their gendered identities in relation to their 
domestic lives throughout their careers at MOF. As in most, if not 
all, societies, their participation in the labour market requires them 
to juggle their traditional gender role as home maker with their 
career (Guillaume and Pochic, 2009, Kim, 2008, Sumaira and 
Muhammad Azam, 2012, Watts, 2009). This is made more difficult 
by MOF’s inflexible approach to organising time and geographical 
space, including the requirements of tours of duty, fixed holiday 
dates and an open-ended overtime commitment. It is also hampered 
by the social expectation that a woman’s place is at home. These 
problems are compounded by the distance between work and home 
in large cities such as Jakarta, particularly in terms of the time 
taken to travel to and from work. The challenges are more 
problematic for female managers than for their male colleagues and 
this hinders their capacity to compete effectively in the professional 
sphere.  
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The primary means by which women navigate these challenges are 
by personal sacrifices (such as leaving children behind or taking on 
the stress of dual responsibilities) or accepting that their careers 
will inevitably come second to their wider social duties. Even if 
women are prepared to make personal sacrifices, their freedom to 
do so depends on their husbands’ consent. Opting out of these 
challenges by not marrying or not having children is heavily 
stigmatised and therefore does not represent a genuine alternative, 
no matter how highly women value their careers. Putting the family 
first is particularly evident during these women’s reproductive years, 
in keeping with the experiences of many women in developed 
countries (Hoser, 2012), and may include following the husband if 
he is relocated (Bielby and Bielby, 1992). However, for many 
informants in this study this prioritisation does not end once their 
children reach adulthood. A combination of other effects including 
the religious positioning of women as subordinates in marriage 
continues to constrain their freedom to pursue their professional 
ambitions, especially when their husbands also work at MOF. 
Although many of the female managers in the sample experienced 
limited career mobility, few directly devoted substantial amounts of 
time to childcare or housework. Every woman that I spoke to had a 
pembantu or domestic helper. Some had more than one, and many 
also received support from their parents or parents-in-law. Acker’s 
(1990) comments about gendered time and space mainly stem from 
the home-work tensions, especially childcare, that make it difficult 
for women to compete equally with men. In the case of MOF female 
employees, rather than the actual domestic work and childcare it 
was the social expectation that they be present in and take general 
responsibility for the domestic sphere that constrained their 
professional lives. 
Many female managers had met their husbands while working at 
MOF or being trained at STAN. Since civil service management is 
normally a job for life, they found themselves working in the same 
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organisation as their husbands until they retired. This had several 
consequences: first, their husbands were part of MOF’s patriarchal 
work culture (examined in previous chapters), which was likely to 
affect their attitude towards their wives; more generally, it increased 
the extent of work-to-family and family-to-work spillover, as in the 
lives of Irma and Hesti. Rather than facilitate the work-life balance, 
these spillovers tend to further restrict female managers’ capacity to 
reconcile their different roles. 
There is considerable evidence from developed countries that 
changing attitudes to gender roles both at home and at work have 
reduced the constraints on working women, particularly those in 
higher-level professions (see Moen, 2010 for a brief history of work, 
family and gender). However, in developing countries family 
responsibilities continue to constitute a barrier to women’s 
employment and good-quality jobs (ILO, 2012). This study has 
found little evidence that changing social norms allow women 
greater freedom or opportunities to navigate their domestic and 
professional roles. There were few obvious distinctions between 
women recruited in older and newer cohorts. The rise of religious 
conservatism over recent decades appears to have counter-balanced 
any liberalising effects of globalisation (Bayes and Tohidi, 2001). 
This was particularly evident among female STAN recruits, for 
whom the opportunities for balancing their work with the rest of 
their life were very limited. 
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11 Practicing what you preach? 
Internal organisational processes 
and external outcomes of gender 
mainstreaming in MOF 
…. Why do we at the Ministry of Finance need to understand gender 
issues? We know that, as those responsible for allocating 
development funds to the technical ministries, we need to understand 
how the funds will be spent. What does that have to do with gender? 
I’ll give you an example. Suppose there is a proposal to build a 
community toilet in a village. We usually ask them, ‘Why do you need 
this much wood’? They answer: ‘Well, this is the design’. We might 
see that the design is for open toilet facilities where the wall does not 
reach the roof. In this case we can tell them, ‘That design works only 
for men, but women would hesitate to use such facility. Why? Some 
men in the village could climb up a tree and peek at these women 
having a shower. We don’t want that’. So there, ladies and 
gentlemen, is an example why we, as the government agency that 
examines budget proposals, need to have a gender perspective on 
carrying out our tasks so we won’t cross out a proposal or agree to it 
out of ignorance.  
(Chair of the GM Team addressing the team at its first meeting of 
the fiscal year, 05 May 2005) 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general account of efforts made to promote 
GM in the Indonesian MOF. It does not provide a comprehensive 
review of the literature on GM, which is too extensive to deal with in 
a single chapter. It draws on elements of the wider literature 
including studies of GM in other state agencies and particularly 
finance ministries. It focuses on a specific issue: the relationship 
between GM (and gender processes more generally) within an 
organisation and that organisation’s capacity to develop gender-
friendly external policies.  
GM encompasses issues of planning, implementation and the 
monitoring of any social, political or economic action, including 
addressing internal aspects of organisations. Changes in internal 
organisational procedures refer to ‘…changes needed in 
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organizations to embrace the goals and values of GM and to alter 
systems and procedures to meet these goals’ (Mehra and Gupta, 
2006 p.3). 
It is logical that any organisation should set its own house in order 
before it can credibly develop gender-friendly external policies. 
There is an implicit argument that internal organisational change is 
a precondition for successful GM, as quoted in Moser and Moser: 
‘Could we realistically expect to achieve at the programme-level what 
we could not achieve in our own workplace?’ (2005 p.16).  
Moser and Moser (ibid.) refer to Valk’s (2000) statement that an 
organisational culture which is male-dominated and male-biased in 
terms of recruitment, working conditions, structure and procedures 
represents an obstacle to GM as it discriminates against female staff 
and clients. The need to address internal organisational issues is 
identified by Rao et al (1999), Rao and Kelleher (2005a), True 
(2003), Hafner-Burton and Pollack (2002), Walby (2005) and Daly 
(2005), who believe that transformative policies for women’s 
empowerment can only be achieved through discursive and 
organisational transformation.  
There are two reasons for this chapter’s focus on GM. First, it 
enables us to explore the last element of Goetz’s gendered 
archaeology of the organisation:  MOF’s gendered incentive and 
accountability structure. Second, this focus emerges from an 
apparent paradox, or at least an incongruence, between MOF’s 
internal experiences and the external policies it generates.   
Since a GM programme was first implemented at MOF there have 
been concrete examples of shifts towards more gender-friendly 
external policies. These include a change to the tax law, introduced 
as part of a wider tax reform, which grants married women a tax 
status independent of their husbands’. This has wider implications 
for these women’s financial status and independence. Also, MOF 
now requires that government ministries and departments include 
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explicit consideration of gender issues in all budgets submitted to it. 
Beyond this, there is some evidence of the GM’s impact internally, 
including an increase in the quota of women accepted to study at 
STAN (albeit still well below parity with men). 
Given these concrete examples of progress, at first sight MOF might 
even be considered a model of best GM practice. The apparent 
achievements of the programme are even more impressive in light of 
the deeply-embedded gender discrimination set out in the previous 
chapters. 
In fact the process of GM in MOF is less straightforward and more 
ambiguous than these apparent successes suggest. This chapter 
reveals an incongruence between flawed internal GM processes 
(which are constrained by MOF’s organisational culture and the 
failure of other organisations to engage effectively with MOF) and 
external policies, where there is evidence of growing momentum 
towards gender friendliness. I explore this incongruence and its 
causes and consequences, both for MOF employees and for the 
wider Indonesian environment. This addresses an important gap in 
the general literature on GM. Few studies systematically examine 
the interface between internal and external elements of 
mainstreaming programmes (Dawson, 2005, Van Dueren, March 
2001). 
This chapter examines MOF’s gendered incentive and accountability 
structure as part of Goetz’s framework. However, it goes beyond the 
scope of her approach. Taking into consideration the level of gender 
discrimination demonstrated in the previous chapters, its main 
objective is to assess how far GM can go when the internal 
organisation itself is gender-discriminatory. To answer this main 
question the chapter is structured around the following sub-
questions: 
 Given the gendered organisational structure and culture, 
including the gendered authority structure and how MOF 
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approaches time and space, to what extent can GM activities 
help MOF to change? 
 What is the history of the GM activities? How did they start? 
Who initiated them? How were the members chosen? Did 
they have an adequate budget? 
 What has GM achieved internally and externally since its 
establishment? 
 Are there any incentives for addressing gender issues at 
MOF?  
 What structures and systems demonstrate accountability to 
women’s interests in the organisation and in society? 
I begin with an analysis of the origins of the GM and then examine 
what external policy and internal changes have been achieved. This 
leads on to a critical analysis of the GM’s core activities that 
assesses the extent to which they have been the main drivers of 
internal and external change. The final part of the chapter considers 
the programme’s sustainability and scope to extend it, given the 
fundamental contradictions in its underlying processes. 
11.2 Establishing GM in MOF 
11.2.1. A MOF GM seminar 
Since 2000, the year when the president decreed that government 
institutions must incorporate GM, UNIFEM and MOWE have invited 
MOF to attend all their discussions on gender. One of my 
informants related that she was always embarrassed because at 
every meeting she was asked: ‘So what about MOF? When are you 
going to get your act together and get moving?’ It was only in 2003 
that MOF started to take concrete measures towards GM. 
As a first step, MOF decided to run an internal seminar on GM. It 
was attended by 50 representatives, including 34 women, from all 
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the MOF units.23 Although the seminar was opened by the Secretary 
General and the moderator was an echelon II official from the 
Secretariat General, all the speakers were from outside the Ministry, 
being mainly from MOWE and the National Planning Agency, 
Bappenas. The first session was delivered by a Bappenas official 
and covered gender-responsive development policies with an 
emphasis on gender-sensitive budgeting, with reference to 
Indonesia’s strategic development planning system, RENSTRA. The 
Bappenas speaker opened his presentation with data on gender 
disparities in development as a result of gender-neutral planning.  
Claiming that the end result of GM would be ‘kesetaraan dan 
keadilan gender’ (gender equality and equity), the presenter used 
mainly instrumentalist arguments to justify GM, arguing that 
female participation is essential to achieve economic development 
goals. He claimed that it was necessary to justify GM with these 
instrumentalist arguments, arguing that among MOF employees, 
economic concepts and jargon would be more acceptable than the 
language of ‘rights’.  
The second session was presented by an MOWE official, who talked 
about gender concepts. Many MOF staff members had never heard 
of ‘gender’. 24  Once the concepts of gender and GM had been 
                                           
23 According to an internal archive, invitations were sent to each of the 76 
units in MOF, stating that two officials (one echelon III and one echelon IV) 
were invited to attend. If everybody invited had come, this would have 
gathered 152 participants. However, the event was attended by less than a 
third of the invitees. Most of the regional offices outside of Java did not 
send a representative, mainly because the invitation was issued at short 
notice and there was not enough time for people to rearrange their 
commitments. According to a key informant, however, there was a money 
issue too, as travel expenses had to be met by the respective regional 
offices. Under the bureaucratic reform, the regional offices are allocated 
limited travel expenses and my informant suspected that a gender seminar 
was not seen as sufficiently important to justify the use of a scarce 
resource. 
24  The terminology of ‘gender’ does not translate well into Bahasa 
Indonesia, as there is no such concept in the indigenous culture. As a 
result, ‘gender’ itself is not usually translated and is sometimes written 
jender. GM is translated into Bahasa Indonesia as ‘pengarusutamaan 
gender’. Pengarusutamaanis is a word especially created to translate 
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introduced, MOWE presentation quickly moved on to cultural 
aspects of gender roles and blamed the patriarchy (another 
unfamiliar concept for the bureaucrats) for all gender gaps. While 
this may be a core belief of radical feminists, discussing it in an 
introduction to gender concepts may not be effective, especially 
when dealing with bureaucrats from whom a certain degree of 
resistance was to be expected.  
Since many in the audience had not heard the term ‘gender’ before, 
one would think that a session explaining what it means would 
have been held before the discussion about gender-sensitive 
budgeting. The organising committee explained that they preferred 
to present things in this order: Bappenas was concerned that people 
would not stay for the second session if they found the first one 
boring’ They deliberately ran the session on gender budgeting first 
because they knew the speaker would use the language of 
economics, which was familiar to everybody in the room. The 
audience could learn what gender is in detail once they had 
appreciated how it relates to their work.25  
The minutes of the discussion show that the participants took three 
major positions: supporters who realised that a GM was needed, 
given the male-dominated internal bureaucracy and the role of MOF 
in public policy making; opponents, who thought that gender issues 
were the core business of MOWE and that MOF was busy enough 
carrying out its own tasks. With reference to the internal policy of 
limiting women’s access to MOF, these people considered that 
female employees tended to create additional work for the HR 
department in terms of promotion and relocation. They strongly 
believed that if women do not reach the top managerial levels it 
must be because they have opted out as a matter of personal choice 
                                                                                                           
mainstreaming literally. Not only this is a newly-created word but it is also 
difficult to pronounce.  
25  Later in this chapter, in a discussion of power dynamics between 
government institutions, I will show that MOF considered Bappenas an 
equal partner, as staff there were conversant in economics and financial 
issues. MOF tended to look down on MOWE as its staff were not. 
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and that those who had managed to occupy the top positions did 
not need the help of a gender policy. The third group consisted of 
sceptics who saw the necessity for a GM but were sceptical about its 
prospects, given the male domination of MOF’s bureaucracy. 
In the end, the GM supporters won the argument despite their small 
number, not because they had convinced the others of the necessity 
of a GM but simply because the GM was decreed by law. It was 
decided that MOF needed a GM Team. The Planning and Finance 
Bureau, an echelon II unit under the Secretariat General of MOF, 
would be MOF’s Sector Focal Point (FP), and in each echelon I unit 
there would be a Finance Sub-Sector FP.  
11.2.2. Putting the team together 
The first step was the creation of a GM Team which was planned to 
be the embryo of the gender focal point and working groups. It is 
common in Indonesia’s bureaucratic structure to form an ad-hoc 
team or committee such as this to perform a specific task that 
requires a matrix of people from different units. Such teams usually 
have a lifespan of a year and can be renewed in the next fiscal year 
if required (see the discussion of the Distance Learning Programme 
in Chapter 7).  
The GM TEAM had its own bureaucratic structure consisting of a 
director, chair, coordinator, secretary, 17 FPs and 8 administrative 
supporters. In total, 29 people were involved in the GM TEAM every 
year and each was given a monthly honorarium that varied 
according their position in the team. The size of such monthly 
honoraria depends heavily on the type of project being run; in this 
case the GM TEAM was paid IDR300.000- 600.000 (GBP25-50) a 
month according to position. This represented around 15% of their 
basic civil servant salary. 
In theory anybody can head a team: it is the expertise that counts 
and not position or seniority. So an echelon III official could be the 
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head of the team presiding over a number of echelon II team 
members. In practice, however, since the hierarchy in this team has 
financial consequences and because of Indonesia’s style of 
bureaucracy (see Chapter 4), the structure of the team tends to 
mirror the structure of the wider bureaucracy. As the team was 
placed under the auspices of the Secretariat General, the Secretary 
General became the director of the GM TEAM. The chair was the 
head of the Planning and Finance Bureau (an echelon II unit in the 
Secretariat General), which would be the FP and deal with the 
allocated budget. The coordinator was the head of the Programme 
Planning Division, an echelon III unit where the actions were to be 
carried out, and therefore the administrative staff were taken from 
the same division.  
There were team members representing each of MOF’s echelon I 
units, who were also expected to be the gender FPs in their units, 
plus three people from the Programme Planning Division who were 
responsible for planning and managing GM activities. The letter 
from the Secretary General to the head of each echelon I unit stated 
that each unit should ideally send their respective Head of Planning 
(an echelon III unit under the Secretary of the respective 
department) to join the team, as the Planning Division was seen as 
a strategic post to start the GM process. So in theory the GM TEAM 
consisted of 8 women and 21 men selected according to their 
formal, structural managerial levels (Table 11-1). Representatives 
from Bappenas and MOWE were also on the team as consultants 
and coordinators. In the end, some units sent their HR Manager 
and some their Planning Manager, all echelon III officials. 
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Table ‎11-1 GM Team Members 
 
Male Female 
Director 1  
 
 
Chair 1  
 
 
Coordinator 1  
 
 
Secretary 
 
 1  
Focal Points 13  4  
Administrative/supporting 
team 
5  3  
Total 21  8  
 
Of the 17 FP, four were from the Planning and Finance Bureau. 
There was initial discussion about whether a gender quota should 
be set for team membership, as MOF’s managerial levels were all 
dominated by men. In the end it was decided to let the GM TEAM 
have more men than women. The main argument was that since 
MOF had more male than female employees, gender issues would be 
taken more seriously. It was argued that if the FPs were men it 
would be easier to convince other men about gender issues. Another 
argument was that the GM would otherwise be seen as women 
crying for help, which would be counterproductive.  
While it is indeed important to include men in every mainstreaming 
programme (see, for example, Pearson, 2000), forming a male-
dominated team chosen from men in a male-dominated institution 
runs the risk of the overall process being dominated by male 
interests and thus subverting the original ideas behind the GM. An 
example of this phenomenon is provided by Suzanne Clisby with 
reference to the Law of Popular Participation in Bolivia (Clisby, 
2005). 
11.2.3. Terms of Reference 
Box 1 sets out the terms of reference (TORs) for MOF’s GM, 
translated verbatim. 
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Box 11. 1 GM Terms of Reference 
Efforts to optimize the participation of women in the Ministry of Finance can be 
implemented through an integrative, participatory and adapted Gender 
Empowerment program. To address gender disparities in the Ministry of 
Finance, all policies, programs, projects and activities carried out by the Ministry 
in the present and the future should integrate experiences, aspirations, needs 
and problems of both men and women in the process of planning, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. 
 
To achieve this, the following is needed: 
1. Understanding of gender issues and a gender perspective should be 
mainstreamed in all tasks and functions of the Ministry of Finance. 
2. To ensure that gender bias does not occur during implementation of 
policies at the Ministry of Finance, a unified gender vision should be built, 
through awareness-raising among policy makers.  
3. A sense of collaboration should be developed among operational level staff 
and stakeholders in the implementation of gender sensitive policies. 
 
To achieve these goals, the following steps are needed:  
1. Dissemination of GM at national and regional levels through several 
activities including: Capacity building, Gender Analysis Pathway (GAP) 
training, and Policy Outlook and Plan of Action (POP).  
2. All MOF employees, especially the policy makers, should understand GM, 
including knowing what is meant by gender, how to address gender 
disparities, how to do gender sensitive planning, and how to carry out 
monitoring and evaluation of these activities. 
3. In order to disseminate GM concepts, there should be gender advocacy and 
GM training for managers in MOF. Gender advocacy refers to a 
communication process aimed at decision makers and policy makers, to 
influence them to make better and more appropriate policies which will 
increase the quality of life of MOF employees. The GM training is aimed at 
building the capacity and will to integrate gender elements into policies 
and development programs – so that GMP can be carried out effectively.  
4. GAP analysis is needed to formulate gender responsive policies, which 
should then be followed by gender responsive policy formulation, its plan 
of action, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.  
5. These steps can be implemented in many ways, including through training, 
seminars, workshops, and other methods. 
 
 
These TORs come across as somewhat vague, aspirational and 
incoherent. Although it was mentioned that MOF’s GM would be 
integrative, participatory and adapted to the tasks and functions of 
MOF, the TORs are not tailor-made for MOF’s task and functions. 
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Instead, they are generic and do not specify the potential role of 
MOF in addressing gender disparities in Indonesian society through 
its policies, let alone recognise that some of these policies may 
exacerbate the gender gap.  
From the first line of the TORs, it seems that the ultimate goal of 
the GM is internally-oriented, i.e. to ‘optimise the participation of 
women in MOF’ and ‘to address the gender disparities in MOF’. This 
sounds promising if we take into account the male domination of 
MOF’s bureaucratic structure discussed in the previous chapters. 
The problem, however, is that this is not properly followed through 
in steps to achieve these goals, which focus instead, on MOF’s 
external tasks. 
There are no clear priorities, let alone step-by-step implementation 
guidelines. What are called ‘steps’ in the third paragraph onwards 
are not all steps in the usual sense of the word, apart from the first 
bulleted item about dissemination. Even there, it is unclear whether 
dissemination should involve GM itself or make use of gender lenses 
in development. 
There is no mention of how the GM is to be monitored or evaluated, 
or who is responsible for this task.  The fact that GM is described as 
a programme under the auspices of the Secretariat General implies 
that the whole project is accountable to the Secretary General in 
person. Every year at the end of each fiscal period the team has to 
produce a report on what it has achieved and how the budget has 
been spent. As with every project and programme run by 
Indonesia’s ministries and agencies, this is subject to scrutiny by 
BPK and BPKP as external auditors and the Inspectorate General as 
internal auditors.  
Describing GM as a ‘’programme’’ was problematic, because it 
implies that it is a separate, add-on activity. This runs counter to 
the ethos of mainstreaming. 
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Having an unclear and incoherent set of TORs is not unique to GM. 
TORs are mainly drafted to secure funding, as they are subject to 
scrutiny by the people who review budgets. Sometimes when a 
project is deemed necessary and granted funds the submission of 
TORs is only a formality. In this case, the TORs are reviewed during 
the execution of the programme to match activities to the budget 
but not to consider the actual activities (for example, how many 
meetings, how many people travelling, how many pages of reports 
and the respective costs). Until recently, the Indonesian 
government’s auditing system was limited to financial matters and 
did not take into account the substance of the activities. In this 
system what matters is that the procedure has been followed and 
the spending does not exceed the budget: only then may the 
substance be considered.   
11.2.4. Budget 
Once it was decided that the GM would go ahead, it was included in 
the budget proposal for 2004, the next fiscal year. Of the IDR 
127,890,000 (GBP 8,142) proposed, the amount agreed was IDR 
89,700,000 (GBP 5,710) (see Table ‎11-2). The budget for the GM 
Team covers not only the cost of developing materials and paying 
speakers, instructors and tutors but also the honoraria of the team 
members.  
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Table ‎11-2 GM Budget 
Year Total MOF budget GM budget proposal GM budget 
Percentage of 
total MOF 
budget 
2004 USD 332,924,816.95 USD 14,307.21  USD 10,035 0.0030%  
2005 USD 373,147,490.60 USD 21,498.77  USD 10,351 0.0028%  
2006 USD 564,125,052.98 USD 33,386.77  USD 24,227 0.0043%  
2007 USD 1,051,055,683.19 USD 52,439.56  USD 42,578 0.0041%  
2008 USD 1,066,938,860.73 USD 54,001.03  USD 42,605 0.0040%  
USD to IDR exchange rate is based on the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicator at the time of the fieldwork. 
Table 11-2 shows that the amount channelled to GM activities in 
2004 was USD 10,035, 0.0030% of total MOF expenditure that 
year. This brings MOF’s commitment to GM into question.  It might 
be argued that USD 10,035 is not a negligible amount of money, if 
spent well. However, more than half of the budget was spent on 
honoraria. There was a significant budget increase from 2006 to 
2007, but this was mainly due to a doubling of the honorarium rate. 
With half of the budget already spent on honoraria, the rest of the 
money was spent on training and other forms of dissemination 
relating to gender equality. ‘Training’ here refers mostly to activities 
run by MOWE, Bappenas or its NGO partners. Section 11.4 
provides more details about these activities. First I discuss the 
achievements of the GM since its establishment. 
11.3 External and internal policy changes 
11.3.1. Revision of the Draft of Income Tax Law 
According to the old Income Tax Law, on marriage a woman who 
does not have a prenuptial agreement must contact her local tax 
office and ask the tax officials to remove her tax identity number 
(TIN) and merge her tax reporting with that of her husband. This 
was considered as one of the factors that inhibit women’s economic 
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empowerment, as without an independent tax identity they could 
not access a bank loan. After considering the inputs from the GM 
TEAM this regulation was changed, and since 2008 a married 
woman no longer needs a prenuptial agreement to be able to have 
her own TIN if she wants it. While the default position is still that 
the TIN belongs to the husband as head of the household, wives are 
at least permitted to apply for their own. If they do this, the 
calculation of the income tax is the same as if they had a pre-
nuptial agreement. 
The revision to the tax law was made while I was doing my 
fieldwork. Consequently, I was able to observe parts of the decision-
making process at first hand. The identification of the gender bias 
in the old Tax Law did not come directly from MOF’s GM TEAM but 
from a researcher at the Faculty of Economics, University of 
Indonesia (FE-UI), whose report was read by the GM TEAM. In 2007 
income tax law was being revised as part of the bureaucratic 
reform. The GM TEAM felt that this created an opportunity to advise 
the tax reform team to address this gender concern. To clarify the 
matter and gather evidence about the gender bias in the tax law, 
they opened a dialogue with the FE-UI researcher. The GM TEAM 
held a meeting of the FPs, the Tax Reform Team, MOWE and 
Bappenas representatives and the FE-UI researcher.  
I was present at this meeting and some others related to the tax 
revision, as both a participant and an observer.26 My notes on these 
meetings reveal a process that was more ambivalent. They 
suggested that the fundamental attitude towards gender issues of 
those present from MOF was no different from that described in the 
previous chapters. 
Below is a snapshot of one these meetings, drawn from my personal 
research notes: 
                                           
26 My role as a participant was related to the fact that during my fieldwork 
period I was often asked to advise the GM Team. 
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GM meeting, 25/05/2005.  
On the agenda is an item to discuss the taxation law, which was said to be gender 
biased. It started with a discussion about the tax law and how it was seen as 
gender unfriendly. The regulation then obliged that upon marriage, a professional 
woman should join her husband’s TIN (tax identity number), unless they had a 
pre-nuptial agreement…..Suddenly the Head of the Planning Bureau got up and 
started speaking about gender and why MOF needed to have a GM TEAM. This 
was not on the agenda of the meeting itself. He talked about the budget to make 
community toilets in villages and that they had to be entirely enclosed so that 
nobody would look at women having a shower: he said ‘this is gender budgeting’. 
I have been in three meetings with him over recent months and for some reason he 
always used this toilet example. He spoke for half an hour, about gender and how 
he valued women, etc. The next half an hour, there was still no word on the gender 
bias in the taxation law coming from him. Then, five minutes later, he left, saying 
that he was needed by the Boss to discuss something else, but he wished us luck. 
I suggested that the team should see the draft of the newly proposed Income Tax 
Law, to be able to comment on it in detail. The GM member from the DGTX (Tax 
FP), however, doubted that we would be allowed to see it, considering the 
confidentiality of the draft. The GM TEAM could only send a recommendation 
letter to the team responsible for the income tax law amendment.  
But then it occurred to the members that the GM TEAM’s position might not be 
strong enough to give such a recommendation, and somebody suggested that a 
letter be sent from the FE-UI and another from Bappenas. Both representatives 
raised their eyebrows: they said that in their institutions a memo would have been 
enough to deal with such a matter, as they ‘were not so bureaucratic’. In other 
words, they refused to provide MOF team with a supporting letter. 
The Customs and Excise FP raised another issue that he considered relevant to the 
subject being discussed. He mentioned that their patrol ships were mainly crewed 
by men. He said the main reason was because those ships did not have toilets, so 
they all had to relieve themselves in the sea. This was not possible for women, so 
women were just not invited to join. But then there was a complaint from the 
association of female captains. In the end the Custom and Excise Office had to 
negotiate the situation with the PT PAL, the company that makes the ships, to 
renovate their ship and put a proper toilet in those ships. 
Suddenly the Chair of the GM came back from his other meeting. He interrupted: 
‘Well yes this is complicated isn’t it. Sometimes there are jobs that we don’t want to 
assign to a woman, just because we don’t have the heart to do so, even if the 
woman is willing to do the job, for example, ship welding. It is a difficult and 
dangerous job, I don’t want my wife or my daughter to be told to do that, so why 
would I tell somebody’s wife to do it?’ 
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During the meeting there was a sense of rejection from the Tax GFP 
about the tax revision proposal. She repeatedly made statements 
such as: ‘Well, it isn’t a problem at all if we want to let those women 
have a TIN separately from their husbands, but are they really ready 
to complete the tax return? Is the whole idea not giving women more 
of a burden?’ 
I found it interesting that the Tax FP was referring to the burden on 
women of having to complete a tax return. She was thinking of the 
question of ‘which women’, and this is an important exercise to 
think about gender issues. If done properly, this exercise could 
come out with ‘how can we help those poor and uneducated women 
– as well as men – with filling out their tax returns?’ Unfortunately, 
this was not where the argument was leading: it was just mentioned 
to dismiss the idea of giving women a separate TIN from their 
husbands. 
Although this particular meeting ended in deadlock, in the end, 
despite the reluctance and hesitation of the GM Team, whose 
members were not confident that their voice would be heard, the 
team drafted several letters. These included a letter from the team 
coordinator to the Chair reporting the meeting and the suggested 
change to the Tax Law, which led to a draft letter signed by the 
Chair to the Secretary General and a draft letter signed by the 
Secretary General to the Director General of Tax for the attention of 
the Tax Reform Team. As a result, the clause was changed and 
women could choose whether or not they would join their husband’s 
tax code. 
11.3.2. Gender-responsive Budgeting 
Another important external policy was gender-responsive budgeting. 
In 2009, MOF decreed its Finance Minister’s Decree (PMK) No. 
119/2009, which stipulates that every ministry and agency must 
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include a gender budget statement when proposing budgets and 
detailing how the proposed budget will affect men and women as 
beneficiaries. This is an important step, as it ensures that 
budgeting, part of MOF’s core business, will contribute to gender 
equality and the fulfilment of women’s rights. If done properly, 
gender-responsive budgeting should identify the interventions 
needed to address the gender gaps in ministerial policies, plans and 
budgets (Barkat and Nazme, 2005, Budlender, 2002, Budlender and 
Hewitt, 2002, Haque, 2005, Rahman, 2005, Tanzania Gender 
Networking Programme, 2004, Zimbabwe Women's Resource Centre 
and Network, 2010, Zohir, 2005). 
By the time this policy had been discussed I was no longer in 
Indonesia, so could not directly observe the informal processes and 
discussions behind this reform. 
PMK No. 119/2009 has been implemented gradually since 2010, 
with seven government ministries and agencies (the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Health, Ministry 
of National Education, MOWE, MOF and Bappenas) promoting 
gender-responsive budgets as a pilot project. While the first four 
ministries act as service providers, the other three are drivers of 
wider policy frameworks.  
Defining MOF and Bappenas as drivers in the national GM 
mechanism puts them on the same level as the national machinery. 
This was one of the recommendations of various donor 
organisations as well as independent consultants (Asian 
Development Bank, 2006, Cattleya, 2006).  Nevertheless, it took a 
while for MOF to accept this strategy.  
In 2007, when gender budgeting was being discussed, one of the 
informants told me that there was concern among top officials that 
putting the word ‘gender’ in the budget proposal requirement would 
create an opportunity for people in the units with the lowest 
budgets to ask for more money ‘in the name of gender [i.e. to form a 
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gender FP, working groups, doing advocacy, training and other 
activities] while the benefit was still unclear’. While there was no 
clear evidence that such a cost inflation occurred when GM was 
established in other government organisations, it took years of 
hesitation on MOF’s part before this regulation was finally decreed. 
Other projects, programmes and activities that cost the bureaucracy 
a large amount of money were implemented on schedule.  
During my fieldwork period most MOF employees expressed their 
opinion that MOF’s role was just as a cashier: it makes payments as 
requested by the government agencies that propose the budgets, 
and gender budgeting exercises are more the responsibility of social 
sector ministries.  The fact that two years after my fieldwork period 
this gender-responsive budgeting statement became an official 
requirement in the budget proposal mechanism is a big step for the 
rest of the Indonesian bureaucracy, as it will require every ministry 
to apply a gender perspective when proposing the budget. The likely 
impacts on these changes are discussed towards the end of this 
chapter.  
In the six years since its inception, the GM effort has made progress 
in ‘doing gender’ in MOF’s core functions and these changes will 
have impacted on the wider society. The next section looks at the 
extent to which the GM affected MOF’s internal handling of gender 
issues.  
11.3.3. STAN’s intake of women 
The third concrete policy that related to the GM was an increase in 
the number of women recruited to STAN. As seen in Chapter 5, 
every year more than 1,000 women were denied access to 
employment at MOF and their seats were transferred to men. This 
policy was changed in 2010 when STAN increased the proportion of 
female recruits to from 15% to 22%. The policy process, however, 
was quite different from those for the two external policies 
discussed above. 
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During my fieldwork period I found that not everyone had realised 
the degree of gender discrimination occurring during the 
recruitment process: some assumed that the limited number of 
women recruited was a result of a fair hiring process (i.e. only a few 
women passed the recruitment test). Others knew about the policy 
but did not consider it gender discrimination. 
When I raised this issue at a GM Team meeting, TA FP firmly said 
that we should not be ‘airing our dirty laundry’ in the presence of 
people from outside MOF (there was one person from MOWE 
attending). When the issue was raised again after MOWE person 
had gone, the majority of the GM Team agreed that it was difficult to 
change this situation ‘because it was the women themselves who 
make it difficult for MOF to employ them’. 
According to an informant, this was raised again at a 2009 meeting 
in which MOF was deciding how many people to admit to STAN in 
2010. The female Minister of Finance mentioned that she was being 
pressured by Parliament to open STAN’s door to more women. As 
discussed in section ‎11.2.2, GM Team members consist mainly of 
the planning or HR managers of each echelon I unit. This particular 
meeting involved planning managers and HR managers in their 
managerial capacity rather than as GM FPs, in which latter capacity 
they had been exposed to complaints from the parliament about 
gender discrimination in STAN recruitment. After a lengthy 
discussion they agreed to increase the maximum female intake from 
15% to 30%. In practice, however, only 22% of recruits in 
subsequent rounds were women. 
As outlined in MOF’s GM terms of reference, in addition to external 
policies the GM is intended to address internal issues. But to what 
extent can we interpret ‘MOF policy makers should understand GM, 
including how to address gender disparities, how to do gender-
sensitive planning’ [point 2 of the steps in the TORs] as addressing 
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gender gaps in recruitment, promotion and other human resource 
development issues? 
This example indicates that not only are the TORs vague but also 
that they are not necessarily pursued. This is not just a case of 
policy evaporation due to neglect, but the result of MOF staff 
themselves feeling strongly about not employing and promoting 
women. Some of my informants mentioned that the people running 
the GM (mostly men) did not feel that the programme was primarily 
concerned with what went on in their own organisation.  
According to one of my informants, people were also disinterested 
because, as the men of MOF bureaucracy put it, they could not see 
what was in it for them. They had been told that GM was not 
focused on women’s welfare only but on both men and women’s. 
They could see that this might be true as far as a programme to 
mainstream gender in poverty alleviation is concerned, for example. 
Yet they felt that GM in their internal HR policy would only benefit 
women. I have discussed the hostile attitudes of many men in MOF 
towards women because they felt that women had a good deal by 
not being posted to remote areas. According to my informants, even 
some of the male FPs did not understand why internal change was 
needed. They were afraid that GM would help women to take over 
their managerial positions without having to do tours of duty in 
remote areas. Until they can be convinced that GM will benefit them 
too, they will not be persuaded to employ this strategy. 
The previous chapters have demonstrated the extent to which 
gendered processes in MOF limit female employees’ ability to 
achieve their potential compared to their male colleagues. Ines 
Smyth (in Smyth and Turquet, 2012) argues that feminist 
bureaucrats must persevere in tackling obstacles and areas of 
persistence. She provides an interesting account of the internal 
organisational processes at the Asian Development Bank, where she 
worked for a year. She was more confident of inducing changes in 
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her limited sphere of influence than more generally across the 
Bank, and hoped that introducing less rigid and authoritarian 
relationships with her staff and other workers would encourage 
debate around gender issues. The same strategy might be attempted 
at MOF, whereby an agent of change develops a gradual and 
indirect approach to promoting gender equality rather than directly 
challenging gendered practices from the beginning. 
The change to STAN recruiting and the two external policies 
discussed in the previous section demonstrate that some progress 
has been made in promoting gender-friendly policies. Yet this has 
occurred in spite of and not because of the attitudes of MOF policy-
makers. As the national advisor/coordinator for GM, MOWE itself 
never raised the importance of linking internal issues with the 
whole effort of mainstreaming gender into the Ministry’s tasks. This 
is a gap that needs to be addressed, not least because in MOWE’s 
Five Year Strategic Plan one of the intended outputs from ‘female 
representation in politics and decision making positions’ is ‘an 
increased number of women in executive positions’. 
Studies on GM activities in African NGOs and projects point out 
that one of the key factors contributing to effective GM is that 
gender is embraced in its fullest application to both sexes, not just to 
women or men as targets or obstacles but rather as partners; 
proactively hired women for senior level positions, hired young 
women and supported non-traditional roles for women’ (Mehra and 
Gupta, 2006 p.9).  
11.4 Mainstreaming activities 
In all the interviews I conducted for my fieldwork, I asked 
informants whether they had heard about the GM activities and 
what they thought of them. The answer was revealing: after three 
years almost no one at MOF other than members of the GM TEAM 
had heard of the GM. This section reviews the GM’s efforts to inform 
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and change attitudes at MOF and identifies the reasons for its 
limited effectiveness. 
11.4.1. Advocacy for top-level management 
According to the TORs, gender advocacy is ‘a communication process 
aimed at decision makers and policy makers, to influence them to 
make better and more appropriate policies that will increase the 
quality of life of MOF employees’. 
Gender advocacy for decision takers and policy makers at MOF is 
mainly conducted in the form of in-house workshops several times a 
year, with echelon II officials the main target. All the 
presenters/speakers are from Bappenas and MOWE; none are from 
MOF itself.  
The material delivered introduced gender concepts and explained 
why they are an important issue for consideration in development. 
Instrumentalist arguments were maintained throughout these 
sessions. The presenters realised that if they used women’s rights 
as part of a human rights justification they would be countered by 
the ‘female responsibilities’ discourse, especially from a religious 
perspective. Unfortunately, even the instrumentalist argument was 
challenged by the audience, using anecdotal examples of low female 
productivity due to childbearing and rearing.   
Because they prefer focus group discussions in small groups and 
there are around 200 echelon II officials in the whole of MOF, the 
workshops were run in batches. Staff turnover as a result of 
retirement and promotion added to the complexity of this job. Once 
a batch had been sensitised, delegates were invited to participate in 
a discussion on appropriate implementation at MOF.  
By the time I finished my fieldwork, there had been two focus group 
discussions (FGDs). One involved some MOF echelon II officials for 
advocacy purposes and the other involved gender FPs. The internal 
MOWE report states: ‘There has been some positive effort by MOF to 
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implement GM, although the phenomenon of gender-neutral and 
gender biased thinking still lingers among the high level officials’. 
According to MOWE report, although all MOF’s officials agreed with 
the effort to achieve gender equality, they were of the opinion that 
development is a gender-neutral process and development results 
trickle down automatically to the whole of society, regardless of 
gender. With this view they were resistant to the idea of including 
gender analysis in the planning process and they associated 
affirmative action with radical feminism. They did not seem to 
realise that some of their policies actually embrace affirmative 
action for men as the preferred sex for employment and promotion. 
Their resistance was also apparent in how they insisted that their 
role in state budgeting was only as cashiers. The MOWE report on 
the gender FPs’ FGD was more positive, saying that they agreed and 
understood that gender must be mainstreamed in development 
processes. 
My interview with an MOF official about three months after the last 
FGD provided a different perspective. Not all the participants had 
been happy about the form of training and dissemination. An 
echelon II official I interviewed said that he had been deeply 
offended by how the workshop had been conducted. He said that 
the presenters might talk like that to illiterate people in village 
meetings, but surely they could have adapted their presentation for 
the directors. 
When I investigated further it turned out that on that particular 
occasion the focus group discussion was facilitated by a 
representative of a local Women’s NGO. There was a stereotypical 
cultural clash between the government bureaucrats and NGO 
representatives, the former being formal and bureaucratic and the 
latter used to an informal style. The NGO facilitator was a confident 
young woman who treated the bureaucrats as her equals. They, 
however, were not used to being addressed with any less than the 
ultimate respect and felt patronised. From the very beginning, the 
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chemistry was not good, and this continued until the session 
finished. According to the organiser, it was a waste of time: instead 
of being enlightened about gender perspectives the directors felt 
humiliated.  
One of the participants told me in an interview: I was so bored. I 
couldn’t wait to get out of the room. It was not linked to our job 
description in any way, and the presenter was so patronising…’, 
while another said:  
I don’t think that session was run as it should have been, the 
facilitator was so smug and disrespectful, she did not appreciate that 
some of us might have had a western education and therefore have 
rubbed shoulders with these gender justice themes. I think I have 
been gender-fair in these years leading the office. That’s why I 
always disagree with the way STAN recruitment discriminates 
against women. I think we should just keep access open to both 
sexes and apply no barriers, so there will be fair competition. That’s 
why I disagree with the quota system that they want to have in 
Parliament, reserving thirty per cent of seats for women. I think we 
just open the door and welcome whoever wants to come in. 
It was clear that the session did not achieve what was intended. The 
participants I spoke to could not see past their sentiments about 
the facilitator to appreciate the need to integrate gender issues into 
their work. The official who considered himself knowledgeable about 
gender justice assumed that gender-neutral policy was gender-just 
rather than gender-blind. 
11.4.2.  Training of Trainers  
Once a year, ‘training of trainers’ (TOT) on gender issues is provided 
for the GM TEAM FPs. The core team set up the training programme 
using trainers from MOWE and Bappenas, as well as academics and 
religious scholars recommended by MOWE or Bappenas. The 
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training sessions are run in a hotel for several days, with 
participants’ accommodation funded by MOF.  
I attended one of these TOTs. The first part of the session was a 
presentation followed by questions and discussion. Training 
materials included information about gender theory and concepts, 
the gender gaps in various development sectors, GM and gender 
analysis techniques. MOWE seemed to use a standard format and 
materials for presentations at every session and did not alter it to 
suit the audience. The idea was that MOWE was the coordinator 
and advisor; the respective ministries would then tailor their GMs 
according to their core tasks and job descriptions. Even so, MOWE’s 
role as coordinator and advisor should put other government 
agencies in a position where they can turn to MOWE for advice 
when in need. MOWE simply did not have any idea what MOF did, 
and even when the participants had elaborated their unit’s core 
tasks, it could not help them to develop their case studies, let alone 
come up with a specific programme for each unit. This situation is 
not unique to MOF; in Chapter 5 the section on GM in other 
departments related some telling stories about MOWE’s inability to 
perform as the national machinery for GM. 
Here are some excerpts taken from my field notes: 
During the presentation of gender analysis techniques, the MOWE 
presenter referred to the Ministry of Education or Health or other 
service ministries. MOF’s GM TEAM, however, objected to these 
examples and said, ‘Could you please give an example that will suit 
us and our job? We can see how this is important, but this is not our 
job’. When the presenter produced a slide of gender disparity in 
manpower, it turned out that he did not do the sums in the table 
correctly. Somebody asked (being a typical economist), ‘how did you 
work out that percentage?’ The presenter was very defensive, and 
said: ‘It doesn’t matter how the percentage was worked out’. Then 
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the arguments started: ‘Well of course it matters’. This kind of 
dynamic was maintained during the whole TOT. 
 
Another trainer started his session by inviting the participants to 
sing the song Sangkar Madu (Honey Cage) with him, with the 
following lyrics: 
Women have been oppressed by men for decades  
They were seen as an adornment, imprisoned in a honey-filled cage.  
Nevertheless, there is a time when men are made helpless,  
Down on their knees, cornered by a woman’s glance.  
 
The message of this song, according to the trainer, is that despite 
the history of women’s oppression, men are not stronger than 
women when they fall in love. Needless to say, this song is 
inappropriate for a gender training session. When I made this point 
to him he replied that it was the most appropriate song he could 
find. 
In the following TOT session, the issue of gender from a religious 
perspective was raised. This was important, as religious arguments, 
especially Islamic ones, are frequently used to justify male 
domination. Previous workshops and discussions had not identified 
any issues related to other religions. From an Islamic perspective, 
however, there was always a heated discussion about how Islam 
sees women.27  
The session I attended was presented by a MOWE representative 
whose specialist area was gender and Islam. Her presentation 
explored how, contrary to what many people currently believe, Islam 
is a gender-friendly religion and that the Koran should be 
interpreted contextually. She raised the issue of polygamy and how 
                                           
27 This may have been because the participants in these sessions were 
exclusively Muslim. An alternative explanation is that other religions were 
seen as fundamentally less problematic in terms of gender issues. 
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the Koran restricts the number of wives a man can have. 
Historically, she said, this was because before Muhammad’s time 
men would sometimes have more than ten wives. Consequently, 
having four should be seen as “instead of a hundred” rather than 
“instead of just one”. 
Up to this point, people were listening, but when she declared that 
women could be imams and lead prayers the participants started to 
appear uneasy. The room felt heavy with disapproving silence and 
the participants looked at each other and frowned, but nothing was 
said. During the break all the participants, both male and female, 
agreed that the presenter had gone too far in making this 
suggestion. 
The speakers recommended by MOWE were relatively liberal Muslim 
scholars who read the Koranic verses with an open interpretation 
and detached them from Arabic cultural traits. The majority of 
Muslims at MOF were conservative and believed that men were 
bound to be superior to women and hence had the status of 
household head. Instead of opening their eyes to ‘alternatives’ to 
traditional gender relations, this advocacy based on liberal 
interpretations incensed the men, especially when the speaker was 
a woman. 
The TOT was meant to enable the GM members to disseminate the 
idea of gender equality to other MOF employees. In the end it was 
the only form of training given to the GFPs. In general, training 
seems to have been the main, if not the sole activity in MOF’s GM. A 
similar situation is reported in other South East Asian countries 
where lack of political will causes ‘policy evaporation’ when it comes 
to implementation (Kusakabe, 2005).  
11.4.3. Dissemination to regional offices 
After being trained, the GM TEAM members were sent to MOF’s 
regional offices to disseminate what they had learnt. The core team 
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had prepared materials for the members to present. Dissemination 
events usually took place in a local MOF assembly hall (GKN), 
attended by the lower and mid-managerial levels – echelon  IV and 
III – from all MOF offices in that region. I attended these activities 
on several occasions as a participant-observer. 
The event itself was like a big seminar, with two GM TEAM 
presenters sitting on a raised stage. Normally the Kepala Kanwil 
(Regional Director) an echelon II regional official, opened the session 
and left shortly afterwards. The issues disseminated at these 
sessions were exactly the topics covered in the TOT: the theory and 
concept of gender, the gender gaps in various development sectors, 
GM concepts and gender analysis techniques in development.  
Apart from disseminating the idea of gender equality, these events 
were also used to gather information on what MOF employees 
thought about gender issues in their respective units. The results of 
this data gathering were to be used for GM activities at MOF. They 
included data on whether MOF employees thought selected MOF 
policies were gender-biased. Data were collected before and after the 
training sessions to assess the impact of the training, and usually 
indicated clearer understanding of the difference between sex and 
gender. There was, however, no evidence of change in what the 
participants thought about gender roles as prescribed by their 
religion. Responses included statements like ‘God said that men are 
superior to women and as believers we must accept that’ and ‘God 
has given men authority to lead the family’. 
As a team member between late 2004 and early 2005 and also doing 
my fieldwork, I often found that other team members complained 
that they did not feel confident enough to give a presentation in 
regional offices ‘preaching’ about gender. They claimed that the TOT 
sessions had not prepared them sufficiently. One team member 
said: ‘I feel as if I’ve just finished primary school and immediately 
have to teach in that school’. 
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Three years after my fieldwork period, I conducted several telephone 
and email follow-up interviews with my informants to update my 
data on the GM effort at MOF. Half of the gender mainstreaming 
team members had been replaced since 2003. While activities still 
centred on training and dissemination to regional offices, I was 
expecting that those who had been doing this since 2003 would 
have gained more technical expertise. Rani, who had been a 
member since 2003, told me: 
I’m so bored now. We’ve been here for the last seven years. Some 
offices have changed their GFP and some are still the old people. But 
apart from that, nothing has changed. The Planning Bureau still 
invites us to attend training sessions at least a couple of times a 
year, but even the training materials haven’t changed. The trainers 
might change, but the material is the same – the same PowerPoint 
presentation, the same picture, even the same song. You remember 
that lady with the PowerPoint with the picture of a stork? It’s still 
there – would you believe it? 
 
As standard practice at the end of training, workshops or 
presentations the participants are given a CD containing all the 
training materials plus reading suggestions. Rani forwarded me the 
content of the CD for the latest training session so that I could 
compare it to the one used when I was in Indonesia. Nothing had 
changed, apart from the dates on the slides. 
So how much progress have the FPs made in promoting the GM? 
From the beginning it was not clear what they were expected to do 
in their units, apart from collecting information to take into the GM 
meetings. According to Arum , who had been a GFP/GM TEAM at 
the Training Office for the last three years: 
I’ve been to most of their trainings and workshops and you name it. 
But I still can’t put my finger on this gender stuff. I don’t think people 
explain things very clearly here. For example, that consultant from 
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Indonesian Science Institute LIPI – she’s taught us three times and 
she always uses not just the same format but even the same slides. I 
think people from MOWE cannot appreciate our work so they can’t 
help us. Last year we had some training on gender budgets with a 
person from the Netherlands. They gave us some tools for analysis, 
eight or nine, I can’t remember, then we had to choose whichever 
suited us best, or, as she said, we might want to adapt it to suit our 
organisation. It’s that level of discussion.  
 
This excerpt suggests that Arum did not feel she belonged to the 
GM but saw herself as a passive member who did as she was told, 
attending training, workshops, etc. It emphasises the need for 
training to be ‘made specific or tailored to operational activities, 
clearly demonstrating its relevance to the work that people do’ (Moser 
and Moser, 2005 p.17). 
Some team members complained about the lack of time available for 
the work: 
These days I’m just too busy. With the bureaucratic reform and other 
things, as the head of the planning division I often have to attend 
meetings which frequently clash with the GM meetings arranged by 
the Planning Bureau. Of course I can’t escape the meeting that I’ve 
invited people to, so I’ve got no choice but to miss the gender one. 
This sort of thing has happened several times now. I’m just so busy 
doing other things. I can’t dedicate all my time, energy and 
intellectual capacity just to do gender, that’s not my job title ... 
 
No specific tasks and targets were given to the FPs. A working group 
was not established until the beginning of 2010, and even then it 
was just a shadow of the GM TEAM. The heads of the Planning 
Division who made up the GM TEAM were always busy and could 
not attend meetings, which was the main reason for forming the 
working team. The new team consisted of echelon IV staff based in 
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the Planning Division – the subordinates of the Head of Planning 
Division. By mid-2010, the working team’s main job was to develop 
a training material handbook for the purpose of GM at MOF. This 
‘project’ has been planned since the implementation of GM in 2004. 
Without a handbook, the FPs are forced to rely on MOWE’s 
presentations, most of which are irrelevant to MOF.  
Even if there were a clear job description and target for FPs it would 
be impossible to ask one person to be in charge of GM for a whole 
echelon I unit, which in the DGTX, for example, employs about 
32,000 people. This becomes even more impossible when the FP is 
already overburdened with other aspects of their job. The scenario 
gets worse when the FP delegates tasks (for example attending GM 
TEAM meetings, as often happened) to a subordinate echelon IV 
official who also has many other responsibilities. As previously 
mentioned, in the Indonesian bureaucracy, and especially at MOF, 
hierarchy is very important. How can an untrained junior manager 
be expected to convince seniors about an issue on which nearly 
everybody already had a strong opinion? Political commitment from 
the upper echelon and a top-down approach are needed in such a 
situation, so that gender issues can be mainstreamed into daily 
business. 
Studies of GM in other government ministries in Indonesia 
(Kementerian Negara Pemberdayaan Perempuan, 2006) and 
elsewhere in the developing world (see, for instance, Greed, 2006, 
Kusakabe, 2005, Rao and Kelleher, 2005b, Woodford-Berger, 2004) 
identify similar issues relating to institutional mechanisms and 
personnel. The commonest example is that the FP delegates 
responsibility to a junior person already overburdened with other 
work and whose rank is not senior enough to make decisions that 
challenge the organisational culture. 
Despite failing to influence MOF’s internal dynamics, the GM 
strategy has achieved some significant success in external policy. 
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The weaknesses, constraints and limitations of its implementation 
within MOF cannot be separated from wider Indonesian 
bureaucratic mechanisms and socio-cultural aspects of Indonesian 
society. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a number of key 
problems.  
11.5 Factors constraining GM implementation at 
MOF 
11.5.1. Power dynamics between the different actors: 
MOF, MOWE and Bappenas staff versus NGOs and 
academics 
The previous sections have shown that relationships among the key 
agents of MOF’s GM activities were often asymmetrical. My key 
informants in the GM TEAM kept complaining about MOWE with 
statements such as: ‘People in MOWE are still not with us’ and ‘It’s 
so hard to make them understand that our work is different to that of 
the Ministry of Health or Education’. 
MOWE is a relatively young ministry compared to MOF, which has 
been in place since independence. HR is another important 
contributor to this power asymmetry. Both MOF and Bappenas take 
pride in their ‘first-class manpower’ and this is widely recognised, 
given the difficulties of obtaining employment in both organisations, 
especially for women. This is wrongly seen by some people in the 
bureaucracy as a sign of prestige: ‘di sini ngga banyak ibu-ibunya’ 
(we don’t employ too many mothers here because we do serious 
work). MOWE, on the other hand, is seen as struggling with the 
quality of its HR; it employs many ‘mothers’, is seen as a women’s 
institute and, most importantly, does not understand economic 
jargon.  
A study by the University of Gadjah Mada Yogyakarta in 2002 (GOI 
and Gadjah Mada, 2002) reveals that 64% of MOWE’s employees 
had at least an undergraduate education. Those sent out to deal 
with clients such as MOF were usually staff members with an 
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education higher than a bachelor’s degree, and so in theory 
education should not impede client communication. The Gadjah 
Mada report, however, mentioned that there was a mismatch 
between the employees’ educational background and the expertise 
needed by the organisation.  
I observed that among MOWE staff there was a diverse view on 
gender and a different level of technical expertise in implementing 
GM depending on the context of the client’s ministerial duties. For 
example, one MOWE trainer, a dentist, told me that since this was 
her main subject she could not give any examples of what MOF 
should do to mainstream gender. Situations like this never occur in 
MOF: all of its staff, particularly those who deal with outsiders, have 
a good grounding in finance and economics. 
Another issue related to power asymmetries. Because Bappenas 
and MOF have the final say in how much money a ministry receives 
each fiscal year (Booth, 2005), they have considerable power over 
the other ministries, including MOWE, whose fear of losing 
budgeting puts it in an inferior position to MOF. Jokes like ‘Awas 
nanti dicoret’ (be careful not to get stuff in your budget crossed out!’) 
were sometimes made in informal meetings. 
Academics who worked with MOWE as consultants often expressed 
exasperation about ‘these bureaucrats’. I attended a seminar on 
gender budgeting run by an NGO that had invited a senior MOF 
manager to be keynote speaker. Some female academics who had 
been doing consultancy work for MOWE attended. During the talk I 
heard them commenting on the poor content of the speech, and 
saying ‘these bureaucrats will never get it after all these years of our 
effort’. During the break, when I introduced myself and tried to talk 
to them about GM efforts in the Indonesian bureaucracy in general, 
one said: ‘Look, your director has been to so many gender training 
sessions and seminars abroad and locally, and he still confuses 
“gender” with “women”. What more can I say?’ 
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11.5.2. Religion and GM at MOF 
The experience of GM at the Ministry of Religious Affairs discussed 
in Chapter 5 was in some ways a setback for GM in the Indonesian 
bureaucracy, MOF included, if not for Indonesia in general. While it 
is frequently claimed that men resort to religious texts and verses to 
justify their resistance to the idea of gender equality (Mulia, 2004, 
Mulia, 2001) 2004) I observed genuine fear, especially among 
women, that they would be ‘sinful’ if they stepped outside what they 
believe is prescribed in the Koran. As one interviewee expressed to 
me: ‘I am not really sure that [the presenter] interpreted the Koran 
properly. I don’t want to follow her and find myself in hell later when 
I’m dead.’ 
As discussed in a previous chapter, most female managers at MOF, 
including those educated abroad, tended to be conservative when it 
came to religious affairs. Therefore, it was unsurprising that when 
the MOWE speaker suggested women could become imams and lead 
daily prayers, the MOF women did not accept this. The trainer’s 
radical suggestion made the wider religious discussion 
counterproductive and entirely discredited her in the eyes of the 
participants.  
Religious issues also constrained the activities of the GM TEAM. 
The FPs did not feel confident preaching about gender equality and 
saying that Islam was in favour of it, even if they believed this to be 
the case, because they were not conversant with Islamic teachings 
and so did not know which verses and Hadits to use to defend their 
position. They found this frustrating, as they realised that they 
would need to defend themselves against religious challenges from 
conservative Muslims who were more able to provide religious 
justification to back their arguments. 
The fact that the MOWE trainer specialised in gender and Islam and 
belonged to the Liberal Islam Network, the same network as the 
leader of the GM TEAM working in MORA, was also seen as a 
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problem at MOF, which is mainly staffed by conservative Muslims 
who oppose open and democratic (as well as women-friendly) 
interpretations of Islamic texts and verses (Blackburn et al., 2008 
provide an analysis of the complexity of the Indonesian Islam). 
Some women’s groups have tried to initiate gender-sensitive 
interpretations of Islamic teachings with the assistance of 
international funding agencies, particularly the Asia Foundation 
(Asian Development Bank, 2006). Some of these women’s 
organisations are mass-based and affiliated to the main Islamic 
organisations in Indonesia (Muhammadiyah and Nadhlatul Ulama). 
Nevertheless, having foreign donors behind their efforts often puts 
them in a difficult position. Addressing gender issues in the face of 
the current rise of conservative Islam is not easy, and both the 
government and women’s organisations have to be careful that their 
efforts do not backfire and are seen as promoting a Western agenda 
(Schech and Mustafa, 2010). 
11.6 GM in relation to other reforms 
11.6.1. MOF Bureaucratic Reform and introduction of 
the New State Financial Law: missed 
opportunities for GM? 
In theory, the bureaucratic reform should have provided MOF with 
the momentum to mainstream gender. The reform consists of three 
pillars: organisation, business processes and HR. Mainstreaming 
gender in MOF’s line of work would involve reforming the 
organisation to accommodate gender issues, developing business 
processes that prevent new gender-blind policy and ensuring that 
HR is managed in gender-sensitive and gender-responsive ways. 
None of these, however, were included in the bureaucratic reform 
agenda.  
The jargon of accountability, transparency, effectiveness and 
efficiency feature prominently in the effort to transform MOF so that 
its organisation, business processes and HR perform better and, 
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most importantly, are free of corruption. Combating corruption – in 
MOF, financial corruption – is the main goal of the bureaucratic 
reform.  
The failure to include gender indicators in MOF’s bureaucratic 
reform should not be blamed entirely on MOF but also on a wide 
range of actors. International organisations such as the UNDP only 
prescribe the use of gender indicators in good governance for social 
sectors. For the economic and business sectors that MOF belongs 
to, governance only refers to corruption, business and finance, 
economic growth, competitiveness and regulatory quality (Corner, 
2002). 
Another missed opportunity was the launch of the State Finance 
Law at the end of 2004. There has been criticism from feminists 
that this law was passed without any involvement or consultation 
from MOWE or female activists (Cattleya, 2006).  
The new law prescribes that state budgeting must be unified, 
performance-based and part of the medium-term expenditure 
framework. Unified budgets mainly seek to avoid duplication. 
Performance-based budgeting means a change in budget allocation 
from input- to output-based, shifting the focus of performance 
measurement from the amount of resources put into an activity to 
the results of this resource allocation. The medium-term 
expenditure framework gives each ministry a chance to see the 
broader picture, rather than focusing on programmes and projects 
financed on an annual basis. 
The State Finance Law is gradually being implemented. If properly 
followed, old problems such as the lack of links between programme 
inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes will be overcome, 
duplication will be avoided and any form of corruption will be 
detected early and tackled. There is still a chance to integrate 
gender concerns into the law, as it is by implementing gender 
perspectives at each step that it ‘offers the opportunity to establish 
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gender equity as a standard performance measure’ (Asian 
Development Bank, 2006). This has been done, for example, by the 
government of Cambodia (PeaceWomen, 2010). 
This new budgeting system and MOF’s bureaucratic reform provide 
an opportunity for MOF to require that all ministries integrate 
gender concerns into their development processes, from planning 
and implementation to monitoring and evaluation. In MOF’s 2010-
2014 strategic planning (GOI, 2010), however, there is no mention 
of GM and women are only mentioned once, when describing the 
total composition of MOF’s employees in 2010: 14,139 women and 
47,220 men. 
11.6.2. The National Plan of Action for GM: can it work 
under MOF’s current bureaucratic structure? 
MOF’s Decree no. 119 on gender-responsive budgeting supports 
Indonesia’s National Plan of Action for Gender Mainstreaming by 
requiring each government agency to carry out a gender budgeting 
exercise before submitting a budget proposal. Once the ministry in 
question has submitted the proposal, under the current 
organisational structure it is the Directorate General of Budgets’ 
task to review it. The immediate question is whether the latter is 
ready and competent to review the gender exercise. Considering the 
current male-dominated bureaucratic context, there is a risk that 
this review will end up constituting no more than an exercise in 
ticking boxes on a checklist. If the decree is to be taken seriously, 
MOF’s GM workload will double as it will need to address gender 
budget reviews more seriously by preparing mechanisms and 
training personnel. There has been no mention, let alone planning, 
of how they will develop the skills and expertise necessary for this. 
There was no plan, for example, to train more people in the DG of 
Budget on gender issues or to involve GM TEAMs in the budget 
evaluation cycle.  
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As previously mentioned, the TORs of MOF’s GM mention nothing 
about monitoring and evaluating activities. Until lately, the 
monitoring and evaluation of GM activities in government 
institutions were only carried out by MOWE, using the five criteria 
discussed in Chapter 5: political commitment, policies generated, 
sex-disaggregated data, institutional mechanism and HR. This will 
change with the GM National Plan of Action, which takes into 
account the new budgeting system. According to the National Plan 
of Action, MOF will be responsible for the monitoring and evaluation 
of GM activities in all government agencies. Individual ministerial 
reports on GM activities will be reviewed by MOF, Bappenas, BPKP 
and the Ministry of Civil Service before being analysed by MOWE, 
which will then report to the President. 
The involvement of BPKP in this process raises a number of issues. 
BPKP is a government audit agency created under Suharto. In the 
constitution there is a separate audit agency, the BPK. According to 
the national constitution, the BPK has the same authority as the 
executive and legislative bodies. Suharto did not want his financial 
affairs to be subjected to BPK scrutiny, so he weakened it and 
created the BPKP, which reports to the president only. There is an 
element of rivalry between these two audit agencies and it is 
possible that BPKP will eventually be subsumed into BPK. If that 
happens, it is unclear whether BPK would be willing or permitted to 
take on BKPK’s gender audit responsibility. 
The BPKP aside, there are some problems with the reporting 
mechanism that relate to the power dynamics among the various 
organisations involved. I have shown in previous sections that its 
failure to appreciate the work of other government agencies is one of 
MOWE’s major weaknesses, which in turn makes it difficult for it to 
play its role as gender advisor to these government agencies. Under 
the new mechanism it can be assumed that MOWE will have to 
synthesize the reports of the other four government agencies to 
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produce an overview report for each. For this mechanism to work, a 
number of conditions must be fulfilled:  
 staff of in these four government agencies must be able to 
perform gender audits (which will involve, among other 
things, all the auditors, who until now have mainly carried 
out financial audits, being able to understand gender issues 
and being able, prepared and willing to incorporate a gender 
perspective as part of the compliance audit). 
 staff at MOWE must analyse financial audit reports through 
a gender lens, which I consider unlikely given their inability 
to understand other organisations’ work and functions. 
While the ministerial decree on gender-responsive budgeting was a 
big achievement for MOF’s GM TEAM, there is a loophole in the 
regulation that may be exploited. One clause of the decree states 
that not every project or programme/activity has to be gender-
responsive, and some may be gender-neutral. Staff without the 
capacity or will to do gender analysis properly may take advantage 
of this statement.   
Although theoretically the reporting system appears appropriate, an 
organisational analysis should have been carried out at MOF to find 
out whether it will work in practice. Placing MOF above other 
government ministries may be a good approach to ensuring the 
compliance of other ministries, given MOF’s particular influence. 
However, this may give it a sense that it is beyond the reach of the 
other government agencies: nobody will be able to reprimand MOF 
for not mainstreaming gender in its own organisation, tasks and 
functions. 
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11.7 Conclusion 
This chapter cannot provide a comprehensive overview and critique 
of the global theory and practice of GM, as to do so would require a 
much lengthier discussion and fuller analysis than is possible in a 
single thesis chapter. Nevertheless, this case study brings to light a 
wide range of issues that are potentially relevant to researchers and 
practitioners interested or engaged in GM in a range of settings. 
MOF’s GM effort has brought tangible results in the eight years of 
its existence and may even be construed by outside observers 
unfamiliar with its organisational structure and culture as a 
potential model for other government departments inside and 
outside of Indonesia. Income tax law has been changed, gender 
budgeting has been introduced, and toilets have no doubt been 
updated.  
Raising the female recruitment cap on STAN entry examination 
candidates from 15% to 22% represents more limited progress, but 
may allow the number of female MOF managers to reach a critical 
mass over time, leading to wider changes in the organisational 
culture. When discussing female representation and critical mass, 
Kanter (1977a p.208-209) distinguishes between ‘tilted groups’ 
(20%-40% of the workforce) and  ‘skewed groups’ (under 20%). She 
argues that while token women in a skewed group are not ‘treated 
as individuals but as representative of the group’ (ibid.), the tilted 
group can operate collectively and influence the culture of the 
group. Having 22% of women, at least in STAN recruitment, may be 
just enough to establish a tilted group, and arguably a higher 
female presence among MOF managers may, in the long run, modify 
some of the deeply entrenched patriarchal norms and practices that 
subordinate women in MOF. 
There is no evidence to date, however, that the GM effort has 
addressed the internal organisational culture that discriminates 
against women. Internal gender issues, although mentioned in the 
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TORs, seemed to be missing from MOF’s GM agenda. MOWE never 
recommended that MOF should link internal and external issues, 
because it was either unaware of the problems or afraid to raise 
them, given the power dynamics among the GM actors. Rosario 
(1995, 1997) notes a similar situation in the Philippines’ 
Department of Labour and Employment, where staff were 
supportive of their clientele but very resistant when came to GM in 
their own organisation. 
Gender has been mainstreamed in ministries of finance in 
developed countries including Australia and Canada and developing 
countries such as South Africa and Sri Lanka (Budlender, 2002, 
Budlender and Hewitt, 2002). The key to successfully implementing 
GM in finance ministries, as in other ministries, is political will. 
MOF’s political will, especially regarding resolving internal gender 
issues, is limited. For example, appointing junior staff as gender 
FPs is unlikely to be effective in a large bureaucracy where seniority 
is highly valued. This is especially problematic where job rotation 
and relocation mean that juniors are continually moved before they 
achieve their GM tasks. 
This raises an important question: how far are internal changes 
needed in order to be able to make external changes? This case 
study has witnessed several external successes in terms of 
producing favourable gender equality outcomes in MOF’s line of 
work – the reform of an item in the Tax Law and gender budgeting – 
without touching the internal organisational culture.  The question 
is perhaps not so how much MOF has done through GM without 
changing its male-biased practice as whether GM can achieve all its 
potential, as listed in the TORs, without internal changes.  
For example, the first line of the TORs says that the GM was 
established to optimise the participation of women at MOF. This is 
somewhat instrumentalist, as it sees women as the means of 
achieving MOF’s goals. Nevertheless, current practice does not allow 
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women to participate in the gendered organisational culture on an 
optimal basis. We might assume that advocacy ‘to influence 
decision- and policy-makers to make better and more appropriate 
policies that will increase MOF employees’ quality of life’ refers to 
the quality of life of MOF’s female as well as male employees. 
Chapters 6-10 of this thesis, however, have demonstrated that GM 
has not succeeded in this, as women continue to be both directly 
and indirectly discriminated against in a wide range of ways.  
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12 Conclusion 
12.1 Overview 
This thesis contributes to social science knowledge in two ways. At 
the theoretical level, the thesis applies and adapts Goetz’s 
framework to the gendered archaeology of the Indonesian Ministry 
of Finance. In doing this, it assesses the extent to which the Goetz 
framework is workable in a specific organisational setting. At the 
empirical level, it provides a unique and thorough analysis of a 
government bureaucracy through a gender lens, an area in which 
the literature is still quite thin. In the international development 
literature, research on gender and organisation is dominated by 
case studies of NGOs and includes a handful of studies of local 
government. The focus of these studies is mainly on organisational 
outcomes (Goetz, 1997a, Kardam and Erturk, 1999, Tiessen, 2004). 
Had it been located in a high income country, my research might 
have been framed by the western context of equal opportunities. 
However, the specific nature of the cultural setting where my study 
is located calls for a wider approach, taking into account specific 
Indonesian and Javanese conceptions of equality and gender norms, 
and how these interact with organisational cultures and processes. 
12.2 Reflections on the overall approach and 
methodology 
This thesis uses Goetz’s framework of the gendered archaeology of 
organisations to analyse the Indonesian MOF, paying particular 
attention to women’s experience as MOF employees. Given its 
detailed and multi-dimensional approach, the Goetz framework has 
the potential to reveal specific insights about gender dynamics in an 
Indonesian government organisation. At the same time, the study 
assesses the usefulness of this framework for analysing the 
gendered dynamics of a bureaucratic organisation in a developing 
country. 
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Goetz’s framework involves dissecting the MOF bureaucracy from 
various angles. These include the historical and cognitive context of 
the organisation, the organisational structure and culture, the 
gendered participants, the gendered way the MOF structures time 
and space, gendered authority structures, and gendered incentive 
and accountability systems. This is a different way of looking at an 
organisation than following a human resource management cycle 
(from hiring to development, then firing or retirement). 
A mixed method approach was used for data collection. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 121 respondents, 
coupled with FGDs with mid and top level managers, and 
gatekeeper interviews. Observation also played an important role in 
this study. As someone who is native to the MOF, using the 
gendered archaeology framework was like using another lens when 
looking at a familiar organisation. In this research, my familiarity 
with the MOF enabled me to point the lens into the right direction 
when looking for evidence to support my analysis.  
As elaborated in the methodology chapter, familiarity with the 
research subject poses researcher to research subject positionality 
issues. My biggest dilemma when doing this research was 
interviewing former colleagues, some of whom were friends. I 
decided not to exclude these friends from the data set, since this 
would have substantially reduced the number of research 
participants.  
Given the diversity of the research participants in terms of age, 
education background, recruitment points (STAN and Sarjana), 
managerial levels, and other dimensions of their lives, it was 
impossible to stratify the sample. Ideally, I would have liked, for 
example, to systematically compare the different experiences of 
female managers in the three directorate generals not only 
according to their recruitment points but also year of recruitment. 
With hindsight, it might have been useful to have been more 
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persistent in attempting to collect systematic equivalent data for 
men as well as women, even if only for the purpose of comparison. 
This would have provided me with a different perspective on gender 
dynamics as experienced by both sexes rather than mainly from 
women’s points of view. 
Another limitation of this research is the lack of visual data. I was 
not granted permission to obtain any visual data including 
photographs of office layouts.  
Despite its limitations, the research design is sufficiently robust to 
support meaningful analysis, and its strengths include the range 
and diversity of the evidence it generated. Primary data were 
obtained from interviews with MOF managers and policy makers, as 
well as personal observations. Secondary data came from a wide 
range documents including policy documents from MOF and other 
government agencies, as well as international development agencies 
and national and regional publications. The use of extensive 
sources of information helped with data triangulation, which to 
some extent compensated for my subjectivity as a researcher. 
My ability to triangulate the data was inseparable from my 
familiarity with the MOF as an organisation. In this research, data 
triangulation was done in several ways: (1) to cross-check aspects of 
information obtained from an interviewee with MOF internal 
documents such as human resource data, minutes of meetings or 
other internal reports; (2) to cross-check aspects of information 
obtained from an interviewee with another interviewee, which was 
done carefully without pitting informants against each other, (3) to 
cross-check MOF internal documents with external and 
independent reports and publications. 
Since the sample includes more than two-third of middle and senior 
female MOF managers (59 out of 86 female echelon III and II 
managers), the findings can be taken as representative of this group. 
The extent to which they reflect the experiences of female managers 
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in other Indonesian government ministries is harder to verify. All 
Indonesian civil servants in the MOF and beyond are regulated by 
the Civil Service Law, which sets out standard regulations on 
working hours, holidays, leave of absence, promotion, rank 
advancement, payroll adjustment and retirement. For example, the 
clause that once a person resigns from civil service, he or she 
cannot be re-employed even as an employee in a different ministry 
or regional office, applies uniformly across the civil service. Also, the 
challenges of juggling between family responsibilities and work 
commitments in Indonesia’s cultural setting are shared by women 
across ministries. 
That said, the MOF has a particularly sharp gender imbalance in 
higher level management, which may set it apart from other parts of 
the Indonesian bureaucracy. From my discussions with informants 
in other ministries, it can be said that overt gender discrimination 
in the recruitment system is also unique to the MOF, as is the 
requirement of working outside Java for first promotion. Even in the 
Indonesian Ministry of Defence (MOD), neither of these applies. 
Consequently women are better represented in MOD, making up 40 
per cent of its workforce. Despite this, only 6 per cent of MOD 
managers are women. This suggests that even when there is no 
overt discrimination in recruitment, other aspects of the MOD’s 
gendered organisational culture disadvantage women just as much 
(if not more) than is the case in the MOF. 
The scope to generalise from this study to the situation of women 
working outside government is much more limited. There are very 
few studies in Indonesia that look at the subject of ‘women in the 
office’. Most private sector firms are considerably smaller than the 
MOF and are less likely to share features such as complex 
formalised hierarchies of authority or nationwide networks of 
branch offices (Basri and Eng, 2004, Bennington and Habir, 2003). 
Unlike the civil service, private sector firms are bound by 
government restrictions on overtime for female employees, although 
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the extent to which they comply with these regulations has not been 
verified. All of the above may reduce the restrictions faced by female 
private sector managers, compared to their public sector 
counterparts. That said, among Indonesians, there is a general 
perception that private sector employees work harder and longer 
than civil servants. If this is indeed the case, the challenges faced 
by female private sector managers  may be greater. 
To what extent do the experiences of the female managers in this 
study mirror those of their civil service counterparts in other 
developing countries? This is not straightforward to assess, given 
the degree of variation not only in civil service management but also 
the cultural contexts that women inhabit. For example, senior 
female civil service in Ghana, as well as facing difficulties of juggling 
family and work, report frustration about being intellectually under-
used and face widespread sexual harassment from male colleagues 
(Amos-Wilson, 1999). In the Nigerian civil service women managers 
are severely discriminated against in term of promotion because of 
the traditional view that women should ‘care’ rather than ‘lead’ 
(Ogenyi, 2004). The findings of studies located in other Islamic 
countries are broadly similar with the findings of this study. In 
Bangladesh, Zafarullah (2000) reports that female civil servants 
encounter direct and indirect forms of discrimination during 
recruitment, placement, advancement, mobility and training. With 
reference to female civil servants in Malaysia, Yousof and Siegel 
(1994) refer to the challenge of balancing work and domestic 
responsibilities. They observe that many female civil servants 
remain unmarried, which is less apparent in this study and may 
reflect different social norms about the requirement to marry for 
Malaysian women. They report that those women who do take on 
family commitments appear to have low self-esteem and attribute 
any career progress to luck, rather than their own efforts of abilities 
(Yousof and Siegel, 1994). 
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12.3 The position of women in the MOF  
This study shows that looking at the “position” of women in an 
organisation is more useful than simply counting heads to see “how 
many” women work there. There are at least two ways we can look 
at the position of women in MOF. The first is to observe their official 
rank in the organisation (echelon). Chapter 5 shows that female 
managers in the MOF are concentrated in the lower levels (echelon 
IV). Although this is a common situation across the Indonesian civil 
service, the low proportion of senior managers in the MOF is 
particularly marked. Overall, 10% of female Indonesian civil 
servants hold echelon I positions, but none of them are in the MOF. 
Meanwhile, the proportion of MOF women holding the echelons II 
and III positions is half that for civil service as a whole. At lower 
managerial levels (echelon IV), only 13 per cent of MOF employees 
are female, compared to a civil service average of 20%. 
The second way of looking at women’s position in the MOF is by 
observing the roles that they play in the organisation. Chapters 8 
and 9 show there is a tendency to promote women to administrative 
jobs that are perceived to require particular diligence, patience or 
other attributes related to feminine characteristics. As a result, in 
DGTX most women holding echelon III positions are Public 
Relations Managers even if they have masters degrees in Tax 
Auditing. In TA, women tend to manage the Evaluation Division 
which deals with examination marking and report writing: these are 
considered women’s jobs as they need attention to detail.  
Men and women’s positions within the organisation can also be 
seen from the way they cluster together forming networks. It has 
been observed that women do not tend to have gatherings or 
socialise outside office hours as men do, since when they finish 
their office work they have to go home and mind their families. 
Although women can still socialise within office hours, such as 
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weekly Quran recital groups, these opportunities are more limited 
and tend to be less significant in terms of career advancement. 
12.4 On Goetz’s Gendered Archaeology of the 
organisation 
The thesis explores why women in MOF were not able to reach the 
same organisational levels or participate in the same activities as 
their male counterparts. It shows that women in MOF faced several 
constraints: both organisational constraints (including constraints 
on joining MOF, the experience of being a minority group within the 
MOF and constraints in getting promoted) and societal constraints 
(such as having a double-burden of workplace and household 
responsibilities and having to comply with traditional gender roles 
that are culturally and religiously prescribed).   
This thesis has demonstrated that the constraints women face in 
the MOF do not operate separately, but are closely interrelated. 
Wider social gender norms frame the MOF’s organisational culture 
and structure. Goetz’s framework is useful for revealing these links, 
since each of its elements relates what is happening within the 
organisation to wider societal phenomena and more fundamental 
processes (such as the way organisations are conceptualised, based 
on and in tandem with divisions between the public and domestic 
spheres).  
The first two elements of Goetz’s gendered archaeology of 
organisation are the gendered organisational history and cognitive 
context of the organisation. These reveal the context of the state as 
a wider environment that impedes female civil servants’ equal 
access, participation and control of the MOF. The dual status of the 
Indonesian armed forces as the servants of the public/society as 
well as the servants of the state had a general effect on the 
Indonesian civil service. The grading and ranking system is more 
employee-oriented (grading them to I/a to IV/e) than job-oriented, 
and resembles a military system. This is also seen in other 
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countries, such as Bangladesh, where a military regime has also 
been in power (Zafarullah et al., 2001).  
The adoption of a military style has a gendered effect, as happens in 
military organisations (Carreiras, 2006). Sending people remote 
areas for their first managerial assignment, for example, resembles 
military service, which is in fact depicted as rite of passage which 
transform boys and youths into men, and at the same time as 
differentiation between men and women (ibid., p.41). 
The civil service law is premised on the notion that female civil 
servants are secondary earners and that their primary responsibility 
is as homemakers. For example, the law permits women to take 
unpaid leave, but in practice, the only reason these women can 
apply for this leave is in order to follow their husbands on overseas 
assignments. At first sight, this policy could be interpreted as 
offering women’s flexibility, but closer inspection shows that it 
reflects the state’s validation of male authority over their wives.  
Apart from mirroring the military in terms of hierarchy, another 
characteristic or cognitive context of the Indonesian civil service in 
general is the value placed on employees’ academic qualifications. 
This diploma system resembles the one used in France where 
managerial grades are structured according to different 
qualifications in the national education system (Guillaume and 
Pochic, 2007). Although the result could be gendered, it is not an 
‘intentional’ measure to channel women into lower rank jobs. In 
that sense, it differs from, for example, the UK’s “white blouse 
revolution” in the UK in the beginning of 20th century where a large 
number of women were recruited  to do routine clerical work with 
no upward career prospects (Witz and Savage, 1992). 
Unlike the first two elements of Goetz’s framework, which are 
applied without modification, the third element, organisational 
culture, required some adaptation. This element was too wide-
ranging to permit discrete analysis in a single chapter, and 
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elements of organizational culture spill into issues covered by other 
elements. This thesis takes a more focussed approach, referring to 
“MOF’s structure and gendered practices”.  
Chapter 6 analyses the MOF “house rules” from a gender point of 
view. It reveals overt discrimination in the recruitment process 
whereby MOF limits its intake of women to a minimum (less than 
15 per cent) even though more qualified women than men apply. It 
provides a detailed analysis how the procedure of filtering out 
female applicants was applied in the recruitment processes. This 
policy has been denying employment to more than a thousand 
eligible female applicants every year just because of their sex. STAN 
provides scholarship for bright students who otherwise would not 
access to university education, plus the opportunity to work in the 
MOF. As such, the biased recruitment policy has been denying 
women an opportunity for social mobility, not just employment.   
For those women who overcome this barrier and join MOF, other constraints and 
disadvantages restrict their career development vis a vis their male colleagues. 
For example, promotion requires workers to have a masters degree that they did 
not possess when they joined the MOF, but the opportunity of pursuing further 
degrees is gendered. Consequently, the process of promotion is weighted against 
women. Women are further marginalised due to their inability or unwillingness to 
take part in corrupt behaviour. 
The next element in Goetz’s framework is the gendered authority 
structure, which in this thesis is analysed using the concepts of 
patriarchy and weberian bureaucracy. Chapter 8 discusses the role 
of discretion in promotion, and the extent to which this discretion 
affects women’s career development. This overlaps with spatial 
aspects of gendered space and time, in the sense that MOF links 
promotion to posting outside Java. Whilst MOF gives women 
flexibility in terms of placement and is more flexible to women as 
junior staff than men as junior staff, this flexibility does not 
continue to managerial levels. This means that even when some 
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women have managed to overcome the diploma barrier and 
successfully obtained a further degree, they face another obstacle to 
promotion. Not every woman is both free and willing to move away 
from their family home for an unknown period (unlike overseas 
study which is for a fixed time), especially when the family is not 
prepared to follow her. Promotion decisions also reflect the wider 
gendered authority structure of Indonesian society. In some cases, 
the Human Resource Manager might ask a woman’s husband if he 
would mind his wife being promoted to a higher managerial level 
with higher responsibilities. These managers would never make 
similar enquiries with the wives of male workers –such an idea 
would be seen as absurd. 
Using Kabeer’s framework of practical gender needs versus strategic 
gender interests, we can see that MOF human resource 
management only deals with women’s practical gender needs, such 
as being close to their families so that they could manage their 
“primary” responsibility as homemakers. This links to the gendered 
cognitive context of Indonesian Civil Service as a wider umbrella 
organisation, as elaborated in Chapter 5. 
The gendered space and time of the MOF, the next element of 
gendered archaeology, is explored in Chapter 10. Even though they 
have domestic helpers at home, female managers often seem to be 
required to be in two places at the same time. This is not the case 
for their male colleagues, who can focus on one issue at a time. The 
use of a life-course framework provides insights about the shifting 
priorities of these female managers over time, as they struggle to 
reconcile their careers and family lives. 
Chapter 11 discusses the final element of the Goetz framework, the 
gendered incentive and accountability system. It looks at gender 
mainstreaming in the MOF both as a case study to demonstrate the 
incentive and accountability system, as well as to see to what extent 
the gender mainstreaming activities have changed the MOF as an 
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organisation. The gender mainstreaming effort is mainly concerned 
about external policies, such as example removing gender bias in 
tax law or imposing gender responsive budgeting on other 
government agencies. In this sense, it has been quite successful. 
There is less evidence that the programme has changed the MOF’s 
internal gendered practices. It does not, for example, offer help 
women deal with specific problems they encounter with the 
masculine bureaucracy. The prospect of this changing is remote, 
since the current bureaucratic reform makes no direct reference to 
gender issues.  
Overall, the Goetz framework is effective in capturing women’s 
experiences in the Indonesian MOF as a bureaucratic organisation. 
It takes into account both structural effects, as represented by 
organisational and societal constraints, as well as female agency. 
That said, the Goetz framework also has some imperfections. Rather 
than operating in isolation, each element of the framework contains 
aspects of other ones. This thesis does not always make neat 
distinctions between these elements. Instead, it applies each 
element like a lens to reveals different aspects of the MOF and its 
female managers. Some figures and scenes may overlap when seen 
from several angles, and some issues straddle several elements of 
the framework. This sometimes created difficulties for the division of 
the analysis into discrete chapters focussing on single elements.  
12.5 The MOF as a gendered organisation and 
wider issues of Indonesian governance 
The MOF’s insistence to keep the number of female employees to a 
minimum, apart from mirroring prescribed gender roles in 
Indonesian society, is also due to some specific aspects of 
Indonesian development. For example, uneven regional development, 
including unequal provision of education, means that only people 
from more prosperous regions pass the recruitment test. MOF has 
to staff offices all over Indonesia, including its most underdeveloped 
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and remote regions. Consequently, MOF employment includes 
posting and placement in these remote areas, which are considered 
unsafe for unaccompanied women who would have to move away 
from their family homes in more developed areas.  
MOF’s internal policies of gender discrimination are also related to 
other government civil service policies. In Indonesia civil service 
employment is regulated by a special Civil Service Law, rather than 
by general national employment laws. General employment law 
keeps changing and adapting to the current situation, including 
efforts to implement CEDAW. By contrast, the civil service law, 
which applies to all government employees both in regional and 
national government, has not been changed since the 1960s. Even 
the current bureaucratic reform makes no alterations to this civil 
service law.  
The civil service is still seen as a source of life-long employment 
with a closed career system, where it is impossible for people to 
discontinue their careers and resume them at some future time. 
There is a clause in the Civil service law saying that to be eligible for 
recruitment, a person must not have previously resigned from the 
service. Apart from being unfair to women, this closed career system 
has contributed to inefficiency in the civil service, by reducing 
managerial flexibility and accountability. It also limits the pool of 
leadership talents to insiders, encourages the dominance of 
seniority and patronage in promotion and appointments, and 
reduces incentives to perform well (Rohdewohld, 2007 p.153-154). 
Furthermore, there is no option for going part time in the 
Indonesian civil service, let alone job sharing. In developed 
countries there is a growing acknowledgement of workers’ needs for 
an improved work-life balance, leading to flexible hours and options 
for part-time and job sharing (Russell et al., 2009). This is not 
possible in the context of Indonesia’s rigid and immutable civil 
service regulations.  
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With more than two million civil servants engaged in many different 
activities across a large and diverse national territory, there may be 
some advantages in maintaining a simple, centralised set of 
bureaucratic regulations. Despite this, some aspects of civil service 
operations have been increasingly decentralised in recent decades 
(Haris, 2005, Rohdewohld, 2007, Tjiptoherijanto, 2006). If this 
process of decentralisation were extended to allow for include 
locally-based regulations for civil servants, it could conceivably lead 
to a more flexible approach. Decentralising civil service 
administration would resolve the problem of transferring employees 
across the archipelago, since positions would be locally based. 
However, the likelihood that this would benefit women is 
questionable: where local discretion has been permitted in other 
aspects of government policy this has usually led to a heavier 
emphasis on gender discriminative customary and religious law 
(Irianto, 2006, Noerdin, 2002). For example, in Aceh sharia law has 
been operation since 2001. As a result all Muslim women are 
obliged to wear a hijab and are not permitted to go unaccompanied 
in the evening (Bowen, 2003 p.232, Clarke et al., 2012, Fernandes, 
2013). As much with concerns about security in remoter regions, 
these local laws may increasingly serve as a disincentive for female 
MOF managers (who are accustomed to the more liberal laws of 
cities like Jakarta) to be posted in some parts of the country. 
The impact of specific policies such as decentralisation on the 
status of women may therefore be double-edged. This demonstrates 
the need to apply a more holistic approach to civil service 
employment, especially when addressing gender issues. This thesis 
has demonstrated that most of the time, the MOF only deals with its 
own organisational “interests”. These interests are to staff the 
organisation with people whose commitments are not divided 
between the office and the home, or at least people who prioritise 
work over domestic commitments. How can an organisation be 
staffed with people who, at least in theory, give their careers their 
undivided attention but at the same time support gender equality? 
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This work-family tension is not an uncommon problem in the world 
of work. Both in the private or public sectors there has been an 
assumption that people who go to work at the office have somebody 
else to cover for their absence in the domestic sphere. Perhaps the 
right question is not how this can be achieved, but should it be 
viewed that way at the first instance. Moen (2010) argues that there 
is a need for a transformation, rather than just assimilation or 
accommodation of women’s work. This means recognising that both 
members of a couple are often in the workforce, and so employers 
should accept “the reality of the changing workforce and the fact that 
their male workers as well as female workers no longer had an adult 
family member at home to care for all the non-work aspects of their 
lives” (p.12-13). It might be argued that these sorts of 
accommodation would be easier for a government employer than a 
private sector one, since the main purpose of such a government 
organisation is meant to be serving people, not maximising profit. If 
the state is expected to set an example to wider society, then there 
should be scope for it to lead rather than be led by wider societal 
norms. In practice, however, this is contingent upon influential 
decision-makers’ political will for change, and there is little evidence 
of this in Indonesia.  
This is the area where gender mainstreaming, if applied 
appropriately, could play an important role, by linking the 
organisational goals with the processes to achieve them. Gender 
mainstreaming activities in the Ministry of Civil Servants’ 
Empowerment and the Civil Service Agency should be directed to 
find a good work/family ‘fit’ (Moen, 2010 p.6) for Indonesian civil 
servants, and be integrated into the current bureaucratic reform. 
12.6 Women’s agency in the MOF 
Despite the many structural constraints, female managers in MOF 
exercise agency in different ways to negotiate their places within the 
bureaucracy, their families and society. This is done according to 
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their personal priorities, including their careers, families and 
religious views. Within particular religions, such as Islam, these 
women adopt different interpretations of religious teachings and 
doctrine, and these interpretations significantly affect their choices 
and perceptions. 
The thesis explores these women’s reactions to MOF’s gender policy. 
Some women, regardless of their educational background, choose to 
stay as junior staff and do not seek promotion. In some cases, these 
women are placed in particularly quiet offices, widely known as 
“mothers’ office”, where productivity is claimed to be very low. Other 
women try to compete equally with their male colleagues despite all 
the difficulties balancing their work and family lives. Only a handful 
of my interviewees had abandoned the chance to have a family, and 
focussed their efforts on their careers. 
It would be easy to label the non-achieving or slow-achieving women 
as victims of both bureaucracy and patriarchy, if not of Islam as a 
dominant religion. It has been shown throughout the thesis, 
however, that MOF women exercise their agency throughout their 
working and family lives. Gerami and Lehnerer (2001) identify four 
different methods that Iranian women have used to exercise their 
agency since the 1979 Revolution: collaboration, acquiescence, co-
optation, and subversion. If the same categorisation is used to 
describe the agency of female MOF’ managers, we can see that these 
strategies are not mutually exclusive. 
Very few female managers ‘collaborate’ fully and play the MOF game 
at the expense of their own personal lives, by remaining unmarried 
to be able to compete with their male colleagues. In doing so, these 
exceptional women subvert the patriarchal expectation for women to 
have families and stay at home. More often, female managers try to 
meet the demands of both bureaucracy and patriarchy. They try to 
find a balance between their careers and families, often making 
slower progress than their male colleagues, but still reaching senior 
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positions in the end. Other female managers co-opt and manipulate 
MOF regulations on promotion: they stay in the mothers’ offices, 
and get paid more than enough money to meet their families’ needs 
without wanting to be promoted. Under Civil Service Law, their rank 
might stop at a certain point depending on their education, but 
their salary will keep being adjusted until they retire. These female 
employees co-opt MOF’s bureaucratic regulations. However, they 
also ‘collaborate’ and play along with traditional gender roles by 
putting their families first and treating their work as a source of 
secondary income.  
While the strategies of these female employees vary, there is little or 
no evidence of them pursuing a strategy of resistance. This might 
take the form of resigning from employment at MOF. Such women 
would have been excluded from my data set, which could represent 
a form of potential bias in the study. According to my wider 
knowledge of MOF managers, resignation was very unusual and the 
main reason given by such women was to focus on their families or 
remain in Jakarta  Rather than resistance, resignation might be 
better interpreted as opting out of the bureaucratic regime. So far 
there has been no overt move among MOF female employees to fight 
for their rights collectively. The establishment of a gender 
mainstreaming programme was due to external pressures rather 
than an internal push from female employees who felt a sense of 
injustice at the way MOF bureaucracy had been operating.  
The thesis considers the role of religion, especially Islam, in the lives 
of female MOF managers. Some writers have demonstrated how the 
relationship between women and Islam is more complicated than 
the binary question of whether Islam empowers or disempowers 
women (White, 2010), not the least because of the multiple 
subjectivities that individuals tend to have (Torab, 1996). 
Meanwhile, Mahmood (2005) explores women’s agency within 
religious structures rather than against them. This brings us to the 
discussion back to the issue of empowerment. What is considered 
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as being empowered in western society does not necessarily or 
automatically apply to Muslim women in different social settings 
(Abu-Lughod, 2002), including, as shown in this thesis, Indonesian 
society. 
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